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This book has been just over 30 years in the making. While indigenous 
Hawai‘i holds a central place in much Pacific archaeological and 
anthropological discourse, this extraordinarily lengthy gestation was not 
due to the magnitude of the literature and sources to master. Indeed, my 
conclusions in this volume are essentially the same as my first full MA 
draft in the early 1990s, subsequently enriched by decades of exposure 
to wider circles of context. Rather, this length of production is more of 
a tribute to the incredible support I have received from a tight circle of 
friends, colleagues and family that carried me through some very rough 
times. This study began in the mid-1980s at the University of Hawai‘i 
at Mānoa (UH Mānoa) as a comparative study of indigenous state 
formation in Hawai‘i, Tonga and Tahiti. The sudden death of my younger 
brother, Nick; severe spinal damage from an association football injury; 
and becoming diabetic all in the space of two years ended my time at 
Hawai‘i and saw me return to Aotearoa New Zealand. Many of my note 
cards, prepared in that pre-laptop era, were lost in transit from Hawai‘i 
and so I had to revisit many of my sources and submit my study as an 
MA, focused solely on Hawai‘i, at the University of Otago in 1992. 
Work for Television New Zealand (TVNZ) followed, including being 
approached to join the Dunedin-based Natural History Unit in a joint 
project The Seven Seas with NHK of Japan. Funding fell through, but the 
project inspired me to explore my own maritime heritage out of Liverpool 
and the extraordinary affinity Pacific Islanders have with the sea, which 
I  witnessed daily in Hawai‘i. A PhD scholarship to The  Australian 
National University in 1995 allowed me to escape years of casual work 
on the economic margins of Dunedin as a night watchman and gardener 
and produce a PhD on Pacific Islanders as maritime peoples. Securing 
a  lectureship at Victoria University of Wellington (VUW) in 1997 
provided welcome employment as the tertiary sector went through another 
of its increasingly frequent funding contractions. Full-time lecturing at 
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VUW and then James Cook University delayed my PhD submission and 
publication until 2006, just after I returned to ANU as a staff member. 
I published military aspects of my MA conclusions in article form 
in 2003, but only revisited my Hawai‘i study seriously in 2007 with an 
intention of revising and publishing. The study has taken another 10 years 
to complete due to a combination of a flurry of new works on Kānaka 
Maoli (indigenous Hawaiians) during this time, significant teaching 
commitments, and increasingly community-orientated contemporary 
projects in the Pacific being given priority over my more historical work. 
Ironically, over the last two years, I finished this project as I began it 
in the late 1980s, with my academic future uncertain, awaiting spinal 
surgery, but as always, supported, inspired and, ultimately, rescued by 
extraordinary friends and scholars to whom I am forever grateful and 
who inspire my optimism about our profession and humanity in general. 
Scholarship is always a collective endeavour and, in this case, especially 
so. A long list of helpers is therefore particularly in order for this project.
My undergraduate training at Otago University inclined me towards 
placing Pacific political and social evolution in global perspective, enriched 
by anthropological, sociological and archaeological theory. In taking an 
honours degree in Pacific and African history, I was fortunate to study 
under four exceptionally gifted scholars at Otago. The first was the brilliant 
South African historian, the late Professor John Omer-Cooper. John’s 1966 
The Zulu Aftermath remains a classic work on how to use oral history and 
read Western sources in new ways to reveal indigenous history running 
parallel to the Boer triumphalism that dominated South African history. 
John also introduced me to the revolution in the history of indigenous 
statecraft occurring in West and Central Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The works of Djibril Niane on Mandingo history and traditional African 
history in general, Ivor Wilks on the Ashante, Saburi Oladeni Biobaku 
and P.C. Lloyd respectively on the Yoruba, and Jan Vansina and Thomas 
Reefe on Central African Savanna kingdoms have especially shaped my 
approaches to examining Hawaiian statecraft. More recent interactions 
with fellow Pacific specialists grounded in African studies, Dave Chappell 
and Pierre-Yves Le Meur, have reminded me of the intellectual dynamism 
and Pacific relevance of key studies on African societies. 
The eccentric and intellectually gifted Professor Gordon Parsonson taught 
Pacific history from the inside looking out by combing the archives for 
glimpses of the indigenous Pacific past. His honours course used chapters 
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of his draft indigenous history of the Pacific entitled The Children of Maui 
as weekly lectures. The draft book and the entire course were based largely 
on primary sources and depicted Pacific history as a series of internally 
driven revolutions well into the colonial era. Gordon’s perfectionist streak 
means The Children of Maui remains unpublished, although he is now 
into his 90s. This is a tragedy as it remains the best work I have read on 
indigenous Pacific history. Social anthropologist the late Professor Peter 
Wilson and archaeologist Professor Atholl Anderson rounded out my 
education and left a passion for multidisciplinary approaches, and a deep 
and profound respect for ‘big picture’ anthropological theory based on 
astute fieldwork in the case of Peter, and meticulous excavations combined 
with theoretically lateral thinking in terms of where to look and what to 
look for in the deep Pacific past in the case of Atholl. Atholl’s classic works 
on his Ngāi Tahu ancestors and John’s on Bantu South Africa reinforced 
my belief in the need to walk over the sites that I write about with historical 
sources in my backpack. This was particularly revealing in assisting me 
to find the discrepancies in accounts of indigenous battles in Hawai‘i 
that are discussed later in this book. While majoring in history honours, 
I also undertook two years of honours in geography, anthropology, and 
archaeology respectively. After graduation, I worked for two years on an 
Otago-based archaeological project.
The 1980s were times of bold theory in Pacific Studies, with major 
advances in studies of Hawai‘i coming from archaeologists Patrick Kirch 
and Robert Hommon, and anthropologist Marshall Sahlins. While 
all three have continued to publish on Hawai‘i, they have also largely 
continued to adhere to their fundamental theoretical stances formulated 
in the 1980s. Kirch has focused a great deal of attention in the last decade 
on incorporating Kānaka Maoli traditions recorded in the 19th century 
into his previous essentially archaeologically informed works on Hawai‘i 
to support his interpretations of Kānaka Maoli political evolution. Their 
work continues to inspire and intellectually challenge my thinking. 
While referring to traditions recorded by 19th-century Kānaka Maoli 
historians such as David Malo and Samuel Kamakau, few anthropologists 
and archaeologists have cited or even acknowledged the scholarship 
of the current generation of stunningly innovative Hawaiian/Kānaka 
Maoli scholars I met while at graduate school at UH Mānoa in the late 
1980s: Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa, Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio, 
and the late Kanalu G. Terry Young, to whom this book is dedicated. 
This is especially surprising given the development of the UH Mānoa’s 
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
xiv
Kamakakūokalani Center for Hawaiian Studies to be arguably the best 
centre for indigenous scholarship in the Pacific today. The highlights of my 
coursework at UH Mānoa were the late Jerry Bentley’s multidisciplinary 
course on world history, which emphasised the need to embrace the 
histories of non-Western peoples on their own terms, and David Hanlon’s 
theoretically wide-ranging course on Micronesian history. Other students 
who inspired me and shaped my thinking included Lewis Mayo, who 
focused on Chinese and environmental history and who is still a close 
friend and also the most brilliant mind I have ever encountered; Bruce 
Campbell from Guam who introduced me to Micronesia and impressed 
upon me the need to give back to Pacific communities through items 
and knowledge they valued rather than academic learning alone; the late 
Teresia Teaiwa, who had already embraced multiple forms of indigenous 
self-expression as a means of developing indigenous voices informed, but 
not dictated, by more conventional academic scholarship; Dave Chappell, 
who had travelled the world, lived in Africa, and thinks deeply and writes 
profoundly about many key issues in Pacific and world history; Mike 
Pavkovic, whose thoughtful combination of classical studies and military 
history left a deep impression on me; and Dave French, whose profound 
knowledge of Amerindian cultures and fascination with Central Asian 
languages and history intoxicated me in our daily conversations. Dave 
shopped for me and visited me every day while I was bedridden for six 
months with a spinal injury, and did so while working full-time to put 
himself through graduate school. I could not have made it through those 
dark days without his help and support.
The completion of my MA on Hawai‘i in the early 1990s at Otago was 
made possible by the friendship and support of the entire department, and 
my supervisor Judy Bennett in particular. Modest and forthright in equal 
measure, Judy was supportive and constructively critical of my drafts. 
She also heightened my awareness of the importance of environmental 
history in processes of political and social evolution. Exchanges with John 
McNeill during this time as he was writing an article-length overview 
of the first environmental history of the Pacific, and the TVNZ project 
combined to establish environmental perspectives as fundamental to my 
historical analysis. 
Environmental perspectives were combined with non-Western 
historiography for my PhD at ANU with a dream panel and an 
exceptional cohort of PhD students. Donald Denoon as my panel 
chair reunited me with my African studies, which he combined with 
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his deep understanding of Papua New Guinea and big-picture, broad-
brush approach to Pacific history and settler colonialism. Niel Gunson, 
Deryck Scarr, Mark Elvin and Tony Reid were always willing to discuss 
problems and methodologies as panel supervisors. Niel opened my eyes as 
never before to the richness and untapped potential of traditional Pacific 
histories contained in archives and remembered within the community 
that are still unfortunately rarely seen in modern academic studies of 
the Pacific. His students Kambati Uriam and Kieran Schmidt reinforced 
this potential with their detailed studies of the pre-European traditional 
history of Kiribati and Samoa respectively. Deryck’s deep knowledge of 
Fijian traditional ways served to further move me towards the traditional 
history – environmental history trajectory that influenced this book. 
Tony’s big-picture histories of South-East Asia served as models of what 
we could also do in the Pacific and started me on a long investigation of 
linkages between the two regions that colonial rule and colonial languages 
had combined to divide the two regions within academic expertise. Mark’s 
brilliant environmental perspectives on Chinese history and profound 
knowledge of cultures of the sea throughout history inspired me. I was 
also reunited with my friend Lewis Mayo, who Mark was supervising on 
a Chinese environmental history topic centred on western Gansu. Lewis’s 
work and encouragement, along with that of our fellow PhD cohort 
member, Vicki Luker, have influenced my work profoundly. Lewis and 
Vicki remain among my closest friends today. 
It was during my PhD that I saw Kanalu for the last time when we were 
panellists together at the Pacific History Association conference in Hilo in 
July 1996. His talk preceded mine and was spellbinding in its emotion and 
brilliant in voicing the frustration of having your history articulated by 
outsiders while your own perspectives and understandings are sidelined. 
I remember frantically taking notes on almost every sentence he spoke 
and then being unable to focus on my own talk with my mind full of 
the brilliant insights and alternative ways of conceiving Hawaiian society 
that he had just outlined. His book came out soon afterwards and was 
a profound influence on this book and my thinking about Pacific history 
in general. To my knowledge, it was never reviewed by any Pacific journal 
nor cited since by any non-Hawaiian academics, despite a raft of studies 
being published in the last decade. Hawaiian scholarship has flourished 
since then, however, and Hawai‘i remains one of the strongest centres 
for indigenous studies in the Pacific with Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa still an 
intellectual force 30 years after her groundbreaking PhD was completed 
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at UH Mānoa, and published as a book in 1992, and Kanalu’s and my 
contemporary, Jon Osorio, publishing his equally superb historical study 
of early 19th-century Hawai‘i in 2002. Cutting short my PhD scholarship 
to take up a teaching position at VUW reunited me with Teresia Teaiwa as 
she developed a Pacific Studies Program there, but delayed the submission 
of my PhD and stifled my publications while I developed numerous 
courses in Pacific, European and world history. Similar teaching to 
research imbalances followed in a new position at James Cook University 
in Townsville.
It was not until I returned to ANU as a staff member in 2006 that I could 
focus on research more than teaching. Here I linked up with Niel Gunson 
again and continued to learn much about traditional history from him. 
Vicki Luker has been a warm, inspiring and supportive colleague in the 
Department of Pacific and Asian History and as executive editor of the 
Journal of Pacific History. Stewart Firth and Greg Fry have been especially 
encouraging and supportive in pushing me to publish this study, while 
my departmental supervisor and mentor, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, has been 
a tower of strength and integrity, and an intellectual inspiration over the 
last decade. In recent years I have also been fortunate to work and often 
co-author with inspiring scholars in the Pacific: Tamatoa Bambridge from 
Tahiti; Zag Puas and Mymy Kim from Chuuk; Roannie Ng Shui from 
Samoa; Morgan Tuimaleali‘ifano from the University of the South Pacific 
at Laucala and also Samoa; Colin Philp of Leleuvia, Fiji; Chels Marshall 
from Australia; Tanira Kingi, Jacinta Ruru, Jenny Bryant-Tokalau and 
Lyn Carter from Aotearoa New Zealand; and Daya Dakasi Da-Wei Kuan 
and Vavauni Ljaljegean from Taiwan. Daya’s and my edited book on 
indigenous responses to climate change and globalisation will feature a 
stunning piece from Jon Osorio expressing the vital importance of place 
and belonging to Kānaka Maoli. I am also lucky to be working with a 
very supportive and intellectually inspiring editorial team on the next 
Cambridge History of the Pacific: Jane Samson, Matt Matsuda, Anne 
Perez-Hattori and Ryan Jones. 
This work has been improved immeasurably by detailed anonymous 
referees’ reports, and especially through a very careful and perceptive 
copyedit by my wonderful editor Justine Molony. It has been a pleasure 
from start to finish working with ANU Press’ acting manager Emily 
Hazlewood and graphic designer Teresa Prowse. Teresa designed the 
cover and checked the manuscript, while Emily has done an enormous 
amount of work to improve this book, and displayed immense patience 
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with my endless delays. All of the figures in this book were created to 
my specifications by Kay Dancey, Jenny Sheehan and Karina Pelling of 
CartoGIS, the Cartography Unit of ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. 
Both ANU Press and CartoGIS produce world-class outputs on a slender 
budget that defies belief. It is fitting that this study will be affiliated with 
my new workplace within ANU, the Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA) 
in the Coral Bell School of the College of Asia and the Pacific. DPA is 
a happy and productive workplace directed by a generous and visionary 
Pacific scholar and leader, Nicole Haley. Nicole and the Dean of the 
College of Asia and the Pacific, Michael Wesley, have been fundamental in 
facilitating my transfer and providing me with the welcoming and stable 
workplace I have long sought to join. DPA works for the Pacific and not 
merely on the Pacific – a vital distinction. Lastly and most importantly, 
I owe so much of my academic success to the support and love of my 
family: my mum and dad, Anne and Brian, who have always supported 
my scholarship and taught me what really mattered in life. Mum and 
Dad were founding members of the New Zealand Values Party that later 
evolved into the New Zealand Green Party. Above all, my wonderful wife 
Xiaoqin and son Christopher inspire and support, fill every day with joy 
and make my life complete.

xix
Explanatory Note on the Use of 
Hawaiian Terms in this Book
Where possible Hawaiian terms have been used for specifically Hawaiian 
institutions or objects.
Ali‘i is used to refer to Hawaiian chiefs in general. Ali‘i nui refers to senior 
chiefs as opposed to those with relatively little genealogical status. Mō‘ī 
were the rulers of discrete polities known as moku. Maka‘āinana refers 
to all commoners, most of whom cultivated the land. But, within this 
group, there were commoners who served in chiefly retinues, and such 
people are distinguished by the term kanaka. The basic local land division 
was known as an ahupua‘a. Akua refers to gods as opposed to ‘aumakua 
(spirits). In general, I have used the term gods for the broader sense of 
the supernatural world. When referring to particular deities, they are 
mentioned by name rather than as akua. Temples are referred to as heiau. 
Because of the large number of Hawaiian words that are used in the text, 
these have not been italicised or underlined so as not to disrupt the flow 
of the narrative.
Hawai‘i is used for both the culture in general and Hawai‘i Island. Where 
there may be ambiguity in sentences between the two usages, Hawai‘i 
Island is used for the latter, and Hawai‘i for the former.

xxi
Glossary of Hawaiian Terms
‘aha ali‘i council of chiefs
ahu boundary marker
ahupua‘a basic local community land division, under 
the control of a lesser chief known as an ali‘i 
ai ahupua‘a 
‘āina land in general
ai noa ‘free eating’ – eating to deliberately break 
and challenge traditional food kapu practised 
by Ka‘ahumanu and her followers in 1819
akua a god, spirit or deity
ali‘i chief
ali‘i ‘ai ahupua‘a chief of the basic local community
ali‘i ‘ai moku district chief
ali‘i akua god king, term reserved for chiefs of the highest 
rank, especially pi‘o rank
ali‘i nui great chief, paramount chief of a discrete, unified 
polity, also known as a mō‘ī
‘auhau tax
‘aumakua ancestral spirits and deities
‘awa kava (Piper methysticum), the root of which was 
used to make a psychoactive beverage consumed 
by chiefs
haku‘āina a landlord, most typically a konohiki or ali‘i ‘ai 
ahupua‘a level lesser chief
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hale nauā the house in which genealogical specialists gathered 
to ascertain the pedigrees of chiefs for decisions 






ho‘omana to worship, to empower through worship
hula traditional dance in various forms
ihe a short spear measuring from two to 2.5 metres, 
thrown or used to thrust
ilāmuku officer of the paramount chief ’s household 
responsible for maintaining the kapu associated 
with that household 
‘ili; ‘ili lele subdivision of an ahupua‘a
‘ili kūpono a segment of the ‘ili land division directly 
controlled by the paramount chief rather than the 
ahupu‘a chief, the tribute from which was reserved 
for the paramount chief
ka‘a-kaua sub-commanders within each retinue
kāhili fly whisks or standards; symbols of chiefly rank
kahului crescent formation with horns pointing towards 
the enemy
kahuna person with specialist knowledge of valued skills, 
usually associated with favour from the gods such 
as canoe makers, herbal medicine specialists and 
priests
kahuna kuni sorcery priests 
kahuna nui high priest
kahuna pule priest, religious specialist
kalaimoku war councillor, senior military adviser to rulers
xxiii
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kalana subdivision of a moku (district)
kalo taro (Colocasia esculenta)
kanaka commoners recruited by ali‘i for their martial 
prowess
Kānaka Maoli indigenous Hawaiians
kanaka no lua kaua ali‘i and maka‘āinana who lived with the chief 
and did not desert him in battle
kapa tapa, cloth made form the bark of the wauke 
(paper mulberry plant, Broussonetia papyrifera)
kapu permanent or temporary sacred status through 
connection to the gods
kapu moe prostrating taboo requiring commoners and lower 
ranked chiefs to lie prostrate in the presence of 
a high-status sacred chief
kaukau ali‘i collective name for lesser grades of chiefs
kāula prophet 
kāuwa underclass enslaved by their enemies or descended 
from other kāuwa. Used for human sacrifices at 
luakini heiau (temples)
ko‘a a fishing shrine dedicated to the god Kū‘ula
kō‘ele land division worked by commoners, all the 
produce of which was reserved for the benefit 
of the konohiki and ali‘i
konohiki land manager for an ahupua‘a land unit on behalf 
of the ali‘i ‘ai ahupua‘a (chief in charge of the 
ahupua‘a)
kū‘auhau genealogical specialist within the paramount chief ’s 
retinue responsible for memorising the genealogies 
and mo‘olelo of the ali‘i
kuhina governors
kukulu straight battleline
kula dryland cultivation areas especially associated 




lo‘i irrigated pond-field for growing taro
loko i‘a (loko, loko 
kuapā) 
fishpond on reef flat enclosed by a stone wall
luakini heiau temple where human sacrifice was offered
luakini kaua temple dedicated to the war god Kū 
luakini po‘okanaka temple where human sacrifice was offered
māhele the land reform process from 1846 to 1855 which 
replaced traditional landholding procedures with 
Western-style individual tenure parcels held by the 
Hawaiian Crown, the government, and individuals
maka‘āinana commoner majority below the chiefly classes
makahiki four month, rainy season period of ritual, 
celebrations, and chiefly tax collection 
commencing when Pleiades became visible in 
November, and dedicated to Lono, the god 
of rain-fed agriculture
makawalu battle formation of small flexible groups for 
broken terrain 
mālama care for, management of resources or people
malo loincloth
mana signs of the gods’ favour manifest in good 
fortune to people eliciting respectful treatment 
of individuals
moemoe night attacks
moe-pu ali‘i’s chosen companions in death
mō‘ī paramount chief, see also ali‘i nui
moku polities
mo‘o a land unit subdivision of an ‘ili land unit
mo‘okū‘ahuhau genealogical heritage
mo‘olelo traditional historical account
naha one of the highest chiefly ranks
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nī‘aupi‘o (Pi‘o) close consanguineous marriage between high-status 
chiefs resulting in offspring of the most sacred 
rank, the ali‘i akua or ali‘i kapu
noa temporarily or permanently free of kapu 
(sacred status) by separation from the divine
‘okana (also known 
as poko)
a subdistrict incorporating several ahupua‘a 
pahoa a hardwood dagger measuring up to 60 centimetres 
pahupū literally, cut in half, name given to special group 
of Maui warriors in the era of Kahekili who 
tattooed half of their body with black dye
pa‘i‘ai storable form of taro produced by steaming, 
mashing and pressing taro corm into hard dry 
cakes
palaoa pae ruler’s right to whalebone washed up on shore
peleleu new larger, sturdy canoe design commissioned 
by Kamehameha after loss of much of his fleet 
between O‘ahu and Kaua‘i in 1796
pikoi used as a throwing club to bring down 
fleeing enemy
poi cooked and mashed corm of taro with water added
poi-po ambushes
poko (also known 
as ‘okana)
a subdistrict incorporating several ahupua‘a
polulu a long hardwood pike of up to six metres
pua‘a pig
pukaua commander in chief
pu‘uhonua place of refuge and safety in times of conflict
pu‘uku nui chief treasurer
toa warrior
‘uala sweet potato (Ipomoea batatas)
wahine a woman, female
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waiwai literally plentiful water, applied to wealth in goods 
or property
wohi high chiefly rank exempt from the prostrating tapu
xxvii
List of Historical Personalities, 
Gods and Scholars
Alapa‘i ruler who unified most of Hawai‘i Island 
in the early 1700s
I‘ī, John Papa 19th-century Hawaiian historian 
Ka‘ahumanu favourite wife of Kamehameha I, 
and effective ruler during the reign 
of Kamehameha II and III
Ka‘eokulani Kahekili of Maui’s half-brother who 
controlled Kaua‘i in the late 1700s in alliance 
with Kalanikūpule against Kamehameha
Kahahana ruler of O‘ahu in the late 1700s who was 
overthrown by Maui ruler Kahekili
Kahekili ruler of Maui in the late 1700s who 
conquered O‘ahu
Kalanikūpule Maui chief who succeeded Kahekili as ruler 
of Maui and O‘ahu in the late 1700s until 
defeated by Kamehameha
Kalani‘ōpu‘u ruler of Hawai‘i in the late 1700s who 
succeeded Alapa‘inui
Kamakau, Kēlou 19th-century Kānaka Maoli historian
Kamakau, Samuel M. 19th-century Kānaka Maoli historian
Kame‘eleihiwa, Lilikalā contemporary Kānaka Maoli historian 
Kamehameha nephew of ruler of Hawai‘i, Kalani‘ōpu‘u, 
unified the Hawaiian chain in 1790s
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Kamehameha-nui son of Maui ruler Kekaulike and nephew 
of Kalani‘ōpu‘u, ruler of Hawai‘i Island, 
who succeeded his father as ruler of Maui 
in the mid-1700s
Kanaloa one of the four principal gods of the Kānaka 
Maoli pantheon
Kāne one of the four principal gods of the Kānaka 
Maoli pantheon, the creator god and god of 
waters and irrigation, to whom kalo (taro) 
was sacred
Kaumuali‘i the last ruler of Kaua‘i before it was taken 
over by Kamehameha
Keawemauhili half-brother of Hawai‘i ruler Kalani‘ōpu‘u 
and influential warrior and chief supporting 
Kamehameha
Ke‘eaumoku powerful chief from Kona, Hawai‘i, who 
supported Kamehameha throughout his 
lifetime
Kekūhaupi‘o famous warrior of Hawai‘i Island who 
mentored and advised Kamehameha
Keōpūolani sacred daughter of Hawai‘i chief Kīwala‘ō 
who became royal wife of Kamehameha
Keōua Kuahu‘ula younger son of Hawai‘i ruler Kalani‘ōpu‘u 
who controlled south-east Hawai‘i Island 
as a rival to Kamehemeha until killed by 
Kamehameha in 1791
Kepelino 19th-century Kānaka Maoli historian
Kīwala‘ō oldest son of Kalani‘ōpu‘u who briefly 
succeeded his father as ruler of Hawai‘i 
before being killed by Ke‘eaumoku at the 
battle of Moku‘ōhai in 1782. His daughter, 
Keōpūolani, became the sacred wife of 
Kamehameha
Kūali‘i ruler of O‘ahu in the late 1600s and 
early 1700s
xxix
LIST oF HISToRICAL PERSoNALITIES, GoDS AND SCHoLARS
Kū‘kā‘ili-moku war god Kū, the carver of lands
Liholiho son of Kamehameha who succeeded his 
father as King Kamehameha II in 1819, but 
died in London in 1824
Malo, David 19th-century Kānaka Maoli historian
Osorio, Jonathon Kay 
Kamakawiwo‘ole 
contemporary Kānaka Maoli historian
Pelei‘ōhōlani ruler of O‘ahu and Kaua‘i in the late 1700s
Pi‘ilani ruler of Maui in the mid-1500s
Pukui, Mary Kawena 20th-century Kānaka Maoli scholar 
‘Umi-a-Līloa first unifier of Hawai‘i Island in the late 
1500s




Hawaiians figure prominently in literature on the transition from 
fragmented chiefdoms to a unified state. The conquest and unification of 
the Hawaiian Islands by Kamehameha I between 1782 and 1812 came 
at a time of increasing European contact, prompting many to attribute 
his success to European weapons and ideas. Kamehameha succeeded 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u as mō‘ī (paramount chief ) of leeward Hawai‘i when he 
defeated the other contender, Kīwala‘ō, in battle in 1782. He went on 
to conquer all the islands in the Hawaiian archipelago apart from Kaua‘i 
and Ni‘ihau between 1790 and 1795 (see Figure 2). By 1812, he had 
overcome the last challenge to his rule and Kaumuali‘i of Kaua‘i had also 
acknowledged his primacy. No one seriously threatened his rule from 
then until his death in 1819.
This study examines the role of coercion in the unification of the Hawaiian 
Islands in the era of Kamehameha I. Hawai‘i was rapidly transformed from 
a series of divided chiefdoms into a unified kingdom at a time of increasing 
European contact. As such, it is a topic that involves consideration of 
a range of issues that are central to human history. The study of conflict 
and its role in wider power relations is crucial for any study of human 
society. The formation of centralised polities that transcended local kin-
based loyalties was a significant watershed in social evolution, while the 
impact of European contact on non-Western societies is a major theme in 
world history. Three interrelated themes in Hawaiian political evolution 
are examined in this book: the balance between coercion and consent, 
between structural trends and individual leadership qualities and specific 
historical events, and between indigenous and European factors.
The unification of Hawai‘i took place relatively late in its history and 
within a single generation. The period between 1778 and 1819 is rich 
in both European and Hawaiian documentary sources. This was a time 
of increasing European penetration in to the Pacific. Kamehameha’s use 
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of European advisers and Western military technology has been cited as 
a major factor behind the victories that paved the way for unification. 
This has naturally raised the question of the degree to which European 
contact influenced the process of political centralisation. Was it an 
essential ingredient, or did it merely speed up an already existing process? 
The latter part of this study deals with these issues and offers particular 
insights into the impact of European firearms on traditional warfare in 
Hawai‘i and elsewhere. Those asserting firearms as a significant factor in 
Kamehameha’s wars of unification largely ignore the nature of Hawaiian 
warfare and do not consider warfare alongside the other forms of political 
control that were central to this process in Hawai‘i.
The study of warfare in the non-Western world has been neglected until 
relatively recently. Pacific history is no exception. The few studies of 
warfare in Pacific history have been heavily influenced by anthropology, 
and tend to emphasise the cultural context behind acts of violence, rather 
than the actual fighting. By neglecting the narrative of events, they tend 
to treat warfare as a static institution rather than an evolving process. 
But, perhaps, the most pressing need is for an attempt to follow the lead 
of recent European military historiography and combine the study of 
tactics and weaponry with consideration of psychological and logistical 
factors, and the place of warfare in wider social relations. This study 
constructs such an approach by combining the best aspects of European 
and non-European military historiography. The resulting synthesis is 
a radical reinterpretation of Hawaiian warfare that treats it as an evolving 
process heavily imbued with cultural meaning, and characterised by 
fluid circumstances, including crucial turning points when choices were 
made to take elements of Hawaiian society on paths of development that 
proved decisive for political unification, but which were neither inevitable 
or predictable.
The timing of Hawaiian unification has also created a disciplinary boundary 
in studies on this topic that rarely transcends the juncture marked by 
European contact and the addition of European written observations to 
the body of sources available for the study of this era. This study challenges 
the standard historiography in arguing for a diminished role for Western 
weapons and ideas in unification and a greater role for indigenous 
institutions. It also argues against the tendency to examine history in the 
non-Western world in terms of generalised structural history rather than 
historically specific dynamics in which a number of historical trajectories 
were possible depending on choices made by indigenous actors. In 
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arguing for a more wide-ranging approach to power that encompasses 
political, diplomatic, social, religious and economic institutions as well 
as military topics, this study also spans disciplinary divides and knits 
Western and non-Western historiography. This approach is adopted here 
as a model for studies of political evolution and the role of warfare in non-
European societies beyond Hawai‘i. This more comprehensive framework 
diminishes the role of warfare and violence and elevates the role of consent 
and compromise in securing long-term political power.
This study examines works from a number of disciplines, and depicts 
the struggle for power in Hawai‘i as a complicated and dynamic process 
involving long-term, slowly evolving continuities as well as short-term 
perturbations that could alter existing structures. It argues that long-term, 
indigenous processes had more influence on centralisation in Hawai‘i 
than is generally recognised, and that logistical and political consolidation 
was more important in chiefly struggles for power than battle tactics 
and weapons. At the same time, however, it is argued that the process 
of Hawaiian history suggests that more attention needs to be paid to 
detailing historical events in non-Western historiography to explain why 
and when processes occur. Having the necessary conditions for military 
victory and centralisation in place only ensured that there was a potential 
for unification; specific triggers and opportunities were also needed. 
Perhaps the greatest omission in the standard discourse on the political 
evolution of Hawaiian society is the almost total exclusion of modern 
indigenous Hawaiian scholarship on this topic in favour of largely North 
America-based anthropologists and archaeologists. The Hawai‘inuiākea 
School of Hawaiian Knowledge at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa 
is the world’s leading centre for scholarship on Hawai‘i. The conclusions 
reached by its historians present forms of political leadership and socio-
economic organisation that were much more consensus-based, and in which 
environmental guardianship played a more prominent role in assessing 
leaders than is usually allowed for. This is markedly different from the 
standard interpretations that are critiqued in this book. While it might be 
argued that such interpretations merely reflect worldwide contemporary 
priorities and values, the fact that these values are consistently represented 
in Hawaiian traditions and scholarship across the ages, and also find 
common ground with a host of independently arrived at conclusions by 
other Pacific island scholars, requires that such perspectives are considered 
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seriously by scholars of the Pacific. Above all, this study finds indigenous 
Hawaiian approaches a much better fit with the historical evidence related 
to Hawaiian history than more conventional scholarship.
5
1
Three Key Debates: Positioning 
Hawai‘i in World History
Hawai‘i figures prominently in the archaeological and anthropological 
literature on the transition from chiefdoms to unified states. This 
introductory chapter compares and contrasts academic analysis of 
indigenous Hawaiian society with that of wider disciplinary and 
geographical entities for three key debates concerning the evolution of 
human societies. Hawai‘i is central to a number of these debates, yet 
marginal to others. The first theme debated is the process of political 
consolidation from chiefdoms based on kin loyalty derived from blood 
links to states based on power vested in institutional office holders 
and membership based on territorial residency. The second is the role 
of coercion and consent in political consolidation. Research on the 
history of Hawai‘i is poorly served in this regard, despite the fact that 
most investigators acknowledge that unification occurred in the 1790s 
as a result of an extensive military campaign and the major role ascribed 
to warfare in state formation in most locations beyond the Pacific. The 
third theme is the role of European influences in ensuring the Hawaiian 
archipelago was unified for the first time in its history, given that this 
unification occurred soon after regular contact with European naval 
and trade vessels was established and widely acknowledged structural 




The literature on the unification of Hawai‘i largely ignores comparative 
world history, sociology and political science in which coercion is 
generally allocated a central role in state formation, but which, in Pacific 
case studies, are largely absent. Combining frameworks from these diverse 
bodies of literature suggests exciting and fruitful approaches to the study 
of this topic in the Pacific. Indeed, the broader questions about the 
manifestation and consolidation of power that are explored in this chapter 
offer lessons for all disciplines and all regions, trapped as we are within 
partial and subjective prisms of observation. Three main methodological 
points are advocated here: the value of reading and applying approaches 
from other disciplines; the value of reading and applying approaches 
from other regions (especially combining Western and non-Western 
historiography); and, perhaps more problematically, the importance of 
local context, which requires caution in applying externally generated 
frameworks of analysis without modification.
While state formation in the West and elsewhere is generally acknowledged 
to have been forged in the crucible of violence to overcome strong senses 
of local identity and affiliation that characterise most of humanity, 
countervailing forces promoting diversity are generally acknowledged 
more in discussion of Western nation states as the seed that spawned 
later democratic institutions. In contrast, pre-colonial, non-Western, 
orientalist states are portrayed as ultimately held together by despotism, 
or hopelessly fragmented to the point of being beyond control other than 
by the application of often externally imposed coercion. Such mindsets 
justified colonial rule and postcolonial interventions across the globe by 
former colonial states in ‘failed states’. These approaches ignore the fact 
that many political evolutions across the globe were based on balancing 
power bases for stability rather than unifying for efficiency in the delivery 
of outcomes. In the former, representation and relative consensus was the 
key objective while, in the latter, the goal was to deliver results and ensure 
limited dissent to block this delivery. While citing ‘traditional’ sources that 
were collected soon after European contact and before Western influence 
destroyed or compromised their veracity, few Western academics of 
state formation in the Pacific cite current indigenous academics. These 
indigenous Pacific academics portray a very different configuration of 
power in which rule is more consent-based and consultative by both 
necessity and social values, often in fluid and evolving circumstances.
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The dilemma of political consolidation: 
Focusing power while accommodating 
diversity
The investigation of state formation in Hawai‘i has mainly been conducted 
by anthropologists and archaeologists. They see economic modes of 
production as the key to understanding political power in Hawai‘i during 
the pre-unification period. This emphasis is, in part, a reflection of their 
disciplinary assumptions on the processes driving the evolution of human 
societies, which are in turn partly derived from the relative absence of 
written observations for the times and peoples they study, and the relative 
abundance of archaeologically accessible remnants of economic production, 
such as field systems and buildings. There is also a voluminous literature on 
state formation written by sociologists, political scientists and historians, 
who tend more to emphasise political accommodation and/or military 
domination as key processes, which is again, in part, a reflection of sources 
available and disciplinary assumptions. In the late 1950s, historian Karl 
Wittfogel linked the development of sociopolitical complexity to the need 
for coordinated management of large-scale irrigated agricultural complexes, 
such as those found in Hawai‘i. He argued that irrigated taro fields produced 
sufficient surplus to feed the warriors and administrative officers needed 
to support more complex forms of political organisation.1 More recently, 
archaeologist Patrick Kirch noted that intensive dryland agriculture gave 
rise to inherently unstable and expansive chiefdoms. According to him, 
variable rainfall reduced food security and necessitated the conquest of 
other agricultural land.2 However, the economic structures seen by British 
explorer Captain James Cook in the 1770s existed long before unification 
and do not, therefore, explain why unification occurred when and as it did.
Archaeologist Timothy Earle departs from this economic focus. He notes 
that the same military power that allowed expansion also introduced 
internal instability because the ruler could not always rely on the loyalty of 
warriors serving under subordinate chiefs. He emphasises the importance 
of ideological factors in securing sustained loyalty. Most state-builders in 
1  Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 241–43.
2  P.V. Kirch, The Wet and the Dry: Irrigation and Agricultural Intensification in Polynesia (University 
of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 8. Kirch has maintained this contention in his most recent works – 
see How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai‘i 
(Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 2010) and A Shark Going Inland Is My Chief: 
The Island Civilization of Ancient Hawai‘i (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).
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Polynesia faced similar problems. There was always the danger of chiefs close 
to power making a bid for supremacy. At the same time chiefs in areas away 
from the centre of power might be tempted to assert their independence. 
This latter prospect was sometimes enhanced by problems of communication 
along narrow trails or across stormy seas. These problems were also common 
to chiefdoms outside of Polynesia.3 Agriculture is important to Earle for the 
symbolic value of the temples and fields constructed under chiefly supervision 
as well as for subsistence. According to Earle, ‘these constructions of social 
labour encapsulated the social relations of the chiefdom or, more precisely, 
the historical events that defined these relations’. Reminders of chiefly 
power were all around, as was the place of commoners in the subsistence 
economy: ‘The symbolic order was thus grounded and subsumed within 
the everyday practice of ritual and subsistence labour in the monuments 
and fields of the chiefs.’4 While acknowledging the role played by coercion, 
the anthropologists Marshall Sahlins and Valerio Valeri also emphasise 
the importance of belief in the ideology of sacred chieftainship for power, 
particularly in securing compliance from maka‘āinana (commoners) well 
into the post-unification period.5
In his 2010 study of Hawaiian political and social evolution, How Chiefs 
Became Kings, Kirch argues convincingly that, by the arrival of Cook in 
the 1770s, Hawaiian polities had developed an array of the institutions to 
support the centralisation and concentration of power under high chiefs. 
According to Kirch, these archaic Hawaiian states were characterised by:
the development of class stratification, land alienation from commoners 
and a territorial system of administrative control, a monopoly of force 
and endemic conquest warfare, and, most important, divine kingship 
legitimated by state cults with a formal priesthood.6 
Two years later, Kirch published a more comprehensive history of 
Hawai‘i in A Shark Going Inland is My Chief in which he continues his 
consistent assertion that the driving influence on political evolution was 
population growth built on agricultural intensification. Once agricultural 
intensification had reached its limit in the 16th century, around the time 
3  I.C. Campbell, A History of the Pacific Islands (Christchurch: University of Canterbury Press, 
1989), p. 47.
4  Timothy K. Earle, How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehistory (Stanford 
University Press, 1997), p. 184.
5  Marshall Sahlins, ‘Other Times, Other Customs: The Anthropology of History’, American 
Anthropologist, vol. 85 (3), 1983, esp. 522–23, and 535 n. 12; and Valerio Valeri, Kingship and Sacrifice: 
Ritual and Society in Ancient Hawaii, Paula Wissing (trans.) (University of Chicago Press, 1985a).
6  Kirch (2010), p. 27.
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of ‘Umi-a-Līloa’s reign on Hawai‘i island and Pi‘ilani on Maui, the further 
expansion of political power lay in the conquest of other lands. In so doing 
Hawaiian polities moved from being ruled by chiefs who were considered 
kinsmen by their commoner followers to states ruled by divine kings. 
Kirch is more certain in A Shark Going Inland Is My Chief than in How 
Chiefs Became Kings that Hawai‘i’s political centralisation occurred more 
because of multiple indigenous factors than European influences, but still 
cannot explain unification without recourse to the influence of Western 
weapons, again with almost no discussion of the evidence for this.7 While 
making much more use of indigenous traditions than in his previous 
works, he still favours his previous explanations of underlying influences.8 
Archaeologists are increasingly coming to realise that oral traditions must 
be better utilised not just as a sign of respect for indigenous peoples but as 
key sources to enhance and clarify archaeological evidence.9
Archaeologist Robert Hommon also published his The Ancient Hawaiian 
State in 2013. Hommon pioneered the close reading of recorded traditions 
alongside archaeological material in the 1970s and 1980s. In his 2013 
work, however, he retreats from his earlier close reading of historical 
processes for specific islands to emphasise that Hawaiian chiefdoms on 
the eve of European contact were state-like in their shared structures of 
political economic and social organisation.10 The discussion in chapters 
seven and eight of the authority–power spectrum in Hawaiian polities 
in the lead-up to unification under Kamehameha I is of particular 
interest for this study. While making a strong case for the presence of 
the component parts of political rule that are generally associated with 
states, the lack of discussion on processes leading to this and how these 
structures were enacted in local and specific contexts means that Hommon 
cannot adequately explain why Hawai‘i unified when it did according 
to these pre-existing indigenous elements. Hommon agrees with Kirch 
in seeing the key driving force as being the structural instability of 
dryland  production to support expanding populations and ambitions 
of dryland rulers in the eastern islands.11 However, the link between this 
7  Kirch (2012), p. 225.
8  Kirch (2012), pp. 68, 79. This under-utilisation of traditions was also noted in a review of 
Kirch (2012) by Kerri A. Inglis (‘Review of P.V. Kirch, A Shark Going Inland Is My Chief: The Island 
Civilization of Ancient Hawai‘i’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 44 (2), Autumn 2013, 269).
9  Peter M. Whiteley, ‘Archaeology and Oral Tradition: The Scientific Importance of Dialogue’, 
American Antiquity, vol. 67 (3), Jul. 2002, 405–15.
10  Robert J. Hommon, The Ancient Hawaiian State: Origins of a Political Society (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 2.
11  Hommon (2013), pp. 7–8, 117–35.
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instability and the development and/or sophistication of specific elements 
of coercive capacity or other elements of state rule before or after specific 
events in the late 18th century is not clearly made.
This work departs from both Kirch and Hommon in arguing for greater 
documentation of the role of coercive mechanisms in this process and in 
arguing that sacred kingship was not as crucial as they and most other 
anthropologists and archaeologists claim. Rather, I argue here that the 
late 18th century witnessed the development of sophisticated methods of 
power sharing, resource allocation and mobilisation of resources, which 
consolidated the rule of certain chiefdoms at the expense of others that 
did not embrace these tactics in a process that can be seen as a political and 
military revolution. All this is recorded in Hawaiian traditions, but only 
modern Kānaka Maoli scholars Kanalu G. Terry Young and Jonathan Kay 
Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio, as discussed below, have noted this in detailed 
reference to the recorded history of their ancestors.12
Anthropology and archaeology have been the main disciplines concerned 
with the investigation of state formation in pre-industrial Pacific 
Island societies. The Western intellectual traditions from which they 
derive have been heavily influenced by the idea of linear evolutionary 
progress. Through time, societies become increasingly complex in their 
organisation, more politically unified, with an increasing capacity to 
utilise resources more efficiently. The generally accepted model of social 
evolution portrays a progression from relatively egalitarian societies 
to socially stratified, centralised states, by means of a transition phase 
characterised by the development of social differentiation.13 Sophistication 
in this body of Pacific-orientated literature is generally synonymous with 
greater mobilisation and concentration of resources by those in power, 
rather than a means of power sharing and balancing power, as argued by 
Kānaka Maoli scholars and scholars beyond the Pacific.
12  Kānaka Maoli is the term used by indigenous Hawaiians to describe themselves and their 
culture. The best examples of the revolution in Kānaka Maoli scholarship are Kanalu G. Terry Young, 
Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1998); and Jonathan Kay 
Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002).
13  Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 35; 
Alexander Alland Jr, To Be Human: An Introduction to Anthropology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1980), pp. 438 ff.; and Joseph A. Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), pp. 24 ff.
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Within mainstream Western literature on state formation, egalitarian 
societies are characterised by a lack of permanent hierarchical distinctions 
between individuals. Status is based on individual achievement rather than 
institutionalised rankings. Leadership tends to be minimal, and to be based 
on the power of persuasion. Leaders are usually only obeyed temporarily to 
achieve specific goals. Social organisation is based around small, intimate 
kin groupings. Few cooperative enterprises can be sustained for any length 
of time between two or more of these groupings. Resources are distributed 
throughout the community by the exchange of goods and services and there 
is very little accumulation of resources in the hands of any one individual. 
The route to elevated social status is to acquire resources and distribute 
them to attract followers. Accumulated goods are also used to enhance 
prestige through the holding of public feasts and gift giving. Elevated status 
is only maintained by continued success in the accumulation and judicious 
distribution of goods. The only significant form of sanction is appeal to 
public opinion, which acts as a strong constraint on behaviour.14
Some communities become ranked societies. Individuals are ranked 
hierarchically and those in higher ranks have greater access to resources 
and privileges. Differences in rank may become institutionalised and even 
hereditary. But power is still essentially based on collective consent rather 
than coercive capability. Authority can only be used for collective purposes. 
Consent is freely given and may be freely withdrawn by participants. High 
rank holders have status, make decisions and use material resources on behalf 
of the whole group. They do not possess coercive power beyond their own 
kin base, however, and cannot divert group resources for private use without 
risking other kin groups withdrawing their support. Polities are more 
federations than organic wholes, with an ever-present potential for fission.15
Authority rests on sacred status that is sometimes claimed to emanate 
from a divine source that is not open to challenge. The sacred ruler secures 
obedience through claims of membership or influence over the supernatural 
14  Mann (1986), p. 37; Tainter (1988), p. 24; Bruce Trigger, ‘Generated Coercion and Inequality: 
The Basis of State Power in the Early Civilizations’, in Henri J.M. Claessen, Pieter van de Velde & 
M. Estelle Smith (eds), Development and Decline, The Evolution of Sociopolitical Organization (South 
Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey, 1985), p. 50.
15  Mann (1986), pp. 37, 52; Christopher S. Peebles & Susan M. Kus, ‘Some Archaeological 
Correlates of Ranked Societies’, American Antiquity, vol. 42 (3), 1977, 421–22; B.G. Trigger, Times 
and Traditions: Essays in Archaeological Interpretation (Edinburgh University Press, 1978), pp. 197–99; 
Timothy Earle, ‘The Evolution of Chiefdoms’, Current Anthropology, vol. 30 (1), 1989, esp. 86; and 
Robert L. Carneiro, ‘The Chiefdom: Precursor of the State’, in Grant D. Jones & Robert R. Kautz 
(eds), The Transition to Statehood in the New World (Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 37–79.
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world in societies where the supernatural are believed to have a major 
impact on man’s fortunes. The problem with sacred authority is that, in 
claiming a power that transcends human power, the leader must retain 
sufficient distance from his subjects to develop an air of mystification, 
and yet not become so isolated as to risk losing popular appeal as head 
of a secular community. To intervene too blatantly in worldly affairs is to 
threaten the myth of divine control over the course of events.16
Rulers are able to use their sacred status to acquire goods and services in 
the name of ensuring supernatural support, but still need to redistribute 
goods and services to retain their secular support base. Accumulation of 
goods by leaders is also limited by the continued reliance on kinship as the 
basis of social and economic organisation. Family and kin groups tend to 
be primarily concerned with ensuring that their own needs are met rather 
than generating a large surplus for wider societal needs. Distinguished 
anthropologist of the Pacific Marshall Sahlins refers to this system as 
the Domestic Mode of Production. To Sahlins, households in this form 
of organisation are caught in a dilemma, ‘temporising always between 
domestic welfare and broader obligations towards kinsmen in the hope 
of satisfying the latter without menacing the former’.17 This curtailed the 
augmentation of production and polity and was the ultimate structural 
limitation on chiefdoms in Hawai‘i and elsewhere.
Ranked societies span the full spectrum from near egalitarian to those with 
a marked concentration of power in the hands of a ruling body. In some 
ranked societies an absolute, uncontested highest rank emerges, with all 
other ranks’ lineages being graded according to their relation to this focal 
point. Seniority is usually expressed in terms of genealogical proximity 
to the ultimate ancestors of the group, who are often associated with the 
gods. Leadership roles are usually reserved for those from higher ranks. 
Their authority derives from the belief that high genealogical rank endows 
them with exceptional powers or qualities through their connections 
with the gods. Periodic proof of the leader’s abilities is required for the 
maintenance of authority. This type of authority is open to challenge from 
other competitors within the pool of genealogically qualified candidates, 
particularly when the incumbent is unsuccessful or fails to benefit his 
16  Irving Goldman, Ancient Polynesian Society (University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. xv–xxi; 
Sahlins (1983), p. 518; Alland (1980), p. 435; John Keegan, The Mask of Command (London: 
Penguin, 1987), p. 318; and Mann (1986), p. 158.
17  Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), pp. 41–100, 124–32, 148, 
esp. 125.
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followers. Kinship is still the dominant form of social organisation, with 
open conflict tending to occur horizontally between groups, rather than 
vertically between classes within a group.18
Ranked societies are sometimes referred to as chiefdoms. Anthropologist 
Robert Carneiro defines a chiefdom as ‘an autonomous political unit 
comprising a number of villages or communities under the permanent 
control of a paramount chief ’.19 To Carneiro, the major threshold in man’s 
sociopolitical evolution was the move from egalitarian societies to stratified 
societies, as this represented the first transcendence of localised autonomy. 
From that point onwards, change was more quantitative than qualitative. 
Similarly, Earle believes the fundamental dynamics of chiefdoms are 
essentially the same as those of states. Many scholars disagree, pointing 
to the continuing tendency of ranked societies to fragment. They claim 
that the major threshold in human social evolution was the establishment 
of permanent centralised authority in the form of states.20
There is much debate on what characterises a state. Most definitions 
usually involve notions of centralised authority, territoriality and coercive 
capability. One of the most concise definitions is that of sociologist 
Michael Mann. To Mann:
The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying 
centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outward to cover a 
territorially demarcated area, over which it claims a monopoly of binding 
and permanent rule-making, backed up by physical violence.21
The transition from advanced chiefdoms to states generally involves the 
conversion of temporary political authority and permanent religious 
centres into permanent political power, institutionalised and secularised in 
its access to coercive measures to quell internal dissent and prevent fission. 
A major part of the centralisation process is the breakdown of localised, 
kin-based loyalties, and their replacement with territorial affiliations. 
The domestic mode of production is supplemented or replaced with 
surplus-orientated forms of agricultural production and profit-orientated 
18  Mann (1986), pp. 37, 527–30; Peebles & Kus (1977), pp. 421–22; Alland (1980), p. 450; 
and Stephanie Seto Levin, ‘The Overthrow of the Kapu System in Hawaii’, Journal of the Polynesian 
Society, vol. 77 (4), 1968, 403–05.
19  Carneiro (1981), pp. 37–45, esp. 45; Alland (1980), pp. 438–42; Peebles & Kus (1977), 
pp. 431–33; Sahlins (1983), pp. 521–22.
20  Earle (1997), p. 14; and Carneiro (1981), pp. 51–54, 70.
21  Mann (1986), p. 37.
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commerce. The state’s administrative structure supports itself by means 
of taxes and tributes levied on this surplus. Increasingly sharp vertical 
distinctions occur within the population as a consequence of declining 
kin-based obligations and affiliations.22
In a review of variations in power within West African kingdoms, 
historian P.C. Lloyd offers insights into the process of centralisation. 
The least concentrated forms of power consisted of rulers who were 
little more than arbitrators between the chiefs, in whom the real power 
lay. Autocratic rulers represented the most concentrated form of power. 
Although ultimately reliant on the goodwill of their chiefs, they were still 
able to manipulate them to achieve most of their aims. While all tended 
to be surrounded by a ‘mystic aura’, that ‘surrounding the arbitrator is 
a substitute for control of physical force; that of the autocrat masks his 
secular power’.23
Effective political power required the possession of wealth and a personal 
following. Often the income from tribute, plunder and gifts was used to 
pay a personal staff. Initially salaried positions were rare in West African 
kingdoms. Senior office-bearers kept a proportion of the tribute collected 
and transmitted to higher authorities, while junior staff received free 
board and lodging. This limited the degree to which a ruler could increase 
his power at the expense of his chiefs for, to do so required gaining 
direct control over certain segments of the population, or establishing 
royal monopolies over certain types of trade. ‘In a long established and 
politically stagnant kingdom, the allocation of these resources of wealth 
and people becomes institutionalised and difficult for a ruler, starting 
from a position of political weakness to alter.’24
To Lloyd, the key to the amount of power that can be concentrated in the 
hands of the ruler is the method of appointment to political office. He 
makes a crucial distinction between:
22  Mann (1986), p. 38; Tainter (1988), pp. 26–28; Henri J.M. Claessen & Peter Skalnik, ‘The Early 
State: Models and Reality’, in Henri J.M. Claessen & Peter Skalnik (eds), The Early State (The Hague: 
Mouton Publishers, 1978a), pp. 637–50; Grant D. Jones & Robert R. Kautz, ‘Issues in the Study of 
New World State Formation’, in Grant D. Jones & Robert R. Kautz (eds), The Transition to Statehood 
in the New World (Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 14–17.
23  P.C. Lloyd, ‘The Political Development of West African Kingdoms’, review article, Journal 
of African History, 9 (2), 1968, 324.
24  Lloyd (1968), pp. 326–27.
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those chiefs who are elected to office by the members of a group – a 
descent group or segment of a royal lineage – and who primarily represent 
the interests of that group; and those chiefs who are appointed by the king 
and incumbent chiefs, whose loyalties lie primarily to the king.25
The degree to which appointed chiefs secured permanency of tenure, 
income independent of the ruler, and were organised into exclusive, 
discrete corporate entities would dictate the degree to which they could 
rival each other and the power of the king.
The series of stages in the transition from the early state into its mature 
form, proposed by European social scientists Henri Claessen and Peter 
Skalnik, outlines the common assumptions of this literature.26 The first 
stage is the inchoate state. Here kinship, family and community ties still 
dominate political allegiances. The concept of a unified supra-community 
polity exists mainly in the minds of the ruling elite, while the bulk of 
the population still retains a parochial outlook. Economically, full-time 
specialists are rare, and taxation is poorly developed and usually on an 
ad hoc basis. Social differences are countered by close kin ties between 
rulers and ruled. The second stage is known as the typical state. Kinship 
ties are now counterbalanced by territorial affiliations. Competition and 
appointment to office exist beside the principle of hereditary offices. 
Economically, ties of redistribution and reciprocity still pervade relations 
between social strata. The transitional state is the final stage on the road 
to a mature state. Appointed officials whose loyalty is to the state rather 
than lineages or localities now dominate government administrative 
posts. The administration of laws and taxation is institutionalised. With 
the breakdown of horizontal ties, vertical divisions based on the uneven 
control of resources come to the fore. The significance of the private 
ownership of resources increases as communal ownership declines. 
This process also increases the potential for social differentiation.
25  Lloyd (1968), p. 324.
26  Claessen & Skalnik (1978a), pp. 559–60; Rolando Tamayo Y. Salmoran, ‘The State as a Problem 
of Jurisprudence’, in Henri J.M. Claessen & Peter Skalnik (eds), The Study of the State (The Hague: 
Mouton Publishers, 1981), pp. 405–06; Tainter (1988), pp. 27–28; Mann (1986), p. 68; Donald 
V. Kurtz, ‘The Legitimation of Early Inchoate States’, in Claessen & Skalnik (1981), pp. 178–83; 
Elizabeth M. Brumfiel, ‘Aztec State Making: Ecology, Structure and the Origin of the State’, American 
Anthropologist, vol. 85 (2), 1983, 276; R.M. MacIver, The Web of Government (rev. edn) (New York: 
The Free Press, 1965), pp. 36–37; Trigger (1985), pp. 46–52, 54, 57–60.
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The mature state is usually distinguished from earlier forms primarily 
by the degree to which centralised power is institutionalised and 
legitimised. While the early state still tends to be based on appeal to 
sacred authority, the mature state claims legitimacy through the secular 
benefits it delivers to citizens. The ruler gradually comes to be portrayed 
as the embodiment of the authority of the state rather than as a source 
of sacred authority. The institutions of the state are depicted as impartial. 
With the institutionalisation of government, power endures beyond the 
lifetimes of individual office holders, although individual ability still plays 
an important role in the effectiveness of any office. The development 
of institutionalised administrative apparatus enhances state coercion 
by allowing the creation of professional standing armies supported by 
government taxes and dues.
Most scholars who discuss the transition from advanced chiefdoms to 
states emphasise the conversion of temporary political authority and 
permanent religious centres into permanent political power that is 
institutionalised and secularised in its access to coercive measures to quell 
internal dissent and prevent fission. They see the breakdown of localised, 
kin-based loyalties, and their replacement with territorial affiliations as 
essential to the centralisation process. The state’s administrators support 
themselves by means of taxes and tribute levied on agricultural surplus.27
To anthropologist Elman Service, the rise of the state is more the result of 
an improved capacity for peacemaking than improved capacity for making 
war.28 With the formalised resolution of conflicts, states are able to devote 
more of their energy to internal consolidation. Most enduring states 
recognise that unity and stability are achieved through the distribution 
of resources reflective of their internal balance of power. Emergent 
states usually succeed because they are not too intrusive, leaving much 
decision-making and regulatory power in the hands of family, local and 
occupational groupings. As long as central government does not interfere 
too much, it is in the interests of local leaders to support it. A challenge to 
one form of authority can threaten other sources of authority by bringing 
into question the idea of authority as eternal and unchanging. 
27  Mann (1986), p. 38; Tainter (1988), pp. 26–28; Claessen & Skalnik (1978a), pp. 637–50; Jones 
& Kautz (1981), pp. 14–17.
28  Elman R. Service, The Origins of the State and Civilization (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1975), pp. 61, 100.
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While there is broad agreement on the structural characteristics of the 
various phases of sociopolitical evolution, explaining how these patterns 
occur and evolve is a more contentious issue. Much explanation of 
social evolution in anthropology and sociology has tended to portray 
societies as integrated entities acting in a coherent manner similar to the 
behaviour of organic entities, such as the human body. This tradition was 
initially prominent in British anthropology’s functionalist school and its 
principles were continued in general systems theory. This approach was 
heavily influenced by cybernetics, the study of regulating mechanisms in 
machines. Society is portrayed as a system of interrelated parts in which 
each element functions in such a way as to maintain the system as a whole. 
Like a thermostat, the system reacts to deviation from the norm. When 
thresholds are reached, the system brings itself back within the boundaries 
of the normal steady state, or homeostasis. Change is therefore usually the 
result of the intrusion of external factors, such as environmental change 
or contact with different societies. The degree of change is usually heavily 
influenced by societies’ degree of success in incorporating new elements 
into existing structures.
General systems theory distinguishes between open and closed systems. 
Closed systems tend toward disintegration and entropy because of 
their inability to adapt to new circumstances, while open systems are 
dynamic and tend towards growth and internal differentiation. Increases 
in differentiation and internal integration occur because they confer 
a competitive advantage. Differentiation allows for increases in the quality 
of products through the increased skill factor that specialisation confers. 
Centralised, integrated structures increase efficiency by counteracting the 
duplication of resources and services, and providing overall coordination.29
Centralised control is important for the processing of information as well 
as the utilisation of energy. To coordinate internal components and react to 
external factors, a system must be able to gather, interpret and disseminate 
information to relevant sectors. The amount of information that can 
be processed by individuals, or groups, is finite. Information theory 
postulates that, as societies increase in size, the majority of individuals 
29  Barbara Abbott Segraves, ‘Central Elements in the Construction of a General Theory of the 
Evolution of Societal Complexity’, in Colin Renfrew, Michael J. Rowlands & Barbara Abbott 
Segraves (eds), Theory and Explanation in Archaeology: The Southampton Conference (New York: 
Academic Press, 1982), pp. 288, 294–95; Peebles & Kus (1977), p. 428; Alland (1980), pp. 262, 
323; and Frank Hole & Robert F. Heizer, An Introduction to Prehistoric Archaeology (2nd edn) (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1969), pp. 363, 373–81.
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must surrender a direct role in the decision-making process to ensure that 
society can respond to challenges more efficiently. It becomes necessary 
for members to obey commands in crucial situations for the benefit of 
society as a whole. For example, martial law and non-consensus decision-
making by the executive core of government commonly occur in times of 
war, as consensus-orientated decision-making could lead to fatal delays. 
The limits on information-processing capacity necessitate a hierarchical 
administrative structure. At each level, specific information is processed 
by specialists and passed on up the decision-making chain so that leaders 
are not overwhelmed by a mass of information. Political power usually 
involves influence on the content and targeting of the disseminated 
information, adding another potential avenue for rulers to consolidate 
or increase their influence.30
Internal divisions may be horizontal as well as vertical. Kinship, 
occupation, locality and other affiliations interact with class affiliations. 
Sociologist Michael Mann’s definition of society as ‘multiple overlapping 
and interconnecting networks of power’31 can accommodate both 
horizontal and vertical divisions. It also suggests society is a series of 
spheres – economic, territorial, cultural and so on, that never coincide 
precisely. Mann notes that: 
Human beings do not create unitary societies but a diversity of intersecting 
networks of social interaction. The most important of these networks 
form relative stability around the four power sources in any given social 
space. But underneath, human beings are tunnelling ahead to achieve 
their goals, forming new networks, extending old ones, and emerging 
most clearly into our view with rival configurations of one or more of the 
principle power networks.32
There is considerable value in combining conflict-orientated and 
integration-orientated perspectives. Social action may be influenced 
by the combination of internal power relations and external pressures. 
Internal power will be based on the interplay of coercive capacity and the 
perceived benefits of loyalty to higher authority for individuals. External 
pressures will either allow leaders to consolidate their powers in the name 
30  Segraves (1982), p. 297; Trigger (1985), pp. 48–49; Trigger (1978), pp. 194 ff., esp. 213–14; 
Tainter (1988), p. 91 ff.; Desmond Morris, The Human Zoo (London: World Books, 1971), chpt 1.
31  Mann (1986), p. 1.
32  Mann (1986), p. 16.
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of preserving society’s coherence, or allow existing contradictions to rise 
to the surface by diverting the power of existing leaders, or providing 
alternatives to their ideology and resource base.33
The development of states is sometimes explained as a result of internal 
responses to external pressures. At present, external pressures and elements 
in terms of European contact are the only theory that has been proposed 
to explain why Hawai‘i became a state precisely when it did and not 
decades before, when all of the necessary internally generated conditions 
Kirch and others outline were already in place. According to this theory, 
societies change because they become hemmed in and their options are 
reduced or channelled. Similarly, a society is faced with a situation in 
which its breakup is impossible and unacceptable in the face of external 
pressure. The most common scenario is one of increasing population in 
circumstances of unchanging or declining agricultural capacity because 
of environmental degradation from overuse; natural disasters, such as 
drought; or territorial confinement because of antagonistic, powerful 
neighbours. Mann uses such a concept to explain why some societies 
developed as centralised states and others did not. According to Mann, 
they became ‘caged’ because of highly specific circumstances. The ancient 
river-valley civilisations of the Middle East, for example, became tied 
to increasingly large-scale, centrally coordinated, irrigation-based and 
sedentary river-valley farming with high population density only because 
their agricultural prosperity attracted less prosperous neighbours to press 
in on their borders and hem them in.34
External elements may also play a more active role by providing new 
sources of power. Trade goods, tribute from conquered territories or 
foreign mercenaries may upset the balance of power. As Lloyd suggests, 
one possible outcome is that:
33  Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and 
China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 18–24; Phil Kohl, ‘Force, History and the 
Evolutionist Paradigm’, in Mathew Spriggs (ed.), Marxist Perspectives in Archaeology (Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), pp. 129–30; and Mann (1986), p. 540.
34  Mann (1986), pp. 124–26. See also Robert L. Carneiro, ‘A Theory of the Origin of the State’, 
Science, vol. 169, 1970, 733–38; Henri J.M. Claessen & Peter Skalnik, ‘The Early State: Theories 




The contest between the categories of office holders becomes more intense 
as established rules do not cover the allocation of the new resources. It is 
through the resolution of such contests, that one is most likely to follow 
the changes taking place in the political structure.35 
Territorial expansion is often cited as a major factor behind centralisation. 
Discussing Oyo in Nigeria, historian Robin Law notes, ‘The connection 
is two fold. First, the territorial expansion of the empire created 
administrative problems to which centralisation was a response. And 
second, the process of imperial expansion created the resources which 
made centralisation possible’.36
Expansion can also create and accentuate internal tensions. Because the 
new territories might incorporate culturally distinct or hostile peoples, 
a  standing army might be needed to garrison new areas and protect 
barriers. Resources from these outer areas may provide the revenue for 
such a  force.  A number of African kingdoms witnessed the erosion of 
established chiefly power in the kingdom’s heartland, as the ruler was 
able to create his own power base in the provinces by utilising provincial 
resources. Indeed, expansion was sometimes initially motivated by 
attempts to resolve or at least divert attention from internal tensions.37 
Most states have been characterised by an ongoing dialectic between central 
authorities seeking to consolidate power and senior officials attempting 
to convert their positions to a more independent and permanent basis. 
Both were confronted with demands for increased local autonomy.
As societies increase in size they confront a series of thresholds beyond 
which structural differentiation and functional specialisation must 
increase if internal coherence is to be maintained. Political expansion 
increases the resource base, but runs the risk of overextending the realm 
because more resources might be needed to maintain coherence than 
were gained through expansion.38 Without structural changes, the society 
may collapse or fragment. Societies are particularly open to change 
during such times of systemic stress. The inability to resolve crises often 
results in rapid change. There is always a tendency to be more willing to 
35  Lloyd (1968), p. 322. See also Earle (1989), p. 86.
36  Robin Law, The Oyo Empire c. 1600 – c. 1836: A West African Imperialism in the Era of the 
Atlantic Slave Trade (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 241.
37  Law (1977), pp. 241 ff.; and Lloyd (1968), pp. 328–29.
38  Campbell (1989), p. 47; and Mark Elvin, ‘Three Thousand Years of Unstable Growth: China’s 
Environment from Archaic Times to the Present’, East Asian History, no. 6, 1993, esp. p. 18.
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risk tragedy or the unknown rather than endure prolonged frustration. 
A society’s development often consists of long periods of relative stability 
interspersed with periods of rapid change. All aspects of society are not 
necessarily transformed to the same degree during times of rapid change. 
Continuity and change exist side by side.39
Centralised states are only one possible form of organisation and are not 
necessarily the logical conclusion of any social process. Power is not one-
dimensional. Mann distinguishes between intensive and extensive power. 
The former consists of concentrated power emanating from the centre 
that is often weak at the periphery. The latter consists of a more diffused 
form of power, usually involving a balance of power between localities 
and interest groups. Even intensive power usually involves a balance of 
power between various factions at the centre of power. It may be more 
appropriate to view state-building as the judicious balancing of power 
alongside attempts to concentrate that power, particularly in the early 
stages of state formation.40 It is argued in this book that this theory best 
fits the observed pattern of events and structures of organisation on the 
ground during Kamehameha’s period. The limits on chiefly coercive 
power required compromises to accommodate diffuse sources of power. 
This contention runs counter to the theories of Kirch and others outlined 
above that chiefly monopolies of power allowed them to concentrate and 
utilise more and more of their societies’ resources. On the other hand, 
there is no reason why societies cannot revert to older or less centralised 
forms of organisation. Devolution, decline, involution and stagnation 
are also possibilities, the last three largely involuntary, but the first in 
keeping with how the majority of humans have organised themselves for 
millennia.41
An important distinction is made in modern political science discourse 
on Pacific Island states between the processes of state formation and 
nation-building. Writing on post-2000 conflict in Melanesia, conflict 
resolution expert Sinclair Dinnen notes that post 2000, international 
39  Tainter (1988), pp. 194–96, 200; Mann (1986), p. 61; Jones & Kautz (1981), pp. 28–30; Kohl 
(1984), p. 130; Jonathan Friedman, ‘Catastrophe and Continuity in Social Evolution’, in Renfrew, 
Rowlands & Segraves (1982), pp. 179 ff.
40  Mann (1986), pp. 532–35. See also Colin Renfrew, ‘Space, Time, and Man’, in Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, vol. 6, 1981, 257–78; R.C.C. Law, ‘The Constitutional 
Troubles of Oyo in the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of African History, vol. 12 (1), 1971, 25–44; and 
Law (1977).
41  Friedman (1982), pp. 177–78, 181–82.
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interventions to restore peace and state services combine nation-building 
and state formation. By overly focusing on achieving ‘good governance’ in 
institutions for the state delivery of services, planners neglected the critical 
need for a joint focus on state and civil society relations. Effective nation-
building requires ‘developing a shared sense of political community that 
is capable of binding together the population of a given state’.42 Dinnen 
and many other political scientists point out that, in much of the world, 
nationalism often preceded state formation.43 While archaeology and 
anthropological discourse on state formation in the indigenous Pacific 
emphasises the breakdown of community loyalty and its replacement by 
loyalty to a territorial entity as a key process in the development of states, 
this study and that of Kānaka Maoli and other Pacific scholars emphasises 
that, to be enduring, polities rather need to broaden and enhance the 
strength of local bonds to embrace a wider state entity. This is a crucial 
distinction, the wider implications of which we discuss in the conclusion 
with reference to its implications for scholarship and contemporary state-
building interventions.
In their 2008 book Intervention and State-building in the Pacific, political 
scientists Greg Fry and Tarcisius Kabutaulaka note that the legitimisation 
of the doctrine of ‘cooperative intervention’ was first needed to justify 
Australian-led intervention in response to civil strife within neighbouring 
Melanesian nations. They note the importance of ‘establishing political 
acceptance of the project among those affected by it’.44 The interventionist, 
state–institution centred approach critiqued by Fry and Kabutaulaka 
rests on two flawed and interrelated assumptions that run counter to the 
conclusions reached in this study of the nature of power and authority 
in Hawai‘i. The first is the idea that centralised institutional efficiency 
is at the core of converting ‘failed states’ into functioning states. The 
centralised state model of Europe advocated by many international bodies 
seeking to resolve conflict only became efficient after prolonged periods 
42  Sinclair Dinnen, ‘The Twin Processes of Nation Building and State Building’, State, Society 
and Governance in Melanesia Briefing Note, no. 1/2007 (State, Society and Governance in Melanesia 
Program, The Australian National University, 2007), pp. 1–2.
43  Dinnen (2007), p. 3. See also Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990–1992 
(rev. edn) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule (Cambridge University Press, 
2005); and Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (rev. edn) (London: Verso, 1991).
44  Greg Fry & Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, ‘Political Legitimacy and State-building Intervention 
in the Pacific’, in Greg Fry & Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (eds), Intervention and State-building in the 
Pacific: The Legitimacy of ‘Cooperative Intervention’ (Manchester & New York: Manchester University 
Press, 2008), p. 3.
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of nation-building in Europe – a period of social identity-building must 
precede state formation based on developing effective state institutions 
so as to engender loyalty from citizens working in these institutions 
and communities seeking to benefit from them in excess of what they 
can provide themselves for kin and community. The Hawaiian polity 
accommodated multiple power sources and local identities through both 
necessity and design.
This conceptualisation of accumulated power as being more diffuse and 
balanced well beyond centralisation than the preceding theories admit is 
also the belief of the current generation of indigenous Hawaiian scholars.45 
The work of the late Kanalu Young and Jonathan Osorio is particularly 
compelling and persuasive in this regard. Despite the acclaimed 
international reputation of the Hawai‘inuiākea School of Hawaiian 
Knowledge at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa and Ka Haka ‘Ula O 
Ke‘elikōlani, College of Hawaiian Language of the University of Hawai‘i’s 
Hilo campus as leading centres of indigenous scholarship, none of the 
Western scholars of Hawaiian indigenous society cite Young and Osorio, 
or even include them in their bibliographies. Osorio’s work has been highly 
praised by a number of reviewers in leading history journals, making its 
omission from bibliographies of books on indigenous Hawaiian society 
even more astounding, while Young’s stunningly insightful work has not 
even been reviewed by the Journal of Pacific History. Their mentor, Lilikalā 
Kame‘eleihiwa, is recognised only marginally, and her emphasis on the 
nurturing element of chiefly rule is not mentioned.46 The same modern 
texts that praise the insights of mid-19th-century Hawaiian sources 
into their fast eroding culture, amidst European inroads and general 
indifference to Hawaiian beliefs, commit the same oversight in their own 
time against the cultural successors of scholars such as the Kānaka Maoli 
historians David Malo and Samuel Kamakau. It is the contention of this 
work that, in so doing, these scholars also misrepresent the nature of 
chiefly power and basis of social cohesion in Hawaiian society.
Young’s 1998 Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past challenged scholars to 
rethink standard approaches to the study of Hawaiian history outlined 
above by demonstrating a different history that is based on concepts 
derived from the Hawaiian language and oral traditions. Through 
45  Indigenous Hawaiian and Kānaka Maoli are used interchangeably in this book.




detailed and nuanced studies of incidents and cultural institutions that 
have been largely overlooked in most academic studies of Hawai‘i, Young 
revealed how lower ranked retainers acted as the glue that kept the polity 
together as intermediaries and messengers between the rulers and the 
ruled. Young noted that approaches to traditional Hawai‘i have tended 
to focus on the ali‘i nui (high chiefs) as leaders of a stratified society, 
and on the decisions they made in the context of the arrival of the haole 
(foreigners). This over-emphasis on the power and influence of high 
chiefs inadvertently marginalised other crucial institutions and internal 
interactions that provided stability and cohesion. Young’s focus is on 
the vital role and evolving history of his ancestors, the kaukau ali‘i. The 
kaukau ali‘i performed a variety of supporting roles for the high chiefs, 
such as childcare, redistributive service for the welfare of the community, 
as well as forming a key element of fighting contingents. Young argues 
convincingly that these roles provided Hawaiian society with coherence 
and resilience in changing circumstances. These tasks structured the 
flow of daily life and their detailing does much to undermine the idea of 
high chiefs as despots ruling by fear. Kaukau ali‘i also had empowerment 
strategies to advance their own interests. By shifting the focus of historical 
study from the high chiefs to the chiefly servers, a new perspective emerges 
in which the rulers are more in touch with those they rule and the flow 
of information and requests is more two-way than top-down.
Publication of Osorio’s Dismembering Lähui followed soon after Young’s 
work. Osorio examines the effects of introducing Western-style law codes 
on indigenous Hawaiians between the first constitution in 1840 and the 
so-called Bayonet Constitution in 1887, which marked the constitutional 
transfer of political power to resident Westerners. While focused on 
the period after the unification process of Kamehameha I, Osorio’s 
work is highly relevant because it demonstrates the long process that 
centralisation requires and extends Young’s focus on the key role of lesser 
ali‘i in maintaining social coherence in a time of transition, in this case as 
lesser known legislators. Osorio makes good use of legislative records and 
native petitions to government to ascertain the outlook of those outside 
the elite at a time when the new legislative body brought commoner and 
chief together. 
Another important body of scholarship on Eastern Polynesian societies, 
which emerged parallel to these streams in the 1980s, has also received less 
recognition globally but adds support to the image of a less dictatorial and 
despotic form of governance proposed by Young and Osorio. In this era, 
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over a century of Aotearoa/New Zealand Māori protest at land alienation 
and breaches of faith by the Crown finally led to the formation of the 
Waitangi Tribunal to investigate injustices against Māori and to assist 
the Crown’s attempts to address grievances. A great deal of research on 
indigenous histories and ways of viewing land, sea and social relations, 
which was conducted to make the case for compensation and restitution 
before the tribunal, combined with a renaissance in Māori assertions of 
cultural identity to produce a profound cultural and academic revolution. 
Across Eastern Polynesia, indigenous scholars and community leaders are 
emphasising that political power was always more consensus-based than 
most academics claim, and that the effective exercise of this community-
based, consensual power required a strong basis of environmental 
guardianship.47 This vision is in direct contrast to the majority of academic 
theories outlined above. This contemporary Polynesian construction of 
statecraft cannot be dismissed as a romanticised version of the past because 
of the detailed evidence that Young and Osorio use to support their claims 
and because this vision also finds support in state theory and observations 
from history, political science and sociology, as outlined above. This body 
of observation characterises the role and reality of government as creating 
balance and seeking broad consensus among competing interest groups 
rather than concentrating or even monopolising power in the hands of 
the state. We argue here that this vision is also a better fit with events and 
underlying processes that are said to have been at play in the Hawaiian 
unification process.
Guns, hearts and minds: Balancing coercion 
and consent in the pursuit of power
No scholar who claims that Kamehameha’s victories were due to European 
weapons discusses their use in battle. Weapons are simply assumed to have 
conferred a decisive advantage on and off the battlefield. This inflates the 
47  Tamatoa Bambridge (ed.), The Rahui: Legal pluralism in Polynesian traditional management of 
resources and territories (Canberra: ANU Press, 2016); M. Mulholland & V. Tawhai (eds), Weeping Waters: 
The Treaty of Waitangi and Constitutional Change (Wellington: Huia, 2010); Jacinta Ruru, ‘The Right to 
Water as the Right to Identity: Legal Struggles of Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand’, in F. 
Sultana & A. Loftus (eds), The Right to Water: Politics, Governance and Social Struggles (Abingdon, UK: 
Earthscan, 2012), pp. 110–22; and Okusitino Māhina, ‘The Poetics of Tongan Traditional History, 




importance of weapons in warfare, and coercion in political consolidation. 
In so doing, this body of scholarship ignores and runs counter to the 
analysis of 40 years of scholarship on the impact of Western weaponry by 
Pacific historians, which has consistently concluded that Western firearms 
and cannon were not decisive in warfare and political consolidation.48 
Earle, for example, claims that:
Warfare was a strategy that determined real political relationships in 
the Hawaiian Islands. Succession was won on the battlefield, and rival 
island paramount chiefs continually confronted each other in battles of 
conquest. Until the introduction of western weapons, these conquests 
were effective only up to the natural boundaries of the major islands 
and their immediately neighboring islands. Complete unification of the 
major islands through conquest failed, and the Hawaiian state emerged 
only when an effective new military technology was introduced. Until 
then, though bound together through marriage and intrigue, the islands 
remained divided into separate chiefdoms focused on the islands of 
Hawai‘i, Maui, O‘ahu and Kaua‘i.49
Warfare is not considered to be as important as the sacred status of 
chiefs in the accumulation of power and influence in Hawai‘i. However, 
as well as the above-noted absence of analysis of the use of coercion in 
political power, those advocating the role of chiefs’ sacred status as a key 
to commanding obedience rarely examine the degree to which coercion, 
or the latent threat of coercion, secured the loyalty of the population 
within the sacred chiefs’ territories. Earle, in noting that the same military 
power that allowed expansion also introduced internal instability, even 
suggests coercive power might have threatened chiefly power rather than 
reinforced it, as the ruler could not always rely on the loyalty of warriors 
serving under subordinate chiefs.50
Very little has been written about Hawaiian warfare during this time 
of transition or any other time. Indeed, few have even considered the 
extent to which leaders were able to use violence to command obedience 
in indigenous Hawaiian society from 1778 to 1819. Some articles have 
appeared on the role of firearms and beachcombers in Kamehameha’s 
48  Dorothy Shineberg, ‘Guns and Men in Melanesia’, Journal of Pacific History, vol. 6, 1971, 61–
82; K.R. Howe, ‘Firearms and Indigenous Warfare: A Case Study’, Journal of Pacific History, vol. 9, 
1974, 21–38; and Paul D’Arcy, ‘Māori and Muskets from a Pan-Polynesian Perspective’, New Zealand 
Journal of History, vol. 34 (1), April 2000, 117–32.
49  Earle (1997), p. 140.
50  Earle (1997), pp. 105–10.
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victories. Most authors assume that firearms secured victory without 
investigating the nature of the fighting that took place in the 1790s. 
Ethnographers such as Peter Buck provide inventories of Hawaiian 
weaponry, while archaeologist and ethnographer Kenneth Emory’s chapter 
on warfare in Ancient Hawaiian Civilization relies heavily on two 19th-
century writers: Malo and the missionary William Ellis. Both of these 
sources describe warfare as a series of general principles. As a result, Emory’s 
work does not distinguish between pre- and post-unification practices, 
nor does it portray warfare as a process that was modified according to 
circumstances. Historian Gavan Daws contrasts tactical procedures and 
rituals with the grim reality of battle in Kamehameha’s time, but spends 
less than a page on this subject.51 Earle’s study emphasises the importance 
of coercion, but more as a destabilising force than as a factor assisting 
unification. Two non-academic studies touch upon this topic: Neil Dukas’s 
Military History of Sovereign Hawaii and Richard Tregaskis’s The Warrior 
King. Dukas’s 2004 work is a brief, popular history dealing largely with 
the period after the one considered here, has few footnotes and a tendency 
towards an uncritical reading of sources. Dukas follows the format of the 
ethnographic sources consulted and presents Hawaiian warfare for much 
of the period prior to 1819 as a static set of rules and practices rather 
than an evolving process. Tregaskis’s book is a work of historical fiction.52 
The  largest study of warfare in Hawai‘i is  James Fitzsimmons’s 1969 
Masters’ thesis from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, ‘Warfare in Old 
Hawaii’. The study is particularly insightful on the post-unification era.53
This neglect of warfare and other forms of coercion as influences on political 
evolution is somewhat at odds with social science and historical practice 
elsewhere in the world. Distinguished anthropologist Robert Carneiro has 
consistently argued and documented how war existed before states and 
how war was a major, if not the major, influence on the development of 
first chiefdoms and then states and how, in turn, war was transformed by 
51  Peter Buck, ‘Warfare and Weapons’, in Arts and Crafts of Hawaii (Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop 
Museum, 1964), pp. 417–64; J. Feher, Hawaii: A Pictorial History (Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop 
Museum, 1969), pp. 117–19; Kenneth P. Emory, ‘Warfare’, in E.S.C. Handy et al., Ancient Hawaiian 
Civilization – A Series of Lectures Delivered at the Kamehameha Schools (rev. edn), (Tokyo: Charles 
E. Tuttle Company, 1965); and Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1968a), p. 31.
52  Neil Dukas, Military History of Sovereign Hawaii (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 2004); and 
Richard Tregaskis, The Warrior King: Hawaii’s Kamehameha the Great (London: Macmillan, 1973).
53  James Patrick Fitzsimmons, ‘Warfare in Old Hawaii: The Transformation of a Poleomological 
System’, MA Thesis, University of Hawai‘i, 1969.
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states.54 Carneiro echoes anthropologists and archaeologists of Hawai‘i in 
assigning a key role to political control of agricultural surpluses to supply 
and fund the organs of state, but places key emphasis on armies as well, 
not only as beneficiaries of agricultural output, but also as contributors 
by conquering more agricultural land to increase the output available 
to rulers. In this, he also finds common ground with Charles Tilly, the 
renowned scholar of Western and comparative state formation.55 Tilly 
notes the variability of state formation processes and configurations, so 
that caution is needed in applying models from one context to another as is 
attempted in this book. The revised approach to state-building attempted 
here is, however, a better fit between observed outcomes and asserted 
processes. In essence, however, the three components are common and 
crucial to all processes of political development: coercion, or the ability 
to harm or disrupt persons, possessions or social relations; resources, or 
the material means to enforce political will; and commitment, or relations 
between social entities that promote their taking account of each other. In 
other configurations of power discussed below, this last category is usually 
associated with the term consent.56
In the last three decades, military history, political theory and European-
orientated state-formation literature have recognised the need for a more 
wide-ranging vision of the role of violence in power relations. No leader 
can rule by coercive means alone. Power is now usually portrayed as 
multifaceted: involving military, economic, organisational and ideological 
dimensions. This literature has been synthesised into a paradigm-shifting 
theoretical framework for the study of coercion as a political tool that 
has, however, largely bypassed Pacific Studies. While Pacific specialists 
tend to analyse warfare as a cultural act whose form and function varies 
between cultures, contemporary Western military historians emphasise 
the importance of logistical, organisational and psychological factors.57 
Both groups’ approaches call for a re-evaluation of the significance of 
European weaponry and mercenaries in the Hawaiian wars of unification. 
54  Robert L. Carneiro, ‘War and Peace: Alternating Realities in Human History’, in S.P. Reyna 
&  R.E. Downs (eds), Studying War: Anthropological Perspectives (Langhorne, Penn.: Gordon and 
Breach, 1994), p. 14.
55  Decades of Tilly’s thinking are admirably and concisely summarised in his ‘States, State 
Transformation, and War’, in Jerry H. Bentley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of World History (Oxford, 
University Press, 2011), esp. pp. 178–85. His ideas on the role and limits on coercion in state power 
are most thoroughly covered in his Trust and Rule (2005), and Coercion, Capital, and European States 
AD 990–1992 (1992).
56  Tilly (2011), p. 180.
57  D’Arcy (2000).
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On the one hand, warfare was a stage for the enhancement of personal 
status while, on the other, it carried more sanguine aims that were 
achieved through long-term attrition rather than by dramatic victories in 
the course of a day. 
Until the 1970s, military history conventionally focused on fighting 
methods and weaponry. Battles were decisive turning points in human 
history. Warfare was analysed in terms of generalship, tactics and strategy. 
The latter two were discussed in terms of abstract principles of warfare 
that, if applied correctly, enhanced the chances of victory. Great generals 
controlled their men like so many chess pieces to outmanoeuvre their 
opponents and then deliver the decisive blow. The object of manoeuvring 
was to concentrate your strength at a decisive point where the enemy was 
weaker. Battles were described in discrete phases, rather than as a flow 
of confusing and overlapping incidents. Firepower and the shock of the 
charge were the principal ways of delivering the decisive blow. Advances 
in the striking power of hand-to-hand weapons or to the range, volume 
and accuracy of missile weapons provided a decisive advantage. This belief 
fuelled many arms races throughout history.58
Recent studies have challenged many of these conventions. Studies on 
military technology show that its performance in combat is usually well 
below that achieved in peacetime tests and training exercises. Calculations 
of peacetime military strength are usually quantitative, as size is more 
tangible than operational capability. The shrapnel shell favoured by many 
armies in World War I was found to be far less effective than believed 
when a shell accidentally exploded among a group of scientists after the 
war and all escaped unscathed.59
Strategic and tactical plans rarely go as smoothly as portrayed in 
conventional military texts and battle maps. War seldom goes according 
to plan. Rather, war is a risky enterprise with an unpredictable outcome. 
Nations can prepare for war, but they can never practice for the real thing. 
Men tend to blunder through the experience rather than control events. 
Order is usually created in memoirs, official records and history books 
produced only after the fact. Operating principles espoused in military 
58  John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin, 1976), pp. 25 ff.; and Michael Howard et al., 
‘What is Military History?’, in Juliet Gardiner (ed.), What is History Today? (London: Macmillan, 1988), 
pp. 4–17.
59  James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare (New York: 
William Morrow & Co., 1982), pp. 216, 231, 243–44.
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texts distort this reality by relying on simplified accounts of extreme cases 
– the great triumphs and the great disasters of military history, such the 
campaigns of Julius Caesar or Napoleon’s demise at Waterloo. The reality 
is often much less spectacular. For most of history, warfare has not been 
dramatically decisive, but a rather cautious, piecemeal and indecisive 
business with little overall grand strategy. The urge to play safe and think 
of defence has been just as prominent as the desire for dramatic victories 
and bold campaigns. Perceptions, however, often remain unchanged by 
experience. James Dunnigan believes history shows armies remember 
no more of the past than their oldest members. Peacetime armies are 
transformed into fighting organisations through a bloody process of trial 
and error, only to forget these lessons in the next lengthy period of peace.60
There has been, since 1970, a renaissance in studies on psychological 
factors in warfare. In his 1976 book The Face of Battle, John Keegan 
points out that the physical disintegration of an army in battle must be 
preceded by its moral disintegration. As such, the study of battle must 
be necessarily social and psychological. For Keegan, the study of battle 
is the study of group solidarity and its correlate, the disintegration of 
human groups. He  focuses on the behaviour of men: ‘men striving to 
reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honour and the 
achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them’.61
The uninitiated often view the onset of war with enthusiasm. Defeat, 
wounding or dying are seen as remote prospects. But, as battle 
approaches, enthusiasm tends to turn to apprehension. Armies use 
pre-battle ceremonies involving religious rites or military reviews as 
necessary symbolic thresholds at which men pause to mentally prepare 
themselves for the coming shock. Without these ceremonies, armies often 
fight with much less resolve, as is sometimes the case in unanticipated 
encounters. Once in battle, many find the stress of combat preferable to 
the anxious wait just prior to combat. The extreme danger and stress of 
battle increases energy and hones physical functions. Every act has a new 
feeling of significance not experienced in the daily activities of everyday 
life. The simple desire to survive is a powerful stimulant. Dunnigan notes 
that heroes are often simply men who become cornered and see no other 
option than to fight their way to safety. The first sight of a dead body in 
60  Dunnigan (1982), pp. 216, 233; and Keegan (1987), pp. 6–7.
61  Keegan (1976), pp. 302–03.
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battle is usually a great shock. Until then, death is a remote experience 
for young men. Experiencing the sight of death reminds combatants that 
they are potential victims as well as potential victors.62
A group of combatants can be likened to a crowd. Crowds have 
personalities that affect the actions of those within them. Crowds are easily 
panicked. Indeed, it is a difficult task just to keep men on the battlefield 
let alone inspire them to acts of bravery.63 Physical coercion plays its part. 
Dereliction of duty usually carries severe penalties in most armies. Less 
obvious influences play a significant role. The ‘warrior myth’ is commonly 
used to distract attention from the brutal reality of a violent and often 
anonymous, meaningless death. The ‘warrior myth’ tells of battles won, 
heroic deeds of individual valour that confer lasting immortality and 
fame on their instigators. The generally poor treatment of veterans by 
modern societies has done little to overturn the myth. While, however, 
there are young men eager to prove their manhood, and veterans seeking 
to enhance their status and justify their sacrifices, the ‘warrior myth’ will 
continue to endure.64
Modern practice emphasises the importance of drill and discipline in 
the armed forces. In the physically and emotionally taxing environment 
of battle, drill and discipline are something to fall back on as automatic 
responses drummed into the consciousness by constant repetition. 
A group of drilled men tend to have a collective psychology that differs 
from and overrides individual identities and fears. But the most commonly 
cited influence behind keeping men in battle is small unit cohesiveness. 
Small groups that fight and live together tend to establish a strong sense 
of comradeship and loyalty. Group cohesion may be increased by symbols 
of membership, such as uniforms or regimental flags. The fear of being 
seen to shirk one’s duty in front of comrades acts as a strong counter to the 
concern for personal survival. The fear of losing one’s reputation as a man 
among close associates is often held more dearly than life itself.65
62  Keegan (1976), pp. 259–65, 281, 333–34; Dunnigan (1982), pp. 210, 236; Paul Fussel, 
The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 327; Ronald J. Glossop, 
Confronting War: An Examination of Humanity’s Most Pressing Problem (North Carolina: McFarland, 
1983), pp. 79–80.
63  Keegan (1976), pp. 174–75; and Gwynne Dyer, War (New York: Crown Publishers, 1985), p. 142.
64  Dyer (1985), pp. 13–15.
65  Dyer (1985), pp. 12–13; Dunnigan (1982), p. 211; Keegan (1976), pp. 51, 176; and John 




While morale is a decisive factor, élan alone will not carry the day against 
equally motivated opponents with superior weapons. This lesson was 
learnt by Scottish Highlanders at Culloden and by countless indigenous 
societies in the late 19th century against European forces armed with 
modern, rapid-firing weapons. Similarly, morale and weaponry are of 
limited value if an army cannot be maintained and supplied in the field. 
The process of producing and supplying enough to feed and arm troops 
is a major undertaking. Ultimately, the art of winning battles is really no 
more than the art of the logistically possible. Throughout history logistical 
problems have been major constraints on warfare. If wars progress beyond 
the initial encounters, they generally settle down into struggles of attrition. 
Battles are relatively infrequent in war.
While archaeologists of Hawai‘i have emphasised the importance of 
agricultural production for providing a surplus on which chiefs could 
draw for political consolidation, none have realised how crucial logistical 
supplies were to military victory in chiefly societies. Humans have been 
dispersed in agricultural communities for much of history. Urban centres 
and assembled armies represent unusual concentrations of humanity that 
pose logistical problems. This century’s advances in food storage and 
transportation have helped considerably but, for most of history, warring 
armies have had to live off the land, or severely restrict their movements 
to localities with stored caches of supplies and adequate amounts of 
drinking water. Many armies were little more than temporarily assembled 
levies who were expected to feed themselves. This was especially true 
in economies that generated limited agricultural surpluses beyond 
subsistence needs. Such societies could not spare the manpower or food 
for prolonged campaigns, so that fighting had to be brief and organised 
around agricultural seasons.66
Some armies disintegrated, without ever coming into contact with their 
enemies, because of inadequate supplies and poor preventive measures 
to avoid the outbreak of disease. Until relatively recently, disease often 
accounted for more deaths and incapacitation than battle casualties 
in warfare. Public health practices are usually difficult to implement in 
the field and, for much of human history, such practices were at best 
primitive. The medical treatment of wounds has usually been inadequate. 
66  Tilly (2011), pp. 184–85; Keegan & Holmes (1985), pp. 146–50, 225; and Robert S. Smith, 
Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa (Norwich, Great Britain: Methuen, 1976), 
pp. 42–43.
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In Europe, for example, there was very little provision for getting the 
wounded to hospitals and treating them until well into the 19th century. 
Treatment was a traumatic experience of amputations and removal of 
projectiles without anaesthetics. Sanitation was usually appalling. It was 
not until after 1850, when disinfectants began to be used consistently, 
that deaths from complications and infections of battle wounds regularly 
fell below deaths in battle. It was not until World War II that the chances 
of surviving a wound increased significantly with the use of antibiotics 
and blood transfusions.67
Other aspects of human activity, however, affect military capacity besides 
food production. Warfare is a manifestation of the societies that raise 
armies to pursue it, and the economies, technologies and worldviews that 
those societies sustain. Fighters must be motivated enough to risk their 
lives, while the rest of society must make sacrifices to ensure that the war 
effort is kept supplied. The waging of war will be heavily influenced by 
the organisation of society, and particularly its solidarity in supporting 
its leaders. Warfare needs to be examined in a wider context. No such 
breadth of vision has been attempted for Hawaiian society, despite the 
wealth of relevant information available.
***
Warfare is only one form of coercion, and coercion is only one means of 
exercising political control. Organised violence occurs within societies as 
well as between them. Violence need not be direct and physical. Sociologist 
Johan Galtung has coined the phrase ‘structural violence’ to describe 
inequalities and social restrictions on members of a society. To Galtung, 
the mere absence of war is only a negative peace. True positive peace 
involves both the absence of hostilities and injustices.68 This distinction 
is important for any discussion of warfare. Control is about more than 
just coercive ability. Coercion alone will never secure lasting compliance. 
Indeed, as political theorist Hannah Arendt has argued, the resort to 
violence is a sign of a loss of true power, which ultimately rests on a society’s 
willingness to be governed.69 From this perspective, Hawaiian traditions 
on the virtues of chiefly benevolence towards followers can be viewed as 
67  Dunnigan (1982), pp. 323–27; Keegan & Holmes (1985), pp. 145–49.
68  Johan Galtung, ‘Twenty-five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses’, 
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 22 (2), 1985, 145–46.
69  Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Orlando, Florida: Harvest Press, 1970), p. 56.
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much as reflection of a fundamental reality of power as self-serving myth-
making. It was a reality of power that Kamehameha embraced and his 
rivals ignored, to their ultimate demise.
Concepts of power vary. Power is generally portrayed as the ability to 
ensure one’s desires are carried out even in the face of opposition, or as 
resting on the consent of a community. The latter is often referred to 
as legitimised power, or authority. The key distinction is between consent 
and coercion. Power can be seen to rest ultimately on coercive capacity, 
with the exercise of authority also resting on the threat of sanctions as the 
price of disobedience. Alternatively, authority can be seen as not only an 
aspect of power, but as the basis of power. According to this scenario, resort 
to physical violence is a sign of the erosion of power. The supreme exercise 
of power is to avert conflict and grievances by influencing, shaping and 
determining the perceptions of others. Although it is generally conceded 
that a balance between sanctions and benefits is needed to secure enduring 
compliance, most writers tend to emphasise the ultimate primacy of 
one of these two aspects of power.70 In reality, however, power involves 
a judicious balance between coercion and consent. Retaining power 
involves knowing just how far coercion can be exercised without risking a 
counterproductive backlash. An early concession may alleviate the need for 
excessive violence later on in the face of mounting opposition. To French 
anthropologist Maurice Godelier, violence and consent are inseparable. 
The violence of the dominant is only useful if it secures the consent of the 
dominated. Obedience becomes preferable to sanctions.71
Anthropologist Peter Wilson noted that the exercise of power does not 
necessarily require physical actions:
Power as production of an intended effect, when given the meaning ‘to 
make an impression’, can be extended to the successful fulfillment of 
deception, to the successful creation of an illusion, and, most important 
of all, to the conviction that one sort of effect (the impression) may be 
taken to be a reliable confirmation of another sort of effect. In short, 
by producing something that makes a great impression it is possible to 
confirm the possibility of the capacity to produce other, more material 
70  Stephen Lukes, ‘Power and Authority’, in R. Nisbett & T. Baltimore (eds), A History of 
Sociological Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1978), pp. 633, 637; Keegan (1987), p. 315; Johan 
Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1973), p. 35; and Arendt (1970), pp. 43 ff. 
71  Maurice Godelier, ‘Infrastructures, Societies, and History’, Current Anthropology, vol. 19 (4), 
1978, 767; Keegan (1987), p. 315; and Galtung (1973), p. 35.
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effects without actually having to do so … In this way, for example, 
a  candidate, by making an impression, establishes a claim to power 
without ever demonstrating the power to lead.72
There are good reasons for those in power to exercise restraint. Actual 
capacity can only be determined when it is unleashed. Such an occurrence 
is wrought with unknowns. Victory, or catastrophe may result. Powerful 
backlashes may be generated. Restraint from using power may enhance 
one’s power because perceptions of potential power are often much greater 
than the reality. As noted above, it can be argued that resort to physical 
coercion is a sign of the loss of power as its potential consequences have 
failed to deter possible opponents.
Adherence to prescribed behaviour occurs for a variety of reasons. One may 
conform out of fear of sanctions for not doing so. Conformity may arise 
through belief that the behaviour demanded is either justified, necessary, 
or will serve one’s own interests. Consent may also be founded on the belief 
that alternative courses will not return the same benefits. Conformity 
may simply occur through force of habit, with those concerned never 
encountering alternative conceptions that challenge prevailing norms. 
The behaviour of any individual may involve the interaction of all or some 
of these forms of consent – fear, acquiescence, attachment, indifference 
and habit.73
Four spheres of human activity are generally cited as avenues for the pursuit 
of power. These are: economic activity, the use of coercion, organisational 
institutions for governing society, and the definition of norms and 
values.74 Economic activity involves human activities and social relations 
for the production and distribution of goods and services. The elements 
of production are human labour, natural materials, and technological 
means for converting materials into useful resources. Economic power 
involves securing subsistence needs through the social organisation of the 
extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of objects of 
nature. Most Marxists emphasise the importance of controlling modes 
of  production, especially human labour. Others, such as Karl Polanyi, 
72  Peter J. Wilson, The Domestication of the Human Species (particularly chpt 5, ‘The Surrealities 
of Power’, pp. 117–50) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 118.
73  Lukes (1978), pp. 643 ff.; and Joseph V. Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought Hegemony, Consciousness, 
and the Revolutionary Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 37–40, 45.
74  Mann (1986), pp. 20–49.
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stress the importance of controlling the distribution of resources through 
trade and exchange networks. Earle sees the ultimate value of economic 
control as the ability to buy compliance through rewards or deprivations.75
Coercive power derives from control of the tools of coercion: weapons 
and obedient manpower. Coercive capacity is a relative measure. What 
matters is the gap between potential opponents’ strength. The military 
and economic spheres are related not merely through payments to secure 
obedience and the logistical requirements of an army but also in terms of 
social organisation. Hunter–gatherer societies use weapons of the hunt 
against human rivals. The use of cavalry in feudal Europe required the 
decentralisation of power, as cavalry were expensive to maintain and the 
main form of wealth was land rather than a concentrated source, such 
as commerce. Earle notes that, in such decentralised systems, military 
strength is problematic as warriors, who are the basis of chiefly power, are 
also potential usurpers.76
While Marxist theory tends to dismiss government institutions as 
merely tools of a ruling class united by economic interests, some 
sociologists make a strong case for viewing government as a distinct 
power base. Class interests do not necessarily correlate with those of 
government administrative bodies. Once the functions of government are 
institutionalised, the foundations for new power networks are established. 
Loyalty to the state, or even bodies within government’s administrative 
apparatus, replaces other loyalties based on economic interests or blood 
relations.77 Governments in modern states tend to monopolise coercive 
force. The norms of society are codified into laws administered through 
a judiciary, and backed up by the threat of the use of governmental coercive 
apparatus for noncompliance. At the same time government is dependent 
on taxes and levies to support its administrative apparatus. Government 
is usually portrayed as a mutually beneficial contract between citizens 
and the state in which the citizen surrenders certain aspects of personal 
freedom in return for enhanced security.78
A number of commentators claim the crucial means of control is in 
determining the norms and values of society. R.C. MacIver asserts:
75  Earle (1997), p. 6; Mann (1986), p. 24; Segraves (1982), p. 297.
76  Earle (1997), p. 8, Mann (1986), pp. 25–26, 48–49; and Michael Howard, War in European 
History (Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 1–3.
77  Mann (1986), pp. 10–11; Skocpol (1979), pp. 25–30.
78  Alland (1980), pp. 447–51.
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Every society is held together by a myth-system, a complex of dominating 
thought-forms that determines and sustains all its activities. All social 
relations, the very texture of human society are myth-born and myth-
sustained.79 
If one concept of reality is dominant, all modes of thought and behaviour 
will be infused with its spirit. It is this situation that Italian political 
theorist Antonio Gramsci refers to as hegemony. If desirable concepts are 
associated with existing institutions, and external influences restricted, 
then it will be difficult for alternative images of society to emerge. 
Groups, while discontented with their lot, are nevertheless unable to 
locate the source of their discontent because of restricted insight into the 
alternatives.80
Although norms and values can be manipulated to legitimise or hide the 
realities of power, there are limits. Ideologies are unlikely to attain a hold 
over people if they merely serve to justify inequality and domination. 
They must be at least plausible to be generally adhered to without the 
threat of sanction to back them up. Ideologies are able to legitimise 
power when they are able to capture and articulate peoples’ experiences 
and desires.81 Attitudes and beliefs are influenced by their application in 
practice. The basis of authority can change through time. The resilience 
of any normative structure in the wake of change will depend on its 
flexibility and ability to mould perceptions of new elements into existing 
worldviews through control of information dissemination.
It is important to distinguish between the four avenues of power and 
the enactment of power. The four modes of power are merely the realms 
within which the play for power is enacted. Networks of individuals 
attempting to utilise the four avenues to further their own interests create 
power. The success or failure of any network depends on its organisation 
of its resources to achieve its goals. Utilisation rather than possession is the 
key element. As MacIver points out, 
79  MacIver (1965), p. 4.
80  Femia (1981), pp. 24, 43–44, 120.
81  Mann (1986), p. 23; MacIver (1965), pp. 56–58; and John Kenneth Galbraith, The Anatomy 
of Power (London: Corgi, 1985), pp. 39–40, 43.
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To say that in the struggle of groups the most powerful wins is to say 
nothing, for the power of a group is no simple function of the force it 
disposes; it depends no less on its solidarity, its organizing ability, its 
leadership, the resources and its resourcefulness, its tenacity of purpose, 
and other things.82
The four modes of power offer alternative or combinable organisational 
means of social control. Domination is as much a matter of relative 
organisational coherence as it is a trade-off between coercion and consent.
The interaction between the modes of power and their enactment in 
combination is perhaps most clearly articulated by Canadian economist 
and diplomat J.K. Galbraith in his The Anatomy of Power, which traces the 
evolution of power in the European world. He distinguishes underlying 
sources of power from avenues of power. Galbraith lists the sources of 
power as personality, organisation and property. These equate to the 
four spheres just discussed in that, in Galbraith’s scheme, economic 
activity and use of coercion are combined as property. By personality, 
Galbraith means traits such as physique, confidence, persuasiveness 
and intellect that allow individuals to rise above their fellow men and 
secure compliance. Such qualities are usually associated with leadership. 
Any organisation involves the coming together of those of similar interests, 
values or perception. The pursuit of power requires the submission of 
a sufficiently large body of adherents to the purpose of the organisation; 
internal coherence is a key factor. Property refers to material objects whose 
desirability makes them useful commodities for purchasing compliance. 
To a lesser extent, property may enforce compliance if it is in the form 
of coercive instruments wielded by a coherent group.83
The key to power lies in the effective combination of the sources of power. 
To Galbraith, organisation is the ultimate source of power. Personality 
and property have effect only with the support of organisation. 
Personality  alone  may allow an individual access to power, but the 
individual needs the support of an organisation to maintain that power. 
Whether personality secures property or a following of adherents, no 
individual can maintain this hold without support. Galbraith points out 
that many leaders rule not so much because of their ability to ensure 
compliance but because they head an organisation whose coherence 
82  MacIver (1965), p. 12; and Mann (1986), pp. 6–7, 518, 523.
83  Galbraith (1985), pp. 23–25.
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of belief is already in place. On the other hand, strong leaders can ensure 
an organisation maintains its direction and coherence. Property only 
becomes an avenue for power when organisations control and utilise 
property for their own ends.84
Galbraith distinguishes the three ways that the sources of power may 
be utilised as: condign power, compensatory power and conditional 
power. Condign power secures compliance through the imposition of 
unpleasant and painful alternatives for noncompliance with the group’s 
wishes. Compensatory power ensures adherence to the group’s objectives 
by rewarding compliant individuals. In each case, individuals are aware 
that they are submitting. In contrast, conditioned power works to ensure 
that submission is not recognised. By influencing beliefs, the course of 
action desired is made to seem natural and appropriate.85 The power of an 
organisation depends on its association with other sources of power, and 
its control over all modes of power. An organisation is strong when it has 
access to all modes of power, and weak when access is missing. Galbraith 
detects the gradual emergence of organisation to replace property and 
personality as the dominant source of power.86
Western influence versus indigenous 
continuity in Hawai‘i’s unification
The inability of any of the theories in the previous section to adequately 
explain why the conquest and unification of the Hawaiian Islands by 
Kamehameha I occurred specifically between 1782 and 1812, during 
a  time of increasing European contact, has prompted the attribution 
of his success to European weapons and ideas. Scholars are divided on 
the degree to which European influences facilitated political unification. 
Anthropologist Irving Goldman believes Europeans merely precipitated 
a process of unification that would have occurred without their presence.87 
Historian Gavan Daws is more circumspect when he states that:
84  Galbraith (1985), pp. 55–56, 65.
85  Galbraith (1985), pp. 4–6.
86  Galbraith (1985), pp. 89 ff., esp. 131–32.
87  Goldman (1970), p. 200.
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Whether, undisturbed by contact with the West, Hawaiian society would 
ever have crossed the line from tribalism to some sort of unified primitive 
state, is problematical. Certainly the chances for new experiments in 
power politics provided by the appearance of white men with advanced 
military technology transformed Hawaiian traditional society in the space 
of one or two generations.88
Most academics conclude that European contact had a significant 
influence on unification. They generally echo Daws in assigning particular 
importance to European weapons to explain how Kamehameha was able 
to unify the archipelago.89
So far, scholars have been unable to explain the unification of the 
Hawaiian Islands from the late 1780s onwards solely by pre-existing 
factors in Hawaiian society on the eve of sustained European contact. 
Hawai‘i is a prominent focus of one of the strengths of Pacific Studies 
– the dynamics of culture contact and interactions between Europeans 
and Pacific Islanders. Pacific Studies has led the way in examining the 
cultural logic behind the exchange of items and ideas between Europeans 
and Islanders. Island beaches are portrayed as transformative spaces and 
processes where objects, ideas and individuals move between cultures, 
mediated by power relations and acculturation.90
The decade of the 1980s, which saw the reorientation of Pacific anthropology 
towards greater focus on the interaction between cultural structures and 
historical processes, was a time when historians were coming out of two 
decades of adjusting their focus from history as primarily a sequence 
of events to one more focused on the social, economic and ideological 
structures underlying actions. Works like E.P. Thomson’s The Making of 
the English Working Class highlighted the history of this usually neglected 
group in historical narratives.91 The working of underlying structures into 
the narrative of events is no easy task. What has tended to emerge from 
attempts to marry structure and event was what anthropologist Nicholas 
88  O.A. Bushnell (ed.), The Illustrated Atlas of Hawaii, text by Gavan Daws (10th edn) (Honolulu: 
Island Heritage, 1987), p. 14.
89  For example, H.E. Maude, ‘Beachcombers and Castaways’, in H.E. Maude, Of Islands and Men: 
Studies in Pacific History (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 156–57; and M. Kelly 
(ed.), Hawaii in 1819: A Narrative Account by Louis Claude de Saules de Freycinet (Honolulu: Bernice 
P. Bishop Museum Press, 1978), p. 103 n. 24.
90  A good example of this approach is Greg Dening’s Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land, 
Marquesas 1774–1880 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1980), pp. 3, 157–61, esp. 159.
91  E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: V. Gollancz, 1980).
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Thomas calls ‘systemic history’ – analysis that is more structure than 
process.92 The idea persists that culture changes round the edges as a result 
of cultural interaction and changed circumstances, but the core remains 
intact, changing very gradually if at all. Interestingly, Pacific historian J.W. 
Davidson reached similar conclusions a decade before, despite coming 
from an intellectual tradition that emphasises historical processes over 
cultural beliefs.93
According to this systemic history school of thought, Pacific Islander 
political and social philosophy centred on the idea of melding local and 
exotic elements. Daws, for example, notes that power in Hawai‘i was 
‘always violent, always usurping, came from the outside, and belonged 
to strangers. But authority was always legitimate, always came from 
within, belonged to those born with it, belonged to natives’.94 Sahlins 
notes similarities between Polynesian ideas of political sovereignty and 
those noted in the ancient Indo-European civilisations by the classical 
scholar Georges Dumézil. Polynesian rulers are conceived of as hostile 
strangers who are gradually absorbed and domesticated by indigenous 
locals, this process being symbolised by their induction into the local 
pantheon of gods. All strangers are conceived in this way and expected 
to act as their predecessors did. To Sahlins, history re-enacts the myth. 
In more general terms, Polynesian philosophy conceives society of being 
made up of a combination of opposed, yet complementary qualities. 
He emphasises that these dichotomies are fluid and contextual. At the 
moment of intrusion, for example, the immigrant is male, aggressive and 
from the sea, while the locals are female, receptive, fertile and of the land. 
Hawaiians referred to their chiefs as sharks that walked on land – wild 
elements that needed controlling. History taught that strangers came to 
overthrow rulers. They then married the highest born local women to gain 
legitimacy, as they rarely had sufficient numbers to sustain their position 
92  Nicholas Thomas, Out of Time: History and Evolution in Anthropological Discourse (2nd edn)
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1996), p. 96.
93  J.W. Davidson, ‘Lauaki Namalau‘ulu Mamoe: A Traditionalist in Samoan Politics’, in J.W. 
Davidson & Deryck Scarr (eds), Pacific Island Portraits (Canberra: Australian National University 
Press, 1970), p. 267.
94  Gavan Daws, ‘The Death of Captain Cook’, Pacific Islands Monthly, April 1984, 15–17, and 
May 1984, 51–53, 16.
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without local cooperation.95 More recently, Sahlins refined his structure 
of the conjuncture concept to give more influence to individuals and 
localities relative to general structures and word systems.96
Europeans may also have seemed usurping strangers arriving to challenge 
local rulers, as had been the pattern since the dawn of time.97 Most 
scholars suggest that encounters with Europeans were radically different 
to previous encounters.98 Prior to their arrival, most outsiders had broadly 
similar appearance and ways of behaving, regardless of whether they were 
drift voyagers or visiting kin. Even hostile invaders usually came from 
a world known to the communities they attacked. Other Islanders might 
not speak the same language, but they generally acted in ways that made 
sense to those encountering them.
Not all scholars subscribe to this perspective. Historian Ian Campbell 
points out that Pacific history has vacillated between explanations of 
culture contact that emphasise differences in cultural understanding, and 
those that opt for explanations based on desires to advance one’s interests 
in terms of power, material possessions and physical comforts. Campbell 
takes issue with the idea that most conflicts occurred in contact situations 
because Islanders did not share the European belief about private property. 
Europeans often took offence when Islanders took goods without asking 
permission. Literary scholar the late Bill Pearson’s idea that Islanders 
believed they had the right as hosts to take visitors’ goods is based on 
one reference to the reception of Kau Moala in Futuna. It is not clear 
that this was the practice elsewhere. Campbell demonstrates that there 
was a clear distinction between open attempts to take goods off Western 
vessels, and attempts to conceal them. He demonstrates that Polynesians 
had the concept of property rights and punished theft severely.99
95  Marshall Sahlins, ‘The Discovery of the True Savage’, in Donna Marwick (ed.), Dangerous 
Liaisons: Essays in Honour of Greg Dening (History Department, University of Melbourne, 1994), 
pp. 63–65, 69.
96  Marshall Sahlins, ‘Structural Work: How Microhistories Become Macrohistories and Vice 
Versa’, Anthropological Theory, vol. 5 (1), 2005, 5–30.
97  Greg Dening, Performances (Melbourne University Press, 1996), pp. 64–65; Daws (1984), p. 16; 
and Marshall Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the 
Sandwich Islands Kingdom (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981), pp. 129 ff. 
98  For example, see Mālama Meleisea & Penelope Schoeffel, ‘Discovering Outsiders’, in Donald 
Denoon (ed.), The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
pp. 120–21.
99  I.C. Campbell, ‘European–Polynesian Encounters: A Critique of the Pearson Thesis’, Journal 
of Pacific History, vol. 29 (2), 1994, 223–25, 229.
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Campbell suggests that these situations reveal not a clash of two cultures, 
but the moderation of cultural practices to suit what both sides realised 
was an unusual situation. The result was a culture of contact, where 
unusual patterns of behaviour occurred in response to the presence of the 
unfamiliar and uncertain. Polynesians would initially apply rituals and 
practices normally used to greet strangers, but they might also practice 
unusual behaviour, such as giving their women for material gain and to 
placate the foreigners. Similarly, Europeans sometimes overlooked theft in 
the name of maintaining peace.100 Campbell also suggests that references to 
Europeans as papalangi, papaa, etua was not a mark of respect associating 
them with the gods, but a temporary label denoting anything unfamiliar 
and yet to be understood.101 The equivalent contemporary term would 
be UFO. Gunson notes that papaa was simply the word for foreigner in 
Eastern Polynesia, while some early European sources translated papalangi 
as the word for the land of strangers, and others defined it as cloth from 
the sky (European manufactures).102
Europeans had an uneven impact in the pre-colonial Pacific. The size of 
their presence varied enormously. Māori were the only group in the Pacific 
Islands to become a minority in their own land before 1870. Elsewhere, 
Western settlement was limited to a few thousand people concentrated 
around one or two port towns, or a handful of beachcombers. In many 
locations, contacts were limited to visits from naval and trading vessels 
manned by crews of five to a few hundred men.103 Few were able to 
impose their will without naval support. Even then, naval expeditions 
soon had to move on. Most local economies were able to meet the demand 
for provisions from visiting vessels, providing they did not outstay 
their welcome.104 Most localities hosted larger groups than these in the 
course of their normal social relations. The desire for Western goods did, 
however, cause some communities to alter production. This was perhaps 
100  Campbell (1994), pp. 230–31.
101  I.C. Campbell, ‘Polynesian Perceptions of Europeans in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries’, Pacific Studies, vol. 5 (2), 1982, 65–69, esp. 67–69.
102  Niel Gunson, ‘The Coming of Foreigners’, in Noel Rutherford (ed.), Friendly Islands: A History 
of Tonga (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 93, 259–60 n. 34.
103  On ships’ complements see W. Kaye Lamb (ed.), The Voyages of George Vancouver 1791–1795, 
vol. 3 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1984), p. 819. Crew numbers on British naval vessels ranged 
from 70 to 115 men.
104  See, for example, Ross H. Cordy, ‘The Effects of European Contact on Hawaiian Agricultural 
Systems – 1778–1819’, Ethnohistory, vol. 19 (4), 1972, 400–03.
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most notable around ports like Honolulu, where food was grown to cater 
to the Western palates of crews from whaling fleets and trading vessels, 
and Māori growing flax to trade for muskets.105
Introduced diseases were the element of Western contact that Island 
communities were least able to counteract. The fatal impact thesis is 
most often associated with the trauma caused by introduced diseases. 
Fatal impact was brought into question in the 1960s and 1970s as 
many estimates of death rates were lowered, and significant variation 
in the demographic history of individual islands and communities 
was recognised.106 The idea of Western contact as fatal has experienced 
a resurgence in the last two decades with the advent of environmental 
histories that include disease among the exotic invaders.107 These decades 
have also seen the rise of a body of literature that seeks to re-examine 
the impact of European colonialism from the perspective of indigenous 
people.  These works often include significant upward revisions of 
populations at contact. Such revisions require far greater death rates 
to reach the population figures recorded later in the 19th century. This 
perspective has been most forcefully articulated in the work of David 
Stannard, professor of American Studies at the University of Hawai‘i, 
on the demographic collapse of the Hawaiian population.108
Medical historian Donald Denoon presents a comprehensive overview 
on the heated debate over the causes and extent of Pacific Islander 
depopulation as a result of Western diseases. This issue rose to prominence 
in 1989 when Stannard published a book arguing that the indigenous 
Hawaiian population at European contact was at least double former 
estimates, so that post-contact depopulation until the first accurate census 
was truly catastrophic. While debate raged within the world of Pacific 
scholarship about Stannard’s method for calculating contact populations 
105  See, on Hawai‘i, Cordy (1972), pp. 402, 407, 411–12; and Samuel M. Kamakau, Ruling Chiefs 
of Hawaii (Honolulu: Kamehameha Schools Press, 1961), p. 190. On Aotearoa, see James Belich, 
Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth 
Century (Auckland: Penguin, 1996), p. 152.
106  See, in particular, Norma McArthur, Island Populations of the Pacific (Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1967). My overview of the historiography of disease in the Pacific Islands 
is based on Victoria Luker, ‘Mothers of the Taukei: Fijian Women and “the Decrease of Race”’, PhD 
Thesis, The Australian National University, 1997, pp. 5–13.
107  Most notably, Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 
900–1900 (Cambridge University Press, 1986).
108  See, particularly, David Stannard, Before the Horror: The Population of Hawai‘i on the Eve 
of Western Contact (Honolulu: Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawai‘i, 1989).
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and whether depopulation primarily resulted from epidemics or disease-
induced infertility,109 epidemiologist Stephen Kunitz developed a more 
wide-ranging analysis which opened up the debate. Kunitz argued that 
the key factors affecting the rate of depopulation were not so much 
biological as social, economic and political. While epidemics could cause 
high death rates among populations with no exposure and immunity to 
them, the key was post-epidemic recovery which required social stability. 
Kunitz demonstrated that the areas with the most severe depopulation 
on record were areas where European colonisation and dispossession 
disrupted indigenous societies. As Denoon notes, ‘Depopulation was for 
Stannard a cause, for Kunitz an effect, of dispossession’.110 Denoon also 
makes the important point that specific localised circumstances, such as 
local diet and the presence of malaria, led to variation in depopulation.
Conclusion: Towards a framework for 
examining political consolidation
The wealth of material available on the unification period allows Hawaiian 
warfare to be examined along the lines advocated above. Ideally, the 
study of warfare should consider logistical and motivational factors as 
well as tactics and technology. Warfare is only one aspect of coercion, 
and coercion is only one aspect of power. Power is exercised by means of 
sanctions, rewards or the conditioning of social attitudes. Four aspects 
of human activity exist as possible avenues for power: the production 
and distribution of goods and services, the administration of society, 
coercive mechanisms, and the definition of norms and values. For power 
to be enduring it must also secure a degree of consent from a significant 
proportion of the population.
Theories on the centralisation process emphasise the institutionalisation 
and secularisation of the basis of power, and the importance of the 
breakdown of localised, usually kin-based, loyalties. During this process, 
109  See, for example, Andrew F. Bushnell, ‘“The Horror” Reconsidered: An Evaluation of the 
Historical Evidence for Population Decline in Hawai‘i, 1778–1803’, Pacific Studies, 16 (3), 1993, 
115–61.
110  Stephen J. Kunitz, Disease and Social Diversity: The European Impact on the Health of Non-
Europeans (Oxford University Press, 1994); and Donald Denoon, ‘Pacific Island Depopulation: 
Natural or Un-natural History?’, in Linda Bryder & Derek A. Dow (eds), New Countries and Old 
Medicine (Auckland: Pyramid Press, 1994), p. 325.
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
46
tools of coercion become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the 
central governing body. Centralised, coercive power is still limited, so that 
there is a need to establish a workable balance of power between powerful 
groups within the polity. Centralisation is by no means inevitable. This 
study proposes that Kamehameha’s successful centralisation of the islands 
was as much a victory of the arts of peacemaking as the arts of war. 
It  is argued that those who insist that European firearms gave him the 
decisive military advantage needed to secure unification overestimate the 
capabilities of firearms and the degree to which victory in battle translates 
into lasting power in human history.
To fully accommodate these multiple considerations, this study seeks to 
combine long-term ecological perspectives alongside cultural attitudes and 
institutions, and the process of day-to-day living and making decisions 
over choices that can fundamentally change the trajectory societies and 
individuals take. Kirch and Sahlins’ post-contact study of Anahulu on 
O‘ahu represents the high point of the structural history (as defined by 
Thomas) of Hawai‘i, in its blend of emphasis on the influence of long-
term environmental influences and cultural institutions on Hawaiian 
responses to the era of increasing exposure to European influences.111 
Sahlins is more comfortable in knitting structural history with specific 
events and actors than Kirch, but still favours structures incorporating new 
elements than transforming them.112 In How Chiefs Became Kings, Kirch 
is almost defensive when he states that he has not pointed to a time when 
chiefdoms can be said to be archaic states in Hawai‘i, as this was a process 
rather than an event.113 He goes on to assert that social scientists, such as 
archaeologists, are superior to historians and other humanities scholars 
because they seek underlying reasons for actions, while ‘To historians or 
humanists content with a strictly narrative mode of analysis, this may be 
the end of the road’.114 Ironically, the historian he cites most in the book, 
Fernand Braudel, was a leading advocate of the long durée as the ultimate 
causation behind events, and he changed the face of history decades ahead 
of the social scientists who Kirch cites as his influences.
111  P.V. Kirch & Marshall Sahlins, Anahulu: The Anthropology of History in the Kingdom of Hawaii, 
vol. 1: Historical Ethnography (The University of Chicago Press, 1992).
112 Sahlins (1981).
113 Kirch (2010), p. 178.
114 Kirch (2010), p. 176.
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The analytical framework designed by Braudel can accommodate the 
range of influences needed for the broad approach to warfare, coercion 
and political centralisation outlined above. Braudel examined historical 
processes by means of a three-tier temporal scheme. His three temporal 
levels were geographical time, social time and individual time. Geographical 
time consists of permanent, or slowly changing, elements of the natural 
environment. These consist of certain features of the natural environment 
such as mountain ranges and climate. Social time incorporates aspects of 
human activities that endure beyond any single individual’s lifetime. Social 
institutions, economic and demographic trends all fall into this category. 
Finally there is the timescale of individual lifetimes and specific events. 
Influences from all three groupings interact continuously. A combination 
of the physical environment, society’s technological capacity, social and 
political organisation, and beliefs determine the parameters of historical 
action. Within these longer term structures, a number of futures are 
possible. Any single event will be the result of inherited structural restraints 
and specific actions.115
This work argues against the conventional historiography that indigenous 
influences were at least as important as introduced European elements. 
It also adopts a specifically historical approach in arguing that specific 
events and individuals were as important as structural features in shaping 
the Hawaiian Kingdom. A number of futures are possible within any 
combination of longer term structural parameters. Structures determine 
what can happen, but events determine what actually happens. History 
is rich with examples of critical junctures, the ‘what ifs’ of history. How 
would Europe have developed if the young Napoleon Bonaparte had 
not been turned down for a place on the ill-fated La Perouse expedition 
to the South Pacific?116 For this reason, detailed narratives are produced 
alongside more general discussions of the nature of Hawaiian society. 
Because of the controversy over the degree of European influence on 
Hawaiian state-building, specific, datable references have been used as 
much as possible. Local cultural, economic and political variation within 
the Hawaiian archipelago is also examined. In this way, the specifics of 
time and place are not subsumed under more widely applicable structural 
features described in the next three chapters.
115  Fernand Braudel, On History, Sarah Mathews (trans.) (University of Chicago Press, 1980), 
pp. 4, 26; and Ian Hodder, ‘The Contribution of the Long Term’, in Ian Hodder (ed.), Archaeology 
as Long-term History (Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1–8.
116  Daws (1968a), p. 28.
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
48
The organisation of this work reflects the interaction between structure 
and process that is at the heart of the historical process. The next 
chapter examines the environmental and agricultural foundations and 
structures of power that emerged in various localities across Hawai‘i 
from first settlement to the late 1700s. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the 
transformation of political and military structures of power between 1778 
and 1796. Chapter 5 details the course of events in conflicts between 
chiefs from 1778 to 1796, when broadly similar structures of power were 
used differently, resulting in varying fortunes for chiefly rivals. Chapter 6 
carries on this detailed interaction between broad structures and specific 
events and decisions to examine how military victory was converted into 
enduring control of all inhabited islands of the Hawaiian archipelago 
under one ruler for the first time in Kānaka Maoli history. An attempt 
is made to attribute change to Hawaiian or European actions and ideas 
respectively in Chapter 7. The search for Hawaiian precedents prior to 
the unification process in the four decades centred on Kamehameha’s last 
major military victory in 1795 is an important part of this study. Only 
once indigenous precedents have been identified can attempts be made to 
evaluate the degree to which European agency influenced the formation 
of the Hawaiian Kingdom. We conclude by placing the Hawaiian 
achievement in wider Pacific and global contexts.
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Gathering Momentum: Power 
in Hawai‘i to 1770
The structure of Hawaiian polities worked against the concentration of 
power in the hands of one ruler. Yet, in the late-18th century, it took 
Kamehameha – a young ali‘i from Hawai‘i – less than 20 years to unify 
the archipelago, with the exception of Kaua‘i and Ni‘ihau, under his 
rule. The timing of this achievement has led a number of scholars to 
attribute his success to European ideas and European military hardware. 
Such a viewpoint ignores the significant changes that had taken place in 
Hawai‘i during the 200 years preceding the birth of Kamehameha. By the 
late 18th century Hawaiian mō‘ī were pushing the limits of sacred power 
as they strove to enhance their control over subjects and rivals. The history 
of Hawai‘i between 1778 and 1796 represents a continuation of historical 
patterns of political struggle that were only partly modified by European 
influences before unification.
Hawaiian society has, thus far, been studied in a fragmented, discipline-
specific way that has produced divergent and partially correct 
interpretations. When these perspectives are viewed in combination with 
greater emphasis placed on indigenous traditions, it becomes apparent 
that Hawai‘i was becoming more politically sophisticated in the centuries 
leading up to unification, and that mounting competitive pressures 
between polities resulted in political and military transformations that 
were already well under way by the time of the arrival of Captain James 
Cook in the late 1770s. The drama of culture contact, the death of Cook 
at the hands of Hawaiians in 1779, and the wealth of European eyewitness 
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
50
accounts have meant that these profound internal transformations have 
largely been ignored by scholars in favour of the drama of culture contact 
and adjustment. Archaeological remains and a variety of indigenous 
traditions provide evidence of the development of sophisticated logistical 
capacity and arts of government well before Cook’s sails pierced Hawai‘i’s 
horizons. These institutions and practices had sufficient momentum and 
logic of their own to explain Kamehameha’s successful unification of the 
archipelago. The unification of the Hawaiian Islands owes more to this 
indigenous political legacy and a specific set of local circumstances than to 
the new influences brought by strangers from across the sea.
Sacred genealogies and patterns on the 
land: Indigenous and archaeological models 
of political evolution to 1770
Archaeological evidence suggests that humans first settled in the 
Hawaiian  Islands at least 1,000 years ago, and probably came from 
the Marquesas Islands. Artefacts and words from linguistic reconstructions 
of the Proto-Polynesian language suggest that these early colonists were 
skilled mariners, who cultivated tropical root crops and harvested marine 
resources. It seems likely that they introduced domestic pigs, dogs, and 
chickens to the chain. They were probably organised into kin groups 
led by chiefs. The presence of the term toa (warrior) in early language 
reconstructions implies that, even at this early date, warfare was a fact 
of life.1
Patrick Kirch defines the initial colonisation period in Hawai‘i as 1000–
1200 AD. During this era, small groups established permanent coastal 
settlements in windward sites with fertile soil and access to permanent 
streams and marine resources. Bone remains from early sites show evidence 
of fishing, shellfish collection, bird hunting and animal husbandry. 
There are also indications of agriculture, including the introduction of 
1  Kirch (2012), pp. 120–26; Kirch (2010), pp. 17–24; P.V. Kirch, Feathered Gods and Fishhooks: 
An Introduction to Hawaiian Archaeology and Prehistory (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1985), 
pp. 67–88; and Yosihiko H. Sinoto, ‘The Marquesas’, pp. 110–34; H.D. Tuggle, ‘Hawaii’, pp. 167–99 
and Ross Clark, ‘Language’, pp. 266–68, in Jesse D. Jennings (ed.), The Prehistory of Polynesia (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1979).
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coconut trees. Kirch considers this period as one of consolidation rather 
than population expansion. Rank differentiation between chiefs and 
commoners was probably not great, while bonds of kinship continued 
to be the main social cement.2
The Early Expansion Period of Kirch’s scheme encompasses the next 
two centuries from 1200–1400 AD. By the close of this period, small 
settlements were dispersed throughout ecologically favourable areas of all 
major islands. These early sites became the core areas of what would later 
become territorially defined political units; and were often separated by 
mountain ranges and relatively unproductive lands. The elaboration and 
specialisation of fishing gear in this period suggest a successful adaptation 
to local marine resources. Increased dog and pig remains suggest the 
expansion of agriculture, as these animals were fed on agricultural produce 
at European contact. Excavations suggest that, during this period, 
agricultural fields began to expand from valley floors onto surrounding 
slopes. Kirch speculates that, while the total population of the archipelago 
was expanding, it was still relatively limited.
The Late Expansion Period was followed by a period of expansion and 
upheaval between 1400 and 1650 AD. Most archaeologists of Hawai‘i 
agree that the archipelago experienced a major population increase in 
this era. Kirch’s speculation that the population grew to several hundred 
thousand is based on evidence of major agricultural intensification and 
the expansion of settlement into leeward areas and agriculturally marginal, 
arid zones. Kirch believes this population take-off gave rise to a number 
of major technological, social and political changes. The concentration 
of settlement in favoured localities now gave way to dispersed settlement 
across a variety of ecological zones. This expansion of settlement coincided 
with the extension and intensification of all aspects of agricultural 
production. The first clear evidence of agricultural irrigation occurs in 
this period in well-watered valleys, while vast upland field systems were 
developed where soils and rain permitted, most notably on the leeward 
2  The standard accepted archaeological developmental sequence for Hawai‘i is best outlined 
by Kirch. Timelines developed by other contemporary archaeologists of Hawai‘i, such as Robert 
Hommon, Timothy Earle, and Ross Cordy are only cited in the following footnotes as they 




slopes of Kona and Kohala on Hawai‘i Island. Fishponds were also 
developed in this period. Embryonic states begin to emerge towards the 
end of this period and population growth peaked and then stabilised.3
Major changes in social and political organisation occurred, with the 
structures witnessed by Cook’s expedition in the 1770s evolving in this 
period. Artefacts used as symbols of chiefly rank at contact became 
common, which suggests the consolidation of rank differentiation at this 
time. Settlement expansion is seen as a key factor in the breakdown of 
kin-group organisation and its replacement with territorial affiliations 
and class-based social organisation. Robert Hommon suggests that, as all 
the best agricultural land came into use, it became necessary to define 
territorial boundaries more precisely. Ahupua‘a land units may have begun 
to develop at this time. Kin-group solidarity may have begun to erode 
due to dispersed settlement, while the general economic self-sufficiency 
of most ahupua‘a and their increasing populations may have reduced the 
need for exchanges of food and marriage partners between localities.4
Hawaiian traditions confirm that changes to landholding occurred in this 
era. A council of chiefs on O‘ahu elected Ma‘ilikukahi as mō‘ī, in part, to 
act as a mediator. According to Abraham Fornander, a Swede who settled 
in Hawai‘i in 1842, ‘He caused the island to be thoroughly surveyed, 
and the boundaries between different divisions and lands to be definitely 
and permanently marked out, thus obviating future disputes between 
neighbouring chiefs and landholders’.5 Maui was also divided into 
districts, sub-districts and smaller divisions by the kahuna Kalaikaohi‘a in 
the reign of the Maui mō‘ī Kaka‘alaneo. A chiefly supervisor was assigned 
to each land division. Within a few generations, a similar process was 
carried out on Hawai‘i by mō‘ī ‘Umi-a-Līloa.6
3  On population growth and plateauing, see P.V. Kirch, ‘“Like Shoals of Fish”: Archaeology and 
Population in Pre-contact Hawai‘i’, in P.V. Kirch & J.L. Rallu (eds), The Growth and Collapse of Pacific 
Island Societies: Archaeological and Demographic Perspectives (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 
2007), pp. 52–69. On transformative features during this era see also Robert J. Hommon, ‘Social 
Evolution in Ancient Hawaii’, in P.V. Kirch (ed.), Island Societies: Archaeological Approaches to Evolution 
and Transformation (Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 60–67; Hommon (2013), pp. 227 ff.
4  Hommon (2013), pp. 228–35; Hommon (1987), p. 65; R.J. Hommon, ‘The Formation 
of Primitive States in Pre-contact Hawaii’, PhD Thesis, University of Arizona, 1976, pp. 230–31.
5  Abraham Fornander, Ancient History of the Hawaiian People to the Times of Kamehameha 1, 
vol. 2: An Account of Polynesian Race, (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1969), p. 89. 
See Kirch (2012), pp. 131 ff. on Ma‘ilikukahi.
6  M.W. Beckwith, Hawaiian Mythology (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1970), p. 383; 
and Kamakau (1961), pp. 17–20.
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Kirch associates these changes to landholding and land administration, 
which were first initiated on O‘ahu by Ma‘ilikukahi, with a profound 
change in social organisation that increased chiefly power over 
commoners. In this period, land units moved from being controlled 
by genealogical lineages to a situation where commoners, who were 
known as maka‘āinana, formed a distinct class that was separated from 
their former lineage chiefs, and worked the land under the direction 
and control of the chiefly class. Maka‘āinana rights to land resided in 
the chief who ruled their land at the time, and became divorced from 
multi-generational genealogical ties to the land that were remembered 
in family mo‘olelo (histories). Soon maka‘āinana were forbidden from 
claiming and reciting genealogies greater than two generations. The 
power of paramount chiefs became increasingly associated with divine 
status, which justified the demands for more tribute that increasingly 
came to be used to support paramount chief ’s households, warriors and 
administrative officers.7 Kirch posits that this pattern of social relations 
became universal throughout the islands, although the unstable nature 
of dryland agriculture pressured mō‘ī in leeward Hawai‘i and Maui, who 
were more reliant on this form of agriculture, to demand more from 
their subjects and to be more orientated to wars of aggression to seize 
agricultural land.8 Kirch, however, sees the period from Ma‘ilikukahi’s 
reforms until the era of unification of the archipelago under Kamehameha 
as one of the elaboration of existing sociopolitical structures rather than 
as a period of significant structural reform. To Kirch, the underlying 
influences on this elaboration of paramount chiefly power were status 
rivalry and usurpation between chiefs, elite marriage and endogamy 
to raise one’s chiefly status, intensification of agricultural production 
to increase the paramount’s resource base to support his military and 
administrative forces, elaboration of chiefly ritual and human sacrifice to 
enhance divine status, and the application of force, war and territorial 
conquest to increase the paramount chief ’s mana and resource base.9
The longstanding, evolving and relatively uniform sociopolitical structure 
of government behind unification suggested by Kirch and others is most 
comprehensively outlined by Hommon. Society was divided into two 
socio-economic classes – a producer class of maka‘āinana, whose social 
links and work were highly localised in orientation, and the ali‘i, who 
7  Kirch (2010), pp. 34, 47–50, 66–67, 89–91.
8  Kirch (2010), pp. 53–54, 90–91, chpts 4 & 5; Kirch (2012), pp. 222–25.
9  Kirch (2010), p. 121.
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maintained kinship links throughout the archipelago and controlled all 
positions of influence in government and religion, as well as determining 
maka‘āinana access to land, for which the latter paid a rent to them. 
Government of moku consisted of either one paramount or two co-rulers, 
who delegated power to multiple levels of administrators drawn from 
the chiefly class right down to highly localised levels. These delegated 
administrators supervised agricultural production, tax collection, 
military command and the supervision of public works, such as temple 
construction and irrigation works. Armies of up to 15,000 men were 
mobilised by individual mō‘ī by the 1790s, with the fighting core also 
drawn from chiefly ranks and supplemented by an indeterminate number 
of maka‘āinana conscripts or recruits.10
Not all archaeologists and anthropologists adhere to this analysis. 
Marshall Sahlins’s classical analysis of the problems for domestic modes 
of production that were caused by increased demands for tribute has 
already been noted. Archaeologist Michael Kolb asserted that this era on 
Maui witnessed a move from increased demands for produce as tribute by 
paramount chiefs to demands instead for corvée labour for use in temple 
construction, in keeping with the increasing emphasis on the divinity 
of ruling chiefs. Kolb concluded that this increased the bonds between 
ruler and ruled as their demands on their followers switched from 
taking an increasing share of maka‘āinana production as ritual tribute to 
greater maka‘āinana participation in communal building projects that 
were shared by the ruler and the ruled.11 Critiquing Kolb, Valerio Valeri 
noted that this may have in fact had the opposite effect, as such large-
scale communal building projects affected the amount of time that was 
available to be devoted to agricultural production, which was the central 
focus of maka‘āinana life. Valeri went on to note that:
[Moreover,] a system of ritual consumption allowed the ruler to attract 
and keep a large number of clients and subordinate chiefs who could 
be used to stabilise his rule by use of  force directed against the ruled 
but especially against rivals … The sacrificial polity was all the more 
successful the more it could finance its ritual consumption with plunder 
and conquest rather than mere ‘taxation’. The Hawaiian political system 
was not able to transcend its predatory stage completely – at least not 
until the late 18th century.12
10  Hommon (2013), pp. 3–4, 25–38.
11  Michael J. Kolb, et al., ‘Monumentality and the Rise of Religious Authority in Precontact 
Hawai‘i [and Comments and Reply]’, Current Anthropology, vol. 35 (5), Dec. 1994, 527–28, 530–31.
12  Valerio Valeri, comment on Kolb, in Kolb (1994), p. 542.
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In response, Kolb noted that ‘[P]olitical rule is always a delicate balance 
between consensus and coercion, and it is clear that the emphasis in 
Hawai‘i shifted from the former to the latter’.13
Despite the widespread support among archaeologists for this hypothesis, 
there are a number of problems with its assumptions. Firstly, if all moku 
contained the same structures of power and governance, why did one 
succeed where all others failed? Leeward Maui and Hawai‘i are asserted 
to have had the most effective states because of their ability to conduct 
expansionary wars of conquest within and between islands, yet neither 
was able to consolidate conquests until the 1790s. Why? I suggest that 
the process of consolidation mattered more than the process of conquest, 
as shown by the contrasting fortunes of Kamehameha and Kahekili in 
the last decades of the 18th century. Furthermore, the major structural 
changes in military and political organisation that occurred in the late 
18th century can explain why unification occurred in the 1790s and not 
before. Hawaiian traditions also demonstrate the ongoing strength of local 
countervailing power structures that limited the power of mō‘ī over their 
subjects, as illustrated by Kanalu Young. Finally, the limits on coercive 
power to ensure compliance meant that paramount chiefs, by necessity, 
had to restrict their demands and produce benefits to ensure loyalty. 
The alliance of interests between ali‘i and maka‘āinana posited by Lilikalā 
Kame‘eleihiwa and Jon Osorio is a better fit with the realities of power 
and the course of events than the predominant archaeological models.
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the ongoing strength of local power 
bases beyond those controlled by ali‘i nui in Kamehameha’s era raises 
questions about the degree to which class had replaced blood as the prime 
affiliation for the majority of the population. It is worth noting Hommon’s 
observation that the ali‘i probably only made up 1–2 per cent of the entire 
population.14 History demonstrates that no amount of martial ability 
or sacred legitimacy can keep such a small elite in power if  it  alienates 
the rest of the population. Even though it is now acknowledged by 
archaeologists that the ali‘i classes substantially increased as a proportion 
of the population in the late pre-unification era, this was still not on a scale 
where they could alone supply the military and administrative needs of 
paramount chiefs who had alienated their maka‘āinana subjects. At this 
early stage, the mō‘ī’s control over landholding probably required even 
more of a consensus than it did in Kamehameha’s early years. The mō‘ī 
13  Kolb (1994), p. 543.
14  Hommon (2013), p. 17.
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
56
Ma‘ilikukahi played the role of mediator, while Maui’s reforms were 
initiated by a kahuna, with the mō‘ī Kaka‘alaneo’s influence unclear. Just 
prior to ‘Umi-a-Līloa’s unification of Hawai‘i, the dominant ali‘i on the 
island, Hakau, had offended two elderly men called Nunu and Kakohe. 
They ‘became angered and gave the land to ‘Umi’.15 The positions of Nunu 
and Kakohe are not stated, but their actions were a clear indication of the 
need for sensitive diplomacy by power brokers. At this stage, local kin 
groups probably still exercised political influence, albeit on a diminishing 
scale. Were Nunu and Kakohe lineage heads or ali‘i with armed retinues?
While land reforms may have set in train processes that increased chiefly 
power relative to commoners, it was warfare that consolidated this power. 
Competition for arable land precipitated inter-group warfare. Hawaiian 
traditions mention antagonism between chiefs in leeward and windward 
areas of Hawai‘i in this era. While the windward areas were based on 
long-established, stable economies, those to the leeward expanded rapidly, 
but were unstable because of partial reliance on unpredictable yields from 
marginal, drought-prone and possibly overused lands. The greater effort 
required to break in and maintain drier lands served to enhance chiefly 
power in leeward areas by providing a need for coordinated supervision 
above the lineage level. Marginal and fluctuating surpluses may have 
pressured rulers to enhance their logistical base through conquest rather 
than risk commoner dissent by drawing too heavily on production 
not normally earmarked for the support of chiefly retinue. There was 
a noticeable increase in the prominence of leeward chiefs relative to those 
from windward areas of Hawai‘i from the time that ‘Umi-a-Līloa moved 
his main residence from Waipi‘o in Hāmākua to Hōnaunau in Kona. This 
move was preceded by a struggle between ‘Umi and his genealogically 
senior half-brother Hakau at Waipi‘o. Umi was initially forced to take 
refuge in the dry tablelands of Hāmākua, where he gathered disgruntled 
elements of the local population around him until he was strong enough 
to topple Hakau.16
15  Dorothy Kahananui (ed.), Ka Mooolelo Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, Committee 
for the Preservation and Study of Hawaiian Language, Art and Culture, 1984), p. 223; and Kamakau 
(1961), p. 12.
16  David Malo, Hawaiian Antiquities, Nathaniel B. Emerson (trans.) (Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop 
Museum, 1951), p. 258; Kamakau (1961), p. 62; E.S.C. Handy & E.G. Handy, Native Planters 
of Old Hawaii: Their Life, Lore, and Environments (Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1972), 
pp. 533–35; Hommon (1976), pp. 285–86; P.V. Kirch, The Evolution of the Polynesian Chiefdoms 
(Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 236; Kirch (1985), pp. 306–07; Hommon (1976), p. 67; and 
Kirch (1994), pp. 261–62.
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To Kirch, this era was a crucial watershed in Hawaiian political evolution. 
Strong population growth based on irrigated taro and aquaculture that 
had favoured chiefs from the older western islands of Kaua‘i and O‘ahu 
reached its limits, and people moved into drier lands as wet taro lands 
could no longer accommodate the population. The dominant rulers in 
this era, ‘Umi-a-Līloa of Hawai‘i and Kiha-a-Pi‘ilani of Maui, were both 
usurping younger siblings who moved away from the long-established 
irrigated taro lands to new dryland sweet potato-based lands in response 
to this pressure. This dryland agriculture favoured the eastern islands of 
Maui and Hawai‘i. Around this time larger and more complex temple 
sites began to flourish, and large royal centres in locations identified as the 
heartlands and residences of particular rulers occur in the archaeological 
record. These dryland systems were vulnerable to drought, making them 
potentially unstable as more and more people would come to rely on 
their produce unless more land could be incorporated in the realm to 
allow agricultural expansion. At the same time, these dryland chiefs used 
ritual and temples to garner more of the harvest to feed their military 
and administrative contingents and increasingly needed new lands to 
distribute as incentives to followers.17
In his detailed history of O‘ahu, however, Ross Cordy suggests that the 
pinnacle of O‘ahu chiefs’ power occurred during the 1600s and 1700s up 
until their conquest by chiefs from Maui in the 1780s. It is also interesting 
to record that the chiefs of O‘ahu were considered to be more inclined 
towards cooperation than competition, unlike their leeward neighbours. 
This argues against the efficacy of centralised power and in favour of the 
more localised, counterbalancing power, as argued by modern Hawaiian 
scholars. As events transpired, Kahekili, the Maui conqueror of O‘ahu, 
failed to win the loyalty of the long independent O‘ahu lesser ali‘i and 
this fatally weakened his bid for leadership over the entire chain.18 Further 
debate on Kirch’s proposed timeline is raised by Hommon’s dating of 
irrigated taro agricultural systems reaching their capacity to support an 
expanding population to the period 1680–1790. This is much later than 
Kirch, and the fact that it occurred on the eve of unification is not really 
explored by Hommon.19
17  Kirch (2012), pp. 92–103.
18  Ross Cordy, ‘The Rise and Fall of the O‘ahu Kingdom: A Brief History of O‘ahu History’, in 
Janet Davidson, Geoffrey Irwin, Foss Leach, Andrew Pawley & Dorothy Brown (eds), Oceanic Culture 
History: Essays in Honour of Roger Green, New Zealand Journal of Archaeology Special Publication, 
Dunedin, 1996, esp. pp. 600–03; and Ross Cordy, The Rise and Fall of the O‘ahu Kingdom (Honolulu: 
Mutual Publishing, 2002).
19  Hommon (2013), p.7.
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Kirch’s final evolutionary phase dates from 1650 to 1778 AD. In the 
1980s, Kirch dated the end of this era to 1795 – ahead of Cook’s arrival 
in 1778 – because Kirch believed the old political order of competing 
chiefdoms was not structurally altered until 1795, and it was only in the 
1790s that visits by trade vessels began to seriously influence Hawaiian 
culture. As noted in Chapter 1, however, Kirch has recently altered this 
stance as he believes Hawaiian polities were archaic states by the time Cook 
arrived, but fails to discuss how these structures enabled Kamehameha to 
unify the islands, while his rivals, with similar structures of governance 
and power, could not. In How Chiefs Became Kings, Kirch outlines the 
distinct political histories of each major island, but does not emphasise 
structural differences in their respective organisation of power beyond 
the potential ecological instability of those based primarily on dryland 
agricultural systems, which promoted a need to expand and seize more 
agricultural land. Kirch proposed that the era after 1650 witnessed the 
‘elaboration of the existing social order and of further intensification of the 
means of production along lines firmly established’.20 Hawaiian traditions 
suggest that this period was characterised by intense inter-chiefly rivalry 
and warfare. This is supported by archaeological evidence, which reveals 
an increase in the size, and possibly number, of luakini heiau during this 
period. Luakini heiau first appear in the latter part of the Expansion 
Period, and may signal the rise of the chiefly adherence to the war god 
Kū. References to Kū are found in traditions relating to ‘Umi-a-Līloa. 
Hommon’s analysis of Hawaiian traditions suggests that, in the centuries 
leading up to contact, accession to political office and the establishment 
and maintenance of political boundaries were increasingly based on the 
application of force rather than the exercise of genealogical prerogatives.21
Traditions reveal a cyclical pattern of conquests, attempts to integrate 
conquered lands, followed by the contraction or even disintegration of 
polities. Wars extended between islands, with Moloka‘i serving both as 
a battleground and a prize for the chiefs of O‘ahu and Maui, while east 
Maui was periodically occupied or raided by forces from Hawai‘i. Territorial 
conquests were rarely retained beyond the lifetime of the conquering 
paramount, or his immediate successor. Weak or ageing mō‘ī always faced 
the prospect of being usurped by ambitious subordinates, particularly junior 
collateral kin. Successful challenges are usually explained in the traditions 
20  Kirch (1985), pp. 305–06.
21  Hommon (1976), pp. 55, 278–80; Kirch (1985), p. 305; Kirch (2010), pp. 103–16.
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as the result of increasingly oppressive or demanding incumbents alienating 
their subjects and making them amenable to challenges by rival chiefs who 
were perceived to be more benevolent and just.22
The administrative and coercive capacity of Hawaiian mō‘ī in the 1770s 
was insufficient for the imposition of effective centralised rule. Political 
and military structures, however, were far from stagnant. Generations 
of Hawaiian ali‘i and their advisers devoted much time and energy 
into enhancing chiefly power. It is important to take this long heritage 
of political struggle into account when analysing the unification of the 
islands in the decades following Cook’s discovery of Kaua‘i in 1778.
The importance of geography: Variation 
between localities
Local differences in resources and geographical barriers to communication 
played a significant role in shaping the struggle for power between chiefs. 
The natural environment not only influenced agricultural production 
and population concentrations, but also the ease of communication 
between localities. These were important considerations for the essentially 
decentralised polities of 18th-century Hawai‘i. They also influenced 
warfare, as most armies depended on local resources for sustenance. 
Ecological diversity and barriers to communication also created variation 
in cultural practices and political coherence between polities (moku) 
presided over by high chiefs (ali‘i nui) within the broad pattern just 
described.
The Hawaiian archipelago has a wide variety of environments. 
The  landscape is essentially the result of volcanic activity modified by 
wind and rain. The islands are the emergent tips of a chain of volcanoes 
that rest on the Pacific Plate. The oldest islands are to the north-west, 
while the youngest volcanoes are in the south-east. Many, such as Kilauea 
on Hawai‘i, are still active. The older the islands, the more they have been 
eroded by weathering agents such as rainfall and wave action. Kaua‘i and 
O‘ahu are heavily dissected by erosion, resulting in well-developed valley 
floors and coastal plains, while the younger volcanic slopes of Haleakalā 
on Maui, and Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa on Hawai‘i have been only 
slightly eroded. Changes in sea level during the Pleistocene resulted in 
22  Kirch (2010), pp. 103–16; Kirch (1985), p. 307; Hommon (1976), pp. 160–62.
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high sea cliffs in some places while, at places like Honolulu and ‘Ewa on 
O‘ahu, drops in sea level exposed coral reefs which formed the base for 
large leeward plains.23
The islands’ north-west–south-east alignment means that their mountains 
block the prevailing north-easterly trade winds to produce a distinct dry 
leeward, wet windward dichotomy. When the moisture-laden trade winds 
encounter the steep volcanic ranges they are forced upward, leading to 
rapid condensation and rainfall. Rainfall is highest on the windward 
slopes, and then decreases rapidly towards the leeward coasts. On O‘ahu, 
for example, rainfall in the windward coast near Kāne‘ohe averages around 
1,875 millimetres annually, rises to over 6,250 millimetres at the crest 
of the Ko‘olau Mountains, and drops to less than 500 millimetres on 
the leeward coast near ‘Ewa. Rainfall is seasonally variable. The months 
from October to April are generally wetter, while the period from May to 
August is considerably drier. The wetter months are also a time of stormy 
seas that curtail inter-island travel. The major exception to this pattern is 
the Kona district of Hawai‘i, where the peak rainfall months are June to 
August. This is because of moist southerly winds, known as Kona winds, 
which are common during this time.24
Ancient Hawaiian society was unable to cultivate much of the archipelago’s 
landmass. Rainfall and local geology combine to determine the degree of 
erosion, vegetation patterns and food crops. The greater part of Hawai‘i’s 
land area consists of lithosols, either recent lava flows or older, weathered 
saprolites. All are of limited use for agriculture. The lithosols of the older, 
more eroded upland slopes have more depth, but the most productive 
soils for Hawaiian cultivation technology were the alluvial and colluvial 
soils of windward and leeward valley bottoms. Varying soil fertility and 
orographic rainfall produced a pattern of dry forest on lower slopes giving 
way to wet, dense forest on upper slopes, and alpine scrub on the highest 
peaks. Coastal plains were covered with a variety of grasses, shrubs, swamp 
and stands of screw pine.25
The isolation of the chain resulted in a relatively restricted range of 
terrestrial fauna and flora prior to Polynesian settlement. The endemic 
fauna, beyond seabirds and native geese, was of limited use for food. 
23  Kirch (1985), pp. 24–25; and Department of Geography, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, Atlas 
of Hawaii (2nd edn) (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1983), pp. 36–37.
24  Kirch (1985), p. 25; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 16–17.
25  Kirch (1985), pp. 28–31; Kirch (2012), p. 154; Handy & Handy (1972), p. 7.
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There were no suitable beasts of burden. While the marine resources of 
the archipelago were less abundant than in other parts of Polynesia, the sea 
was still a rich reservoir of food. Reef and lagoon complexes were limited, 
and many areas lacked sheltered inshore fisheries and safe coastal waters 
to travel in. Large stretches of rugged coastline made access to marine 
resources difficult, and travel potentially dangerous.26
The physical environment also posed other hazards. Unusually heavy rains 
in the mountains resulted in flash floods in the valleys, while tsunami in 
the north Pacific periodically threatened low-lying coastal areas. Volcanic 
activity is another ongoing hazard, particularly on Hawai‘i. This volcanic 
regime also provided Hawaiians with a number of potentially useful 
stone resources for tools and building. Perhaps the most consistent and 
significant natural hazard to man has been the ever-present threat of 
drought, particularly in leeward areas.27 While rich marine environments 
reduced reliance on agriculture in some localities, local soil and water 
regimes were the critical determinants of a community’s viability. 
Most settlements in the late 18th century were situated within 
10  kilometres of the coast. They were dispersed along much of the 
coastline to varying degrees of intensity. Although early explorers refer 
to several ‘villages’ of up to 70 or 80 structures each, most residences 
were more dispersed. In places, they formed an almost continuous ribbon 
development of individual dwellings set along the coastline or scattered 
among fields and groves of fruit trees.28 French explorer Jean François de 
La Perouse noted such a pattern of dwellings on a fertile section of the 
coastline of south-east Maui, describing:
dwellings which are so numerous, that a space of three or four leagues 
may be taken for a single village, but all the houses are upon the sea 
shore, and the mountains seem to occupy so much of the island, that the 
habitable part of it appears to be scarcely half a league broad.29
26  Kirch (1985), pp. 30–32; and Robert J. Hommon, Use and Control of Hawaiian Inter-Island 
Channels: Polynesian Hawaii: A.D. 1400–1794 (Honolulu: Office of the Governor of Hawaii, 1975), 
pp. 113–48.
27  Kirch (1985), p. 33; and James Jackson Jarves, History of the Hawaiian Islands (4th edn) 
(Honolulu: Henry M. Whitney, 1872), pp. 214–70.
28  Cordy (1972), p. 406; Kirch (1985), p. 179; Tuggle (1979), p. 182; Samwell, in J.C. Beaglehole 
(ed.), The Journals of Captain James Cook on his Voyages of Discovery, vol. 3: The Voyage of the Resolution 
and Discovery (Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society, 1967) 3:2; Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967) 3:1, 
pp. 592–93, 1175–76; and King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 283.
29  L.A. Milet-Mureau (ed.) A Voyage Round the World, Performed in the Years 1785, 1786, 1787 and 
1788 by J.E.G. de La Perouse, vol. 2 (London: J. Johnson Printer, 1798), pp. 37–38.
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The basic local social and economic unit was an ahupua‘a. These generally 
consisted of long narrow strips of land extending inland from the coast for 
a distance of several miles. They incorporated a variety of environments 
from inshore fisheries to forested uplands, providing residents with 
access to a wide range of resources. The seaward boundary of ahupua‘a 
was defined as the depth the tallest man could wade out to at low water. 
Beyond that, the six monthly fishing kapu applied.30 This pattern varied 
to accommodate topographical features, such as steep-walled windward 
valleys, or to compensate for local scarcity by increasing land area. 
Districts as a whole tended to centre on resource-rich localities. The ideal 
was a fertile, well-watered locality with accessible and abundant offshore 
fishing. District boundaries were often in less well-endowed areas.31
Taro grown in irrigated, well-watered valleys and ‘uala (sweet potato) grown 
on dry slopes represent the extremes of Hawaiian agricultural practice. 
A variety of subsistence regimes existed within these parameters. Local 
production generally involved multiple cropping, with irrigated and non-
irrigated fields often sitting adjacent to each other. Dry-field cultivation 
ranged from swidden to permanent fields with capacity enhanced by 
mulching. Broadly speaking, two major environmental zones supported 
the majority of the Hawaiian population. Each had a  distinctive crop 
regime, one based on irrigated fields and the other on dry-field cropping.32 
Permanent streams and fertile alluvial soil allowed the year-round 
cultivation of wet taro in the steep-walled valleys of the windward coasts. 
Swamps, streambeds and artificially irrigated fields provided suitable 
areas for cultivation. Sugar cane, banana and ‘ulu (breadfruit) were often 
grown on the banks separating flooded taro fields, and in non-irrigated 
areas. Larger leeward valleys with reasonable, but less reliable, rainfall in 
their upper reaches could also support irrigated fields, but tended to have 
a higher proportion of their land planted in dryland crops.33
30  Archibald Campbell, A Voyage Round the World from 1806 to 1812 (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai‘i Press, 1967 (1822)), pp. 142–43.
31  Tuggle (1979), p. 181.
32  Cordy (1972), p. 396; Kirch (1984), p. 168; Kirch (1985), p. 31; Tuggle (1979), p. 173.
33  T. K. Earle, ‘Prehistoric Irrigation on the Hawaiian Islands’, Archaeology and Physical Anthropology 
in Oceania, vol. 15 (1), 1980, 1–28; George Vancouver, A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific 
Ocean and Round the World, vol. 3 (London: John Stockdale, 1801), pp. 360–65; and Archibald 
Menzies, Hawaii Nei 128 Years Ago (Honolulu: T. H. Press, 1920), pp. 23–24.
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The other significant environmental zone was slopes or lowlands that 
lacked permanent streams, but had sufficient rainfall or humidity to 
allow cultivation of dry taro and ‘uala. Both crops were planted in non-
irrigated fields, often surrounded by low stonewalls to block runoff and 
covered in mulch to retain moisture. Sugar cane, paper mulberry, banana 
and breadfruit were often planted in groves or on stone walls separating 
fields. In some areas, such as the wet, humid lowlands of Puna on 
Hawai‘i, breadfruit was a major crop. Beyond these two zones, limited 
water generally restricted crops grown to ‘uala and occasionally yams, 
with occasional clusters of sugar cane and bananas when local regimes 
allowed. Mounds of earth and stone were used to enhance the growing 
environment. These techniques were also used in drier areas within the 
two main regimes.34
Variation in cultivation influenced social and political organisation as 
well as economic organisation. Intensive dry-field cultivation requires 
a much higher labour input than irrigated taro cultivation. While wet taro 
systems require limited attention beyond initial field and irrigation ditch 
construction, dry-field systems need continual mulching and weeding 
after the fields have been cleared of stones and rocks and the ground 
broken for planting. The prominence of intensive dry-field systems in 
leeward areas of Maui and Hawai‘i resulted in the drafting of women 
into the agricultural workforce. Discussing regional variation within the 
Hawaiian Islands, Kirch draws attention to a passage in Kamakau, which 
states that:
All the work outside the house was performed by the men, such as tilling 
the ground … This was the common rule on Kauai, Oahu, and Molokai, 
but on Maui and Hawaii the women worked outside as hard as the men, 
often cooking, tilling the ground, and performing the duties in the house 
as well. At the time when Kamehameha took over the rule from Hawaii to 
Oahu it was not uncommon to see the women of Hawaii packing foods on 
their backs, cooking it in the imu, and cultivating the land … On Maui the 
men showed their wives where their [garden] patches were and while they 
went to do other work the women brought the food and firewood from 
the upland … This is why the chiefs of Hawaii imposed taxes on men and 
women alike and got the name of being oppressive to the people, while the 
chiefs on Oahu and Kauai demanded taxes of the men alone.35
34  Menzies (1920), p. 75 (dry-field systems); King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 521 (mulching); 
and Cordy (1972), pp. 395–96; and Handy & Handy (1972), p. 152 (breadfruit).
35  Kamakau (1961), pp. 238–39; and P.V. Kirch, ‘Regional Variation and Local Style: A Neglected 
Dimension in Hawaiian Prehistory’, Pacific Studies (Laie), vol. 13 (2), 1990a, 48–49.
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Figure 1: Ahupua‘a divisions of Kohala District, Hawai‘i
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
Kirch notes that the increased demand on female labour in these areas 
may have negatively influenced female fecundity. This in turn may have 
influenced the human resources available for agriculture and warfare. 
Archaeological investigations suggest there was a significant intensification 
of dry-field cultivation in leeward areas of Maui and Hawai‘i in the two 
centuries before the age of Kamehameha. While these systems were 
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capable of prolific yields they were also dependent on rainfall. Increasing 
yields through intensifying production in existing areas or expanding into 
areas of less reliable rainfall ran the risk of relying on an unpredictable 
rainfall regime. It was a shaky basis upon which to expand the population 
or increase the level of chiefly expropriations. Dry-field systems were 
potentially more politically unstable than wet taro systems because of 
the additional labour demands placed on maka‘āinana by ali‘i, and the 
pressure to conquer more lands to increase agricultural output.36
The natural environment also influenced sociopolitical organisation by 
affecting communications. Wide and often dangerous channels separated 
some of the main islands. These channels tended to divide the inhabited 
islands into four distinct areas whose external ties were somewhat weaker 
than their internal links. These areas were Kaua‘i and Ni‘ihau; O‘ahu; 
Moloka‘i, Lāna‘i, Maui and Kaho‘olawe; and Hawai‘i. The 117-kilometre-
wide channel between Kaua‘i and O‘ahu was particularly hazardous. 
Although the right trade winds allowed the 46-kilometre ‘Alenuihoha 
channel between Maui and Hawai‘i to be crossed in either direction in 
a couple of hours, they could also produce very rough seas. On the other 
hand, the close grouping of Maui, Moloka‘i, Lāna‘i and Kaho‘olawe 
provided a partly enclosed, and relatively sheltered body of water that 
facilitated canoe travel.37
Political groupings were influenced by island alignments. Powerful moku 
tended to centre on one of the four major islands: Kaua‘i, O‘ahu, Maui 
and Hawai‘i. Kaua‘i dominated Ni‘ihau, and Maui dominated Lāna‘i and 
Kaho‘olawe. Moloka‘i sometimes served as a battlefield between the forces 
of O‘ahu and Maui. Neither could establish permanent control over 
Moloka‘i, which remained largely independent until the latter part of the 
18th century. By then, east Maui was also a regular site for confrontations 
between the forces of Maui and Hawai‘i mō‘ī.38
Religious practices and other cultural differences may also have been 
influenced by the relative separation of the inhabited islands into four 
clusters. Fishhooks and food pounders from the material culture of Kaua‘i, 
for example, are distinct from those of other islands in the chain. Chiefly 
dynasties tended to be associated with god forms distinct from those of 
36  Kirch (1985), p. 303.
37  Kirch (1985), pp. 22–23; Hommon (1975), pp. 161–70; Tuggle (1979), pp. 171–72.
38  Hommon (1976), p. 55.
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their rivals. A large number of gods (akua) were worshipped for a variety 
of purposes. Occupational groupings, localities, families, gender and 
class divisions all had their own gods, although most seem to have been 
subsumed under four major gods: Kū, Lono, Kāne and Kanaloa. While 
the rulers of O‘ahu and Hawai‘i both worshipped aggressive forms of Kū 
as their war god, that of the former was Ku-hone‘enu‘u, while the latter’s 
was Kū‘kā‘ili-moku. The hierarchy of Kū, Lono, Kāne and Kanaloa may 
only have become the pattern for the whole group after Kamehameha’s 
unification of the islands. Temple types on Kaua‘i suggest that Luakini 
po‘okanaka were usually dedicated to Kāne and to a lesser extent Kanaloa, 
rather than to Kū, as was the case on Hawai‘i. Some luakini po‘okanaka 
on Maui were even dedicated to Kāne. Pele, the goddess associated with 
volcanoes, was particularly worshipped on volcanically active Hawai‘i. 
Cultural differences were probably more profound among maka‘āinana 
than among the more mobile chiefly elite.39
Figure 2: The Hawaiian archipelago
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
39  Kirch (1994), p. 263; Valeri (1985a), pp. 184–85; Kirch (1985), pp. 99–100; and Handy 
& Handy (1972), pp. 79–83.
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Local resource bases, political traditions 
and spatial relationships
The decentralised nature of Hawaiian polities and their administrative 
capabilities restricted their geographical extent. The smaller islands 
leeward of Hawai‘i were geographically more coherent and each tended 
to form a single moku, apart from during brief succession disputes. 
In  contrast, Hawai‘i fluctuated between unity under a single mō‘ī and 
division between rival rulers, with large tracts of forested uplands and lava 
fields providing a buffer between the core areas of their respective domains. 
All moku were made up of a number of discrete localities. The resources of 
each locality, and the relationships between localities played a crucial role 
in shaping the unification process.
Hawai‘i (see Figure 3) has a landmass greater than that of the other seven 
inhabited islands combined. It is made up of five overlapping volcanoes, 
the most prominent being Mauna Loa and Mauna Kea. As the least eroded 
island in the group, it has sizeable valleys restricted to the windward side 
of the Kohala Mountains. There is a sharp windward–leeward dichotomy, 
with no permanent flowing streams on the western side from South Point 
to Upolu Point. Forested uplands in the interior exacerbated political as 
well as climatic differences between windward and leeward areas. Canoe 
travel was often used, although no reefs protected the coastline.40
The saddle between Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa still has traces of ancient 
trails reflecting its role as a crossroads for windward–leeward communication. 
These narrow trails were poor avenues for the passage of armies and were 
ideal settings for ambushes. It was not good country for manoeuvring, as the 
Welsh naval surgeon on Cook’s third voyage David Samwell noted on a trip 
inland from Kealakekua Bay. He described how, ‘the Underwood Which 
grows here render[s] the Woods Impassable everywhere out of the common 
Paths, many of which we met intersecting each other in various directions’.41 
The interior’s main assets for Hawaiians were the extensive basalt adze 
quarries on Mauna Kea, and the fertile Waimea Saddle between Hāmākua 
and Kohala. The saddle is 790–900 metres above sea level, and also formed 
the only relatively open corridor between the windward and leeward coasts.
40  Kirch (1984), pp. 182–86; and Kirch (1985), pp. 154, 179.




Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
Fierce rivalry existed between windward and leeward ali‘i nui and their 
followers. In Kamehameha’s time, the main centre of power on the 
windward coast was the district of Hilo, home to the important ali‘i 
nui families of I and Keawe.42 Hilo hosted a large population, mostly 
concentrated in the vicinity of Hilo Bay. Here, a number of permanent 
waterways, nightly showers and moist, warm, north-east trade winds 
provided a climate that allowed the year-round planting of dry-field crops 
as well as irrigated field systems. Northern Hilo’s population was based 
in a number of scattered settlements around gulches with permanent 
streams that were terraced to grow wet taro. The land from Hilo Bay 
42  W.D. Westervelt, ‘Kamehameha’s Method of Government’, 31st Annual Report of the Hawaiian 
Historical Society for the Year 1921 (Honolulu 1922), p. 28.
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south to the border with Puna was barren and lava strewn, with few 
permanent waterways. This part of Hilo contained only scattered pockets 
of agriculture and few residents.43
Puna has no permanent streams, but is blessed with substantial areas of 
light and fertile volcanic soils and ample rainfall, particularly in its wet, 
humid coastal lowlands. This allowed year-round planting of dry-field 
taro and ‘uala. Puna was also the main breadfruit-growing area in the 
chain. Breadfruit trees provided a significant source of carbohydrates and, 
in good years, could provide food for eight months of the year. Puna was 
one of the most fertile and populous areas in indigenous Hawai‘i.44 Cook’s 
expedition found settlement spread along most of the coastline. Samwell 
commented that from the sea Puna had:
the most fertile & pleasant appearance of any place we have seen at these isles, 
being almost entirely covered with groves of Coconut and other fruit trees, 
among which on small green plots stand their Houses near the seaside.45
Puna allied itself politically with Hilo or Ka‘ū in Kamehameha’s time, and 
never formed the core area of support for any ali‘i nui seeking to rule Hawai‘i.
The inhabitants of Puna’s neighbouring district of Ka‘ū mainly lived 
inland among their cultivations. Some of these were up to 12 kilometres 
from the coast. Settlement of the barren lava coast was generally limited 
to fishing camps used to exploit Ka‘ū’s rich offshore fishing – the waters 
off South Point were the richest fishing grounds exploited by Hawaiians. 
The inland fields produced dry taro and ‘uala, and depended on rainfall, 
especially winter rains brought by the onset of Kona storms. Member of 
the Vancouver naval expedition to Hawai‘i Archibald Menzies found the 
interior belt of settlement fertile and heavily populated. Ka‘ū traditions, 
however, refer to severe droughts that occasionally forced locals to seek 
temporary refuge in Puna or Kona when reservoirs or dried fish, preserved 
‘uala, and famine foods were exhausted. Despite this, Ka‘ū remained 
43  Cordy (1972), p. 396; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 104, 152, 538–39; King, in Beaglehole 
(1967), 3:1, p. 605; Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 484; and Joseph Ingraham, in Mark D. 
Kaplanoff, Joseph Ingraham’s Journal of the Brigantine Hope on a Voyage to the Northwest Coast of North 
America 1790–1792 (Barre, Mass.: Imprint Society, 1971), pp. 65–66.
44  Cordy (1972), p. 396; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 104, 152, 539–41.
45  Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 1156.
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politically independent well into Kamehameha’s time. The rulers of Ka‘ū 
generally allied with those of Puna and Hilo against the leeward chiefs 
in Kamehameha’s era.46
The district of Hāmākua extended along the windward coast from Hilo. 
Most of the eastern Hāmākua coast was lined with cliffs and streaked with 
spectacular waterfalls as streams from the interior abruptly ended their 
procession to the sea. These streams formed deep gulches that broke up 
the relatively wet, forested upland plateau behind the coast. This upland 
area supported dispersed dwellings scattered among mulched fields of 
dry-field taro and ‘uala.47 The two great valleys of Waipi‘o and Waimanu 
at the western end of Hāmākua contained extensive wet taro cultivation 
and supported substantial populations.48 Hawaiian traditions record 
Waipi‘o as the ancient seat of the first unifier of Hawai‘i. By the late-
18th century, Waipi‘o was no longer a centre of power. Western Hāmākua 
and the Waimea Saddle now formed a zone of rivalry astride the most 
accessible land route between windward and leeward spheres of influence.
The populous north Kona coastline from Kailua to Keouhou was the 
major centre of political power on the leeward coast in the late 18th 
century. Early European explorers reported a number of ‘villages’ and 
archaeological remains show the area contained a number of substantial 
heiau. Relatively high rainfall allowed the cultivation of breadfruit near the 
coast. Extensive dry-field systems, measuring nearly 5 kilometres in width 
and extending for 29 kilometres parallel to the coast, were constructed 
further inland to take advantage of the increased rainfall at higher altitude. 
This area of the Kona coast also contains rich offshore fishing grounds.49 
Further south, Kealakekua Bay supported a sizeable population, despite 
its arid appearance, because moisture from fog and late afternoon showers 
allowed the cultivation of ‘uala and dry taro on the slopes behind the bay.50 
46  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 273, 276, 543–621; Cordy (1972), p. 396; Menzies (1920), 
pp. 185–86; and Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 485–86.
47  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 532, 537–38; Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 476, 478; 
King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 605; Menzies (1920), p. 51.
48  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 273, 535–36; Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, pp. 1152–53.
49  Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 591–92; King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 607–08; 
Menzies (1920), p. 75; and Vancouver (1801), bk 5, pp. 100–02; Handy & Handy (1972), p. 273; 
Kirch (1984), p. 182; Kirch (1985), p. 164; and Hommon (1976), p. 57.
50  Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 592; Cordy (1972), p. 396; Handy & Handy (1972), 
p. 522; Kirch (1985), pp. 3, 164; and David Stannard, ‘Disease and Infertility: A New Look at the 
Demographic Collapse of Native Populations in the Wake of Western Contact’, Journal of American 
Studies, 24 (3), 1990, 3.
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South again, beyond Kealakekua Bay, was the major religious complex 
of Hōnaunau, which housed bones of mō‘ī descended from the original 
unifier of the islands, ‘Umi-a-Līloa. Hōnaunau also supported a sizeable 
population, again by taking advantage of the more suitable climate of 
the rain-fed inland slopes.51 The rest of  southern Kona supported only 
a few coastal settlements of fishermen and appeared to Samwell to be ‘a 
rugged, barren place almost entirely covered with lava’. 52 These fishing 
communities were able to supplement their catch with dry-field crops 
planted eight to 11 kilometres inland.
Kohala was closely allied to Kona by the time Kamehameha rose to 
political prominence. Beyond the arid and lava-strewn shores of Kawaihae 
Bay, the Kohala Mountains provided a good environment for intensive 
cultivation. The upper part of the leeward slopes received enough rainfall 
to support a considerable dry-field system there. ‘Uala and dry taro was 
grown along a 24-kilometre strip that was nearly 5 kilometres wide in 
places. This complex supported a considerable population based in coastal 
settlements.53 High rainfall carved five deep valleys into the windward 
Kohala coast north of Waipi‘o and Waimanu in Hāmākua. Wet taro was 
grown in their alluvial flats, although their permanent streams were prone 
to flooding. Rugged bluffs and steep slopes restricted land communication 
between the valleys.54 The other major population concentration in Kohala 
was the previously mentioned Waimea saddle. Its rich soils and local 
rainfall were supplemented with irrigation channels tapping streams from 
the Kohala Mountains to water extensive fields of dry taro and ‘uala.55
Maui is the second largest island in the chain (see Figure 4), and consists of 
two shield volcanoes connected by an isthmus formed from the merging 
of their lava flows. The western volcano is much older than its eastern 
neighbour, Haleakalā. As a result, the West Maui Mountains are more 
eroded, with deep valleys radiating out from their central spine on both 
leeward and windward sides. The geologically younger slopes of Haleakalā 
are less deeply incised. Haleakalā is now dormant, but was still active as 
51  Kirch (1985), p. 162; and Kirch (1984), p. 256.
52  Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1157; Kirch (1985), p. 160; and Handy & Handy 
(1972), p. 523.
53  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 608; Vancouver (1801), bk 5, pp. 104–06; Cordy (1972), 
pp. 396; Kirch (1984), pp. 182–86; Kirch (1985), pp. 167, 169, 175–77; and Hommon (1976), p. 57.
54  H.D. Tuggle & M.J. Tuggle-Tomanari, ‘Prehistoric Agriculture in Kohala, Hawaii’, Journal 
of Field Archaeology, vol. 7 (3), 1980, 303–05; and Kirch (1985), p. 178.
55  Vancouver (1801) bk 5, p. 106; Kirch (1984), p. 186; and Kirch (1985), p. 177.
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late as 1790. Steep, narrow and difficult to negotiate inland trails crossed 
the central spine of the West Maui Mountains and Haleakalā. Most 
travel was conducted along the coast, either by canoe or along the Alaloa 
(Great Road). This was a well-maintained trail that circled the coastline 
of Maui. Its construction dated to the reign of Kiha-a-Pi‘ilani, the mō‘ī 
who unified Maui in the 16th century. The isthmus also provided an easy 
route between the windward and leeward coasts of west Maui. There was 
little or no reef development, and the coastline was particularly rugged in 
the north-east.56
Figure 4: Maui
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
Maui remained unified through to Kamehameha’s time, thanks in part to 
the relative ease of movement around the island. The seat of power for the 
ruling dynasty of Maui was the Wailuku area on west Maui’s windward 
coast. Here four permanent streams issued forth from the mountains 
to form broad fertile alluvial fans on the coastal plain that supported 
extensive irrigated taro fields. The small size of local districts suggests this 
fertile area supported a dense population. The area was known as Nā Wai 
‘Ehā (the four streams), and its four districts centred on the streams they 
56  Kirch (1985), pp. 134–35; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 470, 489–90.
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were named after: Waihe‘e, Waiehu, Wailuku and Waikapu. There were 
more permanent streams further up the windward coast of west Maui in 
Ka‘anapali. These also seem to have supported irrigated taro complexes.57
The leeward coast of west Maui was also heavily populated. The coastal 
lowlands contained scattered patches of irrigated taro surrounded by dry 
taro and ‘uala with groves of coconut and breadfruit trees. The importance 
of water was demonstrated by the arid nature of this coast away from 
irrigated areas. Even in times of drought, however, water to sustain crops 
on the coastal lowlands could be drawn from the upper reaches of large 
leeward valleys like the Olowalu that extended deep into the mountains. 
There were also coastal springs in places. Lahaina’s rich offshore fisheries 
and irrigated fields made it a particularly favoured leeward locality that 
was often used as a residence by Maui mō‘ī.58
Further east along the leeward coast, water was not so readily available. 
The district of Kula on the south-west slopes of Haleakalā was arid and 
sparsely populated. Its inhabitants relied on ‘uala and fishing for their 
sustenance. The remaining leeward districts of Honua‘ula, Kahikinui, 
Kaupo and Kipahulu contained more substantial populations because 
of the higher rainfall received by their inland slopes. Dry-field systems 
dominated by ‘uala occupied the slopes between 400 and 700 metres 
altitude in all four districts. While fishing was good off Kula and 
Honua‘ula, it was generally poor along the rest of this coastline. Most 
settlements were located up the slopes among the cultivation zone rather 
than on the coast.59
Rainfall increases towards the eastern end of this south-eastern coast 
towards the start of the windward coast in the district of Hana. The eastern 
coast of Hana had relatively wet uplands, which allowed the development 
of extensive fields of mulched dry taro and ‘uala, and almost continuous 
coastal settlement among fruit trees. The windward coast of Hana and 
its neighbour Ko‘olau contained permanent streams and supported 
a  dense population practicing irrigated agriculture. The irrigated taro 
57  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 272, 496–98; and Kirch (1985), p. 135.
58  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 583; Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 570; Vancouver 
(1801), bk 3, p. 326; Menzies (1920), pp. 103–04; and Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 272, 492–94.
59  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 291, 327; La Perouse, in Milet-Mureau (1798), pp. 40–41, 53–55; 
Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 276, 507–11; and Kirch (1985), pp. 135–38.
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fields of Ke‘anae and Wailua-nui in Ko‘olau were particularly productive. 
The political significance of this area is suggested by the massive heiau 
of Pi‘ilanihale in Hana, perhaps the largest heiau in the islands.60
Hawaiian traditions concerning Maui do not indicate that east Maui 
ali‘i ever challenged the rule of mō‘ī based in west Maui. The Maui mō‘ī 
Kahekili’s ignorance of local springs while besieging Ka‘uiki Head in Hana 
in 1783, and the apparent cooperation between local residents and ali‘i 
from Hawai‘i in the 1770s and 1780s, suggest east Maui may not have 
been as fully integrated into the moku of Maui as is generally accepted. 
Hana and Ko‘olau were separated from west Maui by the districts of 
Hāmākualoa and Hāmākuapoko. Both districts were situated on gently 
sloping lands that were too low to catch the moist north-easterly trade 
winds until they were well inland. Rainfall was limited near the coast 
and only small gulches crossed their slopes. The coastal bays generally 
provided good fishing and ‘uala was grown further up the slopes with 
breadfruit and banana trees planted in gulches. The large number of 
narrow ahupua‘a in these districts suggests a relatively high population.61
The rulers of Maui dominated their leeward neighbours on Lāna‘i 
and Kaho‘olawe. These two islands were located in a rain shadow area 
leeward of Maui’s high mountains and their aridity was not helped by 
their relatively low elevation. Kaho‘olawe is the smallest and most arid 
of the main islands. It has steep cliffs around most of its coastline and 
only intermittent rainfall, and seems to have been abandoned by the late 
18th century.62 Lāna‘i had some valley development on its windward 
side, but had no permanent streams and received only seasonal rainfall. 
Most fell on the island’s central plateau. Despite this, most settlement 
by Kamehameha’s time seems to have been along the coast. Lieutenant 
James King, of Cook’s voyage, noted that, in places, ‘the Island look’d very 
Pleasant, and the borders seemed full of Villages’.63 With generally poor 
offshore fishing and limited reef development, the population relied on 
‘uala, yams and dry taro.
60  Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 474; Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1151; Vancouver 
(1801), bk 3, p. 289; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 272, 498, 502; Cordy (1972), p. 396; and Kirch 
(1985), pp. 135, 144. 
61  Handy & Handy (1972), p. 498.
62  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 583, 609, 3:2, p. 1218; Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 
301–02 (Mar. 1793); and Kirch (1985), pp. 144–47.
63  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 610; Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 570; Samwell, in 
Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1220; Handy & Handy (1972), p. 276; and Kirch (1985), pp. 132–34.
75
2 . GATHERING MoMENTUM
Moloka‘i is an elongated island formed from two volcanoes linked by a central 
saddle (see Figure 5). Its east–west alignment meant that the windward face 
of the East Moloka‘i Mountains caught most of the moist trade winds, 
leaving the rest of the island largely deprived of rainfall. Whereas the 
permanent streams of the windward district of Ko‘olau carved deep, steep-
sided valleys that broke up the high sea cliffs of this coast, leeward eastern 
Moloka‘i possessed only intermittent streams in shallow gulches. Low-lying 
western Moloka‘i was even drier. While the ocean crashed directly against 
the rugged windward coast of Ko‘olau, the leeward shore of Moloka‘i was 
blessed with reefs that enclosed broad shallows in which extensive fishponds 
were developed, particularly in eastern Moloka‘i.64
Figure 5: Moloka‘i
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
The population of the windward district of Ko‘olau was concentrated in four 
great valleys and grew irrigated taro, while the population of leeward Kona 
was dispersed along the central and eastern sections of the south coast and 
relied on upland dry-field systems and inshore fisheries for sustenance. The 
only permanent stream on this coast was at Kawela, where irrigated taro was 
grown.65 The western third of Moloka‘i was used only for fishing camps and 
the quarrying of basalt for adze production. Few people lived here and the 
64  Kirch (1985), p. 130.
65  Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 571; King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 609–10; Handy 
& Handy (1972), pp. 511–20; and Kirch (1985), pp. 131, 134 (Ko‘olau); and Samwell, in Beaglehole 




whole area made up only one ahupua‘a.66 Moloka‘i was not a major power 
in the wars between mō‘ī, but its abundant fishponds and lush windward 
valleys attracted the attention of mō‘ī from O‘ahu and Maui. The fierce 
rivalry between Ko‘olau and Kona ali‘i often lead to war, and facilitated the 
intervention of its more powerful neighbours on O‘ahu and Maui. 
The eastern coast of O‘ahu is visible from western Moloka‘i on clear days. 
O‘ahu was shaped by lava flows from its two volcanoes, resulting in two 
parallel mountain ranges separated by a plateau (see Figure 6). There was 
a considerable leeward zone beyond the windward Ko‘olau Mountains. 
This zone included the unusual feature of large coastal plains in the 
districts of ‘Ewa and Kona. In contrast, the windward coast was relatively 
narrow and consisted largely of deep valleys often ending in cliffs at the 
watershed, whose permanent streams created alluvial fans at the coast. 
Unlike most of the other inhabited islands, O‘ahu had well-developed 
reefs around large sections of its windward and leeward coasts.67
Figure 6: O‘ahu
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
66  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, p. 334; Handy & Handy (1972), p. 514; Kirch (1985), p. 134 (western 
Moloka‘i).
67  Kirch (1985), p. 107. 
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Scottish sailor Archibald Campbell, who became part of Kamehameha’s 
retinue, considered O‘ahu to be the most fertile island in the archipelago 
in 1810.68 The windward district of Ko‘olaupoko was the most bountiful 
and populous district on O‘ahu. Centred on Kailua and Kāne‘ohe, its 
heavy rainfall, permanent streams and rich soils in its valley bottoms 
and flood plains produced one of the most productive wet taro areas in 
the islands. In addition, its offshore reefs allowed the development of 
extensive fishponds and provided a sheltered inshore fishery.69 The great 
valleys of Ko‘olauloa between Laie and its boundary with Ko‘olaupoko 
also produced a rich harvest of wet taro. Although the coastal plain here 
is not as extensive as at Ko‘olaupoko, its reefs and sheltered bays provide 
good fishing. The Ko‘olau Mountains decreases in height beyond Laie, 
resulting in a decrease in rainfall. Here the land is less weathered and 
prone to drought. King still found the area to be full of ‘villages’ in the 
1770s.70
Across the Ko‘olau Mountains from Ko‘olaupoko lay Kona, the most 
fertile district of leeward O‘ahu. Despite its leeward climate, Kona’s broad 
coastal plain sustained wet taro fed by permanent streams from the large 
valleys behind it that reach deep into the Ko‘olau Mountains. Fishponds 
lined Kona’s reef-fringed coast, although offshore fishing was relatively 
poor. Kona supported a large population by the 1770s.71 The other 
leeward districts of O‘ahu were noticeably more arid than Kona, and 
probably less densely populated. The scarcity of water on the ‘Ewa plain 
meant that most of the population of the district of ‘Ewa lived around 
the shores of Pu‘uloa (Pearl Harbour). Here they were able to tap the rich 
concentration of fish and shellfish in the harbour. Dry-field agriculture 
predominated, although some irrigated taro grew on the narrow plain 
between the harbour and the foothills of the Ko‘olau Mountains along 
streams that flowed into the harbour.72 The Wai‘anae coast fell within the 
rain shadow area of the Wai‘anae Mountains. Enough rain fell to sustain 
extensive cultivation of dry-field crops, particularly ‘uala. Some irrigation 
was possible in the upper reaches of larger valleys near the watershed of the 
68  Campbell (1967), p. 109. 
69  Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 571; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 271–72, 452–60; Kirch 
(1985), pp. 107–13; and Stannard (1989), p. 57.
70  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 610; and Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 271–75.
71  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 360–65; Menzies (1920), pp. 23–24; Handy & Handy (1972), 
pp. 235, 270, 278–84; and Kirch (1985), pp. 107, 116–17.
72  Gilbert J. McAllister, Archaeology of O‘ahu, Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin 104 (Honolulu: 
1933), p. 29; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 469–70; Kirch (1985), p. 107; and Stannard (1989), p. 24.
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Wai‘anae Mountains. The Wai‘anae coast provided good offshore fishing 
but, Wai‘anae was remote from the centres of power, and its ali‘i do not 
seem to have been influential players in O‘ahu politics.73
The interior of ‘Ewa and Wai‘anae, between the two mountain ranges, was 
sparsely populated. It was traversed by trails linking Puuloa to the Waialua 
coast, and the Wai‘anae coast through Kolekole Pass.74 The population of 
the Waialua district lived mainly on the coastal plain of O‘ahu’s north-west 
coast. This plain was highly cultivated, despite low rainfall at the coast, 
thanks to streams that had their sources deep in the Ko‘olau Mountains. 
Captain Charles Clerke, an officer on the Cook expedition, described the 
land around Waimea Bay as ‘a fine expanse of Low Land bounteously 
cloath’d with Verdure, on which were situated many large Villages and 
extensive plantations’.75 The district did not have good offshore fishing 
and its coastal waters were largely unprotected by reefs.
The mō‘ī of O‘ahu drew the core of their support in this period from Kona 
and Ko‘olaupoko. Linked by the Nu‘uanu Pass and the eastern coastal 
plain, their combined resources provided perhaps the most concentrated 
resource base in the archipelago. Waikiki, Nu‘uanu and Kailua are 
mentioned as royal residences or patrilineal estates of 18th-century mō‘ī. 
The unification of O‘ahu seems to have been a relatively late event and 
18th-century traditions refer to armed resistance to O‘ahu mō‘ī from ali‘i 
in ‘Ewa and Wai‘anae, and, to a lesser extent, Waialua and Ko‘olauloa.76
O‘ahu’s Waialua coast faces Kaua‘i, the oldest of the inhabited islands 
(see Figure 7). Kaua‘i’s mountainous core was heavily eroded over 
centuries to form broad valleys that deposited large alluvial fans at the 
coast. The  heavy rainfall in the interior centred on Mount Wai‘ale‘ale, 
and gave rise to a number of significant waterways.77 Hawaiian traditions 
suggest the Kahakumakalina family provided most Kaua‘i mō‘ī up until 
the late 18th century. From an early period, their principal residence was 
at Wailua in the district of Puna. This was one of the most sacred sites in 
73  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 365–66; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 271, 275–76; R.C. Green, 
Makaha Valley – Prior to 1880 A.D., Pacific Anthropological Records no. 31 (Honolulu: Bernice 
P. Bishop Museum, 1980), esp. p. 75; and Kirch (1985), pp. 107–08.
74  John Papa I‘ī, Fragments of Hawaiian History (Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1959), 
pp. 89 ff.; and Kirch (1985), p. 108. 
75  Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 572–73; King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 584, 610; 
Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 271, 275, 467; Kirch (1985), p. 108; and Kirch & Sahlins (1992).
76  Fornander (1969), pp. 270–82, 289–91, 297; and Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 278, 480.
77  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 269–70; and Kirch (1985), pp. 99–100.
79
2 . GATHERING MoMENTUM
the archipelago, and there were a large number of heiau in its vicinity. 
Wailua was situated on the lower reaches of the Wailua River, the largest 
waterway in the islands. The river enabled the large-scale cultivation of 
wet taro. Breadfruit was another prominent food source in this area. Just 
north of Wailua was another extensive area of irrigated taro cultivation at 
Kapa‘a. The third major population centre of Puna was at Hulē‘ia in the 
south where good offshore fishing supplemented fishponds, wet taro and 
‘uala. The combined resources of Puna and its political dominance on 
Kaua‘i suggest it had a considerable population.78
Figure 7: Kaua‘i
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
To the north and west of Puna were the three windward districts of 
Ko‘olau, Halele‘a and Nā Pali. Broad fertile valleys with permanent streams 
supported large-scale irrigated taro complexes in Ko‘olau and Halele‘a. 
Cultivation was particularly concentrated in the Hanalei Bay area of 
Halele‘a, where a number of valleys converged to produce a substantial 
coastal plain of fertile alluvial soil. The valleys and the plain were 
78  Fornander (1969), pp. 291, 293; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 152–53, 269, 423, 425; and 
Kirch (1985), pp. 99–100.
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extensively irrigated, and fishponds dotted the coastal plain. In contrast, 
Nā Pali consisted of deep, but narrow, valleys separated by razorback 
ridges and coastal cliffs. Most valleys seem to have been cultivated to some 
degree and, today, many still show signs of ancient irrigation systems. 
The Nā Pali coast was a rich deep-sea fishing area. While the combined 
population of these three windward districts was probably large, this 
does not seem to have translated into political influence. Puna remained 
dominant, and what opposition there was usually emanated from the 
large leeward district of Kona.79
The large leeward district of Kona contained the whole south-western part 
of the island. Although it was significantly drier than the other half of 
Kaua‘i, it extended into the rain-drenched central plateau and included 
two large, permanently flowing watercourses. These flowed down the 
Waimea and Hanapepe valleys and allowed the cultivation of irrigated 
taro alongside dry-field crops up to 12 kilometres inland. The southern 
coast, east of Waimea, supported dry-field cultivation, particularly of 
‘uala. Breadfruit thrived along most of the coast between Waimea and 
Wailua. This coast seems to have supported many people, judging from 
Cook’s observation that it had many villages. The Koloa area may have 
formed the third significant centre of population in Kona after Waimea 
and Hanapepe.80 The island of Ni‘ihau lay off the Kona coast and had 
a relationship with Kaua‘i that was similar to Lāna‘i’s with Maui. Kaua‘i 
dominated Ni‘ihau politically. Low-lying and drought-prone, Ni‘ihau was 
home to a population who depended on yam cultivation and temporarily 
abandoned their island during severe droughts and sought refuge on 
Kaua‘i.81 Waimea was a rich resource base for the I‘ihiwalani family, the 
junior branch of the royal line, to pursue their rivalry with their senior 
relatives in Wailua.82
79  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 421 (Ko‘olau), 269, 417 (Halelea), and 269, 414 (Nā Pali); 
Timothy K. Earle Economic and Social Organization of a Complex Chiefdom –– Halelea District, Kauai, 
Hawaii, University of Michigan – Anthropological Paper no. 63 (Ann Arbor: 1978), p. 9; and Kirch 
(1985), p. 99.
80  Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 264, 269–72, 427; Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, 
p. 575; Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1082; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 152–53, 269–70, 
275, 393, 429, 477; Cordy (1972), p. 396; and Kirch (1985), p. 99.
81  Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 275–79; Vancouver (1801) bk 3, p. 386; Handy & Handy 
(1972), pp. 432–34; and Kirch (1985), p. 166.
82  Fornander (1969), p. 293. 
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The translation of observations on settlement patterns into actual 
population figures is a difficult task. No accurate census of the Hawaiian 
population was taken until well into the 19th century, and few areas were 
visited for any length of time by Cook’s expedition. Regional settlement 
surveys by archaeologists help fill the gaps in places. Land records from 
the mid-19th century also help illustrate settlement patterns, although 
change during the intervening decades must be allowed for. Until 
recently, most estimates of the Hawaiian population in 1778 were based 
upon King’s observations. King initially estimated the population to be 
500,000, but later revised this down to 400,000. His figures were based 
on house counts at Kealakekua Bay and Waimea on Kaua‘i. These were 
then extrapolated to cover the length of coastline that King estimated 
to be inhabited. He  estimated that around a quarter of the coastline 
was inhabited, with little or no settlement of the interior. Most modern 
scholars have estimated the Hawaiian population in 1778 at between 
200,000 and 300,000. The lack of firm evidence, however, means that 
these estimates are largely speculation.83
In 1989, David Stannard proposed a radical revision of the Hawaiian 
population in 1778 to at least 800,000. He attacked the rather shaky 
basis of most previous estimates, and suggested King’s figure was 
a  considerable  underestimate. More than a quarter of the coastline 
was occupied, including marginal areas, as were inland zones. He suggests 
that Kealakekua Bay and Waimea did not represent the most densely 
populated areas in the islands, as both were in leeward zones where rainfall 
patterns restricted cultivation. He asserted that windward areas with more 
consistent rainfall probably supported greater population densities than 
most leeward areas.
Stannard supported his upward revision of the Hawaiian population by 
providing evidence to show that this was possible according to the islands’ 
potential agricultural production and accepted models of population 
growth. Stannard argues that such growth rates were not significantly 
curtailed by traditional warfare, infanticide, abortion, sacrificial killings 
or pre-European disease and general health. He notes that rapid and 
significant population decline among populations not previously exposed 
to European diseases usually followed first contacts with Europeans. 
Stannard points out that to take account of the impact of introduced 
83  Stannard (1989), pp. 2–14; Terry L. Hunt, ‘Book Review of David Stannard, Before the Horror’, 
Pacific Studies (Laie), vol. 13 (3), 1990, 256; and P.V. Kirch, (1990b), p. 394.
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disease, Hawai‘i State statistician Robert Schmitt’s contact population 
should be much higher, as it is nearly the same as missionary William 
Ellis’s estimate of the population four decades later (see Table 1).84
Stannard’s study prompted much debate. Most responses have been 
positive, but a number of valid criticisms have been raised. His negative 
assessment of the carrying capacity of Kealakekua Bay and Waimea relative 
to windward areas underestimates the productivity of these areas, and 
exaggerates the difference between leeward and windward production. 
His claim that windward chiefs usually prevailed in battle over leeward 
chiefs is not supported by Hawaiian traditions in general, and certainly 
not by the one reference he cites to back up his claim. Stannard tends 
to rely on average carrying capacity rather than the more significant 
denominator, the carrying capacity of areas during drought and other 
hard times. None of these points, however, invalidate Stannard’s criticism 
of previous population estimates. They suggest that Stannard’s estimate 
needs modification rather than radical alteration.85
Table 1: Population estimates for Hawai‘i
Island 1779 (King) 1779 (Schmitt) 1779 (Stannard) 1823 (Ellis)
Hawai‘i 150,000 90,000 340,000 85,000
Maui 65,400 52,000 260,331 65,082
Kaho‘olawe ? ? ? ?
Lāna‘i ? 3,500 11,879 2,970
Moloka‘i ? 9,000 44,549 11,137
o‘ahu 76,200 42,000 220,927 55,231
Kaua‘i 64,000 25,000 81,502 20,375
Ni‘ihau ? 750 7,774 1,944
Total 355,600 222,250 966,962 241,739
Sources: Schmitt (1971), p . 242; Stannard (1989), p . 54; Kirch (2010), p . 138 .
Estimating the indigenous population of Hawai‘i in the era of Kamehameha 
I with any degree of accuracy is impossible. What is more important for 
this study is the relative distribution of the population. This study generally 
supports Stannard’s argument for an upward revision of Hawaiian 
84  Stannard (1989), pp. 29, 37–45 (agricultural production), 32–37 (population growth models), 
45–50, 60.
85  Kirch (2010), pp. 31–33, 128–31; P.V. Kirch, ‘Review of David Stannard, Before the Horror’, 
The Contemporary Pacific, vol. 2, Fall 1990b, 395; and Hunt (1990), p. 260. 
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population estimates. Deaths resulting from warfare and sacrifice seem to 
have been relatively low, but estimates of the typical ratio of combatants 
to total population argue for a population in excess of Schmitt’s figure. 
The review of settlement patterns supports Stannard’s speculation about 
the extent of Hawaiian settlement, and of  the agricultural  potential of 
the archipelago. However, the fragility of overextending agricultural 
capacity in areas of unreliable rainfall was also noted. The diversity of 
settlement concentrations revealed by the above locality survey argues 
against generalising from particular localities (see Figure 8). Windward 
localities, such as Hilo Bay, Nā Wai ‘Ehā and Ko‘olaupoko, were probably 
more productive than Kealakekua Bay and Waimea, as Stannard claims, 
but other windward localities, such as eastern Hāmākua on Hawai‘i 
and Hāmākuapoko on Maui, were probably not as well populated. 
Furthermore, North Kona and leeward Kohala were probably more 
densely populated than either Kealakekua Bay or Waimea. While Schmitt 
and Stannard agree on the population ratios between islands, this is largely 
due to their use of Ellis’s 1823 estimates for each island. By this time, 
disease and increased mobility may have distorted traditional population 
patterns. Our review of local resources suggests population estimates for 
O‘ahu and Kaua‘i may err on the low side.
Figure 8: Possible population distribution, 1778
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
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The distribution of resources just described conferred distinct 
advantages on  the occupants of certain favoured localities. But the 
diffuse nature of power within moku restricted the degree to which such 
geographical advantages could be converted into lasting political benefits. 
The  expectation of reciprocity underlying maka‘āinana obedience to 
sacred leaders, and the limited coercive power of those leaders relative 
to subordinate ali‘i, combined to restrain the concentration of power by 
mō‘ī. The relative power of the leaders of different localities varied over 
time. The pursuit of status and power by individual mō‘ī, and the pressures 
caused by expanding populations in a variety of local environments, altered 
the relationship between localities over time. Environmental constraints 
on economic activity and social and political barriers to the expansion 
of power by mō‘ī were often challenged. Occasionally they were pushed 
back. Unification was possible, but by no means certain.
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3
The Hawaiian Political 
Transformation from 1770 to 1796
No one alive in 1778 would have predicted that the Hawaiian Islands 
would be unified in their lifetime, or that Kamehameha would be the chief 
to bring it about. To understand how the potential for unification noted 
by scholars became a reality requires a detailed examination of political 
and military structural transformations that picked up momentum after 
1770. Robert Hommon discusses global writings on warfare and state 
formation in The Ancient Hawaiian State, including the work of Charles 
Tilly and Robert Carneiro, and makes a strong connection between the 
two. Hommon concludes that warfare was a causative link but not a crucial 
factor in Hawaiian state formation because war was pursued by states 
and non-states alike. Rather, to Hommon, the key influence on Hawaiian 
state formation was the political innovation of ‘both holding centralised 
political power and delegating it’.1 This and the following chapter contest 
Hommon’s dichotomy by arguing that changes to the nature of political 
and military power in the late 18th century were interrelated. Escalating 
chiefly rivalries spurred military reforms and forced chiefs to delegate 
authority to accommodate a structure of warfare that mobilised and 
relied upon a greater proportion of the polities’ residents and resources. 
Hawaiian society became more militarised as chiefs threw off the vestiges 
1  Hommon (2013), pp. 238–40.
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of sacred power that had come to constrain them, and altered their 
warfare to make it more efficient, even though this resulted in an erosion 
of chiefly status on the battlefield.
The structure of consent: Religious beliefs 
and social relationships
Hawaiian polities on the eve of Kamehameha’s wars of unification are 
best characterised as politically advanced chiefdoms according to the 
standard framework outlined in Chapter 1. The authority of the chiefs 
rested heavily upon their sacred status. Secular power was relatively loose 
and decentralised, with limited development of centralised coercive and 
administrative structures. Yet, by the late 18th century, Hawaiian society 
was moving towards instituting features that are more usually associated 
with early states. Localised kinship affiliations were weak and the courts of 
ruling chiefs contained the seeds of centralised administrative structures. 
But, perhaps the most noticeable feature of this period was the tension 
between the increasing resort to coercive power and continued reliance 
on sacred legitimacy. By 1770, Hawaiian chiefs were reaching the limits 
of sacred power.
Religious ritual played a prominent role in the organisation of Hawaiian 
life in this period. Gods and spirits of dead ancestors influenced the affairs 
of mortals. Natural phenomena were interpreted as supernatural omens, 
and all actions took into consideration the utterances of spirit mediums 
and oracles. The gods were appealed to for protection from hostile forces 
and ceremonies involving prayers and offerings were enacted seeking 
assistance in various undertakings.
The four major gods: Kū, Lono, Kāne and Kanaloa, were general categories 
rather than specific gods. Each god category encompassed a wide variety 
of particular forms. For example, Kū, in his violent form, was the war 
god of the Hawaiian chiefs yet, through this association with war, Kū was 
also connected with prosperity and fertility as the dividends of victory. 
There was no fixed hierarchy within the Hawaiian pantheon. Because of 
often multiple associations, the relative importance of gods depended 
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upon the context in which they were worshipped. Changing hierarchies 
and associations within the pantheon occurred as the perceived needs 
of supplicants varied in time and place.2
While the Hawaiians did not distinguish between supernatural and 
human agency as modern European society does, they did draw a sharp 
distinction between kapu (sacred) and noa (non-sacred) elements. Kapu 
status, which carried restrictions to isolate its possessor from other 
elements, signalled a close association with the supernatural world, whose 
powers were so great that they needed to be approached with caution. 
Valerio Valeri maintains that improper contact between kapu and noa 
elements also threatened the efficacy of kapu elements in Hawai‘i. 
Revised interpretations in the 1980s, however, suggest that noa referred 
to the subject in question being free of the restrictions that kapu status 
conferred. This interpretation is consistent with revisions of kapu and noa 
elsewhere in Polynesia. It is now believed that, apart from certain highly 
sacred individuals who were always kapu, most men and certain women 
moved between states of kapu and noa depending on circumstances.3
Daily activities were regulated by a relatively fixed and regular system of 
prohibitions. These were also known as kapu. Kapu intruded into all aspects 
of life, reinforcing social divisions by restricting contact between genders, 
separating sacred and profane classes, and dictating the conduct of daily 
activities such as eating, work and leisure. Kapu also served to organise the 
year’s activities. The year was divided into the ceremonial periods of Kau 
and Ho‘oilo, which roughly corresponded to the dry and rainy seasons 
respectively. During Kau, four kapu periods were observed each month, 
each of two to three days’ duration. The attendance of chiefs and priests 
at temples was required during these periods, and commoners’ activities 
2  On Hawaiian religion in general, see Valeri (1985a), pp. 4, 13, 31, 58–66. On divination, see 
Thomas G. Thrum (ed.), Fornander Collection of Hawaiian Antiquities and Folklore, vol. 6 (Honolulu: 
Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1919–20), pp. 70–86. On the Hawaiian pantheon, see Malo (1951), 
pp. 83–85; Mary W. Beckwith, (ed.), Kepelino’s Traditions of Hawaii (Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop 
Museum, 1937), p. 10; Kamakau (1961), pp. 200–03; Handy & Handy (1972), p. 14; Rev. John 
F. Pogue, The Mooolelo of Ancient Hawaii, Charles W. Kenn (trans.) (Honolulu: Topgallant, 1978 
(1858)), pp. 45–48; Valerio Valeri, ‘The Transformation of a Transformation: A Structural Essay 
on an Aspect of Hawaiian History (1809–1819)’, Social Analysis, vol. 10, May 1982, 4; and Valeri 
(1985a), pp. 9, 187.
3  See Valeri (1985a), pp. 84–86, 111; and Caroline Ralston, ‘Sanctity and Power: Gender in 
Polynesian History – Introduction’, Journal of Pacific History, vol. 22 (3), 1987, 115.
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were restricted.4 In Ho‘oilo, a harvest festival known as the makahiki 
dominated the ceremonial calendar. During the makahiki in Ho‘oilo, 
events observed during Kau were suspended, as were temple building and 
warfare while Lono, as the god of fertility, achieved temporary ascendancy 
over the war god form of Kū.
The makahiki season roughly coincided with the period of October to 
January on the European calendar and centred upon the collection of 
first fruits’ offerings to Lono in thanks for a successful crop. In its final 
phase, images of the god were carried around each island. According to 
Kēlou Kamakau, the passage of the god image around the island lasted 
23 days. A strict kapu on warfare and offshore fishing applied during this 
time. The giving of tribute to Lono by each local community, public feasts 
and entertainment – such as dancing and boxing contests – marked the 
images’ journey. The makahiki ended with the rite of Kali‘i, in which the 
followers of Kū reasserted the dominance of their god, and the images of 
Lono were set adrift in a canoe. At the end of the makahiki, the paramount 
chief would dedicate a temple to Lono in preparation for a year of peace, 
or to Kū in preparation for war. The dedication of such a temple involved 
a major commitment in terms of labour and offerings, as well as a long 
and complex ceremony.5
The kapu divided Hawaiian society in to two distinct groups: the chiefs 
(ali‘i), and the commoners (maka‘āinana). Although both were believed 
to have descended from the god Papa and his consort Wakea, only the 
ali‘i were deemed to be sacred. This was because the ali‘i were considered 
to have descended directly from the gods while the maka‘āinana were 
only connected to the gods through junior branches of lineages. Status 
was more a function of genealogical seniority than of age or gender. 
A person from a genealogically senior branch outranked older generations 
of junior branches. Chiefs were ranked according to the purity of their 
descent from the gods. Each rank was associated with a personal kapu 
that was conferred at birth. The higher the rank, the stricter the kapu. 
4  On kapu in general, see Sahlins (1981), p. 52; and Levin (1968), p. 413. On the annual ritual 
cycle, see Malo (1951), pp. 31–33, 240; Beckwith (1937), pp. 80–84; Pogue (1978), pp. 40–45; 
and Valeri (1985a), pp. 194–98. On social kapu, see Caroline Ralston, ‘Hawaii 1778–1854: Some 
Aspects of Maka‘āinana Response to Rapid Cultural Change’, Journal of Pacific History, vol.19 (1), 
1984, 23–24. On monthly kapu, see I‘ī (1959), pp. 33–46.
5  Malo (1951), pp. 142–52; Thrum, vol. 6 (1919–20), p. 40; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 329–
68; Valeri (1985a), pp. 200–33; Sahlins (1981), pp. 18–30; Marshall Sahlins, Islands of History 
(Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1985), pp. 115–22; and Marshall Sahlins, ‘Captain Cook 
at Hawaii’, Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 98 (4), 1989, 387–93. 
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As sacredness was hereditary, marriage was an important determinant 
of  rank. Because of the association of high rank with closeness to the 
gods, much importance was attached to the rank of candidates for 
the part of paramount chief (mō‘ī). Mō‘ī and their nuclear families sought 
to conceive unions that would produce offspring of the highest possible 
rank. The ranks that could result from various unions and their associated 
kapu are outlined in Table 2.6
The ruling chief, and his offspring from unions with high-ranking female 
chiefs formed a small, incestuous group that made up the senior branch of 
the chiefly stratum. They were known as the ali‘i nui. All other ali‘i were 
viewed as collateral junior branches of the chiefly stratum and, therefore, 
less suitable candidates to be paramount, although they were by no means 
wholly excluded from contention. The dividing line between junior 
ali‘i and maka‘āinana was defined by the individual’s relationship to the 
incumbent mō‘ī. Chiefly status was determined at the accession of a new 
ruler during the hale nauā ceremony, where a link with the ruler’s ancestral 
line was sought. In general, an ali‘i’s importance varied inversely with the 
number of generations required to prove the link. According to David 
Malo, the questioning only extended to the 10th ascending generation.7 
Failure to prove such a link condemned lesser ali‘i to the ranks of the 
maka‘āinana. There does not seem to have been any upward mobility in 
rank from the status of maka‘āinana. By the late 18th century the rift 
between ali‘i and maka‘āinana was profound. Just as incestuous marriages 
kept the senior branch of the chiefly elite small and selective, the hale 
nauā ceremony kept the ranks of the ali‘i restricted. Maka‘āinana did not 
maintain lengthy family genealogies, and made up the vast majority of the 
population.
The relationship between the mō‘ī and his maka‘āinana subjects was one of 
mutual obligations and duties. The maka‘āinana provided labour and taxes 
in kind to support their ruler in return for his mediation with the most 
powerful gods to secure bountiful harvests, and protection from potential 
threats. The ali‘i nui were able to do this because of their close connection 
with the gods. Indeed the highest ranking ali‘i seem to have been considered 
6  Levin (1968), p. 408; Malo (1951), p. 52; Pogue (1978), p. 60; Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa, ‘Land 
and the Promise of Capitalism: A Dilemma for the Hawaiian Chiefs of the 1848 Māhele’, PhD 
Thesis, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, 1986, p. 24; and Sahlins (1985), pp. 20–21. See also Levin 
(1968), pp. 408–11; Malo (1951), pp. 54–57, 80; and Beckwith (1937), pp. 195–96.




to possess certain attributes that were characteristic of gods. Depictions of 
ali‘i and gods closely echoed each other in terms of their ranks, associated 
kapu, and insignia. Whether ali‘i nui were considered to be living gods is 
uncertain, however, it is clear that deceased ali‘i of the senior branch were 
considered to be ‘aumakua (ancestral spirits) of their successors. In 1819, 
for example, ‘A house was built for Kamehameha’s bones for the purpose 
of deifying him so that he could become an ‘aumakua – a family god’.8 
‘Aumakua were believed to influence the affairs of humans.
The significance attached to religious ritual meant that priests (kahuna) 
occupied an important role in Hawaiian society as appellants to, and 
interpreters of the gods. There were a number of regular orders of kahuna as 
well as less conventional kahuna that were usually associated with prophecy 
or sorcery. Unexpected deaths were often put down to sorcery, and an 
important member of any mō‘ī’s personal pantheon was his sorcery deity to 
assist him against his enemies and their sorcerers. War gods and sorcery gods 
were used to destroy rivals. The importance attached to these gods by ruling 
chiefs is suggested by their epithet: mau akua ‘imi aupuai (gods who sought 
kingdoms).9 High priests (kahuna nui) were closely linked to high chiefs. 
Knowledge of the most important ritual and learning was restricted to 
these two groups. A detailed account of the Hoomanamana priestly order, 
which was recorded in the mid-19th century, suggests that these orders 
were organised into specialised divisions, such as prophecy and medicine, 
each of which was associated with a specific god.10 One had to excel at all 
of the specialties within one’s particular priesthood before being considered 
worthy of becoming a high priest. Most high-ranking kahuna seem to have 
been drawn from the ali‘i class. Senior kahuna advised mō‘ī upon ritual and 
spiritual matters, and were much valued as a significant part of any ruler’s 
legitimacy rested upon his ritual efficacy. Some kahuna nui, like Kalanihula 
of the Hawai‘i, served as advisers to successive generations of mō‘ī, and were 
invaluable advisers on secular aspects of rule as well as ritual. Others had 
8  Kahananui (1984), p. 211. On mō‘ī as intermediary between gods and humans, see Valeri 
(1985a), pp. 86–87; Levin (1968), pp. 407–08; and Kame‘eleihiwa (1986), pp. 34, 43. On mō‘ī 
as ‘aumakua, see Valeri (1985a), pp. 145–53; Sahlins (1981), p. 25; Marshall Sahlins, How ‘Natives’ 
Think: About Captain Cook, For Example (University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 25; Malo (1951), 
pp. 104–06; and Beckwith (1937), p. 13. On the afterlife, see Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), p. 572; and 
Pogue (1978), pp. 56–58.
9  On priests in general, see Malo (1951), pp. 112–14; Sheldon Dibble, A History of the Sandwich 
Islands (Honolulu: Thos. G. Thrum, 1909), p. 83; King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 629; Valeri 
(1985a), p. 138; Levin (1968), pp. 410–11; and Sahlins (1995), pp. 121–22. On sorcery, see Malo 
(1951), pp. 96–97; I‘ī  (1959), p. 8; Vancouver (1801) bk 3, p. 375; and Valeri (1982), p. 25.
10  Thrum, vol. 6 (1919–20), pp. 68–70, 74.
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an  even more direct connection to the secular power of the high chiefs. 
Koa,  the old priest encountered by James Cook in 1779, had once been 
a famous warrior.11
Table 2: Hawaiian chiefly rank system
Rank Rank of child Membership criteria Associated kapu
Highest Nī‘aupi‘o Parents both of highest rank Kapu moe
Pi’o Offspring of full-sibling marriage of 
nī‘aupi‘o rank
Kapu moe
Naha Offspring of half-sibling marriage of 
nī‘aupi‘o rank
Kapu noho
Wohi Offspring of nī‘aupi‘o , pi‘o, or naha father 
with close female relative
Kapu wohi
Papa Offspring of nī‘aupi‘o, pi‘o, or naha mother 
with a lower ranking chief
Lōkea Offspring of high-ranked father with mother 
of a relative through younger siblings
Lā‘au ali‘i Parents are children of high chiefs through 
secondary matings
Kaukau ali‘i Flexible term signifying an inferior or 
dependent status; descendants of high 
chiefs through collateral branches
Lowest Ali‘i noanoa Literally ‘without kapu’ – offspring of 
a high chief  and a commoner woman 
– not recognised as ali‘i unless special 
provision made
Source: Kirch (2010), p . 36 .
The mō‘ī remained the supreme mediator between men and the gods. 
Only the mō‘ī and, perhaps, the most senior kahuna could communicate 
with the most powerful gods of the Hawaiian pantheon. Only ali‘i of the 
senior branch could conduct human sacrifice, the supreme appeal to the 
gods.12 This special relationship with the gods was not, however, accepted 
unquestioningly. Failure to prove the existence of this relationship through 
the successful completion of temple ritual, and tangible signs of the god’s 
favour like success in war and prosperity in peace, threatened the security 
of the mō‘ī’s rule.
11  On priests, see Beckwith (1937), pp. 60–62, 140, 192; Malo (1951), p. 149; Hommon (1975), 
p. 149; and Levin (1968), p. 416. On kahuna as advisers, see Kamakau (1961), p. 173. On Koa, 
see Sahlins (1995), p. 49, citing James Cook & James King, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean … on His 
Majesty’s Ships Resolution and Discovery, vol. 3 (Dublin: Chamberlaine et al., 1784), pp. 3, 69. 
12  Valeri (1985a), pp. 140–42; and Malo (1951), p. 53.
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This relationship between the mō‘ī and gods was conceived of in terms 
of mana. Mana was divine energy that could be conferred or withdrawn 
by the supernatural world. Objects and persons were merely mediums 
and reservoirs for mana. Mana also derived from the accumulated 
achievements of ancestors, so that ali‘i attempted to locate and desecrate 
the secreted remains of their enemies’ ancestors. Some emblems of 
chiefly status were made from the bones of slain rival ali‘i. The ruling 
chief obtained mana from his sacred status, but this could diminish 
without concrete achievements. Defeat in warfare and natural disasters 
within a mō‘ī’s lands were seen as indications of the god’s withdrawal of 
mana. As such, the leadership was open to challenge by ambitious rivals. 
The relative mana of rival ali‘i was put to the test in wars between rival 
ruling chiefs, succession disputes and rebellions. The mō‘ī was not always 
the highest ranking ali‘i. Kamehameha was of the wohi rank and secured 
the rule of the leeward districts of Hawai‘i by defeating the higher ranking 
nī‘aupi‘o ali‘i, Kīwala‘ō.13
The sacred and secular aspects of ali‘i power complemented each other, as 
ali‘i believed favour by the gods would attract many followers, and these 
followers would provide him with a secular power base with which to 
achieve what his reputation suggested he was capable of. In other ways, 
the sacred and secular aspects of a ruler’s power were not so compatible. 
As Valeri notes, ‘The [King] thus must maintain his transcendence, to be 
separated from all men, but at the same time he must enter into a contract 
with them to demonstrate his power … created by society through 
a myriad of rules of separation, the king’s divinity incurs a debt in relation 
to society that it must pay sooner or later’.14
From sacred to secular power? Balancing 
coercion and consent
The kapu of the ali‘i was a double-edged sword. This was particularly true 
of the more demanding kapu of ali‘i of the senior branch. They needed 
to intervene in worldly affairs to assert their mana, yet did so surrounded 
and protected by kapu that restrained their actions. Some high-ranking 
13  Valeri (1985a), pp. 99–100; see also Levin (1968), pp. 403, 410, 414–15; Malo (1951), p. 211; 
and Jocelyn Linnekin, ‘Who Made the Feather Cloaks? A Problem in Hawaiian Gender Relations’, 
Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 97 (3), 1988, 276, 277.
14  Valeri (1985a), p. 149.
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ali‘i had to travel at night so that their kapu that required maka‘āinana 
to prostrate themselves in their presence did not disrupt daily activities, 
and so that the risk of polluting their status by coming into contact with 
impure persons and objects was lessened.15
By the late 18th century, kapu restrictions were being circumvented 
for political efficacy. A number of high-ranking ali‘i interacted with 
maka‘āinana. There are a number of references in Hawaiian traditions to 
mō‘ī personally supervising the improvement of agricultural fields, even 
down to individual taro patches. Presumably, this involved some contact 
with the local cultivators, unless instructions were directed through the 
lesser ali‘i who supervised particular localities for the ruler. Kamehameha 
certainly laboured in his own fields and was said to have been well liked by 
his maka‘āinana subjects. Kalanikūpule, a young ali‘i nui from the Maui 
ruling house, was also much loved by maka‘āinana. Kamakau states that 
he would fraternise with even the humblest of his subjects.16
Ali‘i nui also participated in battles. Some were killed in combat, and 
not necessarily by ali‘i of similar rank. It is unclear if any rules of combat 
governed conduct towards ali‘i nui in battle. Two incidents from the life 
of the nī‘aupi‘o ali‘i Kīwala‘ō, however, suggest a pattern. According to 
traditions, when Kīwala‘ō intervened in a battle on Maui, he effectively 
ended the battle as the combatants were obliged to throw down their 
weapons and prostrate themselves in his presence. Yet, in a later battle 
at Moku‘ōhai on Hawai‘i, Kīwala‘ō’s supporters were routed when his 
slaying by the lesser ali‘i Kalaimoku broke their morale.17
At Moku‘ōhai, Kamehameha challenged Kīwala‘ō for the right to succeed 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u as mō‘ī of Hawai‘i. The stakes were high, and a substantial 
demonstration of prowess and resolve may have been required to win over 
wavering supporters. It may also be significant that both Kīwala‘ō and 
Kalaimoku were high-ranking ali‘i. In contrast, the fight on Maui was 
between the forces of two well-established rulers – Kahekili of Maui and 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u of Hawai‘i. Kamakau’s description of Kīwala‘ō’s intervention 
here suggests that symbols of his high status were prominently displayed to 
signal his intentions. While ali‘i wore distinctive yellow and red protective 
cloaks in battle, on this occasion
15  Valeri (1985a), p. 149; Malo (1951), pp. 54, 56–57; and I‘ī (1959), pp. 51–52, 120.
16  Kamakau (1961), pp. 203 (Kamehameha), and 142–43 (Kalanikūpule).
17  On the battle on Maui, see I‘ī (1959), p. 52; and Kamakau (1961), p. 88. On Moku‘ōhai, 
see Kamakau (1961), pp. 120–22.
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Kīwala‘ō was dressed in the garments of a chief and attended by Ka-
me‘e-ia-moku bearing the spittoon and Ka-manawa carrying the Kāhili. 
As  Kīwala‘ō advanced, splendidly arrayed, endowed with the kapu of 
a god and covered with the colors of the rainbow, down fell the fighting 
men of both sides prostrate to the ground because of his divine rank as a 
nī‘aupi‘o and the severe tabu that demanded prostration to avoid facing 
the sacred back of a chief. The soldiers of Maui wished to ignore the 
tabu, regretting the cessation of the fighting, but Kīwala‘ō continued on 
to Wailuku.18
Kīwala‘ō’s success in ending the fighting, despite the Maui warriors’ desire 
to press home their advantage, may also have been due to kinship links 
between prominent ali‘i within the rival camps. Kīwala‘ō was not only the 
son of Kalani‘ōpu‘u, but was also related to Kahekili. His two attendants, 
Kame‘eiamoku and Kamanawa, were Kahekili’s half-brothers.
Another strategy used to overcome the restraining influence of kapu 
on the actions of mō‘ī was the delegation of ritual obligations to close 
relatives. Kamehameha made his younger brother, Keali‘imoikai, the 
sometime personal guardian of the ruler’s (Kamehameha) kapu, thus 
freeing himself to more actively pursue secular and potentially defiling 
affairs of state. When Kamehameha had to cut short his ceremonial duties 
during the makahiki season in 1794 to accompany George Vancouver to 
Kealakekua Bay, he designated his half-brother to stand in for him, after 
first consulting with his kahuna.19
In some instances, kapu were modified to accommodate chiefly 
interactions with Europeans. But, in all cases, due consideration was 
given to ritual requirements. According to Vancouver, Kamehameha’s 
reluctant modification of the 1794–95 makahiki came about because 
of Vancouver’s threat to take his trade elsewhere. In the previous year, 
Vancouver’s provisioning at Kealakekua Bay had been delayed while 
Kamehameha was in the process of being ritually purified as the makahiki 
drew to a close. Even in 1794, however, religious considerations were not 
overlooked, despite Vancouver’s threat; makahiki ceremonies were merely 
delayed one lunar month to accommodate him.20 Vancouver also relates 
how, in January 1794, the 10-day kapu of ‘Hahcoo’ (Haiku) that pertained 
to fishing was shortened by Kamehameha in the district that Vancouver 
18  Kamakau (1961), p. 88.
19  Vancouver (1801), bk 5, p. 18.
20  Vancouver (1801), bk 5, p. 18 ; Valeri (1985a), pp. 229–30; and Sahlins (1989), p. 389.
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was visiting to allow him to be supplied with fish. Vancouver was under 
the impression that this was allowable in Hawaiian custom if the ‘king’ 
so desired.21
By the late 18th century, observation of the makahiki may have been 
considered by rival mō‘ī as merely a convenient breathing space between 
campaigns. The makahiki was a time when winter weather disrupted 
movement and much attention focused upon the planting of crops to 
take advantage of winter rains. The fact that a religious procession 
went throughout the mō‘ī’s domains and demanded offerings for Lono 
is seen by some as an indication that the makahiki served as a means 
of reasserting his power, with the offerings serving as de facto tribute.22 
Table A1, Appendix 1, shows that armies remained mobilised in the field 
during a number of makahiki seasons. Marshall Sahlins suggests that the 
makahiki kapu on warfare only applied when the image of Lono made 
its brief island circuit of around three weeks duration.23 Whether this 
represented a compromise on earlier practice is unclear. Anthropologist 
Gananath Obeyesekere claims that fighting took place on Maui during 
the 1778–79 makahiki circuit, although he does not make the important 
distinction between fighting and mobilisation made here.24
It is apparent that there were tensions between ali‘i and kahuna during 
the 1770s. During Cook’s visits to Kealakekua Bay, certain kahuna of 
Lono were friendly to the Europeans, even after the outbreak of hostilities 
between the English and supporters of the local mō‘ī, Kalani‘ōpu‘u. 
Although Obeyesekere asserts that the priests identified with Lono were 
acting on Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s orders, Cook’s officers believed he was angry with 
them for giving Cook permission to use a temple site (heiau) without his 
consent. Captain Charles Clerke and others in Cook’s expedition noted 
that the priests of Lono disliked the mō‘ī’s local representative, Koa. Gavan 
Daws has hypothesised that the apparent deification of Cook as Lono 
may have been an attempt by the kahuna of Lono to reassert themselves 
against the now politically dominant cult of Kū by associating their god 
with the power of the Europeans.25
21  Vancouver (1801), bk 5, pp. 30–31.
22  Peebles & Kus (1977), pp. 425–26.
23  Sahlins (1989), pp. 397–98, citing Kēlou Kamakau in Thrum, vol. 6 (1919–20), p. 40; Sahlins 
(1995), p. 26.
24  Gananath Obeyesekere, The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European Mythmaking in the Pacific 
(Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 81; and Sahlins’s reply (1995), pp. 36–37.
25  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 550–53, 559–60; Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, 
pp. 543–45. See also Sahlins (1985), pp. 124–25; Sahlins (1989), p. 400; Daws (1968a), p. 23; and 
Obeyesekere (1992), pp. 42, 92–94.
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Sahlins argues that the followers of Kū and Lono conceived differing 
relationships with Cook. Kalani‘ōpu‘u gave his feather cloak and helmet 
to Cook as well as a royal flywhisk – all symbols of royal kapu status. 
In contrast, the high priest Ka‘o dressed Cook in a mantle of red tapa 
cloth. The same was done to images of gods in heiau. To Sahlins, this 
suggests that the mō‘ī represented Cook in his own social image as a divine 
warrior, while the kahuna nui represented Cook as a manifestation of 
a god. Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s exchange of names with Cook, and the latter’s gifts 
to the mō‘ī, as well as the Lono priests’ surrender of iron adzes given 
to them by the British are all seen by Sahlins as being consistent with 
the ritual transfer of sovereignty from Lono back to Kū that ended every 
makahiki. Cook’s out-of-season return a few days after his departure was 
therefore seen as a challenge to the sovereignty of Kalani‘ōpu‘u and Kū. 
It was the Kali‘i ceremony in reverse. Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s retainers naturally 
resisted Cook’s attempts to take their mō‘ī to sea, just as Lono’s adherents 
ritually resisted the mō‘ī’s wading ashore to usurp Lono during the Kali‘i 
ceremony.26
Other instances of kahuna seemingly coming into conflict with ali‘i 
occurred in this period. In the 1780s, such a conflict resulted in the ruler 
of O‘ahu, Kahahana, killing his kahuna nui, Kaopulupulu, after the latter’s 
prolonged opposition to Kahahana’s policy of appeasement towards his 
uncle, Kahekili of Maui.27 While the kahuna nui of some priesthoods 
associated with the worship of Kū and Lono almost became hereditary, 
and had land granted to them by mō‘ī,28 the priesthoods do not appear to 
have developed independent power bases. What influence they exercised 
in the secular realm derived from the fortunes of their particular ali‘i, 
and the continued, although perhaps diminishing, importance of ritual 
to chiefly rule.
Although mō‘ī do not seem to have tolerated open opposition from 
kahuna at this stage, they were still not willing or able to totally break with 
them. A major part of the ruler’s authority still appears to have rested upon 
his sacred status, particularly with regard to the maka‘āinana majority. 
Hawaiian traditions abound with examples of rulers who were overthrown 
when they became unpopular for neglecting their ritual duties. Support 
26  Sahlins (1985), pp. 123, 128–29; Sahlins (1995), pp. 60, 81, 132–34; refutes Obeyesekere 
(1992), pp. 58, 137–40, 187.
27  Fornander (1969), p. 278; Kamakau (1961), pp. 133–35.
28  Beckwith (1937), pp. 60–62, 140, 192; Malo (1951), pp. 149, 190; Hommon (1975), p. 149; 
and Levin (1968), pp. 416–17.
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for Kahahana, for example, is said to have weakened significantly after his 
murder of Kaopulupulu.29 The fact that some rulers sought the advice of 
renowned kahuna from outside of their realms suggests that their concerns 
went beyond purely secular affairs of state. Kamehameha, for example, 
sought the advice of the famous Kaua‘i soothsayer Kapoukahi, then 
resident on O‘ahu.30 Some orders were, however, privileged over others. 
Sahlins notes that Kamehameha continued his predecessor Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s 
practice of favouring the priests of Kū over those of Lono, with the latter 
having little influence in affairs of state.31
The modification of kapu and the subsidiary role of kahuna in Hawaiian 
politics do not necessarily reflect irreligious attitudes among the chiefly 
elite. Rather the beliefs of the ali‘i were influenced by the demand and 
need for tangible benefits in the competitive arena of chiefly politics. 
Although the gods were believed to be the source of power, their power 
rested upon men’s worship, and particularly upon the sacrifices made to 
them. Worship was usually referred to as ho‘omana, translated by Valeri 
as ‘to cause one to have mana, to empower’.32 Gods and mō‘ī needed 
adherents, and could lose support for not producing benefits. When the 
son of the ali‘i Kalaimoku died from a wound received during a sparring 
exercise with spears, anger at their god for allowing this to happen was 
expressed. Vancouver noted that a kapu due to begin on 23 January 1794 
was suspended ‘to manifest that they were offended with their deity for 
the death of this young chief ’.33 The kapu was again observed soon after, 
but only from sunset to the following sunrise instead of the usual two 
nights and one whole day, again to signal the community’s resentment at 
their god. Kalaimoku ignored all kapu following the death of his son until 
29 January.
Maka‘āinana seem to have generally adhered to the kapu of the gods and 
that of the ali‘i. The fact that secular sanctions against kapu-breakers 
existed, and were occasionally used, suggests that this adherence was not 
entirely due to belief in the underlying assumptions of the kapu system. 
To assess the degree to which the threat of chiefly punitive actions dictated 
29  Fornander (1969), pp. 278–79. On Kahahana, see Kamakau (1961), pp. 134–35. On rebellions 
against mō‘ī who neglected ritual duties, see Malo (1951), p. 252.
30  Fornander (1969), pp. 239–40.
31  Sahlins (1995), pp. 133–34.
32  Valeri (1985a), p. 98.
33  Vancouver (1801), bk 5, pp. 22, 27 (Jan. 1794).
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maka‘āinana obedience, it is necessary to examine evidence on the religious 
beliefs of maka‘āinana, the conditions under which maka‘āinana lived, 
and whether they had the ability to change their circumstances.
Maka‘āinana were mainly concerned throughout the year with rituals 
surrounding subsistence and family affairs. They worshipped ancestral 
deities and spirits, usually in household shrines or small local shrines. 
Daily life was mostly influenced by kapu pertaining to gender and age 
distinctions among kinsmen. The persistence of this type of worship 
well into the 19th century is testament to the strength of belief at this 
level. Maka‘āinana also participated in larger agricultural rituals under 
the auspices of local ali‘i and kahuna of Lono.34 Lono was a popular god 
among the maka‘āinana and not only was he worshipped in heiau, he was 
also the main deity worshipped in domestic shrines. In this respect Lono 
was ‘the mediator between polity and society’.35 Presumably the kahuna 
of Lono were the cultural intermediaries between chiefly and commoner 
cultures, the crucial conveyers of the ideology that justified the Hawaiian 
social order.36
Malo and the 19th-century Hawaiian cultural historian Kepelino state 
that kahuna were much respected by the common people.37 The same 
could not be said, however, for the images of the gods. Ship’s surgeon on 
Cook’s expedition David Samwell noted that:
Tho’ they look upon these Idols as their Gods they pay no great reverence 
to them, for when any of us laughed at them and treated with Contempt 
even those we supposed the most sacred among them, the Indians instead 
of being offended, would join with us in ridiculing them and seemed to 
think as lightly of them as we did; and there was none of them that they 
would not sell even for trifles.38 
Obviously such behaviour may reflect a disbelief in the power of idols 
rather than the gods they represented, and may also be the result of the 
ambiguities of intercultural interaction.
34  On maka‘āinana religious practices, see Malo (1951), pp. 82, 142; Levin (1968), p. 413; Sahlins 
(1981), p. 52; Hommon (1986), p. 58; and Kirch (1985), p. 7. On persistence of traditional beliefs 
after 1819, see K.R. Howe, Where the Waves Fall: A New South Sea Islands History From First Settlement 
to Colonial Rule (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 168.
35  Sahlins (1989), p. 413.
36  Michelle Vovelle, Ideologies and Mentalities, Eamon O’Flaherty (trans.) (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1990), pp. 118–25.
37  Malo (1951), pp. 188–90, 197; and Beckwith (1937), p. 132.
38  Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, pp. 1185.
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During Cook’s visits, maka‘āinana seem to have been genuinely overawed 
by ali‘i nui and obedient of kapu. But in the absence of ali‘i nui they 
were often less willing to adhere to kapu, even in the presence of lesser 
ali‘i acting on behalf of the mō‘ī. Incidents abound of maka‘āinana 
meekly acquiescing to high-handed and often violent treatment at the 
hands of ali‘i nui. In January 1778, for example, Cook’s expedition saw 
a double canoe carrying the high-ranking Kaua‘i ali‘i Kāneoneo simply 
run over a number of smaller canoes occupied by maka‘āinana without 
the slightest attempt to avoid them. The maka‘āinana could not paddle 
out of the way because Kāneoneo’s status demanded that they prostrate 
themselves face down in his presence.39 Cook and his officers noted that 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s kapu on trade was only broken when the old mō‘ī was 
absent on campaign with his warriors. In one instance, an ali‘i launched 
a canoe to prevent commoners breaking the kapu and coming out to 
trade, but he was driven off by a ‘musquet fir’d over his head to make him 
disist’.40 The maka‘āinana continued to trade, apparently undaunted by 
the prospect of the ali‘i’s wrath when they returned to shore.
Lesser ali‘i, in maintaining order at Kealakekua Bay during the absence 
of Kalani‘ōpu‘u, sometimes had to resort to physical force to expel 
maka‘āinana from Cook’s vessels. In the absence of the controlling 
influence of ali‘i, crowds of maka‘āinana could become quite troublesome. 
Maka‘āinana women were particularly prominent in the infringement of 
kapu regulating contacts with foreign vessels. They often engaged in the 
forbidden act of eating kapu food in the company of members of the all-
male crew. Such behaviour may explain why Malo claimed that the 
majority of women were irreligious.41
Outside situations involving contacts with Europeans, maka‘āinana seem 
to have rarely offered open resistance to ali‘i demands for labour, food 
tribute and military service. Malo provides the names of eight ‘kings’ 
killed by uprisings against their rule. Three were mō‘ī, and the others were 
subordinate ali‘i administering lands within their rulers’ domains. All the 
39  Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 281.
40  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 511 (25 Jan. 1779); Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, 
pp. 1166–67; and Sahlins (1981), p. 49.
41  Malo (1951), p. 82. On maka‘āinana in general, see King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 504; 
Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 596; Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 116; and Nathaniel 
Portlock, A Voyage Round the World: But More Particularly to the North-West Coast of America, 
Performed in 1785, 1786, 1787 and 1788, Bibliotheca Australiana no. 43 (New York: Da Capo Press, 
1968), pp. 62–63. On maka‘āinana women in particular, see Sahlins (1981), pp. 46 ff.; and Samwell, 
in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1161.
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revolts were said to have been motivated by the abuse of power rather than 
by a desire to overthrow the concept of divinely ordained ali‘i rule. These 
so-called ‘commoner revolts’ were actually led by chiefly rivals of the ali‘i 
concerned. Individual chiefs changed, but not the rule of chiefs.42
The issue of revolts raises the question of whether the relationship between 
the ali‘i and maka‘āinana gave the latter reason to seek change. Maka‘āinana 
spent most of their lives within highly localised units known as ahupua‘a. 
These were land divisions with defined boundaries. The name ahupua‘a 
derives from the fact that their boundaries were marked by altars (ahu) 
dedicated to Lono as rain god through offerings of hog’s heads (pua‘a).43 
All of the inhabited islands in the chain were divided into ahupua‘a. 
Most ahupua‘a were only a few miles wide at the coast and extended 
some distance inland. In general they were relatively economically self-
sufficient. Ahupua‘a were divided into smaller sections that were held 
and worked by extended households of maka‘āinana. It appears that most 
households were able to be self-supporting from the lands they worked 
and, while there were some exchange networks between relations in food 
staples, these were probably conducted within the ahupua‘a or, at most, 
with neighbouring ahupua‘a. Maka‘āinana social organisation was based 
largely on affinal links rather than lineal descent relationships, which 
could rarely be traced beyond grandparents. There appears to have been 
no surviving traces of corporate kinship units by contact.44
Each ahupua‘a was part of an autonomous polity known as a moku. Moku 
were ruled over by mō‘ī. The ruling mō‘ī appointed lesser ali‘i to control 
ahupua‘a within his domains (ali‘i ‘ai ahupua‘a). These ali‘i in turn might 
appoint one or more overseers (konohiki) to organise work parties, collect 
tribute, mobilise maka‘āinana levies in time of war, and generally ensure 
that the mō‘ī’s interests were maintained. The relationship between the 
terms ali‘i ‘ai ahupua‘a and konohiki is blurred in places. Ali‘i ‘ai ahupua‘a 
were the highest level konohiki of an ahupua‘a. Most konohiki were lesser 
ali‘i associated with the lineages of incumbent paramount chiefs or of 
42  Malo (1951), p. 195; and Hommon (1975), pp. 160–63.
43  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 18–19.
44  On ahupua‘a, see Kirch (1985), p. 2; Hommon (1975), pp. 15–17; Hommon (1976), pp. 55–
57; and Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 48–49. On maka‘āinana social organisation, see Hommon 
(1975), pp. 75 ff.; Jocelyn Linnekin, ‘Statistical Analysis of the Great Māhele: Some Preliminary 
Findings’, Journal of Pacific History, vol. 22 (1), 1987, 22–23; Ralston (1984), pp. 21–40; Sahlins 
(1985), pp. 22–25; and Kirch & Sahlins (1992), pp. 196–203.
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senior ali‘i of their particular district within the moku.45 Land records 
from the 1840s also reveal that there was a further category of supervisor 
below konohiki known as konohiki hope.46
Maka‘āinana had the right to use and occupy land indefinitely as long as 
they were deemed to have met the tributary and labour demands of the 
ali‘i. Beneath the mō‘ī, land was not ‘owned’ in the European sense, but 
rather rights of use were conferred, usually with the implied subordination 
of the recipient. The main requirement for maintaining land rights was 
the giving of ho‘okupu, in the form of produce from the land, especially 
its first fruits. These presentations were made to the land occupier’s 
immediate overlord all the way up the chain to the mō‘ī and beyond 
to the gods. Maka‘āinana could not own the land. Despite the periodic 
imposition of new konohiki at the accession of new mō‘ī, maka‘āinana 
occupancy seems to have been relatively secure. Nineteenth-century land 
commission records suggest that the eldest son inherited most maka‘āinana 
land. It was not in the interests of ali‘i to disrupt cultivation by breaking 
this pattern, and maka‘āinana apparently had the right to abandon their 
land and move into the territory of another overlord if they were unfairly 
treated by their konohiki or ali‘i. This right is suggested by the Hawaiian 
phrase ‘imi haku’ (seeking a lord). It is important to note that the only 
recorded instances of attempts to change overlords in this period came 
from subordinate ali‘i and their retinues, rather than from communities 
of maka‘āinana. A notable example was Ka‘iana. Originally a vassal ali‘i of 
Kahekili of Maui, he fought against Kahekili on O‘ahu, fled to Kaua‘i after 
Kahekili’s victory and, then, after a voyage to China aboard a European 
vessel, settled on Hawai‘i under Kamehameha. In 1795 Ka‘iana turned 
against Kamehameha and joined Kalanikūpule, the son of Kahekili.47
Kula lands and kō‘ele lands were the only ahupua‘a cultivation not 
organised into family plots. Kula lands were upland tracts and forests that 
were unsuited to intensive cultivation and which operated as common 
lands. Individual households were allowed to gather forest products and 
45  On land divisions, see Kirch (1985), p. 2. On konohiki, see Jocelyn Linnekin, ‘The Hui Lands 
of Keanae: Hawaiian Land Tenure and the Great Māhele’, Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 92 (2), 
1983, 185 n. 3; Kame‘eleihiwa (1986), p. 40; and Levin (1968), p. 410.
46  Kirch & Sahlins (1992), pp. 32–33.
47  On land-use rights, see Valeri (1985a), p. 155; Linnekin (1983), pp. 169–72; Linnekin (1987), 
p. 21; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 41, 46–47; Cordy (1972), pp. 396–97; and Malo (1951), p. 16. 
On the right to change lords, see Valerio Valeri, ‘The Conqueror Becomes King: A Political Analysis of 
the Legend of ‘Umi’, in Antony Hooper & Judith Huntsman (eds), The Transformation of Polynesian 
Culture, Polynesian Society Memoir no. 45 (Auckland: 1985b), pp. 86–87; and Sahlins (1981), p. 36. 
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to plant scattered crops to supplement their own crops. Kō‘ele lands were 
small tracts within each ahupua‘a that were worked by maka‘āinana as 
a whole, and whose entire harvest was solely for the use of ali‘i. A study 
of land records pertaining to Halawa Valley on Moloka‘i suggests that 
approximately one third of the valley’s fields were under the control of 
konohiki and ali‘i. Maka‘āinana worked on the kō‘ele fields one day 
in five.48
Early European visitors were struck by the poor physique of most 
maka‘āinana when compared to the ali‘i, who generally appeared robust 
and well built. James King’s comment that the commoners were ‘very 
tawny, thin and small, mean looking people’49 is typical. He attributed 
this appearance to diet, and a lifestyle involving much hard labour. King 
also noted that he saw more deformed people in Hawai‘i than in all the 
other lands that he had visited put together. Although evidence is limited, 
it seems more likely that the physique of the maka‘āinana was the result 
of the composition of their diet rather than excessive appropriation of 
produce by the ali‘i. As well as producing sustenance for maka‘āinana 
households, Hawaiian agricultural systems were required to sustain ritual 
obligations and maintain chiefly retinues in both peace and in their efforts 
against their rivals. Such efforts might involve the periodic destruction or 
depletion of certain localities by marauding armed forces. The Halawa 
Valley figures suggest, however, that chiefly appropriations of food and 
labour were not excessive. Rather the widespread nature of the symptoms 
suggests a predominantly carbohydrate-orientated diet deficient in body 
building protein sources. The main staples of the Hawaiian diet were 
taro, ‘uala (sweet potato) and, to a lesser extent, fish. Taro and ‘uala are 
useful carbohydrate staples, but need supplementing with foods rich in 
proteins, fats, minerals and vitamins, such as fish and coconut, to be truly 
nutritional. The ali‘i diet was supplemented with animal meat and the 
produce of specially constructed fishponds. These were largely reserved 
solely for ali‘i consumption or, in the case of pigs, for ritual offerings.50
48  Kirch (1984), pp. 175–76.
49  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 611, 629.
50  Kirch (1985); Cordy (1972), pp. 395–96; Handy & Handy (1972), p. 75; Malo (1951), 
pp. 42–43, 78; Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 184; and George Dixon, A Voyage Round the 
World: But More Particularly to the North-West Coast of America, Performed in 1785, 1786, 1787 and 
1788, Bibliotheca Australiana no. 37 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1968), p. 275; Handy & Handy 
(1972), pp. 75–101; Emile Massal & Jacques Barrau, Food Plants of the South Sea Islands, South 
Pacific Commission Technical Paper no. 42 (Noumea: 1956), pp. 7–9; J.W. Purseglove, Tropical 
Crops, vol. 1: Monocotyledons 1 (London: Longmans, 1972a), p. 64.
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The political and religious affairs of the mō‘ī and kahuna nui rarely intruded 
into the day-to-day life of maka‘āinana. The mō‘ī’s relative remoteness 
from the affairs of maka‘āinana, and the kapu that surrounded his person 
probably served to enhance the sacred aspect of his office by providing an 
aura of mystery. Religious ceremonies involving the mō‘ī and kahuna nui, 
such as those during the makahiki and ceremonies dedicated to Kū as war 
god were usually conducted in large temples. The largest temples were the 
luakini heiau, also known as heiau po‘okanaka, where human sacrifices 
might be offered to Kū as god of war. Some agricultural rituals for Lono 
may also have taken place in these temples. These temples, which could 
only be constructed and dedicated on the command of a mō‘ī,51 made 
impressive stages upon which to enact the drama of Hawaiian ceremonies. 
Prior to the present technological age, monumental architecture of this 
nature was probably the greatest enduring manifestation of power. 
As Peter Wilson notes:
The ancient monument brought the gods to earth and assembled together 
in one place the scattered powers of nature … As the fusion of permanence 
and perfection such architecture was power, not a symbol of it.52 
Ceremonies in these large temples involved complex rituals that demanded 
precise actions and chants from the kahuna, and long periods of silence 
from all others, and occasionally human sacrifice. To the maka‘āinana 
assembled to bear silent witness to the proceedings, it must have been an 
intimidating experience.
The threat of physical violence also played a role in the maintenance of 
social norms. When King asked a female maka‘āinana why the people 
obeyed the kapu surrounding the expedition’s onshore observatory, 
she replied that they feared that the ‘Etooa’ (Akua) and ‘Teree-oboo’ 
(Kalani‘ōpu‘u, the local mō‘ī) would kill them if they broke the kapu.53 
The removal of eyes, strangulation, and the shattering of heads and limbs 
with clubs were among the punishments meted out to kapu transgressors. 
Those not killed immediately were condemned to the status of kāuwa. 
Kāuwa were either kapu transgressors or defeated enemies from whose 
ranks human sacrifices were drawn. Ceremonies relating to the illness 
51  On heiau, see Malo (1951), p. 160; Kirch (1985), pp. 257–60; Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, 
p. 269; and Samwell, in Beaglehole (1968), 3:2, pp. 1177–78. On important heiau in Hawai‘i, see 
Pogue (1978), p. 40. On ceremonies in heiau, see Sahlins (1981), p. 52. 
52  Wilson (1988), p. 148.
53  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 508.
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of an ali‘i nui, the consecration of temples and victory in war all might 
involve human sacrifice. Vanquished enemy rulers and other high-ranking 
enemy were sought for victory ceremonies. Otherwise, kāuwa in general 
sufficed. David Stannard notes that pigs and other animals were often 
substituted as sacrifices for humans.54
Retribution for breaking kapu was exacted upon the transgressor’s family 
as a whole. All became kāuwa, as did their descendants. Kāuwa were 
avoided by maka‘āinana, yet had a special relationship with ali‘i, whose 
sacred status their transgressions threatened. The ali‘i considered them 
as their gods and ancestral spirits and allowed them free access to their 
houses, a privilege denied to maka‘āinana. This apparently contradictory 
relationship may be explained by the fact that the sacrificial deaths of 
kāuwa helped to restore order to the universe and appease the gods.55
Punishment of kapu violations was not applied consistently to both ali‘i 
and maka‘āinana, nor was physical sanction always clearly in pursuit of 
breaches of kapu. Offences that would result in the death of maka‘āinana 
might only elicit a rebuke if the offender was an ali‘i. When a handsome 
young ali‘i was discovered to be the secret lover of Kamehameha’s favourite 
wife, Ka‘ahumanu, he was spared from execution because of his rank. 
Instead he was punished by the loss of all of his property. In January 
1794, Vancouver learnt that a prominent ali‘i’s son had been mortally 
wounded in a spear contest with a man ‘of mean rank’.56 The unfortunate 
maka‘āinana was seized the next day and had his eyes pulled out. He was 
left in this state for two days before being executed by strangulation with 
a rope. 
During the dedication of a luakini heiau, Malo mentions a ceremony 
known as ka-papa-ulua. In this ceremony a kahuna, accompanied by 
several others, went to fish for ulua (crevalle) to dedicate at the heiau. 
If they failed to catch any ulua, Malo relates how they then returned to 
land and went from one house to another, shouting out to the people 
within and telling them some lie or other and asking them to come 
54  Howe (1984), p. 166; and Stannard (1989), p. 61. On sacrifices, see Valeri (1985a), chpt 4. 
On kāuwa, see Valeri (1985a), p. 164; Malo (1951), pp. 68–70; and Beckwith (1937), p. 144.
55  Valeri (1985a), pp. 93, 374, n. 81; and Malo (1951), p. 68.
56  Vancouver (1801), bk 5, p. 20 (Jan. 1794). On adultery, see Hommon (1976), p. 167. 
On differences in punishment between chiefs and commoners, see Levin (1968), p. 414, citing I‘ī 
(1959), p. 23; and Kamakau (1961), p. 17.
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outside. If anyone did come out, they killed him and, thrusting a hook 
in his mouth, carried him to the heiau. If there were many people in the 
house, they resisted and thus escaped.57
The unfortunate victim was then offered as a sacrifice at the heiau. 
Although vague, the reference to dwellings with many people escaping 
sacrifice may indicate that the victims were loners or outcasts. Certainly 
this reference appears on the surface to suggest a more random violence 
than other references that are usually justified in terms of kapu violations.
The degree to which the threat of violent death secured social order is 
uncertain. Ceremonies involving human sacrifice did not appear to have 
been particularly numerous, nor were executions outside of ceremonies. 
In any case the ability of maka‘āinana to disrupt the status quo was 
limited by their social and economic organisation. Any sense of class-
consciousness was curtailed by the strong, localised affiliations that the 
economic self-sufficiency of most ahupua‘a and limited social interaction 
between ahupua‘a communities engendered. After commenting on the 
apparent frequency of battles between rival chiefs, King observed that 
‘the  different Villages even had dislikes to each other which might 
lead one to suppose their contest[s] were too frequent’.58 Much of this 
animosity may have been stifled by the control that ali‘i exercised over life 
in general, or channelled into controlled activities such as the boxing and 
dancing competitions that were held during the makahiki. The periodic 
mock battles between communities that were used for military training 
may have fulfilled a similar role.59 Given the prominence in Hawaiian 
traditions of revenge as a driving motive behind many antagonisms, 
and the belief in sorcery as a cause of misfortune and even death, it is 
probable that suspicion and mutual distrust often characterised relations 
between locations.
Ahupua‘a communities were not, however, totally discrete. Drought-
affected communities received supplies from elsewhere, or were 
temporarily evacuated to other ahupua‘a or even to other districts. 
During drought, the inhabitants of Ni‘ihau took temporary refuge in 
nearby southern Kaua‘i, people from Ka‘ū on Hawai‘i moved as far away 
as the neighbouring districts of Puna or Kona; while communities in 
57  Malo (1951), pp. 172–73.
58  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 614.
59  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 252–58.
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arid Kula on Maui were supplied with produce from Waikapu on the 
windward coast of west Maui.60 Cook’s visits to Kealakekua Bay seem to 
have attracted maka‘āinana to the bay from surrounding areas. Sahlins 
notes that maka‘āinana followed Cook’s circuit of the island of Hawai‘i 
in 1778–79 for at least part of the way, just as the annual procession of 
the Lono image gathered followers en route.61 In the 1790s, Archibald 
Menzies noted that Vancouver’s presence at Kealakekua resulted in 
maka‘āinana arriving from ‘several leagues’ north and south of the bay.62 
Sources are silent on the impact that these journeys and military service 
outside home areas had on maka‘āinana, who otherwise lived most of 
their lives within a single ahupua‘a.
Distinctions within chiefly status softened the distinction between ali‘i 
and maka‘āinana, and served to modify any consciousness of exploitation 
as a class that maka‘āinana may have harboured. The lowest ranking ali‘i 
lived in daily contact with the maka‘āinana of their locality. Through 
the hale nauā ceremony, these ali‘i could become maka‘āinana. Local 
ali‘i ‘ai ahupua‘a and konohiki acted primarily as organisers of land-use 
rights, supervisors of supra-household activities and sources of security 
and justice rather than as agents of oppression. While maka‘āinana could 
not become members of the ali‘i, they could advance their position 
within their fixed status by rendering valuable service to their overlord, 
particularly in warfare. Maka‘āinana might be rewarded by being made 
part of an ali‘i’s personal retinue, or by the granting of land for their use 
by grateful mō‘ī. Hawaiians also distinguished maka‘āinana who stood 
out from others because of their prosperity and skill in cultivation.63 
Such successful farmers must also have served to blur social boundaries. 
The involvement of kaukau ali‘i in supervision down to the local level 
meant that leadership skills beyond the control of family affairs were rare 
among maka‘āinana. By the late 18th century, maka‘āinana seem to have 
been dependent on ali‘i leadership. When Kamehameha was away with 
his army in O‘ahu in 1796 and a rebellion occurred back on Hawai‘i, 
the rebellious ali‘i encountered little resistance. The captain of a visiting 
European vessel found the population of one of Kamehameha’s districts 
paralysed into inactivity when faced by their traditional enemies from the 
60  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 274, 510–11.
61  Sahlins (1989), p. 413; and King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 561, 618.
62  Menzies (1920), p. 67.
63  Malo (1951), p. 56; Thrum, vol. 6 (1919–20), p. 178; and Levin (1968), p. 437.
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other side of the island. They seemed incapable of mobilisation against the 
approaching danger, ‘having no chief in whom they confided to lead them 
on’.64 Kamehameha was left with no choice but to return from O‘ahu and 
crush the rebellion himself. 
This incident suggests maka‘āinana played a limited role in warfare. 
For most maka‘āinana, warfare involved periods of heightened tensions, 
punctuated by brief periods of danger as opposing forces moved through 
or into their ahupua‘a. The composition of fighting forces, however, 
still required the engagement and support of significant elements of the 
population beyond the upper echelons of the chiefly ranks. Heightening 
competition between chiefs in the late 18th century prompted the 
broadening of recruitment into core chiefly fighting contingents. 
This  served to expand chiefs’ military capacity against each other, but 
also increased the importance of ensuring the loyalty of chiefly subjects 
from the ranks of both kaukau ali‘i and maka‘āinana. It is unclear from 
mo‘olelo the extent to which maka‘āinana with martial ability might be 
elevated to kaukau ali‘i status in this era, although the expansion of the 
ali‘i class in this late pre-unification era due to population expansion 
has already been hypothesised by a number of archaeologists. Enhanced 
coercive capacity against rivals came at the price of a diminished coercive 
gap between the ruler and those they already ruled over who, increasingly, 
formed the mainstay of armed contingents.
64  William Robert Broughton, A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean Performed in His 
Majesty’s Sloop Providence, and Her Tender, in the Years 1795, 1796, 1797, 1798 (New York: De Capo 




The Hawaiian Military 
Transformation from 1770 to 1796
In How Chiefs Became Kings, Patrick Kirch argues that the Hawaiian 
polities witnessed by James Cook were archaic states characterised by: 
the development of class stratification, land alienation from commoners 
and a territorial system of administrative control, a monopoly of force 
and endemic conquest warfare, and, most important, divine kingship 
legitimated by state cults with a formal priesthood.1
The previous chapter questioned the degree to which chiefly authority 
relied on the consent of the majority based on the belief in the sacred 
status of chiefs as opposed to secular coercion to enforce compliance. 
This chapter questions the nature of the monopoly of coercion that 
Kirch and most commentators ascribed to chiefs. It is argued that 
military competition forced changes in the composition and tactics of 
chiefly armies that threatened to undermine the basis of chiefly authority. 
Mass formations operating in drilled unison came to increasingly figure 
alongside individual warriors and chiefs’ martial prowess as decisive 
factors in battle. Gaining military advantage against chiefly rivals came 
at the price of increasing reliance on lesser ranked members of ones’ 
own communities. This altered military relationship in turn influenced 
political and social relations in ways that favoured rule based more on the 
consent and cooperation of the ruled than the threat of coercion against 
them for noncompliance. As armies became larger and stayed in the field 
1  Kirch (2010), p. 27.
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longer, the logistics of adequate and predictable agricultural production 
and supply became increasingly important and the outcome of battles 
came to be less decisive.
The structure of coercion
Most 19th-century ethnographers state that Hawaiian armies were 
constituted from general mobilisations of the mō‘ī’s subjects. As in 
most Polynesian societies, all adult males were potentially eligible for 
military service.2 In reality, it appears that the brunt of any fighting fell 
upon a  relatively small cadre that was occasionally supplemented by 
levied forces. In a battle drill witnessed by George Vancouver in 1793, 
two distinct types of combatant were apparent. Maka‘āinana opened 
the  exercise with disorganised skirmishing. When they had finished, 
well-drilled columns of men brandishing long spears came forward to 
spar. This confirms David Malo’s distinction between half-trained, lightly 
armed troops, and other, more competent troops. Malo also noted that 
the latter included a distinct body of men known as papa kaua, who were 
armed with long spears and who probably guarded their ‘king’ in battle.3 
Samuel Kamakau’s description of the armies of Ka‘eokulani of Kaua‘i and 
Kahekili of Maui in 1791 provides a further insight into the composition 
of Hawaiian armies during this era. According to Kamakau, Ka‘eokulani’s 
force consisted of ‘chiefs, warriors, and paddlers’, while Kahekili set out 
from Maui ‘with his chiefs, both high and low, his warriors, the children 
of the chiefs, and among them Ka-niu-‘ula, Ke-po‘o-uahu‘ the pahupū‘, 
and other soldiers newly picked from O‘ahu’.4
Hawaiian sources in general make it clear that every ali‘i of any standing 
gathered around him a retinue, including many who constantly trained in 
the use of weaponry.5 These chiefly retinues formed the nearest equivalent 
that the Hawaiians had to standing armies. Relatives were an important 
part of any retinue. Ali‘i nui entered into sexual unions outside of political 
marriages designed to produce high-ranking offspring. The offspring 
of these secondary unions, and even offspring from secondary unions 
2  William Ellis, Polynesian Researches (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1969 (1859)), p. 149.
3  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 252–58; and Malo (1951), pp. 197, 294.
4  Kamakau (1961), p. 159.
5  For example, see Malo (1951), pp. 59, 191, 194, 196; I‘ī (1959), p. 66; and Beckwith (1937), 
p. 124.
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of the incumbent’s parents, were often known as the ‘backbone of the 
chief ’, in reference to their importance to their lord’s fortunes. For those 
lacking lineage affiliations to influential chiefs, the prospect of becoming 
connected to an ali‘i’s retinue was an attractive proposition. The women’s 
relatives, therefore, welcomed the amorous advances of ali‘i towards 
maka‘āinana women.6
While the power and authority of the mō‘ī was considerable, it was 
based on the loyalty of coercive forces drawn from lower ranked 
followers. These consisted of the kaukau ali‘i, on which Kanalu Young’s 
groundbreaking study focused, who were lesser ali‘i associated with the 
ruling ali‘i and the offspring of such liaisons with women not until then 
connected to the chief ’s line. The term kaukau ali‘i was used by Kamakau 
as a collective term for the lowest five of the 11 chiefly ranks. The six 
highest chiefly grades filled roles as members of the chief ’s advisers and 
council, and acted as leaders of battleline sections during complicated 
moves, such as flank attacks, that required coordinated actions between 
units. The core of the fighting contingents, however, were made up 
of kaukau ali‘i.7
Young notes that the legendary reformer ‘Umi-a-Līloa, who is regarded 
as a crucial figure in the evolution of chiefly power in Hawai‘i, came 
from the ranks of the kaukau ali‘i. ‘Umi was an ali‘i noanoa, the offspring 
of a union between someone from the three highest ali‘i nui ranks and 
a country person of no rank.8 Through skills and proven ability he was 
able to rise to prominence as probably the most influential ruler of his 
generation. Young also notes that he was, however, exceptional in his 
ability.9 In addition, kaukau ali‘i had connections with each other beyond 
their loyalty and empowerment as members of chiefly retinues. Young 
notes:
6  Malo (1951), p. 81; Levin (1968), p. 410; Valeri (1985a), p. 159; and Sahlins (1985), pp. 24, 
130.
7  Young (1998), p. 34; and Samuel M. Kamakau, Ka Po‘e Kahiko: The People of Old (Honolulu: 
Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1964), pp. 4–6, 73–74, 80. See also Valeri (1985a), pp. 86–93, where he 
compares and contrasts relations between chiefs and their retinues with European feudal relations and 
orientalist conceptions of Hawaiian power.
8  Young (1998), p. 43.
9  Young (1998), p. 90.
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Significant for the kaukau ali‘i story is that as lineages from west Hawai‘i 
and east Maui continued to maintain their own lower level connections … 
The chiefly servers [i.e., kaukau ali‘i] from the Moana kāne line followed 
the lead of their ranking superiors by engaging in noho [to stay, sleep, 
remain with] that were inter-island in scope.
Young goes on to note the potential implications of such relations beyond 
the chiefly retinue as:
[If ] too many of a particular lesser lineage were to noho with siblings 
or engage in the act of ho‘i [a sexual union of cousins], a challenge 
to Ali‘i. Nui supremacy might be suspected. A challenge to Ali‘i. Nui 
paramountcy could result if enough familial support for a strategic action 
was mustered.10 
In his case study of the Moana lineage of kaukau ali‘i, Young notes how 
Moana women linked their group into powerful warrior lineages across 
moku boundaries – linking dryland agriculture-based Kona in eastern 
Hawai‘i to Maui and to the powerful and numerous I clan of Hilo in 
windward Hawai‘i, which commanded a powerful warrior force.11 While 
archaeologists emphasise the logistical base for the evolution of Hawaiian 
political power, contemporary and past scholars of Hawaiian history 
emphasise the importance of blood ties and sociopolitical ties. 
‘Umi’s road to power involved usurpation of an unpopular ruler by 
someone of lower rank by demonstrating leadership ability. This popular 
support was legitimised through engaging in noho with women of ali‘i 
nui rank and demonstrating the mana of Kū through achievements in 
battle or, more correctly, ‘well organised, consensus-based, protocol-
mandated acts of violence’.12 A great deal of ability was required to make 
this transition. Inferior blood links and the inability to mobilise battle 
support from many quarters kept the vast majority of kaukau ali‘i out of 
contention for such usurping of power.13 By the same token, however, the 
same need to mobilise and command the support from many quarters 
meant that ali‘i nui could not afford to alienate their followers with 
10  Young (1998), pp. 48–49, 52–53.
11  Young (1998), pp. 56, 59, 64; and Edith Kawelohea McKinzie, Hawaiian Genealogies: Extracts 
from Hawaiian Language Newspapers, Ismael W. Stagner (ed.), no. 2, vol. 1, The Institute for 
Polynesian Studies (Lā‘ie: 1983), p. 44.
12  Young (1998), p. 49.
13  Young (1998), p. 50.
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oppressive or unpopular actions. Ali‘i nui had the right to put kaukau 
ali‘i to death for poor service, but this seems to have been rarely exercised 
in a relationship that was mutually beneficial.14
Retinues were bolstered from further afield. According to Malo, mock 
battles like the one witnessed by Vancouver were used, in part, ‘to show 
the chiefs beforehand who among the people were warriors, so that they 
might be trained and brought up as soldiers’.15 The use of the term ‘people’ 
is ambiguous in terms of distinguishing between ali‘i and maka‘āinana, 
although elsewhere Malo refers to ‘commoners’ who lived with the chief 
and did not desert him in battle. Such men were called kanaka-no-lua-
kaua (men for the pit of battle). This epithet was also applied to ali‘i who 
demonstrated similar loyalty. Malo claims that warriors who distinguished 
themselves in battle were sometimes rewarded with feather cloaks.16 Such 
cloaks were usually a symbol of chiefly status. Even if there was social 
mobility, the conveying of specific titles and regalia still suggests that social 
distinctions between ali‘i and maka‘āinana within retinues were retained.
Hawaiian terminology distinguishes between commoners who cultivated 
the land (maka‘āinana) and landless commoners (kanaka) who became 
clients or servants of an ali‘i. Nineteenth-century sources suggest that 
many of these were ‘adventurers’ who moved between different polities 
in search of service in the retinue of a lord under whom their personal 
fortunes would be enhanced.17 It should be noted, however, that there 
was a marked increase in mobility after the unification of most of 
the archipelago in 1796. Such mobility may not have existed prior to 
this. On the other hand, it may explain the apparently contradictory 
image of generally passive and settled maka‘āinana moving on if their 
overlord alienated them. It was perhaps the support of kanaka, and not 
maka‘āinana, that rulers needed to retain. Maka‘āinana were ill suited 
to traditional Hawaiian warfare, if James King’s poor opinion of their 
physique is correct. They would have lacked the necessary muscle to cope 
with the rigours of combat at close quarters. Hawaiian chiefs often asked 
David Samwell who were the ‘tata toa’ (kaua-koa) or fighting men among 
Cook’s expedition, assuming that ‘none are such but those who are tall 
and stout, the same as they are among them’.18
14  Young (1998), pp. 98–99.
15  Malo (1951), p. 66.
16  Malo (1951), pp. 61, 77.
17  Valeri (1985a), pp. 156, 159.
18  Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967) 3:2, p. 1193.
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
114
The most skilful warriors were the higher ranked ali‘i. Kamehameha, for 
example, was famous for his prowess in parrying and dodging spears. 
Important young chiefs received rigorous training in the arts of war.19 
The greatest contemporary warrior-chief on Hawai‘i, Kekūhaupi‘o, trained 
Kamehameha. Kekūhaupi‘o belonged to the powerful Moana people 
of Ka‘awaloa in Kealakekua Bay, who also supplied the war leaders for 
mō‘ī of the leeward coast. Abraham Fornander mentions that Kualoa in 
windward O‘ahu was noted as a place where young ali‘i received training 
in the arts of war and peace.20 Ali‘i figure prominently in traditional 
accounts of battles, with the death of an important ali‘i often deciding the 
conflict. Vancouver found that many of his former chiefly acquaintances 
had died in the time between his first visit to the islands as a member of 
Cook’s expedition and his return just over a decade later. He was told that 
most had died as a result of warfare.21
Ali‘i had much to motivate them to risk their lives in the pit of battle. Their 
mana and secular power were at stake. Sacred status alone could not attract 
adherents. The fortunes of the members of chiefly retinues were obviously 
linked to those of their lords. Decisive victory might mean a share in the 
division of the lands of the vanquished. Noticeable acts in battle might 
enhance an individual’s status within the retinue – all would be aware of 
how past warriors had won immortality through their acts of courage and 
skill, and this knowledge served to inspire each new generation of young 
warriors. For maka‘āinana, the benefits of victory were less direct. Some 
might fight well enough to secure a place in the retinue. For most, the end 
of hostilities would have meant a return to their fields regardless of the 
outcome, providing they could avoid being killed in the interim. Other, 
more general influences probably shaped the attitudes of all combatants 
to varying degrees: social conventions concerning manliness, kin-group 
and retinue loyalties, the fear of losing face in front of one’s associates, 
priestly claims of supernatural support, and the consequences of defeat.
The proportion of the total population involved in warfare is difficult to 
ascertain. The information that is available, however, tends to support 
the idea that armies mainly consisted of chiefly retinues. All references to 
the size of armed forces pertain to Hawai‘i and may not be representative 
19  Pierre Francois Peron, A Frenchman in Hawaii, 1796, Virginia Day (trans.) (Honolulu: White 
Knight Press, 1975), p. 6.
20  Kamakau (1961), p. 126 ; Fornander (1969), p. 278 ; Sahlins (1995), p. 48.
21  Vancouver (1801), bk 2, pp. 405–06.
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of other islands in the chain. Sometime in the 18th century, prior to the 
arrival of Cook, Alapa‘inui, the ruler of Hawai‘i, attacked Maui. Kamakau 
records that his army numbered 8,440 men. The Russian explorer Urey 
Lisiansky was told that Kamehameha’s invasion force on Maui in 1790 
numbered 8,000 men and travelled in 2,000 canoes. Lisiansky’s source 
was John Young, who served Kamehameha from 1790 onwards. Young 
also informed traders Captain Charles Bishop and John Boit Jr that 
Kamehameha raised an army of 10,000 men on Hawai‘i, and a fleet of 
1,200 canoes for the conquest of the rest of the chain in 1795. Young told 
Lieutenant William Broughton of Vancouver’s expedition that the army 
numbered 16,000 men, however, although the figure of 10,000 men is 
more consistent with the size of other Hawaiian armies.22
Fleet sizes were another indication of military strength. In 1791 the 
trader Joseph Ingraham recorded seeing a force of 700 canoes in which 
he estimated that there were 20,000 fighting men.23 While an estimate 
taken from hundreds of canoes is of dubious value, the figure of 700 
canoes is feasible given fleet sizes mentioned elsewhere. In January 1779, 
Cook’s expedition witnessed the return of the Hawai‘i ruler Kalani‘ōpu‘u 
from a campaign on Maui at the head of 150 canoes. While this fleet size 
is well below those of Alapa‘i and Kamehameha, it is important to note 
that Kalani‘ōpu‘u had left a garrison in east Maui. Furthermore, just prior 
to Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s return, Samwell counted 150 large sailing canoes among 
an estimated 1,000 canoes in Kealakekua Bay.24 Given such sailing canoes 
were used to transport troops, it would thus appear that Kalani‘ōpu‘u had 
by no means fully mobilised his resources.
Figures for specific areas of Hawai‘i are in keeping with the previously 
suggested total of 8,000 to 10,000 men for the island as a whole. 
The island consisted of six districts. Fornander suggests that each of 
Kamehameha’s four major chiefly supporters could muster at least 1,000 
spears in battle. Their lands centred on two populous districts, Kona and 
Kohala. The Kona ali‘i, Kame‘eiamoku, was accompanied by 1,000 men 
22  Kamakau (1961), p. 74; Urey Lisiansky A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1803, 4, 5 and 6 
(New York: De Capo Press, 1968 (1814)), p. 129; Michael Roe (ed.), The Journal and Letters of Captain 
Charles Bishop on the North-West Coast of America in the Pacific and in New South Wales 1794–1799 
(London: Cambridge University Press for the Hakluyt Society, 1967), p. 141; and John Boit Jr., The 
Journal of a Voyage Round the Globe 1795 and 1796, University of Hawai‘i microfilm 2890 no. 1, n.d.
23  Ingraham, in Kaplanoff (ed.) (1971), p. 86; and Hommon (1975), pp. 151–57.
24  Hommon (1976), p. 303, citing Rickman. See also, King, in Beaglehole (1967) 3:1, p. 511; and 
Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967) 3:2, p. 1158.
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when he visited Vancouver at Hawai‘i in 1794.25 Accounts of casualties 
resulting from the explosion of Kilauea volcano suggest that the army 
of Kamehameha’s rival, Keōua, numbered perhaps 1,200 men at the 
time. One of Keōua’s three columns was wiped out. William Ellis put the 
losses at 80 ‘warriors’, the missionary James Jarves calculated 400 ‘human 
beings’, Fornander counted ‘2,000 men’, and missionary Sheldon Dibble 
refers to 400 ‘fighting men’.26 At the time, Keōua controlled the Ka‘ū 
and Puna districts. In addition to this force he had almost certainly left 
others to guard Ka‘ū, and to control recently conquered Hilo. He was also 
nearing the end of a series of prolonged campaigns fought to defend his 
domains from the increasingly powerful Kamehameha.
As we have seen, the total size of the Hawaiian population at European 
contact has generated considerable debate. Robert Schmitt’s and David 
Stannard’s figures for the island of Hawai‘i are 90,000 and 340,000 
respectively. As neither figure is conclusive, it is appropriate to work with 
both. A fighting strength of 10,000 men would represent 11 per cent of 
Schmitt’s estimate and 2.9 per cent of Stannard’s figure.27 Most studies 
of pre-industrial societies face similar problems concerning accurate 
measurements, but historian Michael Wood echoes the general consensus 
when, speaking of Bronze Age Greece, he asserts that ‘[T]he idea that 
anything near 10 per cent of a pre-industrial society could be mobilised for 
war is probably far-fetched’.28 In such societies, an army of a few hundred 
well-armed men was a significant force, and expeditions of a few thousand 
men were considerable achievements both logistically and politically. 
If this is a correct assessment, then either Schmitt’s figure errs on the low 
side, or late 18th-century Hawaiian society was more militarised than 
most other pre-industrial societies. References to the replacement of 
casualties suggest that full fighting strengths were rarely mobilised. In the 
1770s, Kalani‘ōpu‘u is said to have lost 800 of his best fighters in one day’s 
fighting on Maui. Yet, he soon after again attacked Maui at the head of a 
25  Fornander (1969), pp. 315, 338.
26  John F. G. Stokes, ‘Dune Sepulture, Battle Mortality and Kamehameha’s Alleged Defeat on 
Kauai’, 45th Annual Report of the Hawaiian Historical Society for the Year 1936 (Honolulu: 1937), pp. 
36–39; and Fornander (1969), p. 324.
27  R. C. Schmitt, ‘New Estimates of the Pre-censal Population of Hawaii’, Journal of the Polynesian 
Society, vol.80 (2), 1971, 237–43. See also Table 1, Chapter 2. 
28  Michael Wood, In Search of the Trojan War (London: Facts on File Publications, 1985), p. 158.
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strong army. After the battle of Koapapa in the early 1790s, Kamehameha 
delayed his pursuit of the retiring army of Keōua to replace his losses. 
A few months later, Kamehameha invaded Keōua’s territory.29
Although women accompanied Hawaiian armies, and some female ali‘i 
fought in battle, most combatants appear to have been men.30 If it is 
assumed that approximately half of the population was female, then 
a 10,000-man army represents 22 per cent of Schmitt’s male population 
and 5.8 per cent of Stannard’s. Obviously, as a percentage of healthy adult 
males, this figure would be even higher. In the case of Schmitt’s figure, 
fighting forces would almost certainly have required the inclusion of 
maka‘āinana, ali‘i and kanaka. The evidence, therefore, suggests that the 
Hawaiian population was larger than Schmitt’s estimate.
Maka‘āinana levies certainly did march with chiefly retinues on some 
occasions. The degree to which maka‘āinana were mobilised varied 
according to the nature of the undertaking, or the seriousness of the threat 
posed. Kamakau relates that, when an O‘ahu army invaded Moloka‘i in 
the mid-part of the 18th century, it was not until the fifth day of fighting 
that every able-bodied man within range of the battlefield came out of 
his house to fight.31 Maka‘āinana levies were almost certainly more useful 
defending their own localities than bolstering forces invading other 
polities or other islands for logistical reasons. Practice varied. Vancouver 
was told that just the principal chiefs of O‘ahu and their warriors had 
gone to Moloka‘i to prepare to fight Kamehameha in the early 1790s. 
Yet, in 1779, King was informed that most of the men in the Waimea area 
of O‘ahu had accompanied the O‘ahu ruler, Pelei‘ōhōlani, to Moloka‘i to 
fight against the forces of Maui.32
Success in war enhanced the ruler’s control over his maka‘āinana subjects 
in a number of ways. By protecting the heartland of his lands from 
aggressors, the mō‘ī shielded its inhabitants and crops from the ravages of 
war. By carrying war to his enemy, the mō‘ī could limit his demands upon 
his population through living off the lands of his enemy and, perhaps, 
even increasing his resources by incorporating enemy land into his own 
29  Kamakau (1961), pp. 85–88, 152; Fornander (1969), p. 324; and Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), 
p. 472.
30  Ellis (1969), pp. 103–04, 124–25; and Fornander (1969), p. 324.
31  Kamakau (1961), p. 70.
32  Vancouver (1801), bk 2, p. 36; and King, in Beaglehole (1967) 3:1, p. 585.
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realm. By also limiting the use of maka‘āinana manpower in fighting 
forces, ali‘i helped maintain a coercive gap between their small, but well-
trained and relatively cohesive retinues, and the general population.
Most mō‘ī seem to have realised the value of courting the loyalty of 
their subjects. The overuse of coercion might not lead to maka‘āinana 
rebellions, but it did threaten to undermine the rule of the paramount 
by inducing sympathy for rival mō‘ī or rebellious subordinate ali‘i. 
The rebellion of the Puna ali‘i Īmakakoloa in the early 1780s against 
his paramount, Kalani‘ōpu‘u, is said to have served as a rallying point 
for subjects disgruntled at excessive demands for provisions from 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s court. The rebellion did not spread beyond Puna but, after 
his defeat, Īmakakoloa was assisted by his people to evade capture for one 
year. Īmakakoloa was eventually betrayed and captured when Kalani‘ōpu‘u 
began to ravage Puna to induce the local population to surrender him. 
Īmakakoloa was sacrificed to Kū, but Puna remained a source of sullen 
dissent to overlords from beyond its borders for years to come.33
Maka‘āinana support was sometimes given to invaders who treated them 
well. When Kamehameha’s brother, Kalanimalokuloku-i-Kapo‘okalani, 
invaded east Maui in the mid-1780s, he won the goodwill of local 
maka‘āinana by respecting their property. As a result, when Kahekili of 
Maui defeated him soon after, local inhabitants helped hide him from 
his pursuers until he could escape to Hawai‘i. This raises questions about 
the relationship between Kahekili and his east Maui subjects. A few years 
earlier his army had exhausted local food resources in a prolonged siege 
of the stronghold of Ka‘uiki Head at the eastern end of Maui following 
a period of Hawaiian control.34
Hawaiian ali‘i must have been aware of their potential vulnerability as 
a small ruling elite. While no maka‘āinana levy could resist drilled columns 
of chiefly retinues in hand-to-hand combat, the maka‘āinana fighting 
elite witnessed by Vancouver in battle exercise used missile weapons. 
Such weapons could be great levellers. Many centuries before, Spartan 
hoplites – using similar tactics to those recorded by Vancouver – had 
been decimated by swarms of lightly armed Athenian skirmishers on the 
island of Spacteria. The skirmishers had refused to close with the Spartans 
and fight on their terms. Instead they had pelted them with a barrage 
33  Fornander (1969), pp. 201–02.
34  Fornander (1969), pp. 216–17, 229; and Kamakau (1961), p. 143.
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of missiles. The Spartans suffered heavy losses in the open and retreated 
to a fort at one end of the island. Here they eventually surrendered once 
they realised that their position was hopeless.35
When the ali‘i Kukeawe abused his position as Kahekili’s regent on Maui 
during the latter’s invasion of O‘ahu in the 1780s, he was confronted 
by local contingents and soundly defeated. The nature of the fighting is 
not mentioned, but it may be significant, given the course of events at 
Spacteria, that, after the initial encounter, Kukeawe retreated and fortified 
a position for refuge. When Kahekili’s son, Kalanikūpule, returned from 
O‘ahu in response to this disruption, order was soon restored peacefully. 
Kalanikūpule was popular with the people of Maui. He agreed with the 
just nature of their grievance against Kukeawe and took no punitive 
action, thereby enhancing the rule of the Maui ruling family.36
Ali‘i and maka‘āinana generally stopped short of open confrontation. 
The limits of sacred power was ambiguously defined by fears and perceptions 
rather than sharply defined by confrontation. The pervading ideology 
elevated ali‘i above maka‘āinana by associating them with the gods and 
linking their sacred status to the wellbeing of the population as a whole. 
The latent threat of punitive measures was probably also a consideration 
in deterring maka‘āinana from openly questioning this worldview too 
vigorously. As long as their lives were reasonably comfortable according 
to the norms they were accustomed to, and better alternatives were either 
not envisaged, or not seen as realistic possibilities, maka‘āinana seem to 
have accepted their lot. For their part, the ali‘i generally exercised restraint 
in their dealings with commoners
Coercion played a prominent role in relations between ali‘i. 
The requirement of proving favour with the gods meant that the relative 
secular power of ali‘i was exposed through physical confrontation. 
According to Hawaiian genealogical rules, the most suitable successor 
to any ruler was the eldest son of his highest ranking wife. In reality, 
the complex social relations between ali‘i nui usually ensured a pool of 
several candidates with valid and comparable claims to the leadership. 
The incumbent did not always designate a successor and, if he did, the 
nominee was not necessarily his eldest son by his highest ranking wife. 
35  Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Rex Warner (trans.) (rev. edn) (Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1972), bk 4, pp. 26–41.
36  Fornander (1969), p. 227; Kamakau (1961), p. 142.
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The designation of an heir by the incumbent did not necessarily ensure 
a smooth transition of government. The legitimacy of any candidate 
depended upon proving their ritual and secular efficacy.37
A war of succession was always possible as rival candidates asserted their 
claims. Power became legitimacy. Kalani‘ōpu‘u perhaps acknowledged 
this in his designation of two heirs to succeed him. His son Kīwala‘ō was 
bequeathed the kingdom, while his nephew Kamehameha inherited the 
old ruler’s war god Kū‘kā‘ili-moku.38 Indeed, the designation of an heir 
may have served only as a signal of the incumbent’s wishes to his own 
retinue after his death to boast the secular power base of his favoured 
candidate for the ensuing succession struggle. Candidates had to secure 
a substantial power base to succeed. Supporters might begin to choose 
between potential candidates well before the death of the incumbent. 
The  temptation to cover all options had to be balanced against the 
possibility of faring poorly in the eventual victor’s division of rewards 
among his followers. The most longstanding and loyal supporters tended 
to receive the best lands to administer, while the vanquished faced the 
possibility of land loss, exile, relegation to maka‘āinana status, or death.
In the absence of a designated heir, the followers of the incumbent ruler 
faced a difficult choice. Their position depended on continued exhibitions 
of loyalty to their lord, yet they also had to give consideration to their 
future as the ruler aged. Structural tension, therefore, existed between 
the incumbent and his supporters, and potential successors and their 
supporters. The danger of usurpation by potential successors was probably 
a major reason why some sons of mō‘ī were raised outside of their father’s 
domains in the court of rival rulers. Because of widespread polygyny 
among ali‘i nui, the various sons of a mō‘ī tended to have different mothers. 
Valerio Valeri notes that this often meant that each drew his support base 
from his matrilineal kin. Patrilineal kin would have conflicting loyalties 
and might end up as supporters of rival candidates.39
Traditions pertaining to the 18th century suggest that the various factions 
usually soon polarised into two opposing camps, each supporting a rival 
candidate for mō‘ī. The stability of these unions was not necessarily 
37  Levin (1968), pp. 403–18; Valeri (1985a), pp. 90–91; Marshall Sahlins & Dorothy Barrere, 
‘William Richards on Hawaiian Culture and Political Conditions of the Hawaiian Islands in 1841’, 
Hawaiian Journal of History, vol. 7, 1973, 18–19.
38  Valeri (1985a), p. 91; and Levin (1968).
39  Valeri (1985a), pp. 90–91.
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guaranteed beyond their immediate purpose, the defeat of the rival camp. 
Although warfare tended to be mostly directed against other polities as the 
new paramount consolidated his rule, the possibility of internal dissent 
was ever present, as the following prayer to Kū suggests:
-E molia aku [curse]
-I na kipi u waho ao 
luko ho‘i [The rebels without and within]
-I ke ka ‘ili‘aina [who wish to seize the land]40
While the conquest of one polity by another might result in significant 
changes in personnel, new mō‘ī were rarely in a position to immediately 
impose their will. Hawaiian warfare rarely resulted in the decimation 
of the losing army. Existing power relations tended to be modified 
rather than overturned. To endure, the allocation of tenure rights and 
administrative positions required a subtle balance between attempts to 
put trusted followers in favoured positions and localities, and the need 
to recognise pre-existing power relations among ali‘i.
There was usually a body of powerful ali‘i who presided over territory 
made up of number of ahupua‘a within each moku. These divisions were 
known as ‘okana or poko.41 Important ali‘i who survived to reach old age 
were usually skilled warriors heading substantial retinues. Such men could 
not be ignored. Powerful ali‘i families, such as the Mahi and I families 
of Hawai‘i, had estates that had been in their control for decades, if not 
centuries. Social scientist Stephanie Levin suggests that, prior to 1796, 
supporters of successful candidates were given lands contiguous to their 
traditional family lands, which, in effect, consolidated their holdings. 
Fornander distinguishes between hereditary estates and ‘[A]ll other lands’ 
which ‘were subject to change in the grand council of division’ that 
marked the accession of a new ruler. Fornander goes on to state that such 
lands were not redistributed if ‘their previous owners were of the court 
party or too powerful to be needlessly interfered with’.42 In reality, there 
were probably few major changes in tenure, with the hale nauā ceremony 
and land redistribution serving mainly to regroup the chiefly elite closer 
to the new ruler by excluding more distant relatives.
40  I‘ī (1959), p. 37.
41  Malo (1951), p. 192; Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 46–48; and Hommon (1975), p. 18.
42  Fornander (1969), p. 300; and Levin (1968), pp. 418, 420.
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The personal retinue of contending candidates in succession disputes 
generally only formed a small part of their forces. This was particularly 
true of younger candidates. Any coalitions required the support of 
older, more established ali‘i. For example, when most Kona and Kohala 
ali‘i threw their support behind Kamehameha to be the successor to 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u, he only controlled his family estate at Halawa in Kohala 
and some land granted to him in Kona and Hāmākua by Kalani‘ōpu‘u. 
The Kona/Kohala faction emerged out of fear that their rivals in Hilo 
and Puna would exercise more influence than they would over the other 
contender, Kīwala‘ō. Hawaiian traditions suggest that both Kamehameha 
and Kīwala‘ō were willing to compromise but that some of the older, 
more powerful ali‘i backing them pushed them into war. Conflict 
became inevitable when  Kīwala‘ō’s powerful and high-ranking uncle, 
Keawemauhili, influenced Kīwala‘ō’s  land distribution to ensure that 
he prospered, while the Kona/Kohala ali‘i, and even Kīwala‘ō’s brother, 
Keōua, were disadvantaged.43
Around the same time, the unpopular ruler of O‘ahu, Kumahana, was 
overthrown and a ‘council of chiefs’ ‘elected’ Kahahana as his successor. 
This move bypassed Kumahana’s children and eroded any entrenched 
power his family may have built up. Kahahana was the son of the 
prominent ‘Ewa ali‘i Elani. He may have been chosen because of the fact 
that he had been brought up outside of O‘ahu at the court of the Maui 
ruler Kahekili and, therefore, did not have a personal power base on 
O‘ahu, as Kumahana had. As an outsider, he may have provided a suitable 
compromise to rival O‘ahu ali‘i within the assembled council.44
Once a successor had been decided, the realm was divided up into 
administrative units. Usually these seem to have conformed to the district 
boundaries, which were largely fixed and stable by the late 18th century. 
The court of the mō‘ī crowned the previously described hierarchical 
administrative structure. The court contained a considerable number of 
councillors, specialists and other retainers, including a body of warriors. 
The court favoured certain localities over others, such as Waikiki and Kailua 
on O‘ahu, Wailua on Kaua‘i and Wailuku on Maui. These areas tended to 
be the fertile heartland of the moku, although the court did move around 
the ruler’s land to ensure that the task of feeding its numbers did not always 
43  Fornander (1969), pp. 300–03, 306–07.
44  Kamakau (1961), pp. 2128–29.
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fall upon any one locality.45 These tours also allowed the mō‘ī to assess the 
state of his lands and reaffirm his relationship with the subordinate ali‘i 
on whom he depended for district and local administration. As the mō‘ī 
could not be in all places at once, messengers were used to convey orders 
and to act as the ruler’s eyes and ears. They travelled by canoes and along 
a network of trails. As well as being trustworthy, messengers needed to 
have speed and stamina for conveying messages overland. When travelling 
by sea, they were provided with the best canoes and paddlers available. 
Some, perhaps even most, were of ali‘i rank.46
Even at the peak of any mō‘ī’s career, power remained essentially 
decentralised. No professional bureaucracy loyal to the ruling mō‘ī 
had emerged to supplant subordinate ali‘i and their retinues’ experts as 
administrative agents. Sources suggest that the mō‘ī’s retinue numbered 
anywhere from a few hundred to a few thousand men.47 Malo mentions that 
subordinate chiefs also gathered warriors. At least four of Kamehameha’s 
chiefly supporters could muster over 1,000 men in battle.48 Their 
contingents were possibly agglomerations of the retinues of less powerful 
ali‘i, given that the battle witnessed by Vancouver engaged sides of only 
150 men. Certainly King believed that the frequency of Hawaiian warfare 
gave ‘weight and consequence to many lesser chiefs’.49
After a decade as ruler of the leeward areas of Hawai‘i, and impressive 
victories against his rivals Kahekili and Ka‘eokulani, Kamehameha still 
acted with caution when dealing with his important subordinate ali‘i. 
Vancouver noted tensions among Kamehameha’s main chiefly supporters 
on a number of occasions. In 1794 Vancouver was led to believe that 
Kamehameha had returned all but one of the knives recently stolen from 
him because it had been given to a ‘person of much consequence, over 
whom Tamaahah did not wish to enforce his authority’. A few years earlier, 
45  On mō‘ī retinue, see Malo (1951), pp. 59–64, 187–95; Beckwith (1932), pp. 124–34; and 
Kirch (1984), pp. 258–59. On Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s administration, see Kamakau (1961), p. 79. On a tour 
by Kalani‘ōpu‘u, see Fornander (1969), pp. 200–01.
46  On messengers, see Hommon (1975), pp. 103–08; and Kirch (1985), p. 266. On modes 
of travel, see Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 489–91; and Hommon (1975), pp. 161–70.
47  Kamakau (1961), pp. 7, 134, 156. See also Fornander (1969), p. 315; Dixon (1968), p. 78; 
Sahlins & Barrere (1973), p. 21; and Hommon (1975), p. 116.
48  Malo (1951), p. 194; and Fornander (1969), pp. 315, 338.
49  King, in Beaglehole (1967) 3:1, p. 614.
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in 1790, Kamehameha had felt the need to take a considerable force with 
him to claim a European vessel and its sole survivor from his ali‘i vassal 
a Kame‘eiamoku after the latter had attacked and overwhelmed it.50
The mō‘ī had to be both politician and warrior, maintaining his support 
base among his chiefly backers while successfully leading his followers 
against the forces of rival rulers to maintain his mana. Open dissent 
within the realm had to be dealt with before the flames of rebellion could 
take hold. Yet the excessive assertion of central authority raised the risk 
of alienating the population. The consolidation of power was also sought 
through marriage alliances between various collateral kin of the ruling 
house and other powerful families. Kamehameha married into the family 
of his slain rival, Kīwala‘ō, to effect a reconciliation, and also to increase 
the status of his family by linking it with such a high-ranking family.51
Marriage unions could bestow significant influence on high-ranking 
female ali‘i. High-ranking women might have many partners in their 
lifetimes. The formidable high-ranking Kaua‘i ali‘i Kamakahelei played 
a crucial role in deciding the leadership of Kaua‘i in the 1770s and 1780s 
through her choice of, and influence over, marriage partners. Other chiefly 
women exercised significant influence in Hawaiian polities in this period. 
Kamehameha’s favourite wife, Ka‘ahumanu, had much influence with 
her Maui kinsmen and also attended Kamehameha’s councils.52 Some 
ali‘i women even fought beside their spouses in battle. One such woman 
was Kalola, the wife of Kahahana, who joined her spouse’s ill-fated stand 
against Kahekili’s invading army at Nu‘uanu on O‘ahu in 1783.53 Chiefly 
women, just like their male equivalents, controlled status symbols such 
as cloaks.54 Given this evidence of female ali‘i nui exerting significant 
political influence and fighting in battle, the possibility that such women 
controlled armed retinues of their own cannot be dismissed.
While some rulers, such as the Maui ruling line, entrusted important 
administrative posts to immediate family members, others gave these posts 
to affinal relations to keep power away from close, consanguineous relatives. 
50  Fornander (1969), p. 230. See also Vancouver (1801), bk 3, p. 215 for 1790; and Vancouver 
(1801), bk 5, p. 26 for 1794.
51  Valeri (1985a), pp. 165–66, 168.
52  Sahlins (1985), p. 22. On Kamakahelei, see Valeri (1985a), p. 166. On Ka‘ahumanu, see Sahlins 
(1981), p. 61; and Kame‘eleihiwa (1987), pp. 107–08. On brother–sister bonds, see Ralston (1987), 
p. 117.
53  Fornander (1969), p. 224; and Ellis (1969), pp. 124–25.
54  Linnekin (1988), pp. 269–70.
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This seems to have been particularly true of Hawai‘i, where traditions 
abound about the usurpation of the leadership by junior collateral kin. 
On Maui, in contrast, the same line had ruled for generations and seems 
to have been relatively untroubled by serious internal strife in the period 
under consideration. The only dissent noted occurred around 1783, when 
some Maui ali‘i fought against Kahekili during a rebellion on O‘ahu.55
The formation of full-time military units loyal to the ruler has usually 
been crucial to the formation of centralised states in most parts of the 
world. There are strong indications that, by the 1770s, units of military 
specialists existed alongside chiefly retinues. Traditions pertaining to this 
decade refer to Kahekili’s army consisting of ‘chiefs, fighting men and left-
handed warriors whose sling shots missed not a hair of the head or a blade 
of grass’, as well as the po‘ouahi (smoke head) and niu‘ula (red coconut) 
‘divisions’. This force defeated and expelled Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s army from 
Maui, prompting the Hawai‘i ruler to spend a year reorganising his forces. 
He is said to have organised six brigades, with ali‘i forming a bodyguard 
called keawe, and ‘nobles’ constituting two other units known as the alapa 
and pi‘ipi‘i respectively. The alapa were armed with spears and are said 
to have numbered around 800 men.56
By 1783, Kahekili’s forces also included men known as pahupū (cut in 
two) because of their distinctive tattooing which covered one side of their 
body. Kahekili was also tattooed in this way.57 Vancouver saw many of 
Kahekili’s subjects with this pattern of tattoo and was told that it had 
been adopted recently with the purpose of intimidating enemy soldiers in 
battle.58 The fact that Kahekili’s nephew, Kīwala‘ō, had his back tattooed 
like his uncles while visiting his mother, Kalola, on Maui dates this 
practice to at least as far back as 1781.59 There appears to be no other 
record of this type of tattooing outside of Kahekili’s realm. Kamakau 
distinguishes pahupū from chiefs and warriors when describing Kahekili’s 
army in 1791. The ali‘i Koi, Kuala-kia and Manu-o-kaniwi, are listed as 
‘leaders’ of pahupū on O‘ahu, which suggests that the tattoos signified 
membership of an organised body rather than functioning merely as an 
55  Sahlins (1981), pp. 61–62; Levine (1968), p. 417; and Fornander (1969).
56  Kamakau (1961), p. 85; Thomas G. Thrum ‘Hana of Historic Tradition and Romance’, in Thomas 
G.  Thrum (ed.) The Hawaiian Almanac For 1919 (Honolulu: Thos. G. Thrum, 1919), p. 66; and 
Fornander (1969), p. 151.
57  Kamakau (1961), p. 135. Greg Dening, History’s Anthropology: The Death of William Gooch, 
(Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1988), pp. xvii, 10, 93.
58  Vancouver (1801) bk 3, Ch 8, p. 347.
59  I‘ī (1959), p. 9.
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instrument of terror in battle. In a reference concerning 1783, Kamakau 
lists the pahupū alongside the Po‘o-uwahi and Ka-niu-‘ula and labels them 
collectively as ‘warrior companies’60 led by chiefs.
It is unclear whether these units were kept together in times of peace or 
whether they were merely specialists from the various retinues assembled 
together in times of war for military advantage. Both Kahekili and 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u were powerful, established rulers by the 1770s and may have 
been able to create such power bases independent of their ali‘i vassals. 
The threat of invasion by the other may have helped justify such a move. 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s reforms seem, however, to have been more a reorganisation 
of his chiefly fighting force rather than the creation of a new power base. 
The fact that Maui had been unified under a stable dynasty for centuries 
may have allowed Kahekili to make more substantial moves towards 
increasing his military capacity relative to his vassals. For all rulers, the 
continued importance to chiefly status of martial prowess remained 
a barrier to the expansion of their power base through the large-scale 
incorporation of maka‘āinana into their military forces.
The ability of any ruler to maintain a sizeable military force of his own 
was also restricted by the structure of the Hawaiian political economy. 
The  existing military power of his more important vassals, and an 
economy  geared to the needs of an essentially dispersed population, 
worked against such a concentration of power. Mō‘ī had direct control over 
only a limited amount of land. Kamehameha’s most noted landholding, 
for example, was Kuahewa in the upper Kailua area of Hawai‘i Kona. 
It consisted of eight ahupua‘a, and was approximately 13 kilometres long. 
Kamehameha also had lands in the fertile Waipi‘o Valley of Hāmākua 
district, and his family estate in Kohala district.61 While Hawaiian dietary 
staples could be preserved in a relatively compact, transportable form 
to feed the substantial armies that were brought together for war, for 
most of the year warriors remained dispersed among the various chiefly 
retinues of the polity. The staggering of crop harvests to ensure reasonable 
production for much of the year reduced the need to maintain stores of 
preserved food for the lean months of the harvest cycle.62
60  Kamakau (1961), pp. 135, 159.
61  Thrum vol. 5 (1918–1919), p. 478.
62  Hommon (1976), pp. 115–18; Peebles & Kus (1977), pp. 425, 426; and Kirch & Sahlins 
(1992), p. 28.
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Excessive expropriation of stored food for military campaigns endangered 
the community’s ability to cope with natural disasters, such as droughts, 
and risked alienating the population. Much of the surplus production 
beyond subsistence needs was reserved as offerings to the gods. Propriety 
demanded that such offerings were not blatantly used for other purposes. 
The mō‘ī maintained his own retinue through the production of his own 
lands and from specific rights to other resources. His retinue included 
expert fishermen whose sole job was to provide the court with fish. 
The court could call upon the produce of kō‘ele lands and fishponds that 
were used solely to feed ali‘i and chiefly retinues. Part of the harvest from 
the lands farmed by maka‘āinana households was set aside as tribute to 
their overlords. Most tribute from the more remote holdings of chiefs 
consisted of pigs, dogs and salted fish rather than vegetable staples. 
The  ruler reserved a portion of the first fruits offered to Lono during 
the makahiki for later redistribution. These rights and resources seem to 
have allowed mō‘ī to maintain retinues of a few thousand men at most. 
Such  retinues did not confer enough of a relative advantage upon the 
ruler to allow him to govern without the consent of the majority of his 
ali‘i vassals. Ultimately, the most important bond between the ruler and 
his vassals was probably their perception that it was in their own interests 
to support him or her.63
Indeed, the political coherence of the moku rested upon the diffusion 
of power. Powerful constraints operated to curtail the consolidation of 
power in the hands of one individual, or even one coherent group within 
a moku. Maka‘āinana obedience to the mō‘ī rested upon the latter’s 
perceived sacred status and the expectation of benefits, in return for 
contributions of produce and labour. The loyalty of vassal ali‘i to their 
mō‘ī rested heavily upon the expectation of rewards for services rendered. 
Logistical and political considerations limited the potential to concentrate 
armed forces in one body and meant that the threat of punitive action 
alone would not ensure compliance.
These internal constraints acted as powerful incentives for the pursuit of 
mana outside one’s own moku. Battle against the forces of rival mō‘ī and 
the conquest of enemy lands were preferable to contests over the division 
of limited resources within the moku, or the application of pressure on 
one’s own maka‘āinana to increase production. The same forces that 
63  Valeri (1985a), p. 159; Beckwith (1932), p. 150; Malo (1951), pp. 145 ff.; and King, in Beaglehole 
(1967) 3:1, pp. 517–18. 
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pressured those in power to look beyond their own territory also served, 
however, to limit their ability to convert the spoils of war into enhanced 
power bases. Nevertheless, relations between moku were an important 
part of the structure of power. It is to these relations that we now direct 
our attention.
The nature of warfare
Hawaiians fought for a variety of reasons. Fornander asserts that a ruler 
attacked rivals ‘as much for the purpose of keeping his warriors and fleet 
in practice and acquiring renown for himself, as with a view of obtaining 
territorial additions to his kingdom’.64 He also cites the desire to control 
resource areas as a cause of war. The need to avenge insults and injuries to 
maintain mana played a prominent role in ali‘i actions. The desecration 
of ancestral bones was particularly offensive. Grudges might be harboured 
for generations. The Maui mō‘ī Kahekili’s decimation of O‘ahu ali‘i who 
revolted against him in the 1780s was partly driven by a desire to avenge 
the abuse of the bones of his ancestor Kauhi by O‘ahu ali‘i. Pelei‘ōhōlani 
of O‘ahu slaughtered many of the chiefly elite of Moloka‘i for the killing 
of his daughter there. When Vancouver sought to punish the killers of two 
Europeans on O‘ahu in the 1790s, local chiefs were hesitant to hand over 
the culprits for fear that their killer’s relatives would seek revenge.65
Hawaiians seldom commenced hostilities without first seeking 
supernatural sanction. Kahuna would pray and sacrifice to the gods and 
seek omens. The construction of a luakini heiau preceded most hostilities. 
This activity served to forewarn rivals of aggressive intent, although not 
the precise timing of attacks. Sometimes formal embassies were sent to 
announce the intention to attack and arrange a mutually acceptable place 
of battle. This was not always the case. Kahekili’s invasion of O‘ahu in 
1783 seems to have caught its ruler Kahahana by surprise and forced him 
to give battle before he was fully mobilised.66 The mobilisation of a rival’s 
64  Fornander (1969), pp. 280–81.
65  Fornander (1969), p. 300. See also Kamakau (1961), pp. 215–18, 232–33. On the desecration 
of bones, see Fornander (1969), p. 208. On revenge, see Vancouver (1801) bk 3, pp. 343 ff.; and 
Dening (1988), p. 19.
66  Ellis (1969), pp. 150–52; Fornander (1969), pp. 223, 334; and Kamakau (1961), p. 135.
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forces was always cause for concern, as rival polities were never more than 
a few days’ march or a day’s sail away in good weather, and the loyalty of 
subordinates could not always be relied on.
When war was imminent, messengers would travel around the moku 
to inform subordinate ali‘i of the number of men they were required 
to mobilise. This would vary depending upon the nature of the threat 
posed or enterprise envisaged. Those called up were expected to arm and 
supply themselves and assemble at designated places. These calls to arms 
were generally rapidly responded to. Evasion of the call to arms carried 
the threat of severe punishment. Ellis claimed that those caught evading 
the call up had their ears slit and were led to camp by ropes tied around 
their waists. In May 1791 European merchants witnessed the power of 
the call to arms while trading off Waikiki on O‘ahu. When a single canoe 
arrived with news of war, the Hawaiians present left immediately and 
some did not even wait to receive payment for the trade goods they had 
brought out to the European vessel.67
Hawaiian armies were equipped with a variety of wooden weapons. 
Although battles usually began with an exchange of projectiles, the issue 
was generally decided at close quarters. The polulu, a long hardwood pike 
of up to six metres in length, was a favoured weapon. Another popular 
weapon was the pahoa, a hardwood dagger measuring up to 60 centimetres 
long. The Hawaiian arsenal also included various types of short wooden 
clubs that were used as bludgeons. Some clubs were edged with shark’s 
teeth and could inflict vicious wounds. Finally there was the ihe, a short 
spear measuring from two to 2.5 metres long that could be used to thrust 
or parry, and could also be thrown like a javelin.68
The sling was the main projectile weapon. Made of plaited twine, Hawaiian 
slings could hurl stones the size of hens’ eggs with great force. A number 
of traditional accounts mention ali‘i being disabled by slingstones. These 
accounts imply slingstones wounded or stunned opponents rather than 
killed them outright. With enemy warriors in hand-to-hand combat 
range, however, being momentarily stunned or distracted by injury could 
have fatal consequences for individuals hit by slingstones. Sometimes 
stones were thrown by hand. One type of club, known as a pikoi, was used 
67  Ellis (1969), pp. 152–53; and Ingraham, in Kaplanoff (1971), p. 89.
68  See Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1322; Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 282; 




as a throwing club to bring down fleeing enemy. The bows possessed by 
Hawaiians were flimsy devices made from slender reeds and tipped with 
bird or human bone, which were used by ali‘i to shoot rodents for sport. 
Kamakau refers to Kahekili’s army including experts with the bow and 
arrow in 1783, but there is no reference to the use of the bow in battle.69
It was relatively easy to equip large armies with this military technology. 
Slingstones were available from a number of sources, such as streambeds, 
while the koa and kauila wood preferred for spears and clubs was found 
in the upper reaches of the dry forest that covered the lower slopes of 
the islands’ mountains. Indeed, koa was the predominant tree of the 
forest zone. Koa was also the wood preferred for the hulls of war canoes.70 
Hawaiian fleets contained hundreds or even thousands of double- and 
single-hulled canoes. Double-hulled canoes were a major investment in 
resources, exceeded only by luakini heiau in terms of the commitment 
of manpower and raw materials required for their construction. 
Only important ali‘i could commission and own double-hulled canoes.71 
They consisted of two parallel hulls of equal size, connected by crosspieces 
that supported a central platform. They were paddled or propelled by 
a light triangular sail made of matting connected to a mast and boom. 
Some were up to 21 metres long. The trader John Turnbull witnessed 
canoes being paddled at speeds of 17 to 19 kilometres per hour. Cook and 
his officers were impressed with both the sailing skills of the Hawaiians 
and the quality of their canoes.72
Warfare was also a major undertaking in terms of the effort required to 
feed an army. The large size of Hawaiian armies has already been noted. 
In addition, their ranks were often further swelled by non-combatants.73 
Between January 1778 and December 1797 open conflict occurred in 
13 out of 20 years. Even when fighting did not break out, the threat of 
attack forced the mobilisation and concentration of sizeable armies for 
69  Kamakau (1961), p. 135.
70  Malo (1951), pp. 20–22; Kirch (1985), p. 29.
71  Malo (1951), pp. 20–21, 125–29; King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 522–23; Clerke, in 
Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 593; Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1167.
72  Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 598; King, in Beaglehole (1967) 3:1, p. 626; Samwell, in 
Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, pp. 1183–84; Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1321; Hommon (1975), 
pp. 149–50; and John Turnbull, A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1800, 1801, 1802, 1803 and 
1805 (Philadelphia: Benjamin and Thomas Kite, 1810), pp. 165–67.
73  Ellis (1969), pp. 103–04, 124.
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substantial periods, particularly in the early 1790s on Maui and Hawai‘i. 
Most mobilisations, however, seem to have lasted only a matter of a few 
weeks or a few months (see Appendix 1).
Armies must be fed enough to perform effectively. There have been virtually 
no studies of the diet of non-Western chiefly armies, despite a wealth 
of anthropological and archaeological studies of subsistence patterns. 
Modern nutritional studies can also shed light on this topic. A healthy 
diet requires a balance of organic compounds. The four main classes of 
organic compounds found in living matter are carbohydrates, lipids, 
proteins, and nucleic acids. Carbohydrates are the source of energy for 
the body. Digested carbohydrates are converted into a usable form known 
as glucose, and circulated through the bloodstream to various parts of the 
body. Glucose excessive to immediate needs is converted into glycogen 
in the liver and muscles. If there is too much glucose present for storage 
as glycogen it is synthesised into body fats. Fats and fat-like substances 
are known as lipids. Proteins are the building blocks of the body, and 
consist of complex combinations of amino acids. The body is built up 
from the amino acids it obtains digesting food proteins. Nucleic acids 
control the process of heredity by which cells reproduce their proteins and 
themselves. An adequate diet must, therefore, include not only enough 
carbohydrates to fulfil energy needs, but also sufficient proteins to provide 
the amino acids needed for growth and maintenance, as well as all the 
required minerals, vitamins and liquid intake for good health.74
The most suitable food for troops in the field is one that is compact, 
portable and durable. It must answer nutritional needs and preferably 
not require cooking, as fuel and water are often not available in the 
field. Grain crops, such as wheat, maize and rice, fit many of these 
requirements. When eaten in their wholegrain form, they are rich in 
protein, minerals and the B-vitamin group. With the exception of rice, 
however, grain crops do not grow well in wet, tropical areas. Root crops, 
such as taro, thrive in damp tropical conditions and can produce prolific 
yields with very little cultivation. They tend to be low in proteins, 
however, do not store well once removed from the ground, and are 
74  Konrad B. Krauskopf & Arthur Beiser, The Physical Universe (5th edn) (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1985), pp. 419–26.
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bulky to transport. While 28 grams of polished rice will provide 100 
calories of energy for the body, it takes 70 grams of taro to provide the 
equivalent amount of energy.75
Nutritional needs vary in accordance with energy expended. While battle 
and forced marches require a great deal of physical exertion, warfare also 
involves a great deal of inactivity. The US National Academy of Sciences’ 
recommended energy intake for healthy males between the ages of 15 and 
50 with an average weight 70 kilograms is between 2,700 and 2,900 
calories. The human body can, however, function on much less than this 
caloric intake. A study of famine-stricken Ethiopian villagers suggested 
that a reduced work rate could be sustained on an average caloric intake of 
only 1,475 calories for adult males, and 1,950 calories for adult females. 
The villagers concerned displayed none of the usual symptoms of victims 
of starvation victims, such as significant weight loss, increased death rates, 
or physical and mental lethargy.76 As little as 56 grams of protein a day 
will suffice for an individual, providing that it contains all the necessary 
amino acids. Meat, fish, eggs and milk are good, well-rounded sources 
of protein, while humans have traditionally relied on grain or root crops 
for their bulk carbohydrates to provide daily caloric requirements. Unlike 
animal products, plant proteins do not usually contain all the body’s 
required amino acids.77
Well-nourished humans can sustain short periods of undernourishment 
by breaking down existing skeletal muscle to provide the amino acids 
needed to process essential proteins from foods. When skeletal muscle 
is lacking or used up, lean body tissue must be resorted to. Weight 
loss and a  marked decrease in resistance to disease and infection soon 
result. A  clinical experiment using well-nourished subjects recorded 
a 24 per cent reduction in body weight over a six-month period on a diet 
of 1,578 calories. Most famine victims die as a result of their reduced 
resistance to diseases such as pneumonia and dysentery, rather than 
undernourishment.78
75  Smith (1976), pp. 85–87; Alland (1980), pp. 329–30; and Massal & Barrau (1956), p. 9.
76  National Academy of Sciences, ‘Recommended Dietary Allowances’, in D. A. Wenck et al., 
Nutrition (2nd edn) (Reston Publishing Co., 1983), pp. 630–34; D. S. Miller & J. Rivers, ‘Seasonal 
Variations in Food Intake in Two Ethiopian Villages’, Proceedings of the Nutritional Society, vols 31, 
32A, 33A, 1972.
77  Krauskopf & Beiser (1985), p. 426; and Wenck et al. (1983), p. 630.
78  Nevin S. Scrimshaw, ‘The Phenomenon of Famine’, American Review of Nutrition, 7, 1987, 7–13.
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The main staples of the Hawaiian diet were taro (Colocasia esculenta), ‘uala 
(sweet potato, Ipomoea batatas) and fish. Irrigated taro fields tended to 
dominate in areas with permanent streams, while dry-field taro and ‘uala 
prevailed elsewhere. The only exception to this pattern was reliance on ‘ulu 
(breadfruit, Artocarpus altilis) in a few limited areas, like Puna in Hawai‘i. 
Although all three crops are highly perishable and it is necessary to stagger 
plantings and practice preservation to ensure year-round supply. While 
there was seasonal variation in diet, the quantity of food available at any 
time of the year seems to have been reasonably regular, and ample for the 
needs of a population dispersed to suit localised production regimes.79
Irrigated taro is an extremely productive and useful crop. Mature wet taro 
can be kept in flooded taro patches for months without rotting. When 
steamed, mashed and pressed into hard dry cakes (pa‘i‘ai) it can be kept 
‘almost indefinitely’.80 Pa‘i‘ai was a compact, durable food for armies, 
which simply required mixing with water to form edible poi (cooked and 
mashed corm of taro with water added). Dry-field taro is more seasonal 
than wet taro. In areas of heavy rainfall, such as Hilo on Hawai‘i, dry 
taro can be planted at any time but, in drier areas like Ka‘ū on Hawai‘i, 
it was generally planted at the beginning of the rainy season to reduce 
the possibility of desiccation through drought. Tests on modern variants 
of the types of taro used by Hawaiians produced 1.23 to 2.46 tonnes 
of edible tubers per acre per year. Under optimum, irrigated conditions, 
output can be as high as 3.28 tonnes per acre per year or more. Kirch 
cites even higher yields – 40 tonnes plus per hectare per year for irrigated 
taro compared to only 10 tonnes per hectare per year for dry-field taro. 
Unprocessed taro weighing 2.495 kilograms would be needed to provide 
the average daily requirement of 2,800 calories for one man. Kirch notes 
that 100 grams of edible taro produces 153 calories.81
Hawaiian ‘uala can tolerate drier conditions than taro and generally 
matures  much faster – in three to six months as opposed to nine 
to 15 months for most varieties of taro. Minimum requirements tie it to 
areas of at least seasonal rainfall. At the other extreme, wet soil tends 
to cause ‘uala to rot and heavy rain could force an early harvesting of the 
crop. In drier areas it was advisable to wait until the ground had received 
79  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 75, 101, 134, 276; Malo (1951), p. 206; and B. Currey, ‘Famine 
in the Pacific: Losing the Chances of Change’, Geojournal, vol. 4 (5), 1980, 457.
80  Handy & Handy (1972), p. 75. 
81  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 75, 104; Massal & Barrau (1956), pp. 7–9; Purseglove (1972a), 
p. 64; Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 28; and Kirch (1994), pp. 92–93.
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several good showers of rain at the start of the rainy season before planting, 
while in areas of higher rainfall it was advisable to plant at the end of the 
rainy season and hope for a relatively dry summer. Cook noted that ‘uala 
obtained at Kaua‘i in 1778 lasted only 10 days at sea in an unpreserved 
state. The drying of harvested ‘uala helped stave off deterioration. ‘Uala 
could also be cooked and mashed to form poi (poi ‘uala), although it 
tended to ferment after only a few days. Some ‘uala fields produced 
prolific yields. Cook’s expedition was particularly impressed with the 
productivity of the fields above Kealakekua Bay on the leeward coast of 
Hawai‘i. King noted that ‘uala were so plentiful here ‘that the poorest 
natives would throw them into our ships for nothing’.82 Studies by French 
medical specialist Emile Massal and ethnobotanist Jacques Barrau suggest 
an acre of sweet potato produces approximately 60 per cent of the caloric 
value of an acre of taro.83
The productivity of breadfruit groves and fishing expeditions was also 
impressive. Breadfruit trees can bear 50 to 100 fruit a year, which equates 
to 60 to 177 kilograms of fruit annually. Kirch suggests that average 
densities for breadfruit per hectare would produce between three to five 
tonnes of fruit per hectare per year.84 Marine resources were abundant, 
despite winter storms and seasonal kapu restricting offshore fishing. 
Schools of aku (bonito or skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis)) could contain up 
to 1,000 fish. Nineteenth-century Hawaiian sources imply that it was not 
unreasonable to expect a catch of 100 aku in a day. In 1810, a European 
resident of Honolulu knew of a day’s expedition that produced 10 to 
12 canoes deeply loaded with fish caught in nets. As a generalisation 
2,400 calories roughly equates to 2.722 kilograms of fish. Small aku 
weigh between 2.268 and 5.433 kilograms, while some can weigh up to 
9.979 kilograms. Even allowing for weight reduction due to gutting and 
drying, a moderate catch of aku represented a significant food resource.85 
The fishponds of the ali‘i represented a highly concentrated and easily 
accessible marine resource. A study of Hawaiian fishponds at the turn of 
82  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 618. 
83  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 75, 127–34; Kirch (1985), p. 51; Malo (1951), p. 205; Cook, in 
Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 277; Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 618, n. 1; and Massal & Barrau (1956), 
pp. 7–9. I am indebted to Marie Toussaint of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Centre 
Norbert Elias – Marseille for the information on Massal’s disciplinary background and training.
84  Kirch (1994), p. 92.
85  Campbell (1967), pp. 140–42; Hommon (1975), p. 142; and Patricia Price Beggerly, ‘Hawaiian 
Initial Settlement – A Possible Model’, in Micronesian and Polynesian Voyaging – Three Readings, 
Pacific Islands’ Program – Miscellaneous Work Papers (Honolulu: 1976), p. 99.
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this century found average yields of 166–365 kilograms of fish per acre. 
Cured fish, preserved by drying and salting, were obtained by Cook at 
Ni‘ihau in 1778 and found to keep well and to be very good to eat.86
Massal and Barrau put the annual production of one acre of dry-field 
taro at 5,200,000 calories, one of irrigated taro at 6,930,000 calories, 
and one acre of sweet potato at 5,800,000 calories. According to these 
figures, the annual production of around 6.47 hectares of dry taro, 
5.36 hectares of wet taro, or just over 5.67 hectares of ‘uala could sustain 
1,000 men for a month.87 These figures were arrived at by multiplying 
1,000 (men) x 2,800 (daily caloric intake) x 30 (average days in a month), 
divided by each crop’s annual caloric output per hectare. Archaeological 
measurements of the dry-field system of the South Kona area of Hawai‘i 
suggest it measured around 139 square kilometres.88 In other words, the 
main logistical problem for waging war was not growing enough food 
to feed armies, but rather ensuring that enough food was available at 
a specific locality at a specific time.
While ali‘i maintained storehouses of food, Ellis implies that those who 
were called up were expected to bring their own provisions. The main 
provisions carried were various types of poi and dried fish and calabashes 
of water. Poi and fish were often wrapped in edible taro leaves. Accounts 
of campaigns reveal that armies also lived off the land. Just prior to the 
battle of Moku‘ōhai in 1782, for example, ali‘i sent their men into nearby 
uplands to collect taro. The degree to which armies relied on preserved 
food stores as opposed to food taken in the field is uncertain. The evidence 
suggests that the latter played a more significant role. Stockpiles of 
preserved food needed to be partially maintained as a safeguard against 
famine. In Ka‘ū, rat damage to stored provisions was a problem. Rats 
could devastate an entire crop and have been recorded in American 
Samoa as eating 117.27 kilograms of a 362.874-kilogram sweet potato 
harvest. Although preserved food was compact, the amount of food and 
water combatants could carry with them was limited. Canoes could carry 
considerable loads but there were no beasts of burden. Women sometimes 
accompanied husbands to war, and were probably weighed down with 
provisions on the march. Ellis mentions that they often waited at the 
86  Kirch (1985), p. 213; Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 279.
87  Massal & Barrau (1956), pp. 7–9.
88  Kirch (1985), p. 225.
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rear of battlefields with food and water to boost their husbands’ strength 
during combat. The women of Maui and Hawai‘i carried heavy loads of 
food and water from upland fields during peacetime.89
Supplies were occasionally sent between islands to armies based beyond 
their own territory. The longer an army remained in the field, the more 
the war zone was stripped of provisions. Any mobilisation that lasted 
more  than a few months placed severe strains on the economy. After 
a prolonged siege of Ka‘uiki Head in east Maui, the besieging force had 
to withdraw from the devastated neighbourhood to another locality and 
plant a food crop. In 1793, the Maui ali‘i Komohomoho told Vancouver 
that Maui, Moloka‘i and Lāna‘i were suffering under the strain of 
supplying an army on Maui for the last two years to guard against the 
threat of invasion by Kamehameha. Famine occurred on O‘ahu in 1796 
because of the continued presence of Kamehameha’s 10,000-man army 
situated there from 1795.90
The problems of maintaining an army in the field, and the danger of 
rebellions at home while the ruler was absent, meant most mobilisations 
soon resulted in armed clashes. Nineteenth-century ethnographies 
suggest battles were rather formal affairs. There is some support for this in 
Hawaiian traditions and eyewitness accounts. In 1790, Kamehameha sent 
a messenger to his rival Kahekili to arrange a mutually suitable place of 
landing and field of battle for Kamehameha’s intended invasion of O‘ahu. 
It is uncertain whether this was more of a taunt than a serious proposal, for 
Kamehameha was forced to return to Hawai‘i before he could launch his 
attack.91 In February 1796, the trader Captain Charles Bishop witnessed 
two armies on Kaua‘i encamped on opposite sides of a valley with only 
a small stream separating them. By mutual agreement a temporary kapu 
on fighting was in place. Bishop noted that:
89  Ellis (1969), pp. 124, 153; Malo (1951), pp. 195, 219; Kamakau (1961), pp. 238–39; Handy 
& Handy (1972), pp. 133–34, 276; Currey (1980), p. 447; and Peter S. Bellwood, A Settlement 
Pattern Survey, Hanatekua Valley, Hiva Oa, Marquesas Islands, Pacific Anthropological Record no. 17 
(Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum 1972), p. 27.
90  Handy & Handy (1972), p. 491; Fornander (1969), pp. 216–17; Vancouver (1801), bk 3, 
pp. 295–96; Broughton (1967), pp. 40, 71; and R.C. Schmitt, ‘Famine Mortality in Hawaii’, Journal 
of Pacific History, vol.5, 1970, 111.
91  Malo (1951), pp. 196–97; Ellis (1969), pp. 155–56; and Fornander (1969), p. 237.
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As Soon as the Taboo is Proclaimed in one camp, for one, two, or three 
days, it immediately takes place in the other for the like time – In this 
time, these intervals of war, they sit on the opposite banks of the stream 
conversing with each other as friends.92
When terrain allowed, troops were usually drawn up in a crescent-shaped 
formation known as kahului with the crescent’s horns pointing towards 
the enemy. Sometimes the opposing forces would simply be drawn up in 
line facing each other. This formation was known as kukulu. According to 
Ellis, slingers and javelin men were distributed along the whole battleline. 
In a battle exercise witnessed by Vancouver, many in the remainder of the 
battleline were armed with polulu. When broken terrain ruled out these 
formations, armies fought in small, flexible groups. Such a battle order 
was known as makawalu. The 1782 battle of Moku‘ōhai was fought in 
such a manner on rough lava fields dissected by deep gulches.93
The Hawaiian Islands had relatively few sites suitable for unimpeded large-
scale manoeuvring prior to the rise of European plantation agriculture in 
the late 19th century. Much was virgin forested uplands or lava flows, 
and most of the flat land around the coasts was settled and covered with 
dwellings, flooded taro fields and dry-field systems. In a description of 
a council of war, related by Kamakau, advisers expressed their preference 
for a battlefield with enough open ground unimpeded by cultivations to 
manoeuvre their troops; and where any advantage of high ground lay with 
them.94 Battle sites from this era were generally not suited to unimpeded 
movement by large bodies of men. Most were also very narrow, suggesting 
that Hawaiian armies were reasonably small, especially for battles fought 
in open order.
Ali‘i usually led their own contingents into battle, unless prevented by 
old age or illness. The mō‘ī was usually stationed in the centre of the 
battleline. Leading from the front was necessary for chiefly mana and 
also served to stiffen the resolve of followers, but diminished the role of 
generalship in battle. Tactical plans needed to be agreed on beforehand. 
The use of reserves in battle suggests, however, that some degree of behind-
the-lines coordination occurred during combat. The battlefield role of the 
92  Bishop, in Roe (1967), p. 146.
93  Ellis (1969), p. 155. On makawalu, see Malo (1951), p. 109. On Moku‘ōhai’s terrain, see 
Kamakau (1961), pp. 120–22; and Fornander (1969), pp. 309–11.
94  Kamakau (1961), p. 50.
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kalaimoku and other war councillors is uncertain. There may have been 
sub-commanders within each retinue in the form of the ka‘a-kaua, which 
are mentioned in passing by Malo.95
Battles were preceded by appeals to the gods for support, and the search 
for favourable omens in front of the assembled forces. Ali‘i encouraged 
their followers with speeches, while orators, brandishing spears in front of 
the battleline, spurred their side on to deeds of valour. Important ali‘i were 
accompanied into battle by images of their war gods carried by kahuna.96 
Ellis was led to believe that Hawaiian battles ‘were most commonly 
a succession of skirmishes, or partial engagements’.97 Battles often began 
with single combat between champions. Much importance was placed on 
drawing first blood, and then securing the corpse for immediate sacrifice 
on the field of battle. This was seen as an indication of divine favour, and 
could have a decisive effect on the morale of both sides. The impression 
of battle as a series of individual duels is consistent with Ellis’s observation 
that the wives of warriors were present to provide food and water for 
their husbands. For this to occur, individual contestants had to be able 
to temporarily disengage and move to the rear, or the women had to be 
free to move around the battlefield without disrupting the battle. Group 
formations acting in unison would have prevented these actions.
Some fights were decided by the clash of massed battlelines, however, 
as at Aiea in 1794. A hail of projectiles generally preceded the collision 
of the two sides. On at least one occasion a heavy barrage of projectiles 
was enough to cause one side to break and flee. Unless one side dissolved 
rapidly, combat probably broke into a series of individual duels. Gavan 
Daws vividly portrays this type of battle as ‘a war of daggers and clubs 
and even bare hands’ where ‘life or death depended on swiftness of hand 
and foot, and, in the last moments spine-breaking brute strength’.98 Most 
casualties probably occurred when one side broke and fled, exposing their 
backs to their antagonists close at hand.
Fighting did not only consist of set battles. The Hawaiians had terms 
for ambushes (poi-po) and night attacks (moemoe). I‘ī relates how 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u concealed his forces in dense vegetation alongside a narrow 
95  Ellis (1969), pp. 155, 159; and Malo (1951), pp. 59, 196.
96  Ellis (1969), pp. 155, 157–58; Kamakau (1969), p. 211; Fornander (1969), p. 236; and Valeri 
(1982), p. 16.
97  Ellis (1969), p. 159.
98  Daws (1968a), p. 31; Kamakau (1961), p. 87; and Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 594.
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trail through the forest of Paiei and ambushed the forces of Alapa‘i as 
they came along the trail. Alapa‘i’s men were surrounded and slaughtered. 
Some years later, Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s forces fell victim to a similar tactic. 
In 1775, a special unit known as the alapa advanced too far ahead of the 
main body of Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s forces and was ambushed and all but wiped 
out in sandhills south-east of Wailuku on Maui.99
Naval operations were usually restricted to transporting troops and supplies, 
but there are also scattered references to other types of naval activity. In 
a comprehensive survey of Hawaiian traditions, Robert Hommon found 
three references to naval battles, one to a battle on Moloka‘i where an O‘ahu 
force was attacked from the sea and mountains simultaneously, and one to 
the successful repulse of an attempted naval landing on O‘ahu. Double-
hulled canoes were not modified for fighting at sea until the introduction of 
cannon. Naval engagements consisted of exchanges of projectiles, followed 
by attempts to board opponents’ canoes. Hawaiians spent much time 
training in canoes and were extremely skilled in their use.100
Battle dress was the same for battles on land and sea. Ali‘i usually wore 
distinctive capes and feathered caps. While Ellis doubted their practical 
value, Cook believed they were capable of absorbing the impact of 
projectiles and spear thrusts. They also served to distinguish ali‘i, possibly 
to preserve the general kapu on ali‘i–maka‘āinana interaction in the heat 
of battle. The grisly fate of the maka‘āinana who accidentally injured an 
ali‘i in a spear exercise has already been noted, although such propriety 
may not have extended to enemy ali‘i. Differences in cloaks distinguished 
ali‘i status. According to King, the longer the cloak the greater its wearer’s 
rank. The shorter cloaks of the lesser ali‘i were also less colourful than the 
magnificent yellow and red cloaks of ali‘i nui.101 Most other combatants 
wore little more than a piece of cloth, known as a malo, around their 
waists. Hawaiians used wetted mats as shields against the musket fire of 
British marines at Kealakekua Bay in 1779. Mats were more awkward and 
cumbersome than chiefly cloaks, and were used by ‘inferior people’ only.102
99  Malo (1951), p. 196; I‘ī (1959), pp. 3–4; Kamakau (1961), pp. 85–88; and Thomas G. Thrum, 
‘Some Noted Battles of Hawaiian History’, in Thomas G. Thrum (comp.), Hawaiian Almanac and 
Annual for 1889 (Honolulu: Press Publish Co, 1889), pp. 59–60.
100  Hommon (1975), pp. 176 ff.; and Ellis (1969), p. 155; and Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 211–12; 
and I‘ī (1959), pp. 130–31.
101  Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 594–95; Ellis (1969), pp. 156–57; Sahlins (1985), 
pp. 130–31; and Linnekin (1988), p. 276.
102  Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 594–95; and Malo (1951), p. 251.
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The main defensive asset of Hawaiians was their ability to dodge and 
parry blows and projectiles. In February 1787, for example, the trader 
Nathaniel Portlock was given an exhibition on board his vessel during 
which an ali‘i had spears hurled at him ‘with the utmost force’ from only 
10 metres range. The first spear was:
avoided by a motion of the body, and caught it as it passed him by the 
middle: With the spear he parried the rest without the least apparent 
concern; he then returned the spears to his adversary, and armed himself 
with a Pa-ho-a; they were again thrown at him, and again parried with 
the same ease.103
Kamehameha was also observed by the Frenchman Pierre Francois Peron 
dodging spears thrown in quick succession, confirming Hawaiian sources’ 
praise of his exceptional ability. Kamehameha’s instructor, Kekūhaupi‘o 
won renown for his duel with the Maui slinger Oulu when he avoided all 
his adversary’s slingstones despite the fact that they were only 11 metres 
apart.104 These skills served ali‘i well as long as Hawaiian warfare remained 
centred on individual prowess. Battle provided a dramatic stage for the 
exhibition of the courage and skill on which so much chiefly status rested. 
Indiscriminate, mass volleys of projectiles and the use of drilled formations 
acting in unison could, however, undermine this system. It was exactly 
these two tactical trends that signalled the beginning of modern warfare 
in Europe in the late medieval period. Accounts of battles, drills witnessed 
by Vancouver and the formation of units of specialists demonstrate that 
a similar transformation was underway in Hawai‘i in the late 18th century. 
The old ways still predominated but, in the atmosphere of intense rivalry 
that prevailed, the temptation to bend conventions and improve fighting 
effectiveness must have been great.
This suggestion of a tension between old and new ways is supported 
by a  comparison of information on casualties and the duration of 
engagements. Information on casualties is limited. Hawaiian traditions 
tend to mention prominent figures killed in battle rather than total 
casualties. Ellis and Dibble claimed Hawaiian battles were usually only 
prolonged skirmishes with few casualties. In February 1779, Captain 
Charles Clerke learnt that a recent battle in Kaua‘i had cost the victors 
only one man, while they had killed 26 of their rivals, including three 
ali‘i. In 1793, Vancouver was told that a revolt on Kaua‘i had just been 
103  Portlock (1968), pp. 188–89.
104  Peron (1975), p. 6; and Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), pp. 452–56, esp. 454.
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crushed in a battle involving no losses to the victors and the death of two 
rebel ali‘i and five of their followers. Some others had been wounded, but 
had managed to escape into a nearby forest.105 The fact that both battles 
involved internal disputes on Kaua‘i means, however, that caution must 
be used in generalising from their example.
Traditions mention at least three occasions when the vanquished were 
virtually wiped out. These occasions were the two ambushes cited 
above, and Kahekili’s execution of the garrison of Ka‘uiki Head after their 
surrender to him following a long siege. Actual numbers killed are unclear 
beyond the fact that the Alapa unit ambushed in 1785 numbered 800 men. 
Kamehameha’s greatest victory, the battle of Nu‘uanu in 1795, cost the 
vanquished somewhere between 300 and 500 men.106 Their total strength is 
unknown, but it probably numbered many thousand given that it was the 
last stand of the Maui line against Kamehameha’s 10,000-man army.
While naval battles seem to have been decided on the same day as conflict 
was joined, fighting on land could last for several days before one army 
retreated or was routed. Both the battle of Kawela on Moloka‘i in the 
middle of the 18th century and the battle of Moku‘ōhai on Hawai‘i 
in 1782 were decided on the fifth day, after four days of indecisive 
skirmishing.107 This coincidence may indicate the use of a standardised 
expression to designate a hard or long struggle, as is common in oral 
traditions. But it is supported by Ellis and Dibble’s comments on warfare, 
and by Hawaiian traditions. The destruction of the alapa in 1775 was just 
one incident in fighting that ranged over many kilometres in the course of 
a number of days. The battles of ‘Īao in 1790 and Aiea in 1794 were also 
the culmination of days of fluid skirmishing and smaller engagements. 
Although no definite conclusions can be drawn, it appears that Hawaiian 
battlefields were not yet the concentrated killing grounds that the triumph 
of drill and discipline over individuality and discretion has caused 
elsewhere. Missionary Hiram Bingham was told that, between 1780 and 
1795, Kamehameha’s losses numbered 6,000, while his opponent’s had 
lost double this. Many of these casualties were the result of starvation 
and sickness in the wake of the depletion of local food resources rather 
than due to direct violence.108
105  Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 577–78; and Vancouver (1801), bk 7, pp. 369–70 
(Mar. 1793).
106  On Ka‘uiki, see Stokes (1937), pp. 35–36; and Fornander (1969), pp. 215–16.
107  On Kawela, see Kamakau (1961), p. 71. On Molu‘ohai, see Kamakau (1961), pp. 120–21.
108  Stokes (1937), pp. 36–39.
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The consequences of defeat in battle varied. Logistical problems and the 
ever-present threat of internal factionalism restricted the degree to which 
victory could be exploited. If the vanquished could evade their pursuers for 
long enough, they stood a good chance of rallying unmolested, providing 
sufficient confidence remained in chiefs seeking to revive their fortunes. 
The rate of recovery for localities serving as war zones varied according to 
the damage inflicted, local environmental circumstances, and subsequent 
involvement in political and military affairs. Armies passing through enemy 
territory generally plundered local resources and destroyed what they could 
not use or carry off. Invaders burned dwellings, wrecked canoes, cut down 
tree crops, destroyed fishponds, wells and irrigation ditches, uprooted crops 
and killed livestock.109 The destruction of tree crops, such as breadfruit and 
coconut trees, were major losses as new trees take from six to eight years to 
produce fruit. Taro, however, if ruined by drought or deliberately uprooted 
can remain alive for months when kept in a damp place and cut with a 
generous portion of the crown intact. Both taro and ‘uala produce crops in 
a matter of months rather than years. In the interim, famine foods in the 
forest might sustain the local population.110
Rainfall and respite from invasion were crucial to recovery. In the 1790s, 
arid Lāna‘i was still recovering from a raid by Kalani‘ōpu‘u in 1778 that 
had stripped the island of food.111 In 1790, Kamehameha’s forces moved 
through the Lahaina area on Maui, plundering or destroying cultivations and 
livestock. When Vancouver visited Lahaina in 1793 he found only limited 
taro cultivation in the immediate vicinity of the settlement. He wrote that 
‘By far the larger portion of the plain was in a ruinous state; the small part 
that was in a flourishing condition, bore the evident marks of very recent 
labour’.112 This was despite the fact that the rulers of Maui were straining 
to feed troops who had been mobilised on the island for some years to 
counter the threat of another invasion by Kamehameha. By  February 
1796, European visitors were remarking on the excellent state of Lahaina’s 
cultivation and the large area that was under cultivation.113 Kamehameha’s 
victory over the Maui ruling family in 1795 had ended Maui’s role as a 
battle zone, enabling local cultivators around Lahaina to rebuild their field 
109  Kamakau (1961), pp. 51, 66, 70, 108; and Fornander (1969), pp. 133, 137, 141, 240. 
110  Malo (1951), p. 43; Handy & Handy (1972), p. 94; Massal & Barrau (1956), p. 20; J. W. 
Purseglove, Tropical Crops, vol. 2: Monocotyledons 2 (London: Longmans, 1972b), pp. 464–65; and 
J. W. Purseglove, Tropical Crops, Dicotyledons 2 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1968), p. 382.
111  Hommon (1976), p. 157; and Schmitt (1970), pp. 110–11.
112  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 332–33. 
113  Broughton (1967), p. 37.
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systems and draw on the rainfall of the nearby mountains of west Maui. 
Table A1 in Appendix 1 demonstrates that most localities were not invaded 
frequently in this period. During the period covered in this study, Lahaina 
seems to have been pillaged only in 1790 and the previous time that it had 
suffered war damage was around 1750. The fact that Lahaina’s coconut and 
breadfruit trees escaped destruction in 1790 suggests Kamehameha may 
have been confident of retaining control of the area.114
Victors attempting to occupy conquered territory might proclaim an 
amnesty to get the land back into production again. Maka‘āinana were 
more useful as cultivators than as fugitives. Although Ellis claims they were 
enslaved and treated cruelly, such oppression ran the risk of alienating a 
population with uncertain loyalties, while their previous ruler might still 
be capable of mounting an effort to regain lost lands. There are hints that 
the Hawai‘i ruler’s control of the Hana and Kipahulu districts of east 
Maui in the 1770s and 1780s involved the retention of some local ali‘i 
in administrative posts. With the rest of the island still controlled by the 
Maui mō‘ī Kahekili, the support of local inhabitants was important.115
Lesser ali‘i might have a role in the conqueror’s new administration, but 
prominent enemy ali‘i would always pose a threat as potential rallying 
points for dissent. For prominent ali‘i, defeat and capture meant death 
or a loss of mana. Kin ties or respect for high status saved some like 
Keawemauhili, who was released after being captured at Moku‘ōhai in 
1783.116 Victory was often emphasised by the construction of a new 
heiau on the ruins of enemy heiau and, occasionally, by the incorporation 
of the enemy’s god images into the new heiau’s pantheon.117 The fate of 
a dead ali‘i’s retinue is uncertain. They were either hunted down and 
killed, or sought a new lord. Victorious and ambitious chiefs were always 
looking to bolster their retinues to control new territory and strengthen 
their position for internal power struggles. Kahekili, for example, left the 
governing of Maui to others while he moved to newly conquered O‘ahu to 
personally oversee what turned out to be a troublesome consolidation.118
114  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, p. 295; and Cordy (1972), p. 398.
115  Ellis (1969), p. 152; and Hommon (1975), pp. 98–100.
116  Kamakau (1961), p. 122.
117  Valeri (1982), p. 6.
118  Fornander (1969), pp. 223–25.
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Fortresses were rare in Hawai‘i, despite the potential benefits as bulwarks 
against invasion and for consolidating conquest. Most fortified positions 
served merely as temporary refuges. If fugitives could not flee and hide 
in the forested uplands, or to the territory of sympathetic friends, their 
only means of evading capture was to reach a fortified refuge or sanctified 
places of refuge known as pu‘uhonua. The most famous pu‘uhonua was at 
Hōnaunau on the South Kona coast of Hawai‘i. After appropriate rituals 
of purification, those who reached such sanctuaries were allowed to leave 
unmolested. Most fortified sites consisted of steep ridges modified by 
fosses, and occasionally strengthened with fighting platforms. Interestingly, 
the fortified ridge at Kawela on Moloka‘i ended in a pu‘uhonua. In some 
localities, fortified caves served as refuges, as possibly did a peninsula in 
Puuloa (Pearl Harbour) on O‘ahu.119
The most prominent stronghold in Hawaiian traditions was Ka‘uiki Head, 
a small steep-sided volcanic hillock on Hana Bay, east Maui. In the latter 
part of the 18th century, east Maui intermittently served as a battlefield 
between the forces of Maui and Hawai‘i. Ka‘uiki Head facilitated the 
occupation of the area by Hawaiian forces by providing a refuge in 
times of defeat until help could be sent. Ka‘uiki’s summit was reached 
by means of a ladder made of trees and vines. References to sorties by its 
besieged defenders and to the head being fortified suggest that another, 
more accessible passage to the summit also existed. Ka‘uiki Head was not, 
however, an ideal position. It lacked defensible, sheltered anchorages and 
had limited space on its summit. Reliance on rainfall and springs at the 
base of the hill for drinking water was perhaps its greatest weakness. These 
shortfalls suggest it was more a refuge in desperate times than a stronghold 
from which to dominate the country around it.120
There are scattered references to the construction of field fortifications. 
With one exception, all are associated with firearms. On 14 February 
1779, Hawaiians at Kealakekua Bay threw up several stone breastworks 
in expectation of retaliation for the death of Cook. When Kamehameha 
invaded Maui in 1790, he encountered a fortified position at Pu‘ukoae, 
probably in response to his firearms and cannon. Earthworks and trenches 
were constructed at Kāne‘ohe on O‘ahu in 1794 specifically to counter 
119  Kirch (1985), p. 273; Kamakau (1961), pp. 110–11; Pogue (1978), pp. 36–38; I‘ī (1959), p. 97; 
McAllister (1933), pp. 35–36; and Ellis (1969), pp. 103–04.
120  Handy & Handy (1972), pp. 502–04; Fornander (1967), pp. 98–99, 108, 215–16; and 
Kamakau (1961), pp. 80, 115, 154.
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the impact of firearms. In a battle on Hawai‘i in 1791, warriors from 
Ka‘ū squatted in small holes to avoid enemy musket fire. The one instance 
in which the construction of fortifications did not involve firearms is 
a reference to the forces of the Maui ali‘i Kukeawe fortifying themselves 
strongly at Kapuoa in response to attacks from local forces. As was 
suggested earlier, this may have been a response to indigenous firepower.121
The distinction between war and peace was not always clear. Some conflicts 
ended in a formal peace ceremony sanctified with prayers and sacrifices, 
and celebrated through feasts and games. At other times, however, open 
hostilities were followed by uneasy stand-offs that sometimes lasted for 
years. In such circumstances, peaceful visits between ali‘i were potentially 
tense affairs. Visitors might be treated with respect and courtesy, as 
the Maui ali‘i Kahahawai was when he called on Kamehameha soon 
after defeating him in battle in 1782. At other times, their lives were 
endangered. When Kamehameha sent two of his most senior councillors, 
Keaweaheulu and Kamanawa, to make overtures for peace with his 
enemy Keōua, Keōua’s advisers recommended killing them. They were 
only spared because Keōua rejecting his councillors’ advice, and accepted 
Kamahameha’s overture. Keōua was struck down and sacrificed to 
Kū‘kā‘ili-moku when he arrived to meet Kamehameha. When Vancouver 
attempted to mediate between Kahekili and Kamehameha in 1793 and 
1794, he found his efforts blocked by each party’s fear that they would be 
killed if they went to talk with the other.122
The tension noted by Vancouver needs, however, to be placed in 
perspective. It occurred at the height of a prolonged military struggle 
for power between Kamehameha and Kahekili that was more intense 
than anything experienced before in Hawai‘i. Outside of such times of 
elevated tension, the importance of high-status marriage partners meant 
that ties among the upper echelons of the ali‘i extended between districts 
and islands. Visits to relatives and the search for status marriages took 
ali‘i out of their own polities. All chiefly dynasties traced their ultimate 
origins to the same divine ancestors, resulting in a fixed, archipelago-wide 
status hierarchy. Generally the oldest and most senior lines were found on 
the western islands of Kaua‘i and O‘ahu. Chiefs from Maui and Hawai‘i 
121  Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1205 (1779); Fornander (1969), p. 236 (1790); Menzies 
(1920), p. 193 (1791); and Kamakau (1961), p. 168 (1794).
122  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 261, 317–19; bk 5, p. 82; Fornander (1969), pp. 319, 331; and 
Kamakau (1961), pp. 155–58.
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
146
sought to enhance their status by seeking unions with members of the 
older lines of the western islands.123 Inter-district and inter-island travel 
by ali‘i seems to have been reasonably frequent, as the following passage 
from Fornander implies: 
Following the custom of the times, Lonokahaupu set out from Kaua‘i 
with a suitable retinue of men and canoes, as became so high a chief, to 
visit the islands of the group, partly for exercise and practice in navigation, 
an indispensable part of a chief ’s education, and partly for the pleasures 
and amusements that might be anticipated at the courts of the different 
chieftains where the voyagers might sojourn.124
On this particular trip, Lonokahaupu visited Keawe, ruler of Hawai‘i, 
and became one of the husbands of Keawe’s wife Kalanikauleleiaiwa.
Most fighting in the late 18th century took place between moku rather 
than within them. Victory vindicated the mana of a ruler. External wars 
might also stifle or divert internal dissent. In 1794 Ka‘eokulani, the ruler 
of Kaua‘i, diverted an oncoming rebellion by proposing that his army 
immediately attack his O‘ahu counterpart rather than return to Kaua‘i.125 
Prolonged periods of peace created domestic restlessness among ambitious 
ali‘i and retinue members anxious to display their worth in battle. Wars 
did not occur every year, however, and some polities saw no fighting for 
years on end. Yet, outside of succession disputes, most polities experienced 
limited open dissent. This suggests a higher degree of political acumen 
than has generally been allowed for.
Warfare was an integral part of chiefly relations by 1770 and provided 
an important means of enhancing status for some but not all ali‘i nui, 
kaukau ali‘i and maka‘āinana. Consideration of the logistical and morale 
requirements to keep an army functioning in the field for any length 
of time, however, meant that the arts of peace – notably agricultural 
production and political consensus-building to maintain coherence, 
and a shared sense of identity and purpose – mattered as much as the 
arts of war. The next chapter details how Kamehameha’s military victory 
and successful  unification of Hawai‘i in the last two decades of  the 
18th  century  rested on this vital combination of the arts of war and 
the arts of peace.
123  Sahlins (1985), pp. 20–21; and Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 23, citing Thrum, vol. 6 (1919–20), 
p. 244; and Fornander (1969) endpaper. 
124  Fornander (1969), p. 296.
125  Fornander (1969), pp. 263–64; and Kamakau (1961), p. 168.
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The Pursuit of Power in Hawai‘i 
from 1780 to 1796
This chapter introduces the third main theme of this book – that 
historical details matter and unification of the Hawaiian Islands was 
not inevitable simply because the necessary structural conditions were 
in place. The  structural features proposed as essential prerequisites for 
unification were all in place in Hawai‘i well before the 1790s. Specific 
events and decisions influenced the course of history. Hawaiian traditions 
place limited emphasis on settlement patterns, carrying capacity and other 
structural characteristics of Hawaiian society. They focus on battles fought, 
rivals slain and marriage alliances successfully concluded. Environmental 
factors, political and social organisation may have set limits on action, 
but they could not dictate the specific course of events. That was a matter 
for the gods and ali‘i.
A detailed examination of Hawaiian traditions suggest that events in 
the 1780s and 1790s allowed the relatively young and militarily weak 
chief Kamehameha to seize power through fortuitous circumstances 
and conciliatory practices pursued initially through his weak position 
but later, as his power consolidated, through choice. The 1780s saw 
the foremost military tactician and military innovator Kahekili expand 
his realm, while Kamehameha was preoccupied with consolidating his 
political heartland against older, more established subordinates. Kahekili 
overextended himself and alienated his new subjects with repressive 
measures, thereby weakening his realm and fatally dividing his polity into 
warring factions upon his death. Their fighting undermined their cohesive 
strength and allowed Kamehameha to achieve a relatively easy victory over 
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their remnants in 1795. Detailed accounts of the battles of the 1790s, 
accompanied by battle maps, reveal that firearms and cannon did not 
and could not have been as decisive as many modern commentators 
suggest. The chapter concludes by noting that victory was relatively 
easy: Kamehameha’s real struggle lay in consolidating this temporary 
ascendancy into sustained control.
Two paths to power: Political consolidation 
versus territorial expansion in the 1780s
In recent decades, European historiography’s traditional focus on the 
lives and clashes of political elites has lost ground to analysis of the social 
and economic structures around which societies are organised. Without 
attention to historical narratives, however, there is a danger that structures 
are seen to determine events. Historical trajectories then take on an air 
of inevitability. The chaos and randomness of human activity is lost. 
While the general pattern already outlined holds true for this period, 
the following detailed account of events shows the influence on history 
of specific events and decisions.
When Captain James Cook’s expedition arrived in the archipelago in 
1778, the islands were divided between four mō‘ī. Kalani‘ōpu‘u ruled 
over Hawai‘i and had also established a presence in east Maui. His main 
protagonist was Kahekili, who controlled the rest of Maui, Lāna‘i and 
Kaho‘olawe. Pelei‘ōhōlani, the ruler of O‘ahu, had recently conquered 
Moloka‘i. Beyond O‘ahu, Kāneoneo presided over Kaua‘i and Ni‘ihau.1
Kalani‘ōpu‘u was probably the most powerful of the four mō‘ī in the late 
1770s. As well as maintaining the unity of Hawai‘i, he had preserved the 
foothold he secured in east Maui during the reign of Kahekili’s predecessor, 
his brother Kamehamehanui. His recent attempts to invade west Maui 
had been repulsed, however, Kahekili suffered heavy losses in the process 
of preserving his territory. Although he still accompanied his army to war, 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u was ageing. Ship’s surgeon on the Cook expedition David 
Samwell estimated that he was over 60 and described him as ‘very tall 
and thin, seemingly much emaciated by debauchery, tottering as he walks 
along, his skin is very scurfy and his eyes sore with ava [kava]’.2
1  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 500, 614; and Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), p. 310.
2  Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1162; King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 512; Clerke, 
in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 597–98; and Fornander (1969), p. 214.
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Kahekili had become the ruler of Maui relatively late in life, after the 
death of Kamehamehanui. Abraham Fornander dates this succession to 
the mid-1760s, but it may have been a decade later, as Kalani‘ōpu‘u and 
Pelei‘ōhōlani’s attacks on Maui lands in the mid-1770s may have been 
an attempt to exploit the death of Kamehamehanui. Samwell described 
Kahekili as ‘a middle aged man … of rather mean appearance’. He proved 
to be a skilled military tactician. In his later years he was described 
as a stern, resolute man, with a cold, calculating manner.3 Pelei‘ōhōlani 
was also a formidable opponent who successfully maintained the unity of 
O‘ahu, which was forged by his immediate predecessor, Kūali‘i. When he 
invaded Moloka‘i, he killed or exiled most of the local ali‘i in revenge for 
the murder of his daughter by ali‘i from windward Moloka‘i.4 Kāneoneo 
became mō‘ī of Kaua‘i by marrying his cousin, Kamakahelei. Both were of 
very high rank. Unlike his three counterparts, Kāneoneo did not launch 
any expeditions against rival rulers. Kamakahelei exerted much influence 
on Kaua‘i, and the young Kāneoneo’s hold on power at Wailua was to 
prove tenuous.5
Cook was able to learn little about the balance of power in the chain 
when he arrived at Kaua‘i in January 1778. By the time he returned to the 
islands in November of that year, Kalani‘ōpu‘u and Kahekili were at war in 
east Maui. After raiding Lāna‘i and parts of Maui, Kalani‘ōpu‘u had been 
confronted by the forces of Kahekili in Hāmākualoa. A battle was fought 
and, when Cook arrived off east Maui, Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s forces were retiring 
in good order towards Hana through Ko‘olau. Kalani‘ōpu‘u remained 
in east Maui until January 1779, when he returned to Kealakekua Bay 
with part of his force. His return seems to have been prompted by Cook’s 
presence at Kealakekua Bay rather than internal dissent elsewhere in the 
island. Gananath Obeyesekere proposes that Kalani‘ōpu‘u returned to 
Kealakekua Bay to try and recruit Cook as his foreign priest to counter the 
influence of Kahekili’s priest, Kaleopu‘upu‘u of O‘ahu, who came from 
a lineage of foreign priests. Fornander makes it clear that Kaleopu‘upu‘u’s 
religious ability was believed to be the reason behind Kahekili’s recent 
victory on Maui.6
3  Samwell, in Beaglehole (1969), 3:2, p. 1151; Fornander (1969), pp. 214–15; and Kamakau 
(1961), pp. 166–67.
4  Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), p. 310; and Handy & Handy (1972), p. 278.
5  Fornander (1969), p. 297; Valeri (1985a), p. 166.
6  Obeyesekere (1992), p. 81; Cook, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 476 ff.; King, in Beaglehole 
(1967), 3:1, p. 511; Dibble (1909), p. 22; Kamakau (1961), p. 91; Fornander (1969), pp. 146–79; 
and Pogue (1978), p. 71.
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On 14 February 1779, followers of Kalani‘ōpu‘u killed Cook when he tried 
to take the old mō‘ī hostage to secure the return of the ship’s cutter, which 
was stolen the previous night. The effect of the confrontation between 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s people and Cook’s party on the old mō‘ī’s rule is unclear. 
A number of Hawaiians were killed by British punitive measures in the 
days following Cook’s death and before peace was restored.7 Kalani‘ōpu‘u 
and his followers were left with an early insight into the power of European 
cannon and muskets, and mana from their possession of most of the 
bones of the great captain. Samwell and James King were led to believe 
that Kalani‘ōpu‘u received the legs, thighs and arms of Cook, while his 
great warrior-chief Kekūhaupi‘o received his head. Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s nephew, 
Kamehameha, was given Cook’s hair. The rest of the body was burnt.8
As the British expedition made one last journey through the islands, they 
discovered two more conflicts. On 27 February 1779, King learned that 
the fires they had seen on Moloka‘i were probably due to the fighting 
between Pelei‘ōhōlani and Kahekili. The fact that Kahekili later sought 
Halawa Valley on Moloka‘i from Pelei‘ōhōlani’s successor suggests 
Kahekili’s attack was unsuccessful.9 The British learnt that Ka‘eokulani, 
the half-brother of Kahekili, had recently supplanted Kāneoneo as 
Kamakahelei’s consort on Kaua‘i. Only days before the British arrival 
on 28 February, Kāneoneo had been defeated in battle by the combined 
forces of Kamakahelei, her son Keawe, and Ka‘eokulani. Kāneoneo had 
escaped, but his remaining support on Kaua‘i was uncertain. Keawe was 
installed as mō‘ī, although it soon became apparent that the real influence 
lay with Ka‘eokulani and Kamakahelei.10
Pelei‘ōhōlani died of natural causes sometime in 1779 or 1780, and was 
succeeded by his son Kumahana. There is no record of any succession 
disputes, although an unspecified number of O‘ahu ali‘i deposed 
Kumahana soon afterwards in response to his increasingly despotic rule. 
A council of O‘ahu ali‘i ‘elected’ Kahahana, the young son of the powerful 
‘Ewa ali‘i Elani, as the new mō‘ī. Kumahana was allowed to return to 
Kaua‘i with his family, where relatives of his mother and sister at Waimea 
7  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 549 ff.; and Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 531 ff. 
8  Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1215; King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 566; and 
Kamakau (1961), p. 103.
9  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 584–85.
10  Clerke, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 577; Valeri (1985a), p. 166; and Stokes (1937), pp. 36–37.
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took them in. Kumahana’s son Kāneoneo was probably here also after 
his recent overthrow in Puna. There is no indication that their line posed 
a serious threat to the new power clique at Wailua.11
Although the new mō‘ī of O‘ahu had blood links with Kaua‘i, his ties with 
Maui had the greatest influence on the future of O‘ahu. Kahahana was 
closely related on his mother’s side to Kahekili of Maui and had been raised 
in Kahekili’s household. Fornander claims that Kahekili made Kahahana 
promise to cede the sacred O‘ahu site of Kualoa in Ko‘olaupoko to him 
before allowing him the leave for O‘ahu. Kahekili also requested palaoa 
pae, the right to whalebone washed up on shore, for O‘ahu. This right was 
usually reserved to the mō‘ī of the land. Kahekili increased his leverage 
over the O‘ahu mō‘ī by keeping his wife Kekuapoiula at his court. 
Fornander asserts that the only reason Kahekili did not invade O‘ahu 
to take advantage of the disruption created by Kumahana’s overthrow 
was the threat that Kalani‘ōpu‘u posed to Maui through his continued 
presence in Hana.12
Time was on Kahekili’s side. Kalani‘ōpu‘u was ageing and, with each 
passing month, Kahahana became increasingly at odds with his subject 
ali‘i over Kahekili’s demands. Kahahana’s announcement of Kahekili’s 
demands had caused divisions in the O‘ahu ali‘i. The kahuna nui 
Kaopulupulu was particularly critical, claiming the handing over of sacred 
Kualoa was disrespectful to the gods and the granting of palaoa pae was 
tantamount to recognition of Kahekili’s right to rule O‘ahu. Kahekili 
created a rift between Kahahana and Kaopulupulu by claiming the O‘ahu 
kahuna nui had twice offered the government of O‘ahu to him behind 
Kahahana’s back. On the second occasion, Kahahana was already ruling 
as mō‘ī. In the wake of Kaopulupulu’s continued criticism of his rule, this 
was apparently enough to convince Kahahana to summon his kahuna nui 
and have him killed. The slaying of Kaopulupulu and his son Kaholupue 
alienated many on O‘ahu.13
11  Kamakau (1961), pp. 128–29; Fornander (1969), pp. 217, 297–98; Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), 
pp. 282–83; and Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 36, n. 1.
12  Fornander (1969), pp. 218–19; Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), p. 282; and Kamakau (1961), 
pp. 128–29.




Kalani‘ōpu‘u confined his activities to touring his moku with a sizeable 
court. The tour was perhaps a response to restlessness among his people 
over the prospect of his declining health and imminent death. Sometime 
in 1780 or 1781 the Puna ali‘i ‘Īmakakaloa rebelled against Kalani‘ōpu‘u. 
The rebellion received much support from ali‘i and maka‘āinana, who 
were  disgruntled at the excessive demand for provisions from their 
mō‘ī’s large touring party. The rebellion, however, seems to have been 
confined to Puna. After consecrating a heiau to his war god at Ohele 
in Hilo, Kalani‘ōpu‘u attacked ‘Īmakakaloa in Puna. The rebellious ali‘i 
was defeated after a long struggle. Kalani‘ōpu‘u went on to neighbouring 
Ka‘ū and built another heiau at Pakini in preparation for the capture 
and sacrifice of ‘Īmakakaloa to Kū‘kā‘ili-moku as thanks for victory. 
‘Īmakakaloa avoided capture for upwards of a year before Kalani‘ōpu‘u 
lost patience and ordered Puna ravaged until the vanquished leader 
was handed over. Loyalty had its limits: ‘Īmakakaloa was soon betrayed 
and killed.14
Signs that Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s death would result in a succession struggle 
emerged at the ceremony of sacrifice in Pakini heiau. While Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s 
son Kīwala‘ō was conducting the preliminary rituals, Kamehameha 
boldly usurped his role and offered up the body of ‘Īmakakaloa himself. 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u had signalled his recognition of Kamehameha through the 
division of Cook’s remains, and Kamehameha’s close friendship with 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s greatest warrior-chief Kekūhaupi‘o was well known. But, 
by this action, Kamehameha stepped beyond the bounds of acceptable 
behaviour. Much anger resulted among the assembled ali‘i and, on 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s advice, Kamehameha left the court and retired to his estate 
at Halawa in Kohala.15
It is uncertain when ali‘i began committing themselves to the contending 
successors to Kalani‘ōpu‘u. It is also uncertain if Kalani‘ōpu‘u had declared 
Kīwala‘ō as his heir and Kamehameha as the guardian of his war god 
at Waipi‘o in Hāmākua prior to the Puna rebellion or on his deathbed, 
or whether he had clearly indicated his wishes at all. Whatever the case, 
it would be the alignment of the moku’s ali‘i and not the will of a dead 
mō‘ī that would decide the issue.16
14  Fornander (1969), pp. 200–01; and Kamakau (1961), pp. 105–08.
15  Fornander (1969), pp. 202–03; and Kamakau (1961), p. 109. On Kekūhaupi‘o, see S. L. Desha, 
Kamehameha and his Warrior Kekūhaupi‘o, F. N. Frazier (trans.) (Honolulu: Kamehameha Schools 
Press, 2000).
16  Fornander (1969), p. 299; Kamakau (1961), p. 107; I‘ī (1959), p. 13; and Dibble (1909), p. 42.
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Kalani‘ōpu‘u died in Ka‘ū in January 1782. Kīwala‘ō succeeded his 
father. Tension mounted as the time for the new mō‘ī’s announcement 
of land redistribution approached. Many ali‘i brought their retinues to 
the site of the announcement. The ali‘i assembled at Hōnaunau in South 
Kona, where Kīwala‘ō deposited the bones of his father in the Hale o 
Keawe mausoleum. Kīwala‘ō’s uncle, Keawemauhili of Hilo, pressured 
the young mō‘ī into ensuring that he did well out of the redistribution. 
Keawemauhili and his windward allies did indeed benefit at the expense 
of leeward ali‘i, and even to the detriment of Kīwala‘ō’s brother, Keōua 
Kuahu‘ula, and Kīwala‘ō himself. The result was just what the leeward 
ali‘i had feared and prompted them to mobilise their forces behind their 
chosen leader, Kamehameha, to mount a challenge to Kīwala‘ō’s party. 
Their forces gathered in the vicinity of Kealakekua Bay a few miles north 
of Hōnaunau.17
The fighting began when Keōua attacked some of Kamehameha’s 
allies. Skirmishing continued for the next few days while the ali‘i 
aligned themselves with one or other party and forces were assembled. 
The resulting coalitions were more marriages of convenience than 
coherent entities, reflecting a complex interaction between self-interest, 
opportunism, blood ties and personal rivalries. Kamehameha headed 
a coalition centred on the forces of five powerful Kona chiefs: Kekūhaupi‘o, 
Ke‘eaumoku, Keaweaheulu, Kame‘eiamoku and Kamanawa. Other 
blood ties bonded this group together. Kamanawa and Kame‘eiamoku 
were twins. Keaweaheulu lost out to Keawemauhili in seeking the hand 
of Ululani and, through her, the control of Hilo. They were supported 
by some Kohala chiefs and Kamehameha’s brothers: Kalaimamahu, 
Kawelookalani and Kalanimalokuloku-i-Kapo‘okalani. Kīwala‘ō, Keōua 
and Keawemauhili were the most prominent ali‘i in the other coalition. 
Their forces were numerically superior and were drawn predominantly 
from Hilo, Puna and Ka‘ū. Some Kona and Kohala ali‘i sided with them, 
however, the most notable being Kamehameha’s paternal uncle Kānekoa 
and his brother Kahai.18
17  Fornander (1969), pp. 204, 302–06; Kamakau (1961), pp. 118–19; and Kahananui (1984), 
p. 198.
18  Fornander (1969), pp. 307–09; Kamakau (1961), p. 120; and Valeri (1985a), p. 167. 
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
154
After three or four days of skirmishing, matters came to a head when 
Kīwala‘ō encountered Ke‘eaumoku on the battlefield among the rough 
lava country of Moku‘ōhai. The terrain forced the combatants to fight in 
small groups. The fighting was open and fluid, with ali‘i to the fore. The 
crucial moment came when warriors accompanying Kīwala‘ō failed to 
finish off Ke‘eaumoku after he became isolated and was badly wounded. 
A warrior rushing to Ke‘eaumoku’s rescue struck Kīwala‘ō with a sling 
stone, allowing Ke‘eaumoku to crawl over to the disabled mō‘ī and 
dispatch him with a shark’s tooth dagger. The death of Kīwala‘ō triggered 
the rout of his forces. Keōua and his men fled to their canoes and sailed to 
Ka‘ū. Others fled into the mountains and eventually made their way back 
to their homes on the other side of the island. A large number of prisoners 
were taken, including Keawemauhili. He managed to escape, and fled 
to Hilo. Kamehameha only arrived at the battlefield late in the day after 
conducting religious observances, but participated in the fighting and 
killed at least one enemy ali‘i.19
Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s moku was now effectively divided between three rulers: 
Kamehameha, Keawemauhili and Keawe. Kamehameha controlled 
Kona, Kohala, northern Hāmākua and eastern Maui. Keawemauhili 
declared himself mō‘ī over the rest of Hāmākua, Hilo, and part of Puna. 
As a nī‘aupi‘o ali‘i, Keawemauhili was the highest ranking ali‘i of the three 
and, perhaps, the most powerful given the resources of his power base 
and the fact that he had governed Hilo since well before the death of his 
brother Kalani‘ōpu‘u. Keōua was acclaimed as Kīwala‘ō’s successor by the 
Ka‘ū ali‘i.
Keōua was prepared for now to acknowledge the superior rank of his 
uncle Keawemauhili, and to align himself with him against the threat of 
Kamehameha. Kamehameha’s family estate in Kohala and his personal 
retinue were probably small compared to his rivals. Rather, his power 
seems to have derived from his willingness to rule in accordance with 
the wishes of the more established Kona ali‘i, the so-called Kona uncles. 
Fornander describes this relationship as an ‘open and tacit partnership’.20
19  Fornander (1969), pp. 309–11; Kamakau (1961), pp. 120–22; and Dibble (1909), p. 43. 
20  Fornander (1969), pp. 315, 311–12; and Kamakau (1961), p. 122.
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Figure 9: The battle of Moku‘ōhai, 1782
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
Kamehameha’s relatives Kānekoa and Kahai fled to Hilo with their 
followers after the defeat at Moku‘ōhai. Keawemauhili granted them 
refuge and gave them lands. For unknown reasons the two ali‘i soon 
rebelled against Keawemauhili. They were soundly defeated and fled 
to the lands of Keōua where they were again granted refuge. Yet again 
they rebelled and were defeated. Kānekoa was slain and Kahai fled to 
Kamehameha and threw himself upon his mercy. He was forgiven and 
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does not figure in Hawaiian traditions again.21 It is unclear how many 
ali‘i moved between mō‘ī like this. They seem to have represented a small 
minority, and such movements were probably more pronounced during 
succession disputes. The fortunes of Kānekoa and Kahai suggest no mō‘ī 
was powerful enough at this stage to ignore the opportunity to increase 
their fighting strength, regardless of the risk involved in taking on people 
who had already deserted other mō‘ī. 
Kahekili was not slow to exploit the divisions that arose after Kalani‘ōpu‘u’s 
death. He offered an alliance to Kamehameha after hearing of his victory 
at Moku‘ōhai. It is unclear whether this was a genuine offer. There were 
rumours that Kahekili was Kamehameha’s true father. Kamehameha 
refused the offer, and found himself confronted by an alliance of Kahekili, 
Keawemauhili and Keōua. Kahekili moved against the Hawai‘i forces that 
still occupied east Maui. Confronted by a two-pronged attack through 
Kaupo and Ko‘olau, and probably outnumbered, the defenders retired 
to the sanctuary of Ka‘uiki Head, without attempting to block Kahekili’s 
progress. Ka‘uiki Head was invested and a long siege ensued. Kahekili 
also sent a contingent of Maui warriors under Kahahawai to Hilo to assist 
Keawemauhili.22
Kamehameha and his main ali‘i met at Kawaihae to decide how to counter 
the powerful coalition arrayed against them. It was agreed to strike before 
the enemy could launch a concerted attack. While Ke‘eaumoku distracted 
Keawemauhili with a fleet of canoes off the Hilo coastline, Kamehameha 
and the main army marched over the Humuula Saddle to the Kilauea 
area. From here Kamehameha could prevent Keōua’s and Keawemauhili’s 
forces joining, and defeat them in detail.23 The two leeward forces reached 
their destinations, despite rough seas off the windward coast, and rain and 
cold foggy conditions in the mountains. According to Samuel Kamakau, 
Kamehameha’s army encountered elements of Keawemauhili’s forces near 
Kilauea crater in cold, rainy conditions. The engagement was thereafter 
referred to as Kau-ua-‘awa, the battle of the bitter rain.24 Another council 
of war was held and it was decided to combine with Ke‘eaumoku’s forces 
and move against Keawemauhili. Kamehameha’s forces were met five to 
six kilometres from Hilo Bay at Pua‘aloa. The leeward forces were routed 
21  Fornander (1969), p. 316; and Kamakau (1961), p. 124.
22  Fornander (1969), pp. 216, 315–17, 220 n. 1; Kamakau (1961), pp. 115–16; and Dibble 
(1909), pp. 40–41.
23  Fornander (1969), pp. 220–22; and Kamakau (1961), p. 124. 
24  Kamakau (1961), p. 125; and Fornander (1969), p. 317.
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after a fierce contest at close quarters. Kahahawai and his Maui contingent 
played a decisive role in the victory. The fact that Kamehameha’s forces 
were able to seek sanctuary on Ke‘eaumoku’s canoe fleet lying just offshore 
raises questions about the extent of their defeat and rout. The leeward 
forces retired up the Hāmākua coast to Laupāhoehoe to recover.25
The windward coalition did not follow up the victory, as Kahekili recalled 
the Maui forces for a more important enterprise. Locked in a stalemate 
deep in enemy territory, Kamehameha withdrew to Kohala. Kamehameha’s 
retreat was also spurred by news that Ka‘uiki Head had fallen to Kahekili 
after a long siege. Kahekili had recently discovered that the stronghold’s 
main water source lay beyond its defences and had moved to cut access. 
When a desperate sortie by the defenders failed to recover access to it, 
they were left with no choice but to surrender. Most were put to death. 
Only a few escaped.26
Kahekili was now free to direct his forces elsewhere. With Hawai‘i divided 
into hostile camps, he felt secure to exploit Kahahana’s troubled reign on 
O‘ahu. After assembling his forces at Lahaina, the Maui mō‘ī sailed for 
O‘ahu, touching briefly at leeward Moloka‘i on the way. Keawemauhili 
and Keōua supplied several canoes for the fleet. Kahekili’s invasion seems 
to have taken Kahahana by surprise. He was at Kawananakoa in the upper 
Nu‘uanu Valley when the Maui forces landed at Waikiki at the beginning 
of 1783. Kahekili sent his forces in three columns towards Nu‘uanu from 
Waikiki by way of Puowaina, Pauoa and Kapena. Kahahana gave battle 
near the small stream of Kaheiki in the Nu‘uanu Valley with the forces 
he had been able to hastily assemble (see Figure 12 for locality). He was 
routed and fled into the Ko‘olau Mountains. Kahahana led a precarious 
life as a fugitive during the two years he evaded capture. The O‘ahu ali‘i 
did not rally behind him, and he was eventually captured and killed after 
being betrayed by a relative.27
The victory at Kaheiki did not secure O‘ahu for Kahekili. The island was 
divided among his ali‘i after the battle, but many of the O‘ahu ali‘i had 
not fought at Kaheiki and remained undefeated. A coordinated island-
wide rebellion was attempted sometime around 1785. While Kahahana’s 
25  Kamakau (1961), pp. 125–26; Fornander (1969), pp. 220–22, 311–12, 317–19; and Dibble 
(1909), pp. 45–46.
26  Fornander (1969), p. 216; Kamakau (1961), p. 116; and Dibble (1909), p. 44.




father Elani was to lead an uprising in ‘Ewa, the O‘ahu chiefly supporters 
of Kahahana Makaioulu and Pupuka were to surprise and kill Kahekili 
and other Maui ali‘i at Kailua, and two other O‘ahu chiefs supporting 
Kahahana, Konamanu and Kalakioonui, were to lead an attempt against 
Kahekili’s man in Waialua, Kiko Hueu. Kahekili was forewarned of 
the rebellion and was able to alert the majority of ali‘i because they 
were concentrated in Ko‘olaupoko, Kona and ‘Ewa. Only Kiko Hueu, 
in distant Waialua, could not be warned in time. He and most of his 
retinue were wiped out. Kahekili moved rapidly and decisively against the 
rebellion. The main fighting centred on Kona and ‘Ewa. Kahekili crushed 
all resistance, killing many non-combatants in the process. Most of the 
important O‘ahu ali‘i were killed and their bones used to adorn a house 
near Moanalua in Kona. It is even claimed that some female ali‘i of kapu 
moe status were killed or mutilated.28
The instability of Hawaiian polities was demonstrated by the fact that 
a number of prominent Maui ali‘i sided with the rebels just as Kona 
ali‘i had sided with the windward coalition at Moku‘ōhai. Kahekili’s 
nephew, Kalaniulumoku, for example, was the son of the previous Maui 
mō‘ī Kamehamehanui, and met his death fighting for the rebels. Other 
Maui ali‘i who supported the rebellion managed to escape to Kaua‘i. 
They included Ka‘iana and his two younger half-brothers Nahiolea and 
Namakeha. Their reasons for changing sides are not mentioned. Possibly 
they had been excluded from the upper echelons of power or fared poorly 
in Kahekili’s redistribution of O‘ahu lands. Kāneoneo had come from 
Kaua‘i to join the rebels just prior to the uprising. Denied rule over 
Kaua‘i, he was possibly seeking to re-establish his family’s name on O‘ahu 
after his father’s overthrow there a few years earlier. He was killed during 
the fighting at Maunakapu on the descent to Moanalua on O‘ahu.29
It took time to stamp out the remaining embers of resistance on O‘ahu, 
although the core of resistance was now broken. Kahekili remained on 
O‘ahu overseeing the subjugation, while his son, Kalanikūpule, returned 
to restore order on Maui where there had been an uprising against abuses 
28  Fornander (1969), pp. 225–27; Kamakau (1961), pp. 135–40; and Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), 
p. 478.
29  Thrum, vol. 6 (1919–20), pp. 288, 290–91, 298; Kamakau (1961), p. 140; and David G. Miller 
‘Ka‘iana, the Once Famous “Prince of Kaua‘i”’, Hawaiian Journal of History, vol. 22, 1988, 1–9.
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by the ali‘i Kukeawe. The death of Kukeawe ended the fighting before 
Kalanikūpule arrived and his sympathetic pronouncement on the just 
nature of the grievances against Kukeawe was enough to restore order.30
There is no record of fighting on Hawai‘i in 1783 and 1784. While 
Kahekili expanded his domains, Kamehameha worked to consolidate his 
power. He married Ka‘ahumanu, the daughter of Ke‘eaumoku, one of 
his main supporters. She soon became his favourite wife and a valued 
political adviser. Kamehameha also put some effort into building up his 
logistical base, spending much time developing the agricultural capacity 
of the leeward districts. His fortunes suffered a setback in 1784 when 
Kekūhaupi‘o was fatally wounded during a training exercise with spears.31
In 1785, Kamehameha moved against his enemies. He invaded Hilo 
and was met by the combined forces of Keawemauhili and Keōua. After 
a long, indecisive campaign he withdrew to Kohala.32 The next year 
Kamehameha sent his younger brother Kalanimalokuloku-i-Kapo‘okalani 
to retake eastern Maui. This was soon achieved, although all the gains 
were soon lost when Kalanikūpule dispatched a force from Wailuku under 
Kahekili’s brother Komohomoho to meet this threat. In a fierce battle 
near Lelekea Gulch in Kipahulu, the Hawaiian forces were driven back 
to Ma‘ulili, where Komohomoho again emerged victorious. The defeated 
forces fled back to their island in disarray.33
Kahekili dominated the Hawaiian political scene at the end of 1786. He 
ruled over Maui, Lāna‘i, Kaho‘olawe, Moloka‘i, and O‘ahu and he was 
on good terms with his half-brother Ka‘eokulani, the mō‘ī of Kaua‘i. 
His warriors seemed invincible in battle. The remnants of the O‘ahu and 
Kaua‘i ali‘i, who might oppose them, posed little threat from their refuge 
in Kaua‘i Kona. Hawai‘i remained divided between three mō‘ī, none of 
whom was able to conquer the others. Kamehameha was the only one of 
the three who had been able to launch offensive campaigns.
Kahekili’s ascendancy was built on shaky foundations. Internal coherence 
mattered as much as territorial size. While Kamehameha worked to 
consolidate his existing power, Kahekili was pushing his to the limit. The 
rapidity of the conquest of east Maui, Moloka‘i and O‘ahu stretched his 
30  Fornander (1969), pp. 227–28; and Kamakau (1961), pp. 142–43.
31  Kamakau (1961), pp. 126–27; Fornander (1969), p. 319; and Kame‘eleihiwa (1987), pp. 107–08.
32  Fornander (1969), pp. 319–20; and Kamakau (1961), p. 126.
33  Fornander (1969), pp. 228–29; and Kamakau (1961), pp. 143–44.
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Maui contingents thinly and meant local loyalty could not yet be assured. 
O‘ahu forces were serving in his army by 1791 but only at the price of 
wiping out much of the island’s fighting core between 1783 and 1786. 
The  remainder of the population lived with the memory of Kahekili’s 
brutal repression. Prior to the fall of Ka‘uiki Head in 1782, much of Hana 
and Kipahulu had been outside of Kahekili’s sphere since at least the mid-
1770s. He had to be informed of Ka‘uiki’s vulnerable water source by locals. 
His long siege of Ka‘uiki exhausted local resources while, prior to 1782 and 
during their invasion in 1786, Hawai‘i ali‘i treated the local population 
and their livelihood with respect. Kalanikūpule was given charge of Maui 
after 1783 so that Kahekili could turn his attention to O‘ahu. Much of 
his effort was spent building up the devastated Kona district. The trader 
George Dixon found that the plain behind Waikiki was crowded with 
new plantations when he visited O‘ahu in September 1787.34 Kahekili’s 
relocation to O‘ahu is perhaps explained by the concentrated wealth of 
the Kona–Ko‘olaupoko area, but the need to be on hand to consolidate 
his new lands must also have figured in his considerations.
From late 1787, the Hawaiian Islands played host to increasing numbers 
of European trade vessels seeking provisions for their operations in the 
north-west Pacific fur trade. Among the items traded were metal cutting 
weapons, other metal that could be moulded into weapons, and small 
amounts of firearms and ammunition. Although visiting vessels tended 
to favour Kealakekua Bay, Waikiki, and Waimea on Kaua‘i as ports of 
call, no mō‘ī appears to have gained a decisive advantage in European 
weaponry over his rivals in the early years of this trade.35
There appears to have been a relative lull in hostilities between moku in 
the late 1780s. The only significant fighting was a 1788 rebellion against 
Ka‘eokulani on Kaua‘i. The rebels were based in Waimea, although there 
are no indications that access to trade influenced their move against 
the Kaua‘i mō‘ī. The rebellion failed.36 Nahiolea’s involvement in the 
rebellion prevented his brother Ka‘iana returning to Kaua‘i in December 
1788 after a trip to China on board a European trading vessel. Ka‘iana 
sought refuge with Kamehameha when the vessel touched at Kealakekua 
Bay. Kamehameha realised the value of the small cache of weapons and 
34  Dixon (1968), p. 266.
35  Fornander (1969), pp. 229–30; Kamakau (1961), p. 144; Pogue (1978), p. 77; and Kahananui 
(1984), p. 176. 
36  Fornander (1969), p. 321; and John Meares, Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from 
China to the North-West Coast of America (New York: Da Capo Press, 1968), p. 335.
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knowledge of firearms that Ka‘iana had acquired on the trip, and accepted 
him into his moku. Kamakau claims that Kamehameha soon gave Ka‘iana 
command of a force to attack Keōua in Ka‘ū. This appointment angered 
his other ali‘i, who felt that they were being passed over. There are, 
however, doubts about this incident. Fornander does not mention the 
campaign, and Kamakau’s description of Ka‘iana’s victory over Keōua 
reads suspiciously like a campaign between the two that occurred in 1791, 
for which there is agreement between sources. In Kamakau’s narrative, 
this campaign is placed after events in 1790.37 This lull in hostilities may 
be explained by two observations made by Captain James Colnett at 
Kailua in 1791. He noted a resurgence of volcanic activity in leeward areas 
of Hawai‘i between 1788 and 1791, and the appearance of a previously 
unknown sickness among the population. This was almost certainly the 
result of renewed European contact after 1786.38
The virtues of moderation: Kamehameha I’s 
road to military victory, 1790–96
The relative peace between moku ended in 1790. In March of that year 
Kamehameha received a windfall of European military equipment when 
Kame‘eiamoku seized a small trading vessel in North Kona. Kame‘eiamoku 
attacked the schooner Fair American to avenge the beating and abuse he 
had suffered at the hands of a previous visiting ship’s captain. Only one 
of the six crew members survived the attack. The sole survivor was an 
Englishman named Isaac Davis, who was only spared on the personal 
intercession of another ali‘i. When Kamehameha learnt of the attack, he 
marched to Kame‘eiamoku’s lands with a sizeable force and took Davis, 
the schooner and the small cannon and firearms on board.39 Meanwhile 
another vessel, the Eleanora, arrived at the Kona coast and anchored 
at Kealakekua Bay. To prevent news of the attack of the Fair American 
reaching the Eleanora, Kamehameha put a kapu on the bay. When 
the ship’s boatswain, John Young, came ashore he was detained until 
37  Vancouver (1801), bk 1, p. 403; Kamakau (1961), pp. 153–54; and Ellis (1969), pp. 209–10. 
38  Sahlins (1989), p. 379, citing James Colnett, Colnett’s Journal Aboard the Argonaut (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 220.
39  Fornander (1969), pp. 231–34; Kamakau (1961), pp. 146–47; and Vancouver (1801), bk 3, 
pp. 227, 230; bk 5, p. 59.
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the Eleanora’s captain tired of waiting for him to return and sailed away.40 
Kamehameha’s caution was more justified than he realised. The captain 
of the Fair American was the son of the Eleanora’s captain, and the latter 
had just come from Olowalu in Maui where he had massacred hundreds 
of locals by opening fire on their canoes with his cannon for a perceived 
grievance.41
In a few days Kamehameha had gained a cannon, firearms and two 
Europeans to assist in their use. Whether this good fortune changed the 
actual balance of power is debatable. Kamehameha had already obtained 
a  small swivel cannon and muskets by 1790 without enhancing his 
military position. The swivel had been mounted on a double canoe, but 
there is no record of it being used prior to 1790. The Fair American’s small 
crew cannot have carried many firearms. The captured vessel, its cannon 
and two Europeans to operate it were, however, potentially valuable assets 
for Kamehameha.
Despite the poor showing of Hawaiian armies against the forces of 
Maui in  the previous decade, Kamehameha now decided to attack 
Maui. Memories of the damage inflicted by trained gun crews in the 
wake of Cook’s death, and tales of the recent carnage at Olowalu against 
exposed canoes, possibly raised expectations of the effect that cannon 
would have in local warfare. A recent reconciliation with Keawemauhili 
also influenced Kamehameha’s decision. Keawemauhili sent canoes for 
the expedition against Maui as a sign of his good faith. Keōua remained 
defiant, but now Keawemauhili could watch him while Kamehameha 
pursued his ambitions elsewhere.42
Kamehameha crossed over to Hana with a force of 8,000 men in a fleet 
of 2,000 canoes. The landing seems to have been uncontested. Fornander 
mentions some preliminary raids prior to the main invasion,43 but the first 
mention of fighting on which all sources agree was a battle in Hāmākualoa, 
where Kamehameha encountered a force sent from west Maui by 
Kalanikūpule under the command of Kapakāhili. An initial engagement 
40  Fornander (1969), pp. 233–34; Kamakau (1961), p. 146; Daws (1968a), p. 34; Henry B. 
Restarick, ‘John Young of Hawaii, an American’, 21st Annual Report of the Hawaiian Historical Society 
for the Year 1912 (Honolulu: 1913), p. 29; and C. H. Barnard, A Narrative of the Sufferings and 
Adventures of Captain Charles H. Barnard in a Voyage Round the World During the Years 1813, 1814, 
1815 and 1816 (New York: J. Lindon, 1829), pp. 224–29.
41  Kamakau (1961), pp. 143–46; Pogue (1978), pp. 83–84; and Daws (1968a), p. 34.
42  Fornander (1969), p. 235; Kamakau (1961), p. 147; and Westervelt (1922), pp. 28–29.
43  Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), p. 470 n. 18.
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between the two vanguards at Pu‘ukoa‘e near Hanawana ended in favour 
of the forces from Hawai‘i. The main forces met in the same area a few 
days later. Despite promising omens, Kamehameha’s men fared badly 
and looked like being defeated. They were saved by reinforcements, who 
helped turn the day and rout the enemy. Kamehameha led from the front 
throughout. The Maui forces were pursued vigorously to prevent them 
from rallying and, when the exhausted fugitives turned and attempted 
to make a stand near Kokomo, the issue was decided by single combat 
between Kamehameha and the Maui commander. Kamehameha slew his 
rival and the enemy’s resistance crumbled. The road to Wailuku lay open.44
Kamehameha regrouped his forces before moving against west Maui. 
Kalanikūpule prepared to meet him at Wailuku with the fugitives from 
Kapakāhili’s forces and whatever other combatants he could assemble. 
With the canoe fleet accompanying it, Kamehameha’s army advanced to 
the eastern end of Kahului Bay (see Figure 10). From there they moved 
overland to Wailuku on the banks of the ‘Īao stream. Accounts of the 
battle are vague. It seems that the Maui forces offered prolonged resistance 
over a number of days, and were only gradually driven back towards the 
‘Īao stream. The local topography suggests that a small ridge between the 
stream and Kahului Bay may have served as a focal point for the defenders 
to make a stand, with sand hills and marshes around the bay impeding the 
attacker’s advance. Eventually the Maui forces retired or were driven into 
the upper ‘Īao Valley. Here the valley narrowed between steep mountains, 
allowing the defenders to make a stand on a narrow front that could 
not be outflanked. They were broken when Lopaka, the Fair American’s 
cannon, was brought up and fired at them with great skill by Davis and 
Young. Its effect on the Maui forces as they stood, packed between the 
steep valley walls, was devastating. The ‘Īao became choked with bodies. 
Resistance crumbled. Many more were killed as they tried to flee up the 
cliff faces lining the valley.45
Traditions remember the battle as ka‘uwa‘u pali (clawed off the cliff) 
and ka pani wai (the damming of the waters). Casualties are unknown 
although it has been noted that the upper ‘Īao could be dammed by as 
few as 100 bodies. Significantly, no Maui ali‘i of any consequence was 
killed or captured. Kalanikūpule and his main ali‘i and advisers were able 
44  Kamakau (1961), pp. 147–48; and Fornander (1969), p. 236.




to flee over the mountains and sail to O‘ahu. The lack of noteworthy 
ali‘i casualties may mean that, after the reverses of Hāmākualoa, much 
of Kalanikūpule’s force consisted of hastily assembled maka‘āinana levies 
from west Maui. Kahekili’s expansion into Moloka‘i and O‘ahu may 
have forced a watering down of the ali‘i fighting core on Maui even 
before Kamehameha’s invasion. It may also mean that Lopaka was only 
directed against a blocking force made up predominantly of maka‘āinana 
or lesser ali‘i.
Figure 10: The battle of ‘Īao, 1790
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
The battle gave Kamehameha control of Maui, which he divided among 
his followers before going on to secure Moloka‘i, apparently without 
opposition. On Moloka‘i he sought to enhance his family’s future status 
by seeking the hand of the ni‘aupi‘o ali‘i Keōpūolani. This was also an 
attempt to bring about reconciliation with Kīwala‘ō’s family, the older 
branch of the powerful Keawe dynasty. Keōpūolani was the daughter 
of Kīwala‘ō and also had connections with the Maui ruling dynasty. 
The overture was accepted. Kamehameha sent word to Kahekili that he 
intended to attack O‘ahu and challenged him to set a place of battle. 
But he showed that his mind was also concerned with securing control 
of Hawai‘i when he sought advice from the respected Kaua‘i soothsayer 
Kapoukahi on how best to achieve this goal. Kapoukahi advised him that, 
once he had built a large heiau to his god at Pu‘ukoholā near Kawaihae, 
he would gain control of the whole island without further loss of life.46
46  Fornander (1969), pp. 238–40; I‘ī (1959), p. 70; Kamakau (1961), pp. 149–51, 208; and 
Kame‘eleihiwa (1986), pp. 60–61.
165
5 . THE PURSUIT oF PoWER IN HAWAI‘I FRoM 1780 To 1796
Kamehameha was forced to return to Hawai‘i when news arrived that 
Keōua had attacked Hilo and defeated Keawemauhili in battle near 
Alae. Keawemauhili had been killed in the battle and resistance in Hilo 
had collapsed. Keōua had moved on to Hāmākua and ravaged Waipi‘o. 
As the news reached Kamehameha, Keōua was already moving against the 
Waimea Saddle. There was no time to lose. Kamehameha hastened back 
to Kawaihae and set out for Waimea at the head of an army accompanied 
by Lopaka. Keōua withdrew to Pa‘auhau and prepared to give battle. 
Kamehameha’s forces approached and battle was joined. Lopaka did not 
intimidate Keōua’s forces. Neither side would give ground. The stalemate 
was broken when two of Keōua’s warriors, Ka‘ia‘iaiea and Uhai, led 
a charge against Lopaka while it was being reloaded and captured it. The 
battle continued without either side being able to gain an advantage. 
Fighting ended when fire from Kamehameha’s foreign musketeers 
persuaded Keōua to withdraw from the field. No clear victor had emerged 
despite heavy casualties on both sides.47
Battle was renewed again the next day a short distance away at Koapapa. 
The battlefield consisted of a broad, open plain with a small grove at 
its southern end. Hawaiian accounts of the battle make no mention of 
Lopaka, however, muskets were prominent. As at Pa‘auhau, neither side was 
prepared to give ground. Descriptions of the battle imply Kamehameha’s 
musketeers skirmished between the two armies and did enough damage 
to cause Keōua’s side discomfort. Lacking firearms, Keōua’s men rushed 
forward and seized enemy muskets. When the gunpowder they had been 
able to seize began to run out, Keōua’s forces retired from the field. Neither 
side had gained a decisive advantage. Kamehameha retired to Kohala 
and Keōua continued his withdrawal towards Hilo.48 While Lopaka and 
muskets were a focal point of the battle narratives, they do not seem to 
have been numerous enough or deadly enough to supplant the influence 
of personal bravery on the final outcome.
After dividing up Hilo among his followers, Keōua set out for Ka‘ū with 
the rest of his forces. Kilauea crater erupted while they were in the vicinity. 
Clouds of poisonous gases from the volcano enveloped the middle section 
of Keōua’s army and the division was wiped out, with sources putting 
the loss of life anywhere between 80 and 2,000 people.49 Perhaps seeking 
47  Fornander (1969), pp. 240–41, 323–24; Kamakau (1961), p. 151; and Dibble (1909), p. 50. 
48  Kamakau (1961), p. 152; and Fornander (1969), p. 324.
49  Fornander (1969), p. 324; Kamakau (1961), p. 152; and Stokes (1937), p. 38.
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to capitalise upon Keōua’s misfortune, Kamehameha launched a two-
pronged attack upon his lands sometime in the later part of 1790 or early 
1791. Although sorely pressed, Keōua held out. Ke‘eaumoku attacked 
his lands in Hilo while Ka‘iana led a force against Ka‘ū. Little is known 
about the operations in Hilo, but traditions pertaining to the Ka‘ū theatre 
suggest that, despite Ka‘iana’s advantage in firearms, the honours were once 
again even. A number of battles were fought. In some battles, Ka‘iana was 
forced to fall back to his fleet while, in others, he was victorious. Kamakau 
claims that the outcome of the battles was influenced by the generalship 
of Keōua and his two commanders, Ka‘iana’s personal bravery, and the 
latter’s use of firearms. Some years later, Archibald Menzies was shown 
a battle site where Keōua’s men had countered Ka‘iana’s advantage in 
firearms by digging small holes to squat into when they saw the flash of the 
musket’s ignition powder. The campaign ended with Ka‘iana withdrawing 
from Keōua’s territory.50
Ka‘iana’s withdrawal from Ka‘ū was possibly a response to events in the 
leeward islands. During the makahiki season of 1790–91, Kahekili and 
Ka‘eokulani concluded an alliance against Kamehameha. The potency 
of Kamehameha’s mana after his victories on Maui could not remain 
unchallenged without eroding their own mana. Ka‘eokulani joined 
Kahekili on O‘ahu soon after the makahiki season ended in 1791. Their 
combined forces then sailed for Maui. Kalanikūpule was left as Kahekili’s 
regent on O‘ahu, while Enemo ruled Kaua‘i on Ka‘eokulani’s behalf. Faced 
with this powerful new coalition and continued defiance from Keōua, 
Kamehameha abandoned Maui and Moloka‘i without a fight in favour of 
defending his Hawai‘i heartland. Kahekili valued Ka‘eokulani’s assistance 
enough to offer him the sovereignty of Maui in return for his support. 
When Ka‘eokulani began to divide up Maui between his followers, 
however, Kahekili’s sons and other Maui ali‘i were enraged. The Kaua‘i 
and Maui ali‘i came to blows near Waiehu. The rift was somehow patched 
up and the two forces proceeded on towards east Maui, but they now 
sailed separately. Kahekili was paying the price for overextending himself 
across a multi-island polity.51
The coalition now moved against Kamehameha on Hawai‘i. Ka‘eokulani’s 
forces sailed from Hana to Waipi‘o in Hāmākua and proceeded to 
ravage the valley. Meanwhile Kahekili sailed from Mokulai and landed 
50  Menzies (1920), p. 110; Fornander (1969), pp. 245, 326–27; and Kamakau (1961), pp. 153–54.
51  Fornander (1969), p. 242; and Kamakau (1961), pp. 159–60.
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at Halawa in Kohala where he fought a series of inconclusive skirmishes 
with Kamehameha’s forces. He then moved onto Waipi‘o and joined 
Ka‘eokulani.52 Kamehameha was in Kona when these attacks were 
launched. He soon mobilised a large fleet and moved against his enemies. 
The two fleets encountered each other off the windward Kohala coast near 
the Waimanu valley. Kamehameha’s fleet now included the Fair American 
and a number of double canoes on which cannon were mounted. Davis 
and Young accompanied the fleet and probably assisted with the firing 
of the cannon. Ka‘eokulani’s force also included cannon and a foreign 
sharpshooter known as Mare Amara (Murray the Armourer?). Little is 
known about the battle except that no significant ali‘i lost their lives. 
The  fact that the battle became known as Kepuwaha‘ula‘ula (the battle 
of the red-mouthed gun) suggests that cannon played a prominent role. 
The battle ended with Kahekili and Ka‘eokulani disengaging their forces 
and retiring to Maui. Sheldon Dibble claims that they lost the greater 
part of their fleet in the action, but this is not in keeping with the lack of 
important ali‘i among the casualties. On the other hand, it was to be the 
last offensive action by Kahekili and Ka‘eokulani against Kamehameha. It 
is unclear if the previous rift between the Maui and Kaua‘i forces affected 
the outcome of the fighting and the subsequent defensive outlook of the 
Maui–Kaua‘i coalition.53
Kamehameha also achieved final victory over Keōua around this time, 
although sources are divided on whether this occurred just before or just 
after the victory over Kahekili and Ka‘eokulani. The heiau at Pu‘ukoholā 
was completed and Keōua was invited to attend. Keōua accepted the offer 
and arrived at the heiau with only a small escort. He was promptly killed 
and sacrificed to the Kū‘kā‘ili-moku. Thus, the prophecy of Kapoukahi 
was fulfilled. While Gavan Daws and Greg Dening hint at treachery 
on the part of Kamehameha, Kamakau and Fornander suggest that 
Keōua realised the fate that awaited him. Before sailing into Kawaihae 
Bay, he prepared his body for sacrifice and chose a small body of men 
to accompany him to the heiau as his moe-pu (companions in death).54 
The preceding events seemed to suggest that the gods were abandoning 
52  Kamakau (1961), pp. 160–61.
53  Fornander (1969), pp. 243–44; Kamakau (1961), pp. 161–62; Dibble (1909), p. 51; Thrum 
vol. 5 (1918–19), p. 474; and Hiram Bingham, A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich 
Islands (2nd edn) (Hartford: Hezekiah Huntington, 1849), p. 40. 
54  Fornander (1969), pp. 327–35; Kamakau (1961), pp. 155–58; Dibble (1909), p. 53; Daws 
(1968a), p. 36; Valeri (1985a), p. 162; and Dening (1988), p. 89. 
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Keōua in favour of Kamehameha. Keōua had been forced to constantly 
defend his own lands in the recent campaign against Ka‘iana. At one stage 
of the campaign he had to abandon Ka‘ū for Puna. The Kilauea disaster 
must also have affected his morale, especially in light of the fact that 
Kamehameha had already begun construction of the Pu‘ukoholā heiau 
as the prophecy of Kapoukahi demanded. These recent misfortunes and 
Kamehameha’s victory off Waimanu seem to have convinced Keōua that 
resistance was hopeless.
The fate of Keōua’s followers is unclear. Keōua left his fleet under 
the command of his half-brother, Pauli Ka‘oleioku, before sailing 
into Kawaihae Bay. Kamehameha was rumoured to be the father of 
Ka‘oleioku.55 The traditions are silent on whether Ka‘oleioku’s genealogy 
tempered Kamehameha’s treatment of Keōua’s people and it is unclear 
whether Keōua’s followers peacefully submitted to Kamehameha’s rule 
after the death of Keōua. Given the longstanding animosity between 
windward and leeward ali‘i on the island, it seems reasonable to assume 
that Kamehameha needed time to consolidate his rule over his new 
subjects in Hilo, Puna and Ka‘ū. Certainly, Kamehameha did not wage 
campaigns against other islands in the chain over the next few years.
An uneasy stand-off now developed between Kamehameha and his leeward 
island rivals, with neither side willing to attack. George Vancouver found 
both sides professed a desire for peace, but neither could overcome deep 
suspicion of the other and agree to Vancouver’s offer to mediate between 
them.56 Vancouver noted that firearms were in great demand. Although 
Vancouver refused to supply weapons, some of the increasing number of 
trading vessels calling at the islands had no such qualms. No one knows 
for certain how many firearms came into the islands during these years. 
While one second-hand account claimed that Kamehameha’s forces 
possessed 5,000 muskets by 1795, confirmed sightings by visitors and 
accounts of battles in the mid-1790s suggest the figure of 600 muskets, 
which was given to Urey Lisiansky in 1804, is probably closer to the mark. 
Visiting ships’ captains never reported seeing more than 20 to 30 muskets 
in any one place during the 1790s.57
55  Fornander (1969), p. 335; and Kamakau (1961), p. 153.
56  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 261, 306, 313, 317, 319, 321, 357 (Feb.–Mar. 1793); and bk 5, 
p. 83 (Feb. 1794).
57  Contemporary accounts of muskets are listed in Appendix 2, and Vancouver (1801) bk 2, 
pp. 353, 355, 391; bk 3, p. 224; bk 5, p. 49.
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The influence of European technology should not be overemphasised. 
The  maintenance of internal coherence in moku continued to be the 
crucial  issue for the pursuit of power. After his triumph over Keōua, 
Kamehameha divided the districts of Hawai‘i between his trusted followers 
and he continued to rely on his original supporters, the Kona uncles. 
By February 1794, Ke‘eaumoku governed Kona, Kame‘eiamoku presided 
over Kohala, Keaweaheulu saw to Kamehameha’s interests in Ka‘ū, and 
Kamanawa ruled over Hilo. Kamehameha’s half-brother, Kalaimamahu, 
was given the relatively unimportant district of Hāmākua, and Ka‘iana 
was given charge of Puna. At the beginning of 1793, Vancouver was 
told the most powerful vassal ali‘i of Kamehameha was ‘Kahowmotoo’ 
(Ke‘eaumoku), followed by ‘Commanow’ (Kamanawa) and ‘Kavaheero’ 
(Keaweaheulu).58 It may be significant that Kamehameha’s most 
troublesome subordinate, Ka‘iana, was placed in Puna between two of the 
most powerful and loyal ali‘i. Their districts had also been the heartlands 
of Kamehameha’s last two rivals, Keōua and Keawemauhili.
Vancouver noted tensions between Kamehameha and Ka‘iana on a number 
of occasions, including one instance involving an affair between Ka‘iana 
and Ka‘ahumanu. Ka‘iana was linked to Kamehameha’s old windward 
rivals, the I and Keawe families of Hilo, through his parents’ blood lines. 
In February 1793, Vancouver was told a rift had developed between 
the leading ali‘i on Hawai‘i. The malcontents did not openly challenge 
Kamehameha, however, as he retained the support of the majority of 
ali‘i. Kamehameha had the support of Ke‘eaumoku, Kalaimamahu and 
Keaweaheulu, while Ka‘iana had the backing of his brother ‘Nomatahah’ 
(Namakeha) and ‘Tamaahmottoo’ (Kame‘eiamoku). Vancouver described 
Kame‘eiamoku as the proudest man on the island.59 When he had 
massacred the crew of the Fair American for an affront to his mana by the 
crew of a preceding vessel, Kamehameha had deemed it judicious to take 
a large force with him to recover the vessel for himself. It may not have 
been coincidental that Ka‘iana and Kame‘eiamoku were put in charge of 
districts at opposite ends of the island. The power of Kamehameha’s close 
collateral kin was also restrained. Kalaimamahu governed Hāmākua, the 
weakest district on the island. Another of Kamehameha’s half-brothers, 
58  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, p. 235, bk 5, pp. 26, 50–53; and Sahlins (1981), p. 62.
59  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 215–17 (Feb. 1793); bk 5, p. 10 (Jan. 1794) and pp. 40–46, 59; 
Thrum vol. 6 (1919–20), p. 288; and Miller (1988).
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Kalaiwahi had no significant territorial holdings. Kalanimalokuloku-i-
Kapo‘okalani fades from prominence in the traditions after his defeat on 
Maui in 1786.60
The alliance of Kahekili and Ka‘eokulani also had problems in the years 
following their repulse from Hawai‘i. The two mō‘ī kept their forces 
mobilised on Maui from 1791 through until at least 1793 to guard against 
invasion from Kamehameha. The task of feeding this large force caused 
severe hardship on Maui. By 1793 supplies were also being sent from 
Lāna‘i and Moloka‘i, and these islands were beginning to struggle under 
the strain. Vancouver also found it difficult to obtain supplies on O‘ahu 
in 1792 and 1793.61 No further conflict is noted between the Kaua‘i 
and Maui contingents, but future events suggest that tensions persisted. 
Ka‘eokulani’s aspirations on Maui may also have been an influence on the 
continued mobilisation of his forces there.
Ka‘eokulani’s prolonged absence from Kaua‘i weakened his influence there. 
In his absence, Enemo had become increasingly despotic and increasingly 
frail. His ageing frame was no longer able to support his body and he bore 
the signs of excessive ‘awa consumption. A rebellion soon took place in 
1793 when the rebels mobilised on a small hill near Enemo’s residence at 
Puna. Enemo was warned of the impending attack and moved decisively 
to pre-empt the rebel plans. He assembled his supporters and marched 
to the hill. While the seven Europeans in his service gave covering fire 
with muskets from the base of the hill, Enemo’s warriors attacked. Three 
rebel ali‘i fell, along with four of their men. The rest of the insurgents 
fled. A number of the surviving ringleaders and other suspects were taken 
prisoner. These included Ka‘eokulani’s half-sister, who was one of his 
favourite wives and had borne him a child. Enemo sent the captive rebels 
to Ka‘eokulani for judgment. One of the Europeans in Enemo’s service told 
Vancouver that the rebellion had been provoked by Enemo’s excesses, and 
that the people were still loyal to Ka‘eokulani and his son, Kaumuali‘i, on 
whose behalf Enemo governed.62
Enemo declared his independence from his mō‘ī a year later in 
February 1794. As they tried to land, the contingent sent by Kahekili to 
investigate was met by local warriors and Europeans armed with muskets. 
60  Vancouver (1801), bk 5, pp. 90–91; and Sahlins (1981), p. 62.
61  Fornander (1969), p. 244; Vancouver (1801), bk 2, pp. 352, 361–63; and bk 3, pp. 296, 301, 
342, 359–60.
62  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 367–70, 375–76; and Menzies (1920), p. 134.
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The  Europeans opened fire and drove off the approaching party with 
much slaughter. Kahekili reacted with uncharacteristic restraint and 
political skill. He persuaded Captain William Brown of the Butterworth 
to take him to Kaua‘i from O‘ahu and used his vessel as a neutral venue 
for talks with Enemo. The meeting on board ended with Enemo agreeing 
to revert to being merely regent in Ka‘eokulani’s absence and Kahekili 
would return back to O‘ahu. In his younger days Kahekili would not have 
been so forgiving.63
Kahekili was now over 60 years old and only had a few months to live. 
Like many other elderly ali‘i, he was increasingly debilitated by ‘awa.64 
Kahekili’s interaction with Enemo raises the question of Ka‘eokulani’s 
position and aspirations at this time. In March 1793, Vancouver was 
under the impression that Ka‘eokulani was subordinate to Kahekili rather 
than being an equal ally. An ali‘i named ‘Tamahanna’ (Namahana) seemed 
to be in command on Maui, and appeared second only to Kahekili in 
consequence. Kalanikūpule continued to rule O‘ahu on his father’s behalf. 
Subsequent events suggest that Ka‘eokulani kept his forces with him from 
1791 to 1794. He spent these years on Maui and Moloka‘i. His absence 
from Kaua‘i in the wake of its internal troubles suggests that he harboured 
ambitions elsewhere. By the middle of 1794, Ka‘eokulani was in effective 
control of Maui, Moloka‘i and Lāna‘i. His position was strengthened in 
February 1794 when the main powder magazine on Maui exploded and 
killed Namahana while he was inside it.65
Kahekili died at Waikiki in July 1794.66 Ka‘eokulani and Kalanikūpule 
were the obvious contenders to inherit his mantle. While Ka‘eokulani, 
who was about 50 years old, was beginning to show signs of ‘awa 
consumption, he retained his sharp mind.67 Kaua‘i may have been his in 
name only by this stage. The degree to which he was able to supplement 
the Kaua‘i followers accompanying him with Maui, Moloka‘i and Lāna‘i 
personnel by this time is unclear. Their loyalty may have been inclined 
towards Kalanikūpule, who was technically the successor to the Maui 
63  Fornander (1969), p. 260; and Vancouver (1801), bk 5, pp. 125–26.
64  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, p. 305; and Menzies (1920), p. 104.
65  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 304–05 (Mar. 1793); bk 5, p. 118 (Feb. 1794); Kamakau (1961), 
p. 168; and Fornander (1969), pp. 214, 244.
66  Fornander (1969), p. 260.




dynasty as Kahekili’s oldest son. Ka‘eokulani’s occupation of Maui denied 
Kalanikūpule access to its manpower and resources should the two come 
to blows.
Kalanikūpule’s position on O‘ahu was also uncertain. He possessed high 
genealogical status, but defeat at ‘Īao had eroded his mana. On O‘ahu, he 
represented a recently imposed alien dynasty with a bloody record against 
the local population. The core of his support continued to be transplanted 
Maui ali‘i and their retinue. He had the advantage, however, of benefiting 
from trade with the vessels that began to frequent Pu‘uloa in the 1790s, 
although this contact had probably also brought disease. In  1793 
Kalanikūpule suffered a puzzling illness that had left him emaciated and 
temporarily unable to use his legs.68
In November 1794, Ka‘eokulani sailed from Maui with his ali‘i and 
warriors, ostensibly to make a long overdue visit to Kaua‘i. An attack 
on Maui by Kamehameha was apparently no longer his most pressing 
concern. Subsequent events suggest that a number of Ka‘eokulani’s 
men increasingly resented their long absence from Kaua‘i. Ka‘eokulani 
must also have realised the value of securing the resources of Kaua‘i for 
future power struggles. On learning of the approach of his uncle’s fleet, 
Kalanikūpule took the precaution of fortifying the Ko‘olaupoko coast 
with trenches and earthworks. The fact that he knew which coastline 
the fleet would sail down suggests he had been forewarned of the route, 
and perhaps of Ka‘eokulani’s true intentions. An attempted landing 
soon followed Ka‘eokulani’s arrival off Kukui in Ko‘olaupoko. This was 
repulsed in a severe battle during which a prominent ali‘i was shot and 
killed by Ka‘eokulani’s gunner, Mare Amara. The fleet remained just 
offshore for the next two days and nights, exchanging shots with those on 
shore. Kalanikūpule then made overtures to his uncle to end the fighting. 
The two met at Kalapewai in Kailua and parted a few days later with the 
goodwill between them restored.69
Ka‘eokulani continued his journey up the windward coast of O‘ahu to 
Waimea. Here he discovered a plot to throw him overboard during the 
crossing to Kaua‘i. The conspiracy was serious enough to involve his close 
adviser Kai‘awa and a number of other ali‘i. Uncertain of his support, 
Ka‘eokulani chose not to confront the ringleaders and instead sought to 
68  Vancouver (1981), bk 3, pp. 357–58 (Mar. 1793); and Daws (1968a), pp. 37–38.
69  Fornander (1969), pp. 262–63; and Kamakau (1961), p. 168.
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divert the conspiracy by proposing war against Kalanikūpule. His gamble 
worked. To stiffen the resolve of the combatants, the canoes were hauled 
on shore and dismantled: there would be no turning back. As they 
marched overland towards ‘Ewa, their ranks were swelled by warriors 
from Waialua and Wai‘anae.70 These districts had never taken kindly to 
the imposition of rule from Kona–Ko‘olaupoko, regardless of whether the 
instigators were from Maui or O‘ahu.
Kalanikūpule advanced from Kona to meet the threat at ‘Ewa. 
He  concluded an agreement with vessels reprovisioning at Pu‘uloa for 
them to provide him with a contingent of musket-armed sailors in return 
for 400 hogs.71 The two sides first encountered each other at Punahawele 
in ‘Ewa. Details are sketchy. It appears that the two sides contented 
themselves with skirmishing, until Kalanikūpule’s forces retreated after 
Mare Amara picked off some of the sailors accompanying them. Kamakau 
states that some Hawaiians were killed also. Fighting continued over the 
next few days as Ka‘eokulani’s forces gradually advanced through ‘Ewa. 
Kalanikūpule only committed part of his forces to these encounters and 
gathered the rest at Aiea near the boundary of ‘Ewa and Kona.72
Kalanikūpule occupied a strong position at Aiea (see Figure 11). His 
battlefront was probably little more than 2 kilometres long. Its left 
flank rested on the shores of Pu‘uloa and its right flank merged into the 
steep foothills of the Ko‘olau Mountains. The Kalauao Stream ran in 
front of his battleline. Kalanikūpule commanded the centre of his line. 
His brother, Koalaukani, led the right wing that occupied the heights 
of Kuamo‘o, Kalauao and Aiea. The left flank rested firmly against the 
harbour at Malei Beach and was commanded by Kalanikūpule’s uncle, 
Komohomoho. The contracted sailors were to provide flanking fire from 
long boats just offshore. The narrow coastal plain beyond the Kalauao 
Stream was covered in irrigated taro fields that would impede movement. 
Further inland the Kalauao’s steep-sided ravine ruled out any chance of 
being outflanked.
The battle took place on 12 December. With his canoes dismantled 
and a quick victory as the only way to avoid open dissent, Ka‘eokulani 
had no option but to assault Kalanikūpule’s strong defensive position. 
70  Fornander (1969), pp. 263–64; and Kamakau (1961), p. 168.
71  Kamakau (1969), pp. 168–69.
72  Fornander (1969), p. 264; and Kamakau (1969), p. 169.
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A fierce and bloody struggle raged for most of the day, despite the hail 
of musket and cannon shot fired into Ka‘eokulani’s flank from the 
harbour. The decisive blow came late in the day. Koalaukani led his men 
in a determined charge down from the heights and drove into the flank 
of Ka‘eokulani’s forces. The flank buckled and Ka‘eokulani’s forces were 
in danger of being hemmed against the shoreline. They panicked and 
fled, despite their leader’s attempts to rally them. Ka‘eokulani was forced 
to flee as his army disintegrated. As he hid from his pursuers in a small 
ravine near the shoreline of Pu‘uloa, his bright battle cloak betrayed him 
to the sailors offshore. While they pinned him down with musket fire, 
Kalanikūpule’s men closed in on him. He died, fighting bravely, together 
with his wives and the ali‘i and warriors still with him.73 The fate of the 
survivors from Ka‘eokulani’s forces is unknown. There is no reference to 
punitive measures being taken against Wai‘anae and Waialua. Nor is it 
certain if the survivors were able to escape to Kaua‘i or elude capture 
on O‘ahu.
Figure 11: The battle of ‘Aiea, 1794
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
73  Fornander (1969), pp. 264–65; and Kamakau (1961), p. 169.
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Kalanikūpule’s success at Aiea seems to have encouraged him to 
contemplate extending his rule beyond O‘ahu. On 1 January 1795, he 
suddenly turned on his European allies and seized their vessels, the Prince 
Lee Boo and the Jackal, as they lay anchored in Pu‘uloa. Only a few of the 
crew were spared to help sail the vessels, and probably also to assist in 
manning the ship’s cannon. The seizure of the two vessels also provided a 
supply of muskets and ammunition. Instead of satisfying themselves with 
filling the vacuum created by Ka‘eokulani’s defeat, Kalanikūpule and his 
advisers decided to move directly against Kamehameha. Three weeks later 
their forces set sail for Hawai‘i in their newly acquired vessels and a fleet of 
canoes. Just off O‘ahu, the surviving crew managed to seize some firearms 
and drive their captors overboard. Kalanikūpule was among the passengers 
expelled. The O‘ahu mō‘ī had now lost his European vessels and most of 
his firearms and ammunition. Contrary to the advice of Komohomoho, 
Kalanikūpule had stored all his guns and ammunition on board the two 
ships instead of distributing them among his followers. The invasion was 
aborted and the surviving crew of the two ships proceeded to Hawai‘i and 
informed Young and Davis of Kalanikūpule’s loss. They may even have 
traded or given their former captor’s arms to Kamehameha.74
Kalanikūpule was now particularly vulnerable. Although he may have 
been able to concentrate his remaining supporters from Maui, Moloka‘i 
and Lāna‘i on O‘ahu before Kamehameha attacked, he had not had 
time to consolidate his hold over the multi-island moku since defeating 
Ka‘eokulani. His control beyond O‘ahu was tenuous and, even on that 
island, the shaky loyalty of many ali‘i had been demonstrated by their 
recent support of Ka‘eokulani. On Kaua‘i, Kaumuali‘i had succeeded 
his father and could hardly be relied on for support.75 To make matters 
worse, Kalanikūpule was now at a serious disadvantage to Kamehameha 
in European military technology.
Kamehameha wasted little time in organising an attack on Kalanikūpule. 
Messengers were dispatched all over Hawai‘i to mobilise men and canoes. 
Kamehameha set sail for Maui at the head of a large force. The fleet now 
also included a small schooner with 12 cannon that Vancouver had helped 
Kamehameha to construct. There is no mention of any resistance on Maui. 
The traditions imply Kamehameha merely stopped briefly at Lahaina and 
74  Kamakau (1961), p. 170; Fornander (1969), pp. 267–68; Dibble (1909), pp. 55–56; and Daws 
(1968a), p. 240.
75  Kamakau (1961), p. 169.
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moved on to the Kona coast of Moloka‘i.76 The sheer size of his fleet 
may have been enough to intimidate these islands into submission, or to 
persuade those opposed to Kamehameha to flee to O‘ahu.
At Moloka‘i, Ka‘iana resolved to join Kalanikūpule. There had been 
tension between Ka‘iana and Kamehameha for some time, and most of 
Kamehameha’s main ali‘i were now antagonistic towards him. He began 
to suspect the worst when he was excluded from the war councils on 
Moloka‘i. As the fleet crossed over from Moloka‘i to O‘ahu, Ka‘iana and 
his supporters separated from the main fleet and headed for Ko‘olaupoko 
instead of the intended landing place at Waikiki in Kona. Ka‘iana’s 
breakaway does not seem to have been contested. From Ko‘olaupoko, 
Ka‘iana proceeded over the Ko‘olau Mountains to join Kalanikūpule in 
the Nu‘uanu Valley.77
The main fleet landed at Waikiki. Kamehameha’s force numbered 
around 10,000 men. Although some sources claim that 5,000 of these 
had firearms,  the figure was probably closer to the 600 firearms of 
Kamehameha’s army in 1802. The army also possessed 12 cannon that 
were commanded by Europeans. Even allowing for Ka‘iana’s defection and 
forces left on Hawai‘i, Maui, Lāna‘i and Moloka‘i, Kamehameha’s army 
almost certainly outnumbered its opponents, and definitely outgunned 
them.78 Kalanikūpule did not contest their landing on the open coastal 
plain, and made his stand in the Nu‘uanu Valley (see Figure  12). 
Kalanikūpule had chosen his ground well. A gradual slope led up to his 
battlefront, giving him the advantage of the high ground. The steep valley 
walls meant that, as at Aiea, his battlefront was relatively narrow and 
hard to outflank. After spending a few days at Waikiki, Kamehameha 
moved against Kalanikūpule’s position. One source claims the battle was 
preceded by a brief delaying action, but most simply refer to the main 
battle in the valley. The defenders resisted with great determination but, 
according to Fornander, were gradually worn down as:
the superiority of Kamehameha’s artillery, the number of his guns, and 
the better practice of his soldiers, soon turned the day in his favor, and the 
defeat of the O‘ahu forces became an accelerated rout and a promiscuous 
slaughter.79
76  Fornander (1969), pp. 343–44; Kamakau (1961), pp. 170–71; and Bishop, in Roe (1967), 
pp. 141–42.
77  Fornander (1969), p. 347; and Kamakau (1961), p. 172.
78  Boit (n.d.), p. 5; and Bishop, in Roe (1967), p. 141.
79  Fornander (1969), pp. 347–48.
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The broken forces of Kalanikūpule were pushed into the increasingly 
narrow confines of the heavily forested upper Nu‘uanu Valley, where they 
were hemmed in by its steep slopes. The valley ended at the Nu‘uanu 
Pali, a 304-metre cliff on the windward face of the Ko‘olau Mountains. 
A narrow trail leading down the slope beside it linked Kona with 
Ko‘olaupoko. According to some accounts the retreating forces attempted 
to make a stand at La‘imi behind a stone wall on top of a steep slope. 
Cannon were dragged up the valley and used to dislodge them. In one 
account, this stand ended when Kalanikūpule was wounded, and splinters 
resulting from a cannonball hitting the wall killed Ka‘iana. Young later 
told Lisiansky that Ka‘iana was killed by a spear, and Fornander claims 
Ka‘iana and his brother Nahiolea were killed early in the battle. The 
stone wall referred to was possibly at the original battleline further down 
the valley.80
Most of Kalanikūpule’s forces seem to have escaped up the valley’s slopes 
and along the ridges of the Ko‘olau Mountains, or down the trail into 
windward O‘ahu. Given the length of the valley and the tree cover of its 
upper reaches, it is possible that the pursuers did not reach the Pali by 
nightfall. Some defenders were trapped against the Pali and condemned 
to a grisly death on the rocks at the foot of its steep cliffs. A fortified ridge-
top position at the head of the valley81 may have served as the location for 
a final stand by those that could not, or would not escape. The reference 
to Ka‘iana being struck down by a spear suggests that firearms and cannon 
did not dominate the fighting. The following year the trader Bishop was 
told that Kamehameha’s side lost only 20 men and inflicted at least 500 
casualties on the enemy. William Broughton was told the defenders’ losses 
were 300 men. William Ellis’s claim that 400 men were driven over the 
Pali is, therefore, probably an exaggeration.82
80  Kamakau (1961), pp. 171–72; Fornander (1969), pp. 347–48; Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), 
p. 474; Campbell (1967), p. 97; Lisiansky (1967), p. 132; Jarves (1872), pp. 84–85; and Thomas. G. 
Thrum, ‘The Battle of Nuuanu’, in Thomas G. Thrum (comp.), Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 
1899 (Honolulu: Press Publishing Co., 1899), pp. 111–12.
81  Kirch (1985), pp. 116, 273. 
82  Bishop, in Roe (1967), p. 180; Broughton (1967), p. 71; and Ellis, cited in Stokes (1937), p. 38.
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Figure 12: The battle of Nu‘uanu, 
1795
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National 
University .
83  Kamakau (1961), p. 172; Fornander (1969), p. 348; and Lisiansky (1967), p. 132.
84  Kamakau (1961), pp. 172–73; and Broughton (1967), p. 71.
85  Westervelt (1922), p. 26; and John F. G. Stokes, ‘Nationality of John Young, A Chief of Hawaii’, 
47th Annual Report of the Hawaiian Historical Society for the Year 1938 (Honolulu: 1939), pp. 15–16.
Kalanikūpule escaped into the 
Ko‘olau Mountains and hid there 
for some months, until he was 
finally captured and killed. His 
body was brought to Kamehameha 
and offered as a sacrifice to Kū‘kā‘ili-
moku. Ka‘iana and other prominent 
enemy ali‘i killed at Nu‘uanu had 
been sacrificed straight after the 
battle and their heads stuck on the 
palings of the heiau. Kalanikūpule’s 
brother Koalaukani is the only 
member of the vanquished side’s 
leadership that seems to have 
escaped to Kaua‘i.83
The Hawaiian army remained 
on O‘ahu for over a year while 
Kamehameha prepared to invade 
Kaua‘i. Part of the preparations 
included the construction of 
a  36-tonne European-style vessel 
by his foreign carpenters at 
Honolulu.84 The consolidation of 
his recent territorial acquisitions 
also had to be attended to. Many 
of the female ali‘i nui of O‘ahu 
were married off to Kamehameha’s 
supporters. Young, for example, 
was married to Namokuelua 
of O‘ahu in 1795.85 The prolonged 
stay of Kamehameha’s forces on 
O‘ahu (which probably increased 
the island’s population by 25 per 
cent) severely strained local food 
resources and produced famine. 
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Visitors to O‘ahu reported the population to be in a desperate state by 
1796. No mention is made of food being brought in from other islands 
under Kamehameha’s control. No leader emerged on O‘ahu to encourage 
an uprising, as had happened in the 1780s. Agricultural production was 
stepped up after the disruption of war and, by 1798, O‘ahu seemed to be 
recovering from its ordeal.86
Kamehameha was ready to invade Kaua‘i in the summer of 1796. 
His attempt was thwarted when much of his fleet was capsized by strong 
winds during a night crossing of the channel between O‘ahu and Kaua‘i. 
Many more canoes would have been lost if the fleet not been close enough 
to O‘ahu to reach the safety of shore.87 Kamehameha remained in O‘ahu 
waiting for another opportunity. He probably used the time to replace 
his losses. In the meantime, Kaumuali‘i had faced a serious challenge 
from his half-brother, Keawe, on Kaua‘i. Keawe was based in Waimea 
and had Europeans serving with him. When Broughton visited Kaua‘i in 
July 1796, Keawe was also in control of Wailua and Kaumuali‘i was his 
prisoner. Keawe died soon after taking power, however, and Kaumuali‘i 
was restored as mō‘ī of Kaua‘i.88
Kaumuali‘i was spared the danger of a second attempt on Kaua‘i later in 
the year by divisions within Kamehameha’s domains. News arrived from 
Hawai‘i that Ka‘ū, Puna and Hilo had rebelled against Kamehameha. 
The rebellion was led by the ali‘i nui Namakeha. In the absence of 
Kamehameha and his army, they were encountering little opposition and 
were threatening the Kona heartland. There had been some skirmishes 
involving the loss of life, but most of Kamehameha’s subjects seemed 
lost without their ali‘i to lead them. Davis found it necessary to send to 
Kamehameha for help. Kamehameha returned to Hawai‘i in September 
1796 and marched against Namakeha, crushing the rebels in battle at 
Hilo. In January 1797, Kū‘kā‘ili-moku once more received the body of one 
of Kamehameha’s opponents as Namakeha was offered up as a sacrifice.89
86  Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 41, citing Bishop, Journal, 21 Feb. 1796; Townsend (1888), p. 72; 
Broughton (1969), pp. 40, 71; and Schmitt (1970), p. 111.
87  Kamakau (1961), p. 173; Broughton (1967), p. 71; and Daws (1968a), p. 41.
88  Broughton (1967), p. 44; Bishop, in Roe (1967), p. 145, n. 1; and Stokes (1937), p. 41.
89  Kamakau (1961), pp. 173–74; Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), p. 476; Broughton (1967), pp. 69–70; 
Daws (1968a), p. 41; and Sahlins (1983), pp. 535–36.
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While Hilo was Kamehameha’s last battle, it did not secure lasting 
control of Hawai‘i any more than the battle of Nu‘uanu ensured his rule 
over O‘ahu. Just as Kahekili had felt the need to remain on O‘ahu to 
consolidate his victory over Kahahana, so Kamehameha’s advisers had 
cautioned against Kamehameha leaving O‘ahu to deal with Namakeha in 
1796. His old enemies might be dead, but the prospect of new challengers 
loomed once the army was broken up and power decentralised in the 
usual way among district ali‘i. In February 1796, Broughton noted dissent 
among Kamehameha’s ali‘i over the proposal to invade Kaua‘i.90 When 
considering who to put in charge of O‘ahu while he was absent attempting 
to quell Namakeha’s rebellion, Kamehameha was reputedly advised:
Do not appoint a chief over O‘ahu, for during your absence in Hawaii 
he would rebel against you. The best thing to do is to leave none but 
commoners on O‘ahu and take the young chiefs with you.91
Heeding this advice:
Kamehameha therefore put his steward Ku-i-helani in charge of O‘ahu, 
and Ka-lani-moku appointed his man Ka-hanau-makai‘i, to collect taxes. 
Ke-kua-manoha‘, although among those who fought for Ka-lani-ku-pule 
and plotted against Kamehameha, was left on O‘ahu because many of his 
relatives were among Kamehameha’s followers.92
It was a move that contained both compromise and innovation. With it, 
the seeds for a new order were planted.
90  Broughton (1967), p. 144.
91  Kamakau (1961), p. 173.
92  Kamakau (1961), pp. 173–74, 182.
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Hawai‘i from 1796 to 1819
Kamehameha followed up his victory with a cautious and conciliatory 
policy of power sharing with his key long-term chiefly supporters, rather 
than power monopolisation. This maintained the coherence of his support 
base. United, they increased their coercive advantage by monitoring all 
localities in the realm to anticipate and stifle rebellious sentiment before 
it developed into a serious challenge. A devastating epidemic on the 
island of O‘ahu in the early 1800s decimated many of those trained in 
warfare, while each year of peace and the cessation of widespread training 
for warfare after 1796 reduced the military capacity of the population. 
Kamehameha’s clique monopolised firearms and demilitarised the islands, 
including their own capacity once their relative coercive advantage was 
assured. In the decade before his death in 1819, Kamehameha showed 
himself to be a cultural conservative in adhering to the old gods and leaving 
much of the day-to-day running of the kingdom to a bureaucracy that 
combined old offices and the new practices that responded to and were 
influenced by the increasing visits from Western vessels. He left a secure 
and peaceful kingdom, but one in which a powerful clique – centred on 
his wife Ka‘ahumanu – sought a greater embrace of Western ways and 
an  erosion of traditional religious beliefs, in the face of the looming 
prospect of more direct Western interference in the kingdom’s affairs. Life 
for most Hawaiian commoners, away from a few ports frequented by 
Westerners, continued to exhibit much continuity with past beliefs and 
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ways, beyond the periodic arrival of new diseases and increasing demands 
from chiefs for labour and produce with which to purchase luxury items 
for their own consumption.
The transition of societies from advanced chiefdoms to early states is 
generally seen as a process involving the centralisation, secularisation and 
institutionalisation of power. The creation of a permanent administrative 
body and an effective full-time military force, both of which are loyal 
to the state, is usually seen as essential to the success of this transition. 
The state needs access to income sufficient to maintain these institutions 
and retain their loyalty. The ability of the ruler to appoint candidates 
to offices within these bodies is an important yardstick with which to 
measure the consolidation of a monarch’s power.
From 1796 until his death in 1819, Kamehameha made much progress 
in ensuring that the necessary conditions for centralisation existed. 
In Samuel Kamakau’s list of Kamehameha’s reforms after the crushing of 
Namakeha’s rebellion, the implication is that reform was initiated rapidly 
in a relatively coherent package. No significant opposition is mentioned. 
Modern commentators have not questioned this representation, despite 
the limited detail Kamakau provides on events during the crucial years 
immediately following the cessation of hostilities. The lack of open 
confrontations in this period obscures the fact that Kamehameha’s power 
was by no means unassailable, even after reforms to the structure of 
power. On closer examination, it appears that his consolidation of power 
was a gradual and, at times, fragile, process. This process can be broadly 
divided into three relatively distinct phases: 1776–1804, 1804–12, 
and 1812–19.
1796–1804: Oligarchy
The four Kona uncles continued to be crucial to Kamehameha’s power 
in this period. With a large, multi-island moku to hold together, and 
temporarily weakened by their losses in the Kaua‘i channel, it made sense 
for the Kona clique to share the burden of controlling the newly conquered 
lands. Keaweaheulu, Ke‘eaumoku, Kamanawa and Kame‘eiamoku were 
given charge of the islands under Kamehameha’s control. Each also 
received large tracts of land throughout the islands. It was specified that 
Kamehameha could not alienate these lands from them.1
1  Kamakau (1961), pp. 175–76; and Kame‘eleihiwa (1986), p. 103. 
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Power within the ruling clique was carefully balanced and restricted. Land 
grants that were scattered throughout different localities on different 
islands inhibited the development of local power bases. John Papa I‘ī’s 
description of Kamehameha’s division of lands on O‘ahu among his 
important followers is typical:
The ‘ili‘aina land of Kaneloa in Waikiki and the ahupua‘a of Punaluu 
in Ko‘olauloa to Keliimaikai; Hamohamo and the ahupua‘a of Kaaawa 
to Keawe a Heulu; Kaluaokau and Pau and the ahupua‘a that includes 
the two Laie’s to Kalaimamahu; Kalaepohaku and a part of Halawa for 
an ahupua‘a to Isaac Davis; Pahoa and the other part of Halawa for 
his ahupua‘a to John Young; Kanewai and a Kalana land division of 
Moanalua to Keeaumoku; Kapunahou and Moanalua for his ahupua‘a to 
Kameeiamoku; Waialae together with all the large ili‘i kupono within the 
lands of the King to Ka‘ahumanu.2
I‘ī also mentions that all prominent chiefs were given parcels of land in 
Waikiki, as it was a site favoured by ali‘i. Kamehameha’s lands included 
rich agricultural tracts at Nu‘uanu, Puaali‘ili‘i, Kapalomo, Keone‘ula, 
Pu‘upueo, and a residence at the increasingly busy port of Honolulu. 
Kamehameha’s full brother, Keli‘imaikai, his half-brother, Kalaimamahu, 
his favourite wife, Ka‘ahumanu, and his two closest European advisers, 
John Young and Isaac Davis, also did well out of the land redistribution. 
The mō‘ī’s sons, however, do not appear to have been granted significant 
landholdings.3 The fragmentation of landholdings increased the number 
of overseers on the land as chiefs increasingly became absentee landlords 
and settled junior kin to see to their interests on their scattered fragments. 
Chiefly power was not only diminished by the fragmentation of 
landholdings but also counterbalanced by the establishment of an 
independent administrative structure. The ali‘i Kalanimoku was 
particularly powerful within this structure. He was designated pukaua 
(commander in chief ) as well as pu‘uku nui (chief treasurer). As pu‘uku 
nui, he was given the task of dividing the lands among Kamehameha’s 
followers, and his consent was required for any gifts Kamehameha wished 
to bestow upon his supporters.4 Land and gifts were two crucial tools for 
securing loyalty in the traditional system. Kalanimoku’s powers, therefore, 
represented a major concession by Kamehameha as mō‘ī.
2  I‘ī (1959), p. 70; see also Kamakau (1961), pp. 175–76.
3  I‘ī (1959), pp. 26, 69–70; Kame‘eleihiwa (1986), pp. 98–99, 101; and Kirch & Sahlins (1992), 
p. 49.
4  Kamakau (1961), p. 175.
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In another passage, Kamakau notes ‘Kamehameha appointed men to serve 
under the different chiefs as stewards. There were several hundred of these, 
all well-educated for the position, alert and strong’.5 The only existing 
groups that could have fulfilled this function were possibly lesser ali‘i 
within retinues or the priesthood. In 1810 Archibald Campbell claimed 
that ‘The principal duties of the executive were, however, entrusted to the 
priests, by them the revenues were collected, and the laws enforced’.6
In an undated passage, Kamakau mentions that Kamehameha appointed 
commoners to govern the islands ‘lest a chief stir up rebellion’.7 This 
conflicts with his earlier statement that the four uncles were made kuhina 
(governors) of the islands. The only kuhina who was not one of the four 
Kona uncles in this period was Young, who administered Hawai‘i from 
1802 onwards. But this may have been because Kamehameha launched 
another expedition against Kaua‘i in 1802 that presumably involved all 
four uncles and their contingents. Marshall Sahlins makes a convincing 
argument that these so-called ‘commoners’ were in fact kaukau ali‘i 
(the children of unions between mō‘ī and women of lesser rank). It was 
this group that David Malo described as the backbone of the king from 
which the ali‘i nui chose his executive officers and advisers.8
The checks and balances within the ruling clique appear to have been 
a mutually agreed-on attempt to preserve their power by reducing the 
potential for fission. Kamanawa suggested the idea of fragmenting 
landholdings to avoid the danger of chiefly rebellion. The strategy 
worked and  there are no accounts of tension within the ruling group. 
Kamehameha continued to rule with his uncles’ approval. His powers 
were restricted by the functions of Kalanimoku’s office. Kamehameha 
maintained a large court with the usual kahuna, craftsmen, fishermen and 
retinue of warriors, but this alone was insufficient to maintain his rule. The 
fledgling bureaucracy would eventually enhance the ruler’s power relative 
to his vassal ali‘i. The restriction of Kamehameha’s power and the granting 
of land in perpetuity was enough to secure the Kona uncles’ approval 
for the formation of a bureaucracy, particularly as it also enhanced their 
5  Kamakau (1961), p. 178.
6  Campbell (1967), p. 123.
7  Kamakau (1961), p. 184.
8  Campbell (1967), p. 97; Kamakau (1961), p. 184; Lisiansky (1967), p. 100; Sahlins (1981), 
p. 57; and Malo (1951), pp. 54–55.
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control over the rest of the ali‘i. Kamehameha’s council was enlarged to 
include more advisers who were experienced in the old ways of warfare 
and government, such as Kai, Kapalaoa and the kahuna Kalaikuahulu.9
The ruling clique had a large enough power base to ensure that, as long as 
it remained united, it could dominate the islands. There was a significant 
coercive gap between their power base and that of other ali‘i. According 
to the testimony of Kekuanio‘a during land hearings after Kamehameha’s 
death, each one of the four uncles received 60 to 80 ‘lands’, while lesser 
ali‘i, such as Kekuanio‘a, received only one or two ‘lands’ each. The 
previously cited reference in I‘ī to the division of land in O‘ahu suggests 
that the lands Kekuanio‘a refers to were probably ahupua‘a or even smaller 
units. Furthermore, those outside of the ruling clique were not guaranteed 
hereditary rights to the lands.10
The new bureaucracy served as Kamehameha’s eyes and ears, ensuring 
that his orders were obeyed, and notifying him of any ali‘i gathering 
men about them with rebellious intent. Kamehameha is also said to have 
scattered informers and female spies throughout his domains to watch 
for signs of trouble.11 Crews of paddlers headed by skilled canoe masters 
conveyed Kamehameha’s messengers between islands.12 In this way, rebels 
had no secluded haven within the realm in which to mobilise without 
attracting the attention of their overlord. The main ali‘i were required to 
accompany the mō‘ī and his court so that he could keep a close watch 
over them. Removed from a personal landed base, these ali‘i depended 
upon Kamehameha for sustenance, and could not feed and maintain large 
retinues themselves. Campbell noted that these ali‘i numbered between 
20 and 30 in 1810.13
The economic power of the ruler was also enhanced by the formation 
of a bureaucracy. As in the past, all land grants carried the obligation 
of providing tribute, corvée labour and military service when needed. 
Kamakau states that the level of tribute was set at one-tenth of the hogs 
and crops raised, as well as a proportion of manufactured goods, such 
as nets, mats, tapa and fishing lines. Kamehameha used his officials to 
9  Kamakau (1961), pp. 175, 177–78; Westervelt (1922), pp. 25–26.
10  Kame‘eleihiwa (1986), p. 80; I‘ī (1959), p. 116.
11  W. D. Alexander, A Brief History of the Hawaiian People (New York: American Book Co. 1891), 
pp. 149–50.
12  Kamakau (1961), pp. 177–78.
13  Campbell (1967), pp. 92–93; Turnbull (1810), p. 141; and Kamakau (1961), p. 178.
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tighten up the collection of tribute. Instead of imposing a head tax on 
households, tribute was now correlated with productivity. Tax assessors 
were appointed to fix individual tenants’ tribute according to the size 
of their holdings. Others collected and recorded tribute once a year at 
a location nominated by Kamehameha. While it is unclear what form the 
payment took, Campbell’s observation that priests made up much of the 
bureaucracy could mean that the collection was in the form of the annual 
makahiki offerings. Samuel Kamakau, however, refers to these payments 
as taxes, implying that they were distinct from religious offerings.14
It is unclear whether the mō‘ī’s traditional kō‘ele lands and stock herds 
were sufficient to maintain the new structure of government. Kamakau 
quantifies kō‘ele lands as 10 per cent of all cultivated land. The old 
problem of utilising production was addressed by improving the transport 
of produce between localities and islands by canoe. In 1801, for example, 
Young sent canoes to Maui for supplies when no fish were to be had 
off Kawaihae on Hawai‘i. European trading ships were also occasionally 
commissioned into service for this task.15 This may have been enough 
to ensure that kō‘ele lands alone could support the new government 
structure. There is also reference to Kamehameha not setting seaward 
and upland boundaries to ahupua‘a so that they were not ‘hemmed in’.16 
The  implication is that rights of access to offshore fishing and upland 
resources were loosened.
Kamehameha’s political and economic innovations contrasted sharply 
with his religious conservatism. He remained a strong supporter of 
traditional religion until his death. Makahiki and annual fishing kapu 
were maintained. The first fish caught and the first fruits continued to 
be reserved for the gods. Kamehameha retained his strong devotion to 
Kū‘kā‘ili-moku, as well as his other personal gods, Kalaipahoa and Pele. 
In 1801, for example, Kamehameha attempted to stem the flow of lava 
from Hualalai by appeasing Pele, the volcano goddess, by throwing hogs 
into the lava followed by cuttings of his own hair. Many heiau were restored 
and others constructed to gods such as Kū‘kā‘ili-moku, Ku ke olo‘ewa and 
Kū ho‘one‘enu‘u. Luakini heiau continued to be built and human sacrifice 
persisted. Both, however, diminished in frequency after the ending 
14  Kamakau (1961), pp. 176–77, 192; and Westervelt (1922), p. 26.
15  Kamakau (1961), pp. 177, 190–91; Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 42; and Young, Manuscript 
Journal (Hawai‘i State Archives, n.d.), f1.5.
16  Kahananui (1984), p. 202.
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of hostilities in 1796.17 A number of important kahuna were included 
among his valued advisers, including Pu‘ou and his son Hewahewa of 
the Pa‘ao priesthood, Kuaiwa and Halo io lena of the Nahulu class, and 
Ka pou kahi of the Hulihonua class. New laws issued by Kamehameha 
continued to be framed in terms of kapu, with kahuna prominent in 
ensuring compliance.18 Kamehameha groomed his son, Liholiho, to be 
his successor by teaching him the correct procedure for heiau ceremonies 
and other religious events. The declaration of Liholiho as heir apparent 
was formalised by bestowing the kapu of the heiau upon him.19
During this period, Kamehameha issued decrees that were designed to 
reinforce traditional kapu, and to preserve the civil peace brought about 
by the end of wars between mō‘ī. Murder, theft, destruction of property, 
disobeying the kapu of the gods and sorcery were all prohibited. Perhaps 
the most celebrated decree was the so-called law of the broken paddle, 
by which it was forbidden to rob or murder the defenceless and the 
innocent. The law was prompted by a meeting between Kamehameha 
and a fisherman who some years earlier, had injured Kamehameha with 
a paddle near Laupāhoehoe in Hilo when the fisherman sought to defend 
himself against raiders seeking sacrificial victims. Instead of seeking 
revenge, Kamehameha is said to have criticised his own actions as an 
unjustified move against a weaker party who had done him no previous 
harm. The man was pardoned and an edict issued forbidding such actions 
in the future.20 These decrees seem to have generally been adhered to 
without need for punitive measures and, for example, only one account 
of a murder occurs in the pages of I‘ī and Kamakau. This was an incident 
where the ali‘i Kāne i halau killed Mokuhia at sea in an attempt to win the 
governorship of Hawai‘i.21
Certain events between 1796 and 1804 suggest, however, that 
Kamehameha’s consolidation of power was by no means complete or 
smooth. While Kamakau and I‘ī do not mention any rebellion in this 
period, William Westervelt claims that there were rebellions, and that 
17  Kamakau (1961), pp. 175–76, 179–80, 183–88; I‘ī (1959), pp. 70, 72–76, 115; Campbell 
(1967), pp. 95, 128–29; Westervelt (1922), pp. 33–34; and Alexander (1891), pp. 151–52.
18  Kamakau (1961), pp. 187, 191–92; and Campbell (1967), p. 123.
19  Kamakau (1961), p. 188, 221; and see, for examples, I‘ī (1959), pp. 56–59.
20  Kamakau (1961), pp. 175–76, 181–83; Westervelt (1922), pp. 24–25; and Alexander (1891), 
p. 151.
21  Kamakau (1961), p. 191.
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Kamehameha left his kuhina to deal with them.22 Much of Kamehameha’s 
efforts were directed towards preparations for another attempt at 
conquering Kaua‘i. One of the reasons Kamakau gives for Kamehameha’s 
desire to subdue Kaua‘i was the need to ‘satisfy the clamour of his chiefs 
and warriors who had endured so many privations to make him ruler, [to 
satisfy them] in their desire for more lands to conquer’.23 This was a legacy 
of the past emphasis on martial prowess. Such ingrained attitudes would 
not die out overnight. The retinues of old rivals might be disbanded, but 
a large number of ali‘i and kanaka still remained skilled in the arts of war. 
Their presence necessitated the continued maintenance of Kamehameha’s 
own forces, and the age-old problem of diverting their restlessness in 
times of inactivity remained.
After crushing Namakeha’s rebellion, Kamehameha remained on Hawai‘i 
until 1802. The troublesome windward districts of that island may 
have required Kamehameha to personally oversee a lengthy period of 
incorporation, as Kahekili had done on O‘ahu in the 1780s. Much of 
Kamehameha’s efforts during this time seem to have been directed towards 
ensuring that the 1796 disaster in the Kaua‘i channel was not repeated. 
He ordered his ali‘i to construct larger, sturdy canoes called peleleu. 
According to 19th-century Hawaiian educator and historian William 
Alexander, most of the fleet was constructed on Hawai‘i, particularly from 
trees felled in the interior of the district of Hilo. The fleet was five years in 
the making and, eventually, may have numbered as many as 800 peleleu. 
Several small European-style vessels were also constructed by Hawaiian 
carpenters under the direction of foreigners, particularly James Boyd, who 
had been in the islands since the early 1790s.24
When the trader Ebenezer Townsend visited Hawai‘i in 1798 he saw 
a 55-tonne schooner being constructed at Kawaihae under the supervision 
of Young. A large peleleu was also under construction there. Its twin hulls 
were 21 metres long, 1.8 metres deep and 60 centimetres wide. The sides of 
the hulls tumbled inwards to avoid taking in water. The hulls were lashed 
22  Westervelt (1922), p. 25.
23  Kamakau (1961), p. 187.
24  Kamakau (1961), p. 187; Ebenezer Townsend Jr., Extracts from the Diary of Ebenezer Townsend 
Jr (Honolulu: Hawaiian Historical Society, n.d.), pp. 71–72; Alexander (1891), pp. 150–51; 
Daws (1968a), p. 42; R.S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 1: 1778–1854, Foundation 
and Transformation (Honolulu, University of Hawai‘i Press, 1938), pp. 48–49; Thomas Bargatzy, 
‘Beachcombers and Castaways as Innovators’, Journal of Pacific History, 15 (1), 1980, 95; and Kirch 
& Sahlins (1992), p. 43.
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together with a 1.5-metre space between them. This gap was covered by 
a platform at the stern, which made the vessel more seaworthy. They were 
also equipped with a mast (kia), mainsail (pe‘a ihu) and a jib (kiakahi) 
similar to those on European-style sloops. Townsend also noticed a large 
number of single canoes of various sizes.25 The construction of the fleet 
may have served to satisfy the competitive spirit of the ali‘i and to occupy 
the attention of their followers.
By 1802 Kamehameha was ready to move against Kaua‘i. Young informed 
the Russian explorer Urey Lisiansky that the force assembled numbered 
7,000 Hawaiians, 50 Europeans and an artillery train of 14 cannon, 
40 swivel guns and six mortars with large quantities of powder and shot. 
Lisiansky also found that Kamehameha controlled trade and had all the 
firearms and other European military technology he needed. Cloth was 
now the trade item most in demand.26 The composition of this force is 
uncertain. Training with traditional weapons continued and the obligation 
of military service still existed for maka‘āinana. John Turnbull noted that 
the supplies were transported to the warriors on each island, implying 
that each kuhina had his own forces.27
Kamakau mentions that Kamehameha divided the ‘warrior-chiefs’ 
into companies. His description suggests that this process may have 
been used to incorporate former enemies and replacements. He states 
that the companies were decided according to certain classes and that 
Kamehameha:
put every man into one of these classes: the Keawe, the Mahi, the I, the 
Ahu, the Pulena, the Luahine, and the Paia. For young stranger chiefs 
he made three classes: the Okaka, the ‘Ai ‘ohi‘a, and the Uouo.28
Some of the first group bears the names of families that had been 
traditional rivals of Kamehameha. The same practice is attributed to 
Kalani‘ōpu‘u on Hawai‘i. In both cases, it is unclear if there was a central 
force loyal to the ruler, or if those combatants were distributed amongst 
his followers. A reference to the invasion force on O‘ahu in 1804 suggests 
that forces were still drawn in large part from a number of chiefly retinues 
– Kamakau refers to the whole company as including:
25  Townsend (n.d.), pp. 23–29; and Kamakau (1961), p. 187.
26  Lisiansky (1967), pp. 11, 133.
27  Kamakau (1961), p. 178; I‘ī (1959), p. 189; Lisiansky (1967), p. 116; Turnbull (1810), p. 226.
28  Kamakau (1961), p. 176.
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
190
Kamehameha’s sons and daughters with their households and those of 
his brothers and sisters, his councilors and chiefs, over a hundred in each 
household, running into a thousand.29
Kaumuali‘i, the mō‘ī mō‘ī of Kaua‘i, told Lisiansky that his own forces 
consisted of five Europeans, three cannon, 40 swivel guns, a large number 
of muskets with an ample supply of powder and shot, and 30,000 
warriors.30 While the figure of 30,000 is probably an exaggeration, it may 
indicate that the gravity of the situation caused Kaumuali‘i to call up 
the maka‘āinana, while Kamehameha’s force of 7,000 represented a force 
of trained warriors only.
The only indication of any break with tradition patterns is Lisiansky’s 
reference to the large stocks of firearms possessed by Hawaiians, and his 
mention of a small bodyguard within Kamehameha’s retinue who wore 
blue European-style coats and drilled in European style. The reference 
to drill presumably means that they at least used firearms, although 
Lisiansky also noted that they were said to be the best warriors in the 
islands.31 The pursuit of power was beginning to increasingly involve the 
use of European goods during this time. There was a noticeable increase 
in agricultural production during these years, particularly on O‘ahu and, 
to a lesser extent, around Kealakekua Bay, Kailua and Kawaihae. All were 
ports of call for European vessels and the new fields developed tended 
to cater to the visitors demands for yams and potatoes as well as taro 
and ‘uala. As Ross Cordy has noted, chiefly power stood to be enhanced 
through arming retainers with firearms and maintaining loyalty through 
the redistribution of European trade goods.32
By the end of this period Kamehameha had also collected an impressive 
fleet of European vessels. Turnbull notes that Kamehameha had upwards 
of 20 European-style vessels ranging between 22 and 63 tonnes. Some 
were even copper-bottomed like the best European vessels, although there 
was a shortage of naval stores in general. The largest of these vessels were 
used as men-of-war and some mounted a few light guns. Most vessels 
seemed to be used solely to transport provisions between the islands to 
Kamehameha’s forces. These vessels were ideal for this task because of their 
29  Kamakau (1961), p. 189.
30  Lisiansky (1967), p. 113.
31  Lisiansky (1967), p. 116. See also Turnbull (1810), pp. 160–62.
32  Kamakau (1961), p. 190; Cordy (1972), pp. 407, 411–12; and Kirch (1985), pp. 235–36, 
310 ff., esp. 313.
191
6 . CREATING A KINGDoM
relatively large holds and ability to cope with rough seas. Soon afterwards, 
Lisiansky noted a similar number of European vessels and commented 
that some were armed with swivel guns and commanded by Europeans.33
The impressive force gathered for the invasion of Kaua‘i never saw action. 
After leaving Young to govern Hawai‘i and formally declaring Liholiho 
to be his chosen successor before his assembled councillors and kuhina, 
Kamehameha sailed to Maui at the head of the peleleu fleet. The fleet 
touched at Kipahulu and Kaupo before stopping at Lahaina. Heiau were 
consecrated in all three landing places. They were probably luakini heiau, 
given Kamehameha’s intentions. Alexander implies this was the case when 
he refers to the ‘usual cruel rites’34 which attended their consecration. 
As guardian of the kapu of the heiau, Liholiho now presided over these 
ceremonies.
The expedition remained at Lahaina for a year ‘feeding and clothing 
themselves with the wealth of Maui, Moloka‘i, Lāna‘i and Kaho‘olawe, 
and worshipping the gods’.35 It is unclear why Kamehameha remained 
on Maui for so long. He may have been disturbed by a prophecy that 
warned against undertaking the expedition uttered by one of his diviners 
before the fleet left Hawai‘i. Perhaps the mobilisation was intended to 
intimidate Kaumuali‘i into submission and deter potential rebels within 
Kamehameha’s domains. When Turnbull visited Kaua‘i in 1802, he 
found Kaumuali‘i, gloomy and fearful of the prospect of the invasion, 
constructing a European-style vessel in which to flee. During the 
expedition’s stopover on Maui, one of the Kona uncles, Kame‘eiamoku, 
died at Lahaina, and was replaced by his son Hoapili.36
Towards the end of 1803 the expedition moved to O‘ahu. Again they 
settled down for a lengthy stay. They were camped on O‘ahu in 1804 when 
an epidemic struck the island. Offerings of hundreds of hogs, coconuts 
and bananas failed to stem its ravages. The sacrifice of three kapu-breakers 
at a Waikiki heiau also failed to satisfy the gods. The disease has not yet 
been identified. Kamakau described it as:
33  Turnbull (1810), p. 160; and Lisiansky (1967), p. 133.
34  Alexander (1891), p. 152. See also Kamakau (1961), p. 188; and Lisiansky (1967), p. 100.
35  Kamakau (1961), p. 188; and Turnbull (1810), pp. 141, 158.
36  Turnbull (1810), p. 149; Kamakau (1961), p. 188; and Alexander (1891), p. 152.
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a very virulent pestilence, and those who contracted it died quickly. 
A person on the highway would die before he could reach home. One 
might go for food and water and die so suddenly that those at home did 
not know what had happened. The body turned black at death. A few 
died a lingering death, but never longer than twenty-four hours. If they 
were able to hold out for a day they had a fair chance to live. Those who 
lived generally lost their hair, hence the illness was called ‘Head stripped 
bare’ (po‘okole).37
Lisiansky was told the epidemic ‘destroyed the flower of his 
[i.e., Kamehameha’s] army’.38 Hawaiian traditions suggest that the epidemic 
may have killed up to two-thirds of the army gathered there. Patrick Kirch 
and Marshall Sahlins dispute this figure, and imply that most of the army 
survived and later settled on O‘ahu. It is unclear what the death toll for 
the civilian population was and whether the epidemic spread throughout 
the chain. While the epidemic may not have killed as many as some claim, 
it still dramatically altered power relations in the islands. The army would 
have suffered many more deaths than ever occurred in indigenous warfare, 
and a number of politically influential ali‘i died, including the three 
remaining Kona uncles. Kamehameha barely escaped with his own life.39
1804–12: From oligarchy to autocracy?
Kamehameha moved decisively to reconstitute his power base after the 
1804 disaster. The sons of the three dead kuhina took their places and 
Kamehameha conferred their fathers’ privileges upon them. Koahou 
replaced Kamanawa, Kahekili Ke‘eaumoku replaced Ke‘eaumoku, while 
Naihe replaced Keawe a Heulu. With Hoapili, these men formed the 
new backbone of the king’s power. All proved to be loyal supporters 
of Kamehameha. A particularly close relationship developed between 
37  Kamakau (1961), 189.
38  Lisiansky (1967), p. 133.
39  Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 44. See also Alexander (1891), p. 152; Westervelt (1922), p. 29; 
Daws (1968a), pp. 42–43; Stannard (1989), pp. 55–57; Bushnell (1993), pp. 115–61, 149–51; and 
A.W. Crosby, ‘Hawaiian Depopulation as a Model for the Amerindian Experience’, in Terence Ranger 
& Paul Slack (eds), Epidemics and Ideas: Essays on the Historical Perception of Pestilence (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), p. 190.
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Kamehameha and Hoapili. The young ali‘i was allowed to take 
Kamehameha’s wife Keōpūolani as a wife and was given the future honour 
of hiding Kamehameha’s bones to protect them from enemies.40
Kamehameha remained on O‘ahu until 1810, from where he administered 
the affairs of the whole realm with a firm hand. Young continued to act as 
his administrator on Hawai‘i. Ke‘eaumoku was made kuhina of Maui.41 
With Kamehameha’s approval, kuhina appointed tax collectors, district 
heads and other local officials. On Hawai‘i at least, old established chiefly 
families were increasingly marginalised from influence by the kuhina and 
the lesser ali‘i who made up his local officials. Campbell describes how the 
tenants paid ‘rent’ to ali‘i four times a year. The payments were made in 
kind, usually in pigs, cloth or mats. The lack of agricultural produce in the 
tribute and frequency of payment implies the mō‘ī’s lands were sufficient 
to provide for government needs, and that this rent or tax was distinct 
from makahiki tribute. The produce of Kamehameha’s estates, ho‘okopu 
(offerings) and levies (‘auhau) satisfied his logistical needs.42
Sacred authority continued to be a key aspect of Kamehameha’s power. 
Human sacrifice and execution for kapu violations still took place, but 
rarely. Most of the population seemed to adhere to the kapu, if Campbell’s 
observations at Honolulu are representative. Campbell heard of no 
sacrifice during his 13-month stay on O‘ahu, but did note the execution 
of one ali‘i for violating a kapu that Kamehameha had placed on others 
having sexual relations with Ka‘ahumanu. Alexander claims three men 
were sacrificed at Leahi heiau on O‘ahu in 1807 because their eating of 
kapu coconuts was thought to be responsible for the illness of the ali‘i 
nui Keōpūolani. Others were willing to risk the consequences of breaking 
kapu. Campbell noted that women took advantage of the presence of 
European vessels to swim out to them at night and eat forbidden foods 
away from the eyes of other Hawaiians. Campbell once encountered 
Ka‘ahumanu breaking a kapu in this manner. She asked for him to keep it 
a secret, implying that a revelation would endanger her life.43
40  Kamakau (1961), pp. 189–90; Westervelt (1922), pp. 29–30; and Kame‘eleihiwa (1986), 
pp. 103, 106.
41  Kamakau (1961), pp. 184, 191; and Campbell (1967), p. 97.
42  Alexander (1891), p. 150; Campbell (1967), p. 118; and Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 44, 50–51.
43  Sahlins (1981), p. 64; Campbell (1967), pp. 128–29, 136, 155; and Alexander (1891).
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Kamehameha was well aware of the benefits of his traditional sacred status 
to his position as ruler. With Davis acting as interpreter, Kamehameha 
told a European visitor:
I should be afraid to adopt such a dangerous expedient as Christianity, 
for I think no Christian King can govern in the absolute manner in which 
I do, and yet be loved by his subjects as I am by mine: such a religion might 
perhaps answer very well in the course of a few generations; but what chief 
would sanction it in the beginning, with risk of its subverting his own 
power, and involving the islands in war? I have made a fixed determination 
not to suffer it.44
Campbell and other European visitors to the islands during these years 
found Kamehameha to be popular with his subjects.45
European interactions with Hawaiians suggested peace and prosperity 
reigned. But tensions loomed beneath the surface. Trade was booming 
in part because many ali‘i were using trade to enhance their power base. 
Kamakau noted that it was from these visiting vessels that:
the chiefs and people bought arms and gunpowder. Kamehameha had 
several storehouses well stocked with foreign arms, but nobody wanted 
money or clothing. On the part of the foreigners potatoes and yams were 
in great demand. The chiefs accordingly went into the cultivation of these 
foods, and grew potatoes on the hill of ‘Ualaka‘a between Manoa and 
Makiki, and yams at Ka‘akopua, and sold them to the foreigners.46
Kamehameha’s impressive supply of munitions seems attributable 
more to his considerable trading skills and ability to meet European 
requirements than his capacity to exclude other ali‘i from trade.47 Despite 
the increasing concentration of most European trade at Honolulu after 
1805, Kamehameha was still unable to halt the diffusion of firearms. 
His continued residence on O‘ahu was probably in large part due to his 
desire to exercise influence over trade after the disruption of his power 
base in the 1804 epidemic.
44  John Martin, Tonga Islands: William Mariner’s Account (4th edn) (Tonga: Vava‘u Press Ltd, 
1981), p. xxxiv.
45  Campbell (1967), p. 131; H.W. Bradley, The American Frontier in Hawaii: The Pioneers 1789–
1843 (Stanford University Press, 1942), p. 10.
46  Kamakau (1961), p. 190; I‘ī (1959), pp. 68–69; and Cordy (1972), pp. 406–07.
47  Daws (1968a), p. 44; Howe (1984), p. 161; and Turnbull (1810), p. 159.
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The coercive gap between the power of the Kamehameha’s supporters 
and  other ali‘i now became weak enough for some of the latter 
to contemplate challenging the ruling clique. Much of the opposition to 
Kamehameha seems to have centred upon his favourite wife Ka‘ahumanu. 
She had always refused to devote herself entirely to her husband, either 
emotionally or politically. She had a significant power base, controlling 
considerable landholdings, and possessing genealogical links with the old 
ruling line of Maui as well as important families on Hawai‘i. As the senior 
member of her generation, Ka‘ahumanu exercised much influence over 
her close relatives. Her brother Kahekili Ke‘eaumoku was now kuhina 
of Maui, while she was inducted into Kamehameha’s council. Although 
she bore Kamehameha no children herself, Ka‘ahumanu sought to 
increase her influence over Liholiho by declaring him to be her hanai 
(adopted child).48
Before he died, Ka‘ahumanu’s father warned Kamehameha to be wary 
of his daughter, and suggested that she was the only ali‘i in the realm 
who posed any real threat to his rule. Kamehameha declared it a capital 
offence for anyone but himself to sleep with her, probably fearing that 
dissidents might coalesce around such a union. In 1809 Kanihonui, 
a nephew of Kamehameha, was discovered to have defied this edict. While 
drunkenness may have accounted for his defiance of Kamehameha’s 
prohibition, Kamehameha feared the worst and had Kanihonui executed. 
Ka‘ahumanu was furious. She attempted to organise a revolt to overthrow 
her husband and install Liholiho in his place. Kamehameha mobilised 
his supporters and prepared for trouble. Liholiho refused to endorse 
the revolt in front of the assembled malcontents. With Kamehameha 
displaying a determination to contest the issue, Liholiho’s action was 
enough to dissuade the assembled ali‘i from openly challenging their ruler. 
The gathering disbanded and conflict was avoided for the meantime.49
Tensions simmered until September 1811, when Kamehameha moved 
to quell trouble on O‘ahu. It had come to his attention that ali‘i in 
Ko‘olaupoko, Ko‘olauloa, Waialua and ‘Ewa were gathering men around 
them. At the same time they were increasing their agricultural production 
and storing guns and powder. Heeding the advice of his councillors, he 
announced that he was returning to Hawai‘i and that he required the ali‘i 
48  On Ka‘ahumanu’s power and influence, see Kamakau (1961), pp. 313, 315; I‘ī (1959), pp. 26, 
53; Sahlins (1981), p. 58; Daws (1968a), p. 56; and Kame‘eleihiwa (1986), p. 109.
49  Kamakau (1961), pp. 189, 194; and I‘ī (1959), pp. 50–51.
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to turn over their guns and ammunition and go with him to his home 
island accompanied by no more than two men each. The conspirators were 
faced with the prospect of either declaring their intentions by mobilising 
prematurely or allowing themselves to be disarmed. None seem to have 
resisted.
According to Hawaiian sources, the accumulated weapons were loaded 
onto one of Kamehameha’s European vessels, the Keoua. A carefully 
stage-managed leak saw the Keoua return to Honolulu and disembark 
its passengers but not its cargo of munitions. The leak was fixed and 
Kamehameha sailed to Hawai‘i. Here the confiscated military hardware 
was stored with two trusted men: Young at Kawaihae and Kamakau at 
Kealakekua Bay. However, a European resident of Honolulu claimed 
that the initial confiscation of the firearms was sufficient to diffuse 
the situation, and that the confiscated weapons were not transported 
to Hawai‘i until almost a year later. I‘ī also mentions that, just prior to 
returning to Hawai‘i, Kamehameha closed the schools of combat that had 
been set up.50
The ease with which Kamehameha was able to disarm his potential 
enemies suggests that he had a decisive coercive advantage over them. 
This advantage probably occurred as a result of a general reduction of 
military forces rather than through a major build-up of Kamehameha’s 
forces. Many of his forces must have perished at sea in 1796 and in the 
epidemic on O‘ahu in 1804. This was also where the armies of Ka‘eokulani 
and Kalanikūpule had last been assembled. Certainly there may have 
been some movement from the island after 1795, and garrisons would 
have been maintained on other islands during the attempted assault on 
Kaua‘i, but the epidemic was still a major blow to the military forces 
concentrated there.
There is no indication that Kamehameha’s regular forces on O‘ahu 
numbered more than 500 men in this period. These men were described 
as ‘disciplined native soldiers’,51 by a visitor to Honolulu in 1806. The 
50  Kamakau (1961), pp. 197–98; I‘ī (1959), p. 103; Alexander (1891), pp. 157–58; and Ross H. 
Gast & Agnes Conrad (eds), Don Francisco de Paula Marin – A Biography with the Letters and Journals 
of Francisco de Paula Marin (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1973), pp. 201, 206, 207.
51  Fitzsimmons (1969), p. 171, citing missionaries visiting from Tahiti in 1806. See also Kirch 
& Sahlins (1992), p. 45, citing William Shaler, ‘Journal of a Voyage Between China and the North-
Western Coast of America Made in 1804’, American Register, no. 3, 1808, 164; and Alexander Ross, 
Adventures of the First Settlers on the Oregon and Columbia River (London: Smith, Elder, 1849), p. 147.
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only body of full-time troops witnessed by Campbell during his stay 
in Honolulu in 1809 and 1810 was a guard of approximately 50 men 
stationed at Kamehameha’s residence in Honolulu. They had no uniform 
beyond a malo. Each man carried a musket, a bayonet and a cartridge 
box.52 It is unclear if this guard formed all or part of the body of troops 
that I‘ī watched practicing gun drill when he was a boy in Honolulu. 
I‘ī’s description of the drill suggests that European tactics now accompanied 
the adoption of European weapons also:
Drilling in those days was not quite like that of today, for they had only 
half of the present knowledge. Their soldiers stood in line from the 
front all the way to the back, and so it was with each line. At the proper 
command, those in the front row, which extended from one end of the 
field to the other, raised their guns in unison and fired. Then they placed 
the guns on their shoulders, turned left about face, marked time, and 
began to advance. So it went until the drilling period was over.53
Campbell’s observations on the drill practices confirm I‘ī’s assertion that 
the troops were still learning to use their weapons. He noted that:
rapidity, and not precision seemed to be their great object. The men stood 
at extended order, and fired as fast as they could, beating the butt upon 
the ground, and coming to the recover without using the ramrod, each 
man gave the word ‘fire’ before he drew the trigger.54
Campbell describes these men as guards, implying they were the same 
men he saw stationed at Kamehameha’s residence. I‘ī noted that the troops 
he watched were the successors to an earlier company of troops, organised 
by Kamehameha and known as the kulailua (‘knocked down’) in reference 
to the ramifications of a musket discharge when not held tightly against 
the shoulder. This evidence of poor handling of muskets casts doubts on 
the degree to which they were used prior to this. It is unlikely that the 
1804 epidemic entirely wiped out Kamehameha’s veterans and required 
a totally new intake of recruits for training. I‘ī claims that Kamehameha’s 
warriors were still unequalled in their ability with traditional weapons. 
Such skills took more than a few years of drills to achieve.
Other forces existed besides Kamehameha’s troops. Davis had a company 
of warriors who protected him. The ali‘i Kuakini had his own European 
vessel and was given six cannon for it by Liholiho. Quality, rather than 
52  Campbell (1967), pp. 149–50.
53  I‘ī (1959), p. 54.
54  Campbell (1967), p. 158.
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relative numbers, may have been the decisive factor in giving Kamehameha 
a coercive advantage. I‘ī states that, while Kamehameha’s fighting schools 
were not the only ones, they were the best of the schools. Kamehameha’s 
men not only drilled regularly with firearms but also trained with spear 
points exposed in a much more rigorous manner than anyone else. While 
no descriptions of other schools of fighting remain, I‘ī’s reference to 
Kamehameha’s schools implies the other schools practised with the spear 
points covered over.55 Campbell mentions that throwing and catching 
sugarcane stalks was a popular pastime and that the general population 
trained for war from youth.56 A mock battle described by I‘ī suggests, 
however, that most of the population was poorly prepared for battle and 
the only weapons used appear to have been stones. The passage is worth 
quoting in full:
Two chiefs who had gone from Honolulu to Puuloa with some chiefs 
of that locality landed at Aioloolo in Waikele, and the battle was staged 
between them and residents of Waikele that very afternoon. The two sides 
gathered at a place above Aioloolo on the slope of the hill leading down 
to Kupapaulau.
The spectators noticed that both sides were equally skilled in stone 
throwing and in dodging the stones that flew back and forth. No one 
was hurt or harmed, and the skill of the participants and the chiefs who 
arranged the sham battle was praised. It seems that the chiefs watched to 
see how skilled their people were in battle.57
It is possible that the most proficient participants were inducted into 
the fighting schools as their predecessors had been into chiefly retinues. 
The  relationship between these schools and chiefly retinues is unclear. 
During the 1809 crisis, supporters were called up, only to be dismissed 
when the anticipated confrontation did not arise.58 Kamehameha kept 
important chiefs at his court and moved against the outer districts of O‘ahu 
only when ali‘i there began to gather supporters and arms. Ke‘eaumoku 
may indeed have been right when he asserted that the only danger to 
Kamehameha came from Ka‘ahumanu.
55  I‘ī (1959), pp. 30, 54, 66, 69, 83.
56  Campbell (1967), pp. 149–50.
57  I‘ī (1959), p. 76.
58  I‘ī (1959), p. 51.
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Kamehameha’s power rested upon more than just manpower. In 1806 he 
was reported to have 2,000 stands of arms stored in a fortified residence 
that dominated the Honolulu foreshore. A palisade protected its land 
approaches, while a battery of 16 cannon faced out to sea. These guns were 
from Kamehameha’s ship the Lily Bird (Lelia Byrd) that lay unrigged in the 
harbour. Within the enclosure were situated the king’s and queen’s huts, 
a store, a powder magazine and a guardhouse. Two storehouses brimming 
with European trade items, including munitions, stood nearby.59 As most 
European trade now came through Honolulu, Kamehameha’s compound 
provided a means of controlling or at least monitoring the flow of arms 
into the realm. The 1811 crisis may have been more of a pre-emptive 
strike by Kamehameha than a reaction to a serious challenge. It was one 
thing to acquire firearms, but quite another to maintain and replenish 
one’s stock, and to drill followers in their use before the government 
noticed and took action.
Rival ali‘i might attempt to match Kamehameha’s strength in muskets, 
but they could not hope to compete against his naval strength. By 1810 
Kamehameha possessed over 40 European vessels. Most were scoops 
and schooners weighing under 36 tonnes that had been constructed by 
Kamehameha’s carpenters. These carpenters were now highly skilled boat 
builders and operated from his naval yard at Honolulu. European captains 
were generally still used to command Hawaiian crews. No naval threat 
existed within the archipelago and, by 1810, Kamehameha seems to have 
abandoned his plans to invade Kaua‘i. As a result, Campbell found most 
of Kamehameha’s European vessels hauled up on Waikiki beach in boat 
sheds, with their spars laid alongside and their riggings and cables under 
cover. Only 10 to 12 of his vessels were moored in Honolulu harbour and 
only one scoop was in regular use, sailing between O‘ahu and Hawai‘i. 
The peleleu fleet lay drawn up on Waikiki beach, exposed to the elements, 
and slowly falling into a state of disrepair.60
The problem of Kaua‘i was resolved diplomatically, without need for naval 
or military action. While Kamehameha never publicly declared an end to 
his campaign to invade Kaua‘i, he had been sending conciliatory signals 
to Kaumuali‘i since 1804 in the form of gifts and embassies inviting him 
to visit O‘ahu. Kaumuali‘i received the embassies hospitably but was 
59  Campbell (1967), pp. 91, 149–50.
60  Campbell (1967), pp. 111, 144; I‘ī (1959), pp. 103, 105, 109, 113; Ross (1849), pp. 38–39; 
Daws (1968a), p. 43; and Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 43.
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understandably reluctant to travel to O‘ahu to visit the slayer of Keōua. 
Eventually he agreed to meet with Kamehameha through the mediation 
of Nathan Winship, an American trader. Although Kaumuali‘i had a body 
of musket-armed Europeans and continued access to European trade at 
Waimea, he could not hope to match Kamehameha’s military resources. 
Reasonable peace terms were preferable to the constant threat of invasion. 
The meeting went well and ended with an agreement by which Kaumuali‘i 
would rule Kaua‘i as a tributary ‘King’ acknowledging Kamehameha as 
his sovereign. There was also a veiled reference to Liholiho becoming heir 
to Kaumuali‘i’s lands as well as those of Kamehameha.61
While the arrangement satisfied Kamehameha, it did not please some 
of his ali‘i. Perhaps angered at the prospect of missing out on the spoils 
that would follow the conquest of Kaua‘i, they attempted to sabotage 
the meeting of the two leaders by trying to poison Kaumuali‘i. Davis 
learnt of the plot and warned Kaumuali‘i in time, only to be poisoned by 
the conspirators. The idea of killing Kaumuali‘i had actually been raised 
in Kamehameha’s council, but had been rejected after Kamehameha 
and Kalaikuahulu had argued persuasively against it. I‘ī names the main 
conspirator as Naihe. Naihe’s fate is unclear, as is the degree of support for 
him. It may be significant that, soon after this event, Kamehameha moved 
to disarm the ali‘i on O‘ahu and sailed for Hawai‘i.62
1812–19: Sacred kingship and bureaucracy?
Sahlins suggests that Kamehameha’s move back to Hawai‘i may have 
been an attempt to preserve his sacred power by insulating himself from 
increasing exposure to foreign influences on O‘ahu. Foreigners and their 
goods were outside the kapu system and did not usually conform to its 
needs and expectations. For all of his political innovations and military 
reforms, Kamehameha remained a religious conservative until his death. 
After his return to Hawai‘i he continued to worship his personal gods 
and to rebuild heiau. Liholiho’s sacred role as intermediary between 
the gods and his people to ensure successful harvests continued to be 
emphasised. The makahiki remained an important event. Kamehameha 
61  Kamakau (1961), pp. 195, 196; I‘ī (1959), p. 83; and Daws (1968a), pp. 42–43. 
See commentaries in Daws (1968a), p. 42; John M. Lydgate, ‘Ka-umu-alii, the Last King of Kauai’, 
24th Annual Report of the Hawaiian Historical Society for the Year 1915 (Honolulu: 1916), pp. 26–27.
62  I‘ī (1959), p. 83; Kamakau (1951), p. 196; and Daws (1968a), pp. 43–44.
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incorporated a number of his own gods into the makahiki procession, 
and used the offerings to them as de facto taxes. Although his storehouses 
were soon brimming with makahiki offerings, they mostly consisted of 
tapa, skirts and malo rather than assets he could use to pay or feed to his 
administration.63
It has been suggested that Kamehameha moved away from Kū‘kā‘ili-
moku and towards other gods during this period. In particular, there 
seems to  have been an increasing association with sorcery gods. With 
warfare now a distant memory, protection from sorcery seems to have 
become a more prominent aspect of Kamehameha’s worship. Evidence 
in I‘ī supports this contention. Liholiho was entrusted with the care of 
Kū‘kā‘ili-moku for the return voyage to Hawai‘i from O‘ahu. When 
Kamehameha’s council met in 1812 to discuss the loyalty of his subjects, 
it was suggested that the help of the Ololupe god be sought ‘to bring 
hither the spirits of the rebellious to be destroyed’.64 Kamehameha’s faith 
was apparently more intense than a number of his subjects. The Russian 
naval captain Otto Von Kotzebue’s observations of ali‘i behaviour during 
his expedition’s visit to Hawai‘i in 1816 reveal apparent inconsistency in 
their attitude towards the kapu system. A female maka‘āinana was killed 
for breaking an eating kapu, yet ali‘i of both sexes openly ate together on 
board the Russian vessel and drank alcohol. On shore the expedition’s 
naturalist was surprised to find religious ceremonies in a heiau observed 
with little reverence.65
Apart from meeting with his council, Kamehameha left much of the 
business of government to his administrators. He remained on Hawai‘i 
until his death, and spent much of his time fishing and gardening. 
He was always consulted on important decisions by his officials, but rarely 
intervened personally in affairs of state. Kamehameha’s withdrawal from 
political affairs opened the way for other ali‘i to enhance their power. 
Sahlins labels this group the Ka‘ahumanu group because their political 
alignments and kinship relations centred on her. Sahlins bases the group on 
the ali‘i who came to control the government after Kamehameha’s death, 
including Ka‘ahumanu’s brothers Kahekili Ke‘eaumoku, and Kuakini, and 
63  Sahlins (1981), p. 46; Sahlins (1995), pp. 218–19; Kamakau (1961), pp. 200, 203; and I‘ī 
(1959), p. 104.
64  I‘ī (1959), p. 123. On sorcery, see Valeri (1982); and I‘ī (1959), p. 124. On Liholiho and Kū, 
see I‘ī (1959), p. 104. Ololupe was an ‘aumakua associated with conveying the dead ali‘i to their 
‘aumakua. I am indebted to Jon Osorio for providing this information.
65  Daws (1968a), p. 58.
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her collateral brothers Kalanimoku and Boki. Ka‘ahumanu’s relations were 
prominent in government because Kamehameha continued the traditional 
Hawai‘i practice of denying collateral kin power bases by using affinal kin 
for important offices. By the time of Kamehameha’s death, Ke‘eaumoku 
governed Maui, Kuakini governed Hawai‘i, Boki administered O‘ahu 
while Kalanimoku continued to serve as pukaua and pu‘uku nui. They 
all controlled significant landholdings as well. In contrast, Kamehameha’s 
collateral kin were mainly entrusted with sacred aspects of government, 
such as the upholding of the ruler’s kapu and his gods.66
The Ka‘ahumanu group identified by Sahlins may not have had a common 
purpose prior to 1819. Blood ties were no guarantee of cooperation in 
Hawaiian politics. Although rumours were rife that this group intended 
to seize power as soon as Kamehameha died, there is no indication that 
they used their offices to put their interests ahead of Kamehameha’s before 
1819. Even if they had been united in purpose they would not have 
monopolised secular power. The designation of Liholiho as Kamehameha’s 
successor must have enhanced his chances of securing the loyalty of the 
royal administration and army that had taken the place of vassal ali‘i and 
their retinues as the source of secular power. The demilitarisation of the 
islands continued in this period, consolidating the royal forces’ advantage 
in coercive power.67
While martial prowess ceased to be encouraged in the majority of the 
population, Kamehameha began to create a substantial standing army on 
Hawai‘i. In January 1816, German employee of the Russian American 
Company Doctor George Scheffer visited Kamehameha’s military camp, 
8 kilometres south of Kailua. Here he noted that Kamehameha ‘taught 
military discipline to about 1,000 men, two-thirds of who had wooden 
arms’.68 Scheffer subsequently went on to scheme against Kamehameha 
without Russian Government consent so that, when Von Kotzebue visited 
the Kona coast in November, he found 400 soldiers armed with muskets 
waiting to see what his intentions were. The force that was mobilised 
to counter Scheffer’s provocative actions in Honolulu came largely from 
Hawai‘i and consisted of ‘chief and fighting men who had joined the 
66  Daws (1968a), p. 44; Sahlins (1981), p. 60; Kirch & Sahlins (1992), pp. 2, 60. On Kamehameha’s 
distancing himself from government, see Alexander (1891), p. 158; and I‘ī (1959), p.  117. 
On Kalanimoku’s duties, see I‘ī (1959), p. 112. On Boki’s duties, see I‘ī (1959), p. 145.
67  I‘ī (1959), p. 123; Kamakau (1981), p. 208.
68  Cited in Richard A. Pierce, Russia’s Hawaiian Adventure, 1815–1817 (Berkley, University 
of California Press, 1965), p. 164.
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King (Okaka), and others besides’.69 This seems to imply that the royal 
forces formed the full-time core of Kamehameha’s army, which was 
supplemented by others in times of crisis. When Vasili Golovin touched at 
Kailua in October 1818, he was given the impression that Kamehameha 
could arm 6,000 men. The European resident Portuguese physician Juan 
Elliot d’Castro told Golovin the figure was 8,000 men, but Golovin chose 
to believe the lower number, which was given him by another resident, 
the Spaniard Don Francisco de Paula Marin (known as Manini to the 
Hawaiians). The difference between these figures and those observed by 
Scheffer and Von Kotzebue may represent the difference between the full-
time army, and the total number of men that could be called up.70
Most of the regulars seemed to have used firearms and been subject to 
European-style drill. European observers were not impressed with these 
forces. Golovin noted that many of their arms were rusty and that they 
used ‘many peculiar, amusing and strange methods’71 in their drills. 
In 1819 the French explorer Louis Freycinet expressed similar views about 
the appearance of these troops at Kawaihae:
A fairly large number of soldiers scattered here and there lent an air 
of great variety to this strange picture of the odd and irregular fashion 
of their uniforms. No order, no uniformity of appearance and movement 
existed amongst them; each one carried his gun as it was convenient to 
him or as it was most comfortable. All of them wore a loincloth, but most 
of them wore in addition an enormous cape of a brownish color and 
rather coarse material; proud of this odd equipment, they paraded past us 
quite complacently, not having the least idea that their appearance was to 
us highly grotesque.72
Despite their appearance, these forces acted as an effective deterrent to 
challenges from both internal and external sources. Few, if any, within the 
islands could match them. After Kamehameha ended the fighting schools 
when he left O‘ahu, mock battles between communities lost any sense of 
being training exercises. Sugarcane stalks were used instead of spears and 
sling stones, to avoid real battles amongst participants erupting as the 
69  Kamakau (1961), p. 206.
70  Otto von Kotzebue, Voyage of Discovery in the South Sea undertaken in the Years 1814, 16, 17 
and 18 (London: Sir Richard Phillips and Co., 1821), p. 84; and V. M. Golovin, Around the World 
on the Kamchatka, 1817–1819, Ella L. Wisnell (trans.) (Honolulu: Hawaiian Historical Society and 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 1979), pp. 191–92, 200.
71  Golovin (1979), p. 200.
72  Kelly (1978), p. 14.
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result of serious wounds and deaths during the sparring. In some instances, 
musket-armed soldiers stood by to preserve order. Golovin found the 
participants in the mock battles he witnessed to be unenthusiastic, 
although a few fistfights did break out afterwards. Americans he met told 
him that the Hawaiians had lost their traditional martial skills and the 
warlike, brave spirit that had characterised earlier generations.73
Incidents immediately before and after Kamehameha’s death suggest that 
he not only attempted to monopolise the supply of firearms in the islands, 
but also restricted the number of firearms issued. Kamakau relates that, 
when a war of succession seemed inevitable soon after Kamehameha’s 
death, ‘Arms and ammunition were given out that evening to everyone 
who was trained in warfare, and feathered caps and helmets distributed’.74 
The reference to trained forces suggests only the regular forces were given 
the privilege of carrying firearms. Firearms may have been distributed 
more widely, just prior to Kamehameha’s death, in preparation for 
possible conflict, however, as Don Francisco de Paula Marin noted on 
2 May 1819, ‘the King is a little better and Cajumanu [Ka‘ahumanu] 
took all the muskets of the chiefs’. This implies that Kamehameha’s 
demilitarisation had not been total, or that firearms had been reluctantly 
distributed by those in power as the prospect of a leadership struggle 
arose, and were re-collected as soon as signs of Kamehameha’s recovery 
occurred.75 Kamakau’s reference to the issue of capes and helmets suggests 
that traditional weapons were also still in use. An 1819 painting that 
depicts the bodyguard of the king illustrates him with a cape and helmet, 
and armed with a spear.76 (Scheffer’s reference to two-thirds of the troops 
he watched training in 1816 carrying wooden arms could either refer to 
traditional weapons or wooden replicas of firearms.)
The only serious disturbance in this era occurred in 1815–16 when 
Scheffer exceeded his instructions to recover property from a vessel 
wrecked off Waimea on Kaua‘i. He sought trade concessions on Kaua‘i 
from Kaumuali‘i in return for Russian naval and military assistance. Both 
made these moves without consulting their superiors, and Scheffer lacked 
the ability to fulfil his promises. Scheffer set up a trading post at Waimea. 
73  James Jackson Jarves, History of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands (Boston: Tappan and Dennet, 
1843), p. 96; and Golovin (1979), p. 187.
74  Kamakau (1961), p. 227. See also Dibble (1909), p. 133. 
75  Gast & Conrad (1973), p. 230.
76  The painting, which depicts a Hawaiian chief in his feathered cloak and helmet, by the French 
artist Jacques Arago in 1819, is held in the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
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Soon after the Russian sealing ship Discovery arrived at Waimea and left 
30 Kodiak Indians from its crew with Scheffer. Then, in November 1815, 
a vessel sent by the Russian governor of Alaska arrived in Honolulu and 
its crew proceeded to erect a blockhouse. Cannon were placed in the 
blockhouse and the Russian flag was hoisted.
Young and resident American traders, who saw Scheffer as a threat to their 
interests, had earlier driven him out of Honolulu. They then followed him 
back to Kaua‘i, where he had to be protected by Kaumuali‘i’s guards. This 
new Russian move called for a more organised response. Kamehameha sent 
Kalanimoku and an armed force from Hawai‘i to Honolulu to ascertain 
the Russians’ intentions. If they meant no harm, they were to be supplied 
with vegetables and pork. If not, Hawaiian forces might once more engage 
in battle. As it was, the Russians withdrew almost immediately to Kaua‘i.77
This incident was enough to persuade Kalanimoku to construct a large 
fort to guard the harbour against similar incursions. Construction began 
in January 1816. The fort was completed early in 1817 using corvée 
labour from O‘ahu. Sited on the Honolulu waterfront, it measured 103 
by 91 metres. Its walls, which were 3.5 metres high and 7 metres thick 
at the base, were constructed of coral blocks faced with an adobe mix of 
clay, sand and dry grass. At least 40 cannon were mounted on the walls, 
ranging in size from four to 18 pounders with the heaviest pieces facing 
out to sea. Adobe embrasures protected those on the wall on the seaward 
side, while a parapet protected the landward sides. The fort was called 
kapapu (the gun wall) and kakuanohu (the thorny back) because of the 
guns bristling along its horizon.78
In the meantime, Scheffer had constructed a fort at Waimea with help 
from Kaumuali‘i’s subjects. By 1817, however, information from visiting 
Russian vessels revealed to both Kaumuali‘i and Kamehameha that 
Scheffer had neither the financial or military backing he claimed. When 
Kamehameha ordered Kaumuali‘i to expel Scheffer, the order was obeyed 
with little resistance from either Kaumuali‘i or Scheffer. Kaumuali‘i 
remained in charge of Kaua‘i and Kamehameha’s control of Honolulu 
was now stronger than ever. A garrison trained and drilled by a resident 
Englishman George Beckley permanently manned the fort at Honolulu. 
77  Kamakau (1961), pp. 205–06; Alexander (1891), pp. 159–61; Westervelt (1922), pp. 35–36; 
Lydgate (1916), pp. 31–32; Daws (1968a), pp. 49–53; and Pierce (1968), esp. pp. 20–21.




Strict discipline was observed with a regular watch maintained throughout 
the night. Inside the fort were chiefs’ houses and barracks for the garrison, 
all arranged around a central flagpole flying the Hawaiian flag.79
Kamehameha’s naval strength continued to be based on a number of 
European vessels armed with cannon. He re-established the naval yards 
at Kailua when he returned to Hawai‘i in 1812. Golovin reported that 
Kamehameha’s navy included two or three brigs and several schooners 
and large decked vessels, all of which were armed with cannon or 
falconets. Most of the crew and many of the captains were now 
Hawaiians. The majority of the ships were used only to transport goods 
between islands. Kamehameha derived great pleasure from acquiring 
European vessels, right up until his death. In 1819 Freycinet noted that 
he possessed five brigs of 81 to 90 tonnes each, five schooners of 54 to 63 
tonnes, and approximately 10 18-tonne cutters. The king’s 170 Hawaiian 
carpenters constructed some of these vessels, while others were bought. 
Batteries of cannon were noted at Kealakekua Bay, Kailua and Kawaihae. 
Golovin was told that, in all, Kamehameha had 100 cannon.80
Kamehameha’s fort, cannon and vessels served more as pillars of his 
domestic power base than as ramparts against outsiders. The Hawaiian 
Islands did not face the prospect of a serious external challenge in 
Kamehameha’s time. Kamehameha’s attempts to align himself with Britain 
met with British unwillingness to risk involvement, while the European 
powers with a presence in the region tended to counterbalance each other. 
As long as their European rivals did not move into Hawai‘i, they were 
content to leave matters as they were.81
The mounting interest in European goods and ideas became more 
pronounced after 1810 with the opening up of the Hawaiian sandalwood 
trade. Ka‘ahumanu and her clique were particularly enthusiastic about 
what they could acquire through such trade.82 A number of prominent 
ali‘i dressed in European clothing and also began learning English. 
Liholiho, Ke‘eaumoku, Kuakini and Kaumuali‘i were among this group. 
79  Peter Corney, Voyages on the Northern Pacific: Narrative of Several Trading Voyages from 1813 
to 1818 (Honolulu: Thos G. Thrum, Publisher, 1896), p. 98.
80  Golovin (1979), pp. 182, 191–92, 200; Kelly (1978), pp. 86–87, 90, 91, 114 n. 49; citing 
Kuykendall (1938), p. 96 n. 94; and Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 60. On cannon numbers, see 
Fitzsimmons (1969), p. 202. On Kamehameha’s purchases, see I‘ī (1959), pp. 103–04, 128, 129; 
Kamakau (1961), p. 207; Bradley (1942), pp. 55–56; and Alexander (1891), pp. 161–63, 169.
81  Daws (1968a), pp. 50–51; and Kamakau (1961), p. 209.
82  I‘ī (1957), p. 128; Kamakau (1961), p. 204; and Sahlins (1981), pp. 60–62.
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Denied the thrill of battle, and shut out of military and political power by 
Kamehameha and a small clique, the ali‘i took to the trade in sandalwood 
with a passion. The accumulation of European trade goods now became 
the medium for chiefly competition. Liquor, silk cloth and other luxury 
items were more sought after than metal tools and military hardware. 
Breaking with tradition, most of these goods were stored away rather than 
redistributed among followers.83
The new chiefly competition brought suffering to the maka‘āinana. 
Ali‘i sent their tenants into the mountains to seek sandalwood for months 
on end. It was hard physical work and their prolonged absences in the 
mountains resulted in less manpower to grow crops for domestic needs 
and to provision visiting ships. The use of women in agriculture offered 
a partial solution. Women were already part of the agricultural workforce 
in leeward Maui, and Kona and Kohala on Hawai‘i. Thus, the diversion 
of manpower into the sandalwood trade does not seem to have seriously 
threatened food production. The only famine recorded between 1810 and 
1819 occurred on the leeward side of Hawai‘i in 1811–12, and European 
visitors were told the famine was due to low rainfall over the last three 
years rather than human agency.84
Kamehameha moved quickly to try and control the sandalwood trade. 
He declared a royal monopoly on the trade under which ali‘i had to give 
60  per cent of the wood collected to the government. Ostensibly this 
was to deter exploitation of maka‘āinana and the neglect of agriculture. 
According to the chief Kana‘ina in the 1820s, however, ali‘i kept 60 per cent 
of the proceeds from the sale of sandalwood while Kamehameha received 
only 10 per cent.85 Whatever the division of proceeds was, the trade was so 
lucrative that ali‘i continued to send commoners out to cut sandalwood. 
One picul of sandalwood, a measure equating to around 61 kilograms 
of sandalwood, sold for eight to 10 United States dollars.86
83  Kamakau (1961), pp. 231–32; Alexander (1891), p. 156; Sahlins (1981), pp. 30–31; Howe 
(1984), p. 162; Ralston (1984), pp. 26–29; Levin (1968), p. 422; and Golovin (1979), p. 210.
84  Kamakau (1961), p. 231; Cordy (1972), p. 412. On Anahulu, see Kirch (1985), p. 314. 
On leeward Kohala, see Kirch (1985), p. 178. On sandalwood-induced famine, see Ralston (1984), 
p. 26 versus Cordy (1972), pp. 409–10. On drought-induced famine, see Levin (1968), p. 422; Schmitt 
(1970), p. 113; I‘ī (1959), p. 114; Alexander (1891), p. 158; and Kamakau (1961), pp. 205–06.
85  Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 59, citing Robert Crichton Wylie, Supplement to the Report of the 
Minister of Foreign Relations, (Honolulu: Government Printer, 1856), p. 25.
86  Kamakau (1961), p. 207. See also Cordy (1972), pp. 409, 412; Theodore Morgan, Hawaii: 
A Century of Economic Change, 1778–1876 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), 
pp. 63, 66; Bradley (1942), pp. 55–59; and Alexander (1891), p. 161.
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Chiefly demand for European items continued to rise, despite inflated 
prices. Kamehameha was one of the most enthusiastic collectors of 
European goods. His storehouse in Kona was crammed full of silverware, 
crystal, shoes and other manufactured items, as well as more practical 
items of government such as munitions and foreign cash. His sandalwood 
revenue was such that he was enabled to engage in major expenditure. 
His purchases of European vessels went well beyond his commercial and 
defence needs and, between 1816 and 1818, he purchased six vessels. 
In 1816, for example, he bought the 150-tonne Albatross for 400 piculs of 
sandalwood. In 1818 he paid the same price in sandalwood for a package 
of assorted items including nails, olive oil, paint oil, brushes, flour, rice, 
sugar, pitch, kettles and old copper.87
Kamehameha’s administration closely supervised all trade and imposed 
a variety of taxes. By 1819, Kamehameha had imposed a one-Spanish 
piaster tax on his subjects for any transactions with foreigners. When 
the Hawaiian crews of three of Kamehameha’s vessels returned to the 
islands with European hats and clothing in 1812, government officials 
confiscated all their possessions. By the middle of the decade it was 
usual for visiting vessels to direct their business through Kamehameha’s 
representatives. These were usually lesser ali‘i with some proficiency in 
English. They ensured the smooth progress of provisioning and repairs, 
and even accompanied ships to other islands in the chain away from 
Honolulu. At the same time, they provided Kamehameha with details of 
crew needs and ship’s trade goods, so that he had an edge over the visitors 
in setting the terms of trade. All items traded to vessels carried a royal 
sales tax. In addition, visitors had to pay various dues before they could 
enter port and conduct their business. The various revenues collected by 
Kamehameha’s government placed its finances in a healthy state. As well 
as an impressive array of Hawaiian goods collected as payment in kind, 
by 1819 the state coffers are said to have contained a sizeable amount of 
foreign currency.88
Kamehameha also kept a tight rein on the behaviour of foreigners onshore. 
While he was on O‘ahu, the number of beachcombers at Honolulu had 
risen to around 100. Many spent much of their day drinking alcohol. 
87  See Kelly (1978). See also Golovin (1979), p. 196; Alexander (1891), p. 161; Bradley (1942), 
p. 56; Kirch & Sahlins (1992), p. 60.
88  On foreign currency, see Kelly (1978), p. 90. On the system for dealing with visiting vessels, see 
Golovin (1979), pp. 203–05; I‘ī (1959), p. 88; Daws (1968a), p. 44; and Howe (1984), p. 161.
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Kamehameha encouraged visiting vessels to recruit from amongst their 
ranks and, as a result, most of these itinerants did not stay long and, 
by 1810, their numbers were down to around 60. Those with desired 
skills, such as carpenters and blacksmiths, were encouraged to work for 
Kamehameha and were often given small grants of land as incentives. 
Honolulu avoided the notorious lawlessness that characterised other 
Pacific ports such as Kororareka (modern day Russell) in the Bay of 
Islands, New Zealand. Ships’ crews were made to adhere to a system of 
harbour rules and the waterfront was policed by government forces to 
control brawling within the foreign community, and incidents between 
foreigners and Hawaiians. On 5 June 1812, for example, a man was 
placed in irons and given 24 lashes for wounding his captain. On another 
occasion, Hawaiian officials imprisoned two sailors in the fort for striking 
their first mate.89 Government forces also controlled relations between 
locals and visitors. Golovin provides the following description of a shore 
patrol at Kealakekua Bay:
About ten o’clock at night several people with torches and crying 
something out in a singsong passed from Kaawaroa to Karekekooa along 
the beach close to the cliff. Later we learnt that his was the patrol walking 
through the settlements and proclaiming by the King’s orders that the 
inhabitants were not to approach the Sloop in the night and were not to 
harm us in any way.90
Kamehameha also attempted to control the use of alcohol. While 
Kamehameha was still on O‘ahu, rum and distilled ki (Cordyline terminalis) 
had become notable agents of social disruption among European and 
Hawaiian alike. Ali‘i and maka‘āinana of both sexes partook. Many of 
the ali‘i who drank regularly also advocated freeing up the kapu system. 
Eventually Kamehameha ordered all stills destroyed and prohibited the 
future manufacture of liquor in the islands. Stills continued to be built, 
however, which only served to confirm their danger to social order.91
The royal administration also maintained its control over those areas away 
from points of European contact. Kamehameha’s stores at Kailua still 
brimmed with tribute in the form of hard poi, dried fish, tapa, malo, 
89  On beachcombers, see Daws (1968a), pp. 46–47; Maude (1968), pp. 139–40; Bargatzy (1980), 
p. 95; I‘ī (1959), pp. 86, 87; and Campbell (1967), pp. 118–19, 144, 154. On the enforcement of 
shore regulations, see Gast & Conrad (1973), pp. 206, 225.
90  Golovin (1979), p. 176.




fishnets and fibrous ropes. In 1818, Golovin was told that European 
resident Juan Elliot d’Castro paid an annual tax of 40 piasters for land 
upon which he had 10 to 20 people working. In addition a one-piaster tax 
existed for seasonal inshore fishing.92 It is uncertain whether these were 
part of the taxes on production imposed after 1796 or new head taxes. 
Kamakau does state that the system devised in the 1790s was designed 
specifically to avoid head taxes.
By 1816 the tax collecting bureaucracy had been centralised, or at least 
a centralised structure had been imposed over existing local officials. 
Charles Barnard relates how he sailed from Hawai‘i to O‘ahu:
having on board between fifty and sixty natives, who were collectors 
of taxes and receivers of rents … On the second day after sailing, we 
arrived at Woahoo, landed the unwelcome visitors, who began collecting 
the exactions, consisting of tapa, a kind of cloth made of the fine inner 
bark of a particular kind of tree, and bunches of dried fish. When all was 
collected, the ship was nearly full betwixt decks.93
This passage implies that both taxes and rent were collected.
Europeans were now playing an important role in government. Golovin 
described Juan Elliot d’Castro as Kamehameha’s minister of foreign affairs 
and secretary of state. Juan Elliot d’Castro assisted in meetings with 
visiting naval officers and any other interactions with representatives of 
foreign governments. For this he received the land grant referred to above 
as well as an annual salary of 800 piasters worth of sandalwood that he 
sold to visiting traders. Others, such as Marin and the American Oliver 
Holmes played an important supervisory role in the government’s trade 
with vessels at Honolulu. Marin had come to the islands from Spain in 
1791. Fluent in Spanish, English and French, he acted as an interpreter 
for Kamehameha and as his agent to vessels visiting Honolulu. By the 
second decade of the 19th century, he had been granted lands on O‘ahu 
and Moloka‘i. He resided at Honolulu with 180 people living on his 
lands. Young continued his close association with Kamehameha and 
remained a respected adviser as well as becoming a prominent landowner. 
The writing skills of some of the Europeans in Kamehameha’s service 
facilitated government administration. Golovin noted that, as well as 
92  I‘ī (1959), pp. 120–22; Kelly (1978), p. 90; and Golovin (1979), p. 205.
93  Barnard (1829), pp. 219, 221.
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sending messengers to transmit instructions verbally, a written version 
bearing Kamehameha’s seal was also sent. In this way the recipient could 
check the seal and then compare the written and verbal messages.94
It remained to be seen whether the structure of the new kingdom could 
outlive its founder. Institutional positions had been introduced to replace 
reliance on powerful vassal ali‘i, but the degree to which Kamehameha’s 
mana held the whole edifice together was uncertain. Ka‘ahumanu sought 
to extend her influence over the young heir, Liholiho, from the early 1800s. 
Kamehameha’s actions laid the foundations for a succession struggle 
between Liholiho and Kekuaokalani, the son of Kamehameha’s younger 
brother Keli‘imaikai. Kekuaokalani was Kamehameha’s favourite among 
his collateral kin and was entrusted with Kū‘kā‘ili-moku as Liholiho was 
increasingly brought into the running of the kingdom.95 It was a division 
of responsibility that echoed the one between Kamehameha and Kīwala‘ō 
in 1782. It has been suggested that this division of responsibilities was 
intended to ensure that Liholiho would have to prove his worthiness to 
rule in the pit of battle.
This was not, however, to be a competition between equals. The conferring 
of the guardianship of Kū‘kā‘ili-moku may not have been as significant as it 
had been in 1782. Worship of Kū‘kā‘ili-moku had declined in importance 
as peace reigned in the islands. Many of Kamehameha’s political and 
military reforms were designed to minimise the possibility of challenges 
to central rule. Kamehameha might tell the two young men that, in times 
past, the god and the government were of equal importance, but he gave 
his European arsenal to Liholiho alone. Guns, not gods, would secure 
Liholiho’s succession. Kamehameha seems to have expected trouble, 
as he purchased $8,000 worth of munitions in March 1819. His attitude 
to complaints from ali‘i about the haughty and provocative behaviour 
of Kekuaokalani is instructive in this regard. According to Kamakau 
he replied:
It is well if he robs the chiefs and not the common people; that would be 
a real fault. He is a fatherless child and can do these things only while I am 
alive. When I am gone you will not pay any attention to him!96
94  Golovin (1979), pp. 177, 192, 205. On prominent Europeans in general, see Daws (1968a), 
p. 47. On Holmes, see Kamakau (1961), p. 174. On Marin, see Alexander (1891), p. 154.
95  I‘ī (1959), pp. 139–40; and Kamakau (1961), p. 209.
96  Kamakau (1961), p. 209; and Sahlins (1981), p. 76 n. 19.
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1819: The question of succession
Kamehameha died at Kailua, Kona, on 8 May 1819, after a lengthy illness. 
The main ali‘i were summoned to Kailua from O‘ahu, where they had 
been cutting sandalwood. Only Boki and a few other notable ali‘i were left 
on O‘ahu to see to matters of government administration. In accordance 
with Kamehameha’s wishes, there were no sacrifices to solicit the gods 
for his recovery, nor were human sacrifices a part of the mourning 
ceremonies. While kahuna kuni (sorcery priests) sought to ascertain if 
Kamehameha’s death had been caused by sorcery, Ke‘eaumoku disturbed 
proceedings with his drunken behaviour. The kahuna promptly declared 
that Ka‘ahumanu and her family were behind Kamehameha’s death.97
The assembled ali‘i were divided over the future division of power within 
the kingdom. A week after Kamehameha’s death, Marin noted that the 
chiefs were in an uproar, prompting him to begin cleaning and repairing 
his own neglected firearms.98 Most ali‘i wanted the royal monopoly on 
sandalwood overturned to increase their profits. A division of opinion 
soon emerged over the question of land distribution. Those who felt they 
were poorly rewarded under Kamehameha’s division of his conquests 
argued that land should be redistributed by Liholiho, as was customary 
for an incoming ruler. But those who had occupied important posts under 
Kamehameha and held significant tenure rights argued that they had been 
granted hereditary rights to their lands. They naturally sought to preserve 
their privileged position by maintaining the political status quo.99
At the same time, the powerful clique gathered around Ka‘ahumanu now 
sought to overthrow the kapu system. Stephanie Levin argues that this was 
because the kapu system threatened the status quo by requiring rulers to 
prove their continued mandate from the gods through successful actions. 
These included defeating attempts to unseat them from power. The 
abolition of the kapu system would effectively make political succession 
hereditary. Davenport has argued that the abolition of the kapu, and all 
the state ritual surrounding it, may also have been seen as a way of freeing 
97  Kamakau (1961), pp. 212–14; and Kahananui (1984), pp. 207–10. On Marin, see Gast 
& Conrad (1973), p. 230.
98  Gast & Conrad (1973), p. 231 (15 May, 18 May 1819).
99  Kamakau (1961), p. 219.
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up the makahiki produce and other religious offerings for use by the state. 
On a more personal level, it would free the ali‘i nui from the very real 
restrictions that the kapu imposed upon their daily activities.100
Ka‘ahumanu was able to gain the support of Liholiho’s mother, 
Keōpūolani, in her attempt to end the kapu. Keōpūolani was one of the 
highest ranking kapu chiefs in the islands. Ka‘ahumanu also succeeded 
in winning over Hewahewa, the kahuna nui of the Holoa‘e priestly 
order. In return, the priestly orders were promised the retention of their 
landholdings and their position within the ali‘i.101 These terms suggest 
that the outcome of the succession was already apparent to Hewahewa, 
and that he was aligning the priesthood with a force he felt he could 
not block. During the mourning period, Liholiho and Kekuaokalani left 
Kailua and went to Kawaihae for 10 days to avoid the ritual pollution 
present at Kailua while Kamehameha’s body lay there. Kekuaokalani 
suspected Ka‘ahumanu’s intentions and tried to persuade Liholiho not to 
return to Kailua. Liholiho characteristically compromised. He answered 
the summons to return to Kailua, but promised Kekuaokalani that he 
would boycott any ai noa (free eating), or any other attempt to subvert 
the kapu system.102
The hiding of Kamehameha’s bones by Hoapili in the vicinity of the 
lava-strewn plains of Pu‘uotaroa in North Kona signalled the end of 
the ritual state of pollution at Kailua. Liholiho was officially recognised 
as his father’s successor on 21 May. The council of chiefs, the kuhina, 
war leaders, and lesser ali‘i all assembled at Kailua to witness the event. 
Armed soldiers were also present. Ka‘ahumanu was given the honour of 
announcing Kamehameha’s political will. Instead of declaring Liholiho 
as the successor, she declared that it had been Kamehameha’s will that 
Liholiho and she rule together. She created the post of kuhina nui for 
herself. This move made her the senior executive officer in the kingdom 
and firmly placed her at the centre of power alongside Liholiho.103
100  Levin (1968), p. 423; William H. Davenport, ‘The “Hawaiian Cultural Revolution”: Some 
Political and Economic Considerations’, American Anthropologist, vol. 71, 1969, 19; Howe (1984), 
pp. 166–67; Ralston (1984), pp. 29–30.
101  Levin (1968), p. 423; Kamakau (1961), p. 224.
102  Kamakau (1961), p. 224.
103  Kamakau (1961), pp. 215–20. See also Daws (1968a), pp. 55–56; Howe (1984), pp. 162–63; 
and Kame‘eleihiwa (1986), p. 110.
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There was no immediate backlash against Ka‘ahumanu’s initiative. 
Kamehameha had never declared such a role for Ka‘ahumanu publicly, 
but few influential ali‘i were willing or able to oppose her. She represented 
the interests of the main power group within the ali‘i as well as her own 
interests. While Liholiho refused a request from his mother to join her 
in a  meal to break the food kapu, he would not openly move against 
the ai noa lobby.104 As long as Liholiho and his father’s top office 
holders remained in this tense association, the rest of the ali‘i proceeded 
cautiously. There was vigorous pressure for a decision over reform of the 
royal monopoly on sandalwood and existing land tenure, but no open 
hostility. While the ruling clique was able to maintain their coherence, 
the war leaders and royal army had no conflict of loyalty to divide them. 
None of the other ali‘i was capable of mounting a serious challenge to 
the status quo. Kaumuali‘i was probably the only vassal with a sizeable 
force of his own, but he seemed to have remained on Kaua‘i, unwilling or 
unable to influence events at Kailua.
The future direction of the Kingdom was still uncertain when Freycinet 
arrived at the leeward coast of Hawai‘i in August. Liholiho had delayed 
making any policy decisions, and most leading ali‘i were still assembled 
there. Freycinet described how several of the principal chiefs of the island 
had raised claims to which there was still not perfect agreement. There 
existed a certain vagueness and indecision in the political situation towards 
which efforts at settlement were being made.105
Freycinet’s main informant was Young, who was concerned enough to 
urge the Frenchman to declare his support for Liholiho to deter rebellion. 
He was particularly worried about Kekuaokalani, who remained apart 
from the assembled ali‘i and was threatening to march against Liholiho 
and overthrow him because of his wavering attitude towards preserving 
the kapu system. Kekuaokalani was now openly talking about killing all 
Europeans to ensure the preservation of the old ways.106
Liholiho summoned the council of chiefs to Kawaihae in August. Faced 
with the threat of Kekuaokalani, he agreed to the ali‘i’s desire to control 
all sandalwood on their own lands to secure their support. But he stopped 
short of agreeing to a redistribution of land rights. It might be desirable 
104  Kamakau (1961), p. 224; Alexander (1891), pp. 166–67.
105  Kelly (1978), p. 5.
106  Kelly (1978), pp. 20–23.
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to avoid driving lesser ali‘i into Kekuaokalani’s camp, but it was essential 
to retain the support of the dominant clique, who controlled most of 
the land in the existing set up. Liholiho made a show of upholding the 
old ways by attempting to consecrate a heiau at Honokahou, in Kona, 
Hawai‘i. But he did so without enthusiasm and in a drunken stupor. 
In this state he failed to achieve the faultless rendition of his ceremonial 
duties that the heiau ritual demanded.107
After the meeting at Kawaihae, Ka‘ahumanu returned to Kailua and 
continued to press for the ending of the kapu. In November, Liholiho 
finally agreed. He was now politically and socially isolated. Already his 
real and adopted mothers, Keōpūolani, Ka‘ahumanu and Kaheiheimalie, 
and his wives Kamokau and Kekauluohi were pressing him to give in. 
Kalanimoku, Naihe, Hoapili and most other powerful ali‘i also supported 
Ka‘ahumanu. Short of the desperate option of joining Kekuaokalani, 
Liholiho had little choice in the matter. He delayed the issue one last 
time by cruising off the Kona coast, drinking heavily with friends. After 
a few days he came back into Kailua. At a public feast he sat down and ate 
with high-ranking female ali‘i. The ai kapu was then declared overturned 
and, to reinforce the point, images of gods in local heiau were destroyed. 
Messengers were sent to proclaim the abolition of the kapu throughout 
the archipelago. Few resisted.108
Only Kekuaokalani and his supporters attempted to defend the old 
ways. Kekuaokalani refused to join in the feast at Kailua and now retired 
to Ka‘awaloa to make his stand. Here he was joined by those prepared to 
risk all to uphold the kapu system – the kahuna Kuaiwa and Holoialena, 
and members of the priestly lines of Kauahi and Nahulu. They urged 
Kekuaokalani to take up arms. To men who still believed in the old ways, 
Liholiho’s failure to perform the temple rituals at Honokahou indicated 
that the gods had deserted him.109 Kekuaokalani, on the other hand, 
was the guardian of Kū‘kā‘ili-moku, a god who had rarely failed his 
supplicants when appealed to through human sacrifice. Kū‘kā‘ili-moku 
might once more vanquish all his worshipper’s enemies. The odds were 
against Kekuaokalani, who may have hoped his stand would galvanise 
others into action. According to Kamakau, ‘[M]any commoners and 
107  Levin (1968), p. 424; Alexander (1891), p. 167; and Sahlins (1981), p. 64.
108  Kamakau (1961), pp. 221–25; Kahananui (1984), pp. 216–18; and Alexander (1891), p. 169. 
See also Sahlins (1981), p. 55; Daws (1968a), pp. 56–57; and Howe (1984), pp. 163–64.




chiefs, even those who had practiced free eating, and the brothers of 
Ka‘ahumanu’s themselves, wanted tabu eating. Few of the chiefs were 
in favour of free eating’.110
Liholiho and Ka‘ahumanu tried to avoid open conflict by offering 
Kekuaokalani the freedom to observe the kapu if he would return to 
Kailua. But they insisted that those who chose to do so could also observe 
ai noa. Kekuaokalani refused the offer.111 A partial kapu was no kapu 
at all. Such terms would still leave him in the political wilderness, with 
Ka‘ahumanu’s party retaining its grip on the effective sources of power in 
the kingdom: the army and the administrative infrastructure. With their 
overture rejected, Ka‘ahumanu and Liholiho decided to move against 
Kekuaokalani before he became a rallying point for other malcontents.
The only other revolt against Liholiho was a local uprising in Hāmākua. 
When Liholiho sent a lesser ali‘i named Lonoakahi to investigate, he and 
two of his men were killed in a skirmish at Mahiki. The bones of the 
slain enemy were then taken to Kekuaokalani, presumably as offerings 
to Kū‘kā‘ili-moku.112 Refusing to be distracted by the disturbance 
in Hāmākua, Kalanimoku advised Liholiho to strike directly against 
Kekuaokalani and his supporters in Kona. Liholiho agreed.113
Kalanimoku marched out of Kailua at the head of the royal army to 
confront the rebels. The evidence suggests that the royal force numbered 
in the thousands, although the exact size is uncertain. Hiram Bingham 
writes that Kalanimoku raised a regiment, while Dibble claims that the 
army was  arranged in nine battalions. Nine war canoes accompanied 
the army,  along with food and water bearers. Kamakau implies that 
others, who were trained in the use of weaponry, reinforced the regular 
forces under arms at Kailua. Large supplies of firearms were collected 
at Honolulu in December in response to the crisis. Marin noted in his 
journal that, on 2 December, Ke‘eaumoku II, the son and successor of 
the original Ke‘aumoku, arrived at Honolulu on board the brigantine 
Bordeaux Packet to collect cannon, muskets, powder and flints. Marin’s 
entry for 12 December notes that 900 more muskets were brought ashore 
from a Captain Luis’s ship. The rebels’ possession of firearms suggests that 
they had powerful supporters with access to European trade. Nevertheless, 
110  Kamakau (1961), p. 226; and Kahananui (1984), p. 219.
111  Kamakau (1961), pp. 226–27.
112  Kamakau (1961), p. 226; Alexander (1891), p. 170; and Sahlins (1981), p. 75 n. 18.
113  Kamakau (1961), pp. 227–28; Dibble (1909), p. 131.
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although Alexander claims Kekuaokalani attracted a large body of 
priests, chiefs and commoners to his cause, accounts of the battle that 
followed suggest the rebels were outnumbered and outgunned. Freycinet’s 
expedition had noted 40 to 60 cannon and several thousand muskets 
belonging to the government. Only the royal force had continued to train 
for warfare in the last decade of Kamehameha’s rule,114 and it had been 
many years since Hawaiians had been to war. Both sides’ determination 
was probably tinged with a sense of apprehension.
The first encounter took place at Lekeleke, when the royal forces 
encountered a rebel scouting party. Kalanimoku’s men were unsettled by 
the loss of some of their men to rebel musket fire and retired to regroup 
behind a stone wall. When it was realised how few rebels opposed them, 
the royal forces resumed their advance and the enemy scouts retreated. 
Kalanimoku came on the main rebel force at Kuamo‘o between Keauhou 
Bay and Kealakekua Bay. Kekuaokalani’s battle line seems to have run at 
right angles to the coastline. The royal forces outflanked his right flank and 
drove the rebels towards the seashore. Here they were exposed to flanking 
fire from the double canoes accompanying the royal army. The firepower 
on board the canoes included an artillery piece manned by an unnamed 
foreign gunner. Inspired by the example of their leader, the rebels resisted 
stubbornly until Kekuaokalani fell after being hit several times. His wife 
Manona was struck down beside him in a hail of musket balls. Rebel 
resistance then crumbled. In 1823 Ellis walked over the battlefield from 
Lekeleke to Kuomo‘o. He noticed piles of stone marking the graves of the 
dead. These steadily increased as he approached the site of Kekuaokalani 
and Manona’s last stand. The rebel’s graves were particularly concentrated 
around those of their leaders. Alexander dates the battle to 20 December 
1819, but it may have been later as Marin wrote that news of the victory 
only arrived in Honolulu on December 30.115
Jarves was told that 10 royalists had been killed as opposed to around 
50  rebels. Most of the rebel leaders were killed at Kuomo‘o.116 The 
survivors hid in fear of their lives until Liholiho eventually announced 
114  Compare Bingham (1848), p. 76 with Dibble (1909), p. 135. See also Thrum, vol. 5 (1918–19), 
p. 480; Kamakau (1961), p. 227; Gast & Conrad (1973), pp. 235–36; and Alexander (1891), p. 170.
115  Alexander (1891), p. 171; and Gast & Conrad (1973), p. 236. On Lekeleke, see Kamakau 
(1961), p. 228; Alexander (1891), pp. 170–71; and Dibble (1909), p. 133. On Kuamo‘o, see 
Kamakau (1961), p. 228; Alexander (1891), p. 171; Dibble (1909), pp. 132–33; Ellis (1969), 
pp. 122–25; Kahananui (1984), pp. 231–32; and Fitzsimmons (1969), pp. 171–72.
116  Jarves (1843), p. 219. On casualties, see Kamakau (1961), p. 228; and Alexander (1891), p. 172.
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a pardon for all surviving rebels. The insurrection in Hāmākua was put 
down soon after the battle of Kuomo‘o. Hoapili and the royalist forces 
had little trouble defeating the rebels in Waipi‘o valley after marching 
against them from Kawaihae by way of the Waimea Saddle.117
The overthrow of the kapu consolidated the influence of those who were 
already in power. Ka‘ahumanu continued to have a strong influence over 
Liholiho. With the freeing up of the royal share of the sandalwood trade, 
the ali‘i turned their attention towards increasing the exploitation of 
their lands by demanding more from their maka‘āinana tenants. The ali‘i 
became, in the words of one visiting European, ‘a united corps of peaceful 
merchants’118 who saw their lands and tenants as merely a means of 
gaining access to European trade goods. The long-term viability of this 
commercial focus, however, remained uncertain. It was based on a rapidly 
declining stock of sandalwood and depended on the demands of distant 
markets over which Hawaiian ali‘i had little control. In time, mercantile 
power might rise to rival more traditional forms of power – as it had in 
Europe centuries before – but, for now, it enhanced the position of those 
controlling the administrative and coercive resources of government and 
the landed elite. While the position of many ali‘i improved, conditions for 
the maka‘āinana declined. There was little opposition to the increasingly 
skewed exchange of services between ali‘i and maka‘āinana. As Caroline 
Ralston notes: ‘The awe and respect inculcated over generations were not 
to be effaced by four or five decades of chiefly refusal to respect customary 
ideas of reciprocity.’119
Some commentators have interpreted the overturning of the kapu 
as a  cultural revolution that was heavily influenced by contact with 
Europeans, whose exotic behaviour brought into question hitherto 
accepted beliefs. Kamakau and others describe it as an action taken by 
a handful of powerful chiefs for political as much as religious reasons. 
Golovin was told that observation of kapu was most lax among the more 
important chiefs.120 Ka‘ahumanu and her chiefly supporters, in particular, 
had a long history of challenging accepted norms and admiring European 
ways. The majority of the population was less enthusiastic and merely 
117  Kamakau (1961), p. 228; and Kahananui (1984), p. 220.
118  Howe (1984), p. 168; citing Kuykendall (1938), p. 89. On the reign of Liholiho, see Howe 
(1984), pp. 168 ff.; and Daws (1968a), pp. 49 ff.
119  Ralston (1984), p. 37.
120  Golovin (1979), p. 209.
219
6 . CREATING A KINGDoM
followed their lead. What disappeared from their lives was state ritual that 
had usually been remote from the daily routine and domestic religious 
activities of most maka‘āinana.
Decades of European contact may have eroded the coherence of the 
Hawaiian worldview, but it did not overwhelm it. The potency of Kū and 
his fellow gods may have been brought into question, but they did not 
disappear from the thoughts of Hawaiians. Traditional beliefs continued to 
be widely held well into the following period of missionary proselytising. 
Idols were still worshipped secretly, as were the bones of dead ali‘i, while 
offerings continued to be made to numerous gods to seek their assistance 
for a variety of undertakings.121 For most Hawaiians, the supernatural 
world continued to mingle with that of humans, sorcerers continued to 
pray enemies to death, and Pele still displayed her displeasure through the 
awesome grandeur of volcanic activity.
By 1819, significant European influence was probably still largely confined 
to the immediate vicinity of the main ports. Despite its importance to the 
ali‘i, Honolulu was then still only a settlement of a few hundred huts 
and most Hawaiians continued to live in agricultural communities in the 
countryside. Their world was very different from that which European 
observers witnessed in ports. Gavan Daws speculates that for most:
As long as the passing seasons were observed in the old way and the 
makahiki festival guaranteed good times to come any exchanges 
brought in at the ports could be seen as superficial, perhaps curious and 
entertaining, but easily put off like European clothes, not touching at the 
heart of things, which was as carefully planted in the soil as the buried 
navel strings and dead bones of centuries of Hawaiians.122
121  Howe (1984), p. 168, citing Ellis (1967), p. 287; and Bingham (1848), p. 79.




The Hawaiian Achievement 
in Comparative Perspective
This chapter draws on historical patterns on the impact of Western contact 
observed elsewhere in the non-Western world to reinforce the contention 
of this study that the Hawaiian achievement of political centralisation 
was at best enhanced rather than triggered or wholly created by newly 
introduced Western elements and ideas. The evidence assembled in this 
chapter is directed towards answering the question of how Hawaiian 
society reacted to new elements in a time of internal transition. Three 
aspects of change are studied and three general propositions articulated. 
The first relates to the fact that new ideas and objects are confronted by 
existing ideas and ways of viewing the world – Marshall Sahlins’s powerful 
conception of the structure of the conjuncture. I argue that the structure 
was much more fluid, mobile and varied than has generally been allowed 
for. As the fluidity of Hawaiian structures of power has been dealt with 
in detail in Chapters 3 and 4, this first section focuses on more general 
observations on the nature of change and continuity. The second focus 
is on the campaigns towards unification of the Hawaiian Islands, and 
it is argued that, in the Hawaiian context, the type of Western firearms 
and cannon introduced were incapable of producing the decisive military 
impact that archaeologists claim, as has been shown in numerous, detailed 
historical studies around the globe. The last point is that consolidation 
of unified rule was achieved by adherence to institutions of consensus-
building and peacemaking accumulated over centuries in the context of 
rulers who lacked decisive coercive advantages over the populations they 
ruled. This process was assisted by depopulation caused by introduced 
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diseases that allowed a demilitarisation of the islands. Demilitarisation 
was, however, a choice. The same circumstances could also have facilitated 
the accumulation and consolidation of coercive advantage by the state as 
occurred, for example, in parts of Europe.
Political transformation: New seeds in old soil
As a well-documented late transition from chiefly fragmentation to 
a  centralised kingdom and period of culture contact with Europeans, 
Hawai‘i provides an ideal insight into the processes of political 
consolidation, culture contact and the dynamics of power. As a small, 
intimate society, it also provides an ideal comparative study for those of 
larger, better known societies, where processes may not be as apparent 
as in Hawai‘i because of the sheer scale and size of the societies under 
review. The Hawaiian example offers lessons on the dangers of perceiving 
state formation as ultimately about the consolidation and centralisation of 
power in circumstances of diverse and highly localised identities. Greater 
consolidation came from the exercise of moderation and accommodation 
by Kamehameha, particularly in circumstances where new realities on 
the ground moved ahead of old mindsets. These lessons on how external 
weapons and attitudes change circumstances faster than they alter local 
attitudes, and that military victory is as much psychological as material, 
have a chilling resonance in the current era of state formation and failed 
state discourse, which is emanating largely from the Western developed 
nations, but directed at the non-Western world.
The efficacy of Pacific historian the late Jim Davidson’s idea persists 
that culture changes round the edges as a result of cultural interaction 
and changed circumstances, but the core remains intact, changing only 
gradually, if at all. External influences and their impact are likened to 
the fluid intertidal zone at water’s edge – eroding the margins, but rarely 
altering the island interior in any significant way.1 The form might vary 
and alter, but underlying beliefs persist. In her classic account of religious 
syncretism in colonial Papua New Guinea, ‘Sunday Christians, Monday 
Sorcerers’, anthropologist Miriam Kahn makes the point that Pacific 
Islanders saw no contradiction in continuing to worship traditional 
spirits to enhance crop fertility while also adhering to Christian churches 
1  Davidson (1970), p. 267.
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or, more correctly, Islander-modified forms of Christian worship and 
doctrine.2 Kahn’s analysis is the norm in Pacific Studies’ interpretations 
of religious conversion and adaptation among both anthropologists 
and historians, with strong emphasis on ongoing continuity in religious 
beliefs and practices, but eventual modification through the gradual 
incorporation and adaptation of new belief systems. This blending of 
old and new resulted in multiple forms of belief existing side by side in 
a fluid and evolving form of interaction. This acceptance of, and search 
for, syncretism has not, however, taken root in other areas of study. This 
is most noticeable in the fields of legal beliefs and governance, which 
were intimately connected to religious legitimacy in Pacific societies. 
A profound sense of political pluralism also prevailed in the Pacific. 
This study has suggested a different reading of the relationship between 
power and authority in Hawai‘i to that noted by Gavan Daws and 
Sahlins, in which power is always violent and external, but in which rule is 
ultimately needed to be considered legitimate to endure, and this authority 
was always conveyed from within.3 Usurping outsiders who defeated rulers 
usually then married the highest born local women to gain legitimacy, 
as they rarely had sufficient numbers to sustain their position without 
local cooperation.4 Relations might be tense and filled with suspicion, 
but there was little alternative. Rulers who offended their people could 
not rely on their support when the next usurper arrived, and might even 
face a challenge from within.5 Kamehameha ruled powerful chiefs whose 
retinues were of a similar magnitude to his and other powerful chiefs. 
Marriage links and loyalties to sisters extended blood alliances across 
moku boundaries. Kanalu Young has shown that even kaukau ali‘i could 
draw on extensive networks of allies. Mō‘ī lacked significant coercive 
advantage over the alliance networks within their lands and so needed 
to be conciliators and mediators as much as fighters to succeed – a lesson 
Kahekili and his son neglected to learn, to Kamehameha’s profit. External 
power and internal legitimacy were as much moral cultural categories that 
rulers moved between through their actions as geographical designations.
2  Miram Kahn, ‘Sunday Christians, Monday Sorcerers: Selective Adaptation to Missionization 
in Wamira’, Journal of Pacific History, vol. 18, 1983, 96–112.
3  Daws (1984), p. 16.
4  Sahlins (1994), pp. 63–65, 69.
5  On Pohnpei, see Ward H. Goodenough, ‘Sky World and This World: The Place of Kachaw 
in Micronesian Cosmology’, American Anthropologist, vol. 88 (3), 1986, 553; Fornander (1969), 
pp. 201–02, 229; and Kamakau (1961), p. 143.
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
224
We need to move away from debates about change versus continuity, and 
towards recognition that change was a constant for most Pacific peoples. 
What mattered was how societies coped with change. As anthropologist 
Alexander Spoehr noted:
Change of itself need not imply instability. Change is always present 
in greater or lesser degree in every culture and society. Stability is not. 
Stability lies in orderly change and finds expression in a continuing 
successful adaptation to habitat and in non-violent shifts in the pattern of 
social organisation.6
The degree of internally generated change between 1770 and 1796, 
and 1796 and 1819 that is described in Chapters 3 to 6 has important 
implications for archaeology, anthropology and history. Archaeologists 
and anthropologists cite few works by Pacific historians. The degree 
of short-term, internally generated change noted by Kānaka Maoli 
historians Kanalu Young, Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio and 
Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa suggests that sources and methodologies employed 
by Pacific historians could significantly enhance Pacific archaeology and 
anthropology. This work has portrayed Hawaiian communities as highly 
localised in their affinities, with local polities and leaders capable of 
pursuing dramatically different paths within a single generation from 
broadly similar, internally generated institutions and structures also subject 
to rapid and significant changes resulting from external influences. Such 
issues of cultural construction and cultural resilience require collaboration 
between archaeologists, anthropologists and historians.7 The Hawaiian 
example argues for greater resilience and continuity in local traditions and 
attitudes in circumstances of increasing Western presence and influence, 
but also for the need to combine archaeological structures of the long 
durée and anthropological structural, institutional approaches to non–
Western history with historical approaches to historical processes that 
suggest the timing of events and individual choices can significantly alter 
history within the bounds set by environmental and cultural structural 
constraints.
6  Spoehr (1954), p. 210.
7  These issues are discussed in more detail in Paul D’Arcy, ‘Cultural Divisions and Island 
Environments Since the Time of Dumont d’Urville’, The Journal of Pacific History, vol. 38 (2), 2003b, 
217–35. This article was part of a special issue on the legacy of d’Urville involving archaeologists, 
anthropologists and historians and which demonstrated the potency of such collaboration.
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There is still no comprehensive account of European influences on the 
unification process in Hawai‘i. Particular European influences have, 
however, been addressed. Most studies conclude that Europeans had 
a  significant influence on the political process and most scholars claim 
that European military technology was a decisive factor in Kamehameha’s 
military successes in the 1790s. European transport technology and 
concepts of government have been suggested as central pivots in 
Kamehameha’s post-conquest centralised administration. Others note that 
the pursuit of trade goods provided a crucial alternative to the conquest 
and distribution of land at this time, thereby helping to maintain the 
peace that followed Kamehameha’s campaigns of unification. At the same 
time, European actions and ideas often conflicted with Hawaiian beliefs, 
and challenged many of the religious assumptions that supported chiefly 
rule. Finally, David Stannard’s upward revision of the demographic impact 
of European diseases carries with it sociopolitical implications that are 
germane to the issue of unification.
This study argues that Kamehameha gained victory because his opponents 
overextended themselves logistically, and were weakened at crucial times 
by internal divisions. Battles were important but, in most cases, European 
military technology was not crucial to the outcome. Military success came 
at the end of a process of attrition rather than in a dramatic confrontation 
on a particular day. Military victory alone was not enough to secure 
power. Many mō‘ī had triumphed in battle before Kamehameha. What 
distinguished him from those before was his method of consolidating 
victory off the battlefield. Centralisation was a victory of the arts of peace 
over the arts of war. Kamehameha had already demonstrated skill at 
building and maintaining coalitions before John Young and Isaac Davis 
were on the scene to advise him. His political reforms after 1796 were 
a blend of old and new. 
The conquest phase: Muskets versus mana
Visitors to the Hawaiian archipelago during the wars of unification 
were often told that European weapons had been a decisive factor in 
Kamehameha’s success. Davis claimed his much-valued knowledge of 
firearms had ‘proved of essential service’ to Kamehameha.8 Revisionist 
8  Campbell (1967), p. 97.
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military historians’ emphasis on the importance of logistical and 
organisational factors calls for a re-evaluation of the significance 
of European weaponry and mercenaries in Kamehameha’s wars of 
unification. While battles were important, European military technology 
was not crucial to the outcome in most cases. Military success came at 
the end of a process of attrition, rather than in a dramatic confrontation 
on a particular day. This study also supports the idea that weapons are 
used according to cultural values and priorities rather than simply to 
maximise the casualties inflicted. It also suggests that competition and 
fear of an eroding position can undermine such cultural values in favour 
of ultimately self-destructive arms races and increasingly pyrrhic victories. 
These assertions find a great deal of support from around the globe.
Traders and beachcombers left few records about the Hawaiian gun 
trade between 1786 and 1795. Hawaiians were generally visited by at 
least three ships a year during this time.9 Several captains traded arms 
and ammunition for provisions and Hawaiians also obtained weapons as 
a result of attacks on shore parties or vessels. There is no evidence to suggest 
that Kamehameha or his rivals had any more than five or six artillery 
pieces and a handful of muskets until 1794. The few ships’ inventories 
noted in this study suggest visiting traders carried 100–200 muskets for 
trade (see tables in Appendix 2). Visiting ships’ captains never reported 
seeing more than 20 to 30 muskets in any one place during the 1790s.10 
Historians give no indication that anything more than a few cannon and 
small squads of musketeers were involved in the combat that occurred 
before 1795.11 Hawaiians’ large-scale accumulation of European weapons 
may have occurred only in 1794–95 or later. Young, Kamehameha’s 
trusted friend, informed visitors that Kamehameha’s 10,000-man army 
of 1795 had 5,000 muskets and an impressive artillery train. In 1804, 
however, Young told Urey Lisiansky that Kamehameha’s forces possessed 
only 600 muskets, which raises doubts about his earlier claim.12
A number of chiefs recruited European beachcombers for their knowledge 
of firearms. According to George Vancouver, there were 14 beachcombers 
spread among the chiefs on Hawai‘i in 1794. Kalanikūpule of Maui had 
9  Bernice Judd, Voyages to Hawaii before 1860 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1974), 
pp. 1–8; Pogue (1978), pp. 77 ff.; and Kahananui (1984), p. 176.
10  Vancouver (1801), bk 2, pp. 353, 355, 391; bk 3, p. 224; bk 5, p. 49.
11  Campbell (1967), p. 97.
12  Boit (n.d.), p. 5; Broughton (1967), p. 34; Lisiansky (1967), p. 133; and Bishop, in Roe (1967), 
p. 141.
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around five beachcombers in his territory, while Kaua‘i was home to 
up to seven beachcombers during the 1790s. In 1796, white residents 
told Captain Charles Bishop that Kamehameha’s army had one or more 
Englishmen in the vanguard of each division. Hawaiians considered them 
to be good warriors. Ka‘eokulani’s Kaua‘i forces used Mare Amara and 
his regent Enemo used foreign musketeers to support his assault against 
rebel forces on Kaua‘i in 1793. In 1794, Kalanikūpule temporarily hired 
sailors from vessels anchored in Pu‘uloa to assist him in his war against 
Ka‘eokulani. The sailors fared badly against Mare Amara in  the initial 
skirmishes. Their role in the deciding battle at Aiea was limited to firing 
into the flank of Ka‘eokulani’s army from the safety of longboats offshore, 
while the two battlelines collided and the issue was decided at  close 
quarters.13
Although Hawaiians faced risks in adopting firearms, some embraced the 
new technology. In 1792, Archibald Menzies, for example, noted that 
the ali‘i Ka‘iana and his followers were proficient in the use of firearms. 
Ka‘eokulani keenly observed European armourers forge metal and strip 
and clean their firearms.14 Not all Hawaiians were as enthusiastic about 
firearms, and often with good reason. The great Maui warrior Pe‘ape‘a died 
a slow, painful death around this time as a result of severe burns acquired 
when sparks from his musket’s firing mechanism fell into a nearby powder 
keg.15 Vancouver and Menzies commented on the poor condition of many 
of the muskets traded to Hawaiians. Menzies dressed the hand of a young 
ali‘i after it had been badly damaged when his musket exploded on firing. 
He was told that his hosts were reluctant to use a shipment of muskets 
as many had burst open on their first firing.16
Most muskets traded in Hawai‘i came from the east coast of the United 
States or Britain. The flintlock musket was the main military firearm in 
use in Europe and North America during this time. The poor quality of 
some muskets suggests that some firearms introduced into Hawai‘i were 
not standard military-issue flintlock muskets. Studies of the gun trade 
with West Africa distinguish between army-issue ‘Tower’ muskets and 
trade muskets. Tower muskets were smoothbore flintlocks that had been 
13  Bishop, in Roe (1967), pp. 177–78; Kamakau (1961), p. 169; Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 381, 
386; bk 5, p. 112; Fornander (1969), p. 159; Maude (1968), pp. 139–40; and Bradley (1942), 
pp. 33–34.
14  Menzies (1920), pp. 14, 109–10.
15  Kamakau (1961), p. 161.
16  Vancouver (1801), bk 5, p. 49; Menzies (1920), p. 72.
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tested with charges of powder by government inspectors at the Tower of 
London, and thus had a minimum guaranteed standard barrel strength. 
Until the establishment of commercial proof houses for testing trade 
guns towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars, trade guns carried no 
guarantee that they would not burst if fired. Most of these trade guns 
were manufactured for West Africa, and often had not been fired by their 
manufacturers to check for imperfections. Trade muskets were cheaper, 
lighter and less mechanically complicated than Tower muskets. They were 
not intended for rapid firing or for the rigours of campaigning.17
Trade muskets continued to be of dubious quality after the establishment 
of commercial testing houses. Many gun barrels made of substandard 
iron still passed through the tests, and many barrels were thinned 
down after they had passed the proofing tests. The counterfeiting of 
proofmarks flourished.18 Exploding gun barrels may also have resulted 
from improper gunpowder charges. The higher the saltpetre component 
of gunpowder, the greater its explosive force. Obviously the strength of 
the gunpowder  should match the strength of the gun barrel, however, 
it was common to increase profits by diluting gunpowder with charcoal 
or other substances that could not be distinguished in the mix. This 
resulted in powder of varying quality and strength, so that charges could 
not be gauged with any consistency. Powder could also be damaged by 
exposure to dampness. Failure to turn powder barrels regularly resulted in 
the powder clogging and the saltpetre accumulating at the bottom of the 
barrel, creating an uneven consistency. Humidity and high rainfall added 
to the deterioration of firearms and gunpowder.19
Military-issue firearms did not necessarily confer an advantage to their 
possessors over opponents armed with traditional Hawaiian weapons. 
Although traditional projectile weapons travelled much slower than 
musket balls and, therefore, generally did less damage when they struck, 
they were more reliable and accurate than muskets within each weapon’s 
17  The whole issue of the Journal of African History, vol. 12 (2), 1971, deals with firearms in Africa. 
For the export of firearms out of Britain see Gavin White, ‘Firearms in Africa: An Introduction’, 
Journal of African History, vol. 12 (2) 1971, 175–82. Another interesting insight into the gun industry 
around this time is found in Smith (1976).
18  See White (1971), p. 181.
19  White (1971), pp. 174–75; F. Clunie, Fijian Weapons and Warfare (Suva: Fiji Museum, 1977), 
p. 79; R.A. Kea, ‘Firearms and Warfare on the Gold and Slave Coasts from the Sixteenth to the 
Nineteenth Centuries’, Journal of African History, vol. 12 (2), 1971, 204–05. 
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effective range.20 The flintlock musket was unreliable at any range over 
90 metres and was preferably used at ranges of 45 to 65 metres, or less, 
against massed targets. Tests conducted by the Prussian army in the late 
18th century bear witness to this fact. In the tests, an infantry battalion 
fired volleys into a canvas target 30 metres long and 1.8 metres tall, which 
was the average height and frontage of an infantry unit. At 205 metres, 
only 25 per cent of the musket balls fired hit the target; at 137 metres, 
50 per cent hit; while, at 68 metres, 60 per cent of the shots found their 
mark.21 Such strike rates required the enemy to be tightly packed together, 
which was often not the case in Hawaiian warfare.
Although soldiers could fire up to four or five times a minute under test 
conditions, the average soldier usually loaded and fired at a rate of only 
twice a minute. The residue of the powder burnt to propel the musket ball 
tended to clog the musket barrel after prolonged use. The faster the rate 
of fire, the more prone the barrel was to fouling. Tests conducted by the 
British army in 1834 showed that, although flintlocks could be loaded 
and fired every 20 seconds, the rate of misfires at this speed was one in 
every 6.5 shots. In the field, the rate of misfires increased significantly. 
Damp powder prevented the musket from firing and powder on an open 
priming pan was particularly prone to damage by rain and dispersal 
by wind.
When a flint became chipped or blunted, it was less likely to generate 
sufficient sparks into the priming pan to ignite the charge. Flints could 
last up to 60 shots but most had a much shorter lifetime. US army 
regulations stated that a flint should be replaced after 20 rounds. It was 
not easy to change a flint in mid-battle, and the musketeer was extremely 
vulnerable until the new flint was installed. Without a local manufacturing 
industry, gun maintenance was also a problem, particularly for worn-out 
firing mechanisms and defective metal gun barrels. Maintenance was 
only possible because the guns were handmade. Surrogates for flints and 
20  The discussion of the technical capabilities of flintlock muskets is based primarily on the 
following sources: H.C.B. Rogers, Weapons of the British Soldier (London: Seeley Service and Co., 
1960), pp. 154–63; H.L. Blackmore, British Military Firearms 1650–1850 (London: Herbert Jenkins, 
1961), p. 45; T.H. McGuffie, ‘Musket and Rifle’, History Today, vol. 7 (4), 1957, 2157–63, and vol. 
7 (7), 1957, 473–79; and Clunie (1977), p. 83.
21  David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1966), 
p. 342, cited in Dyer (1985), p. 62.
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musket balls could be found, but they diminished the consistency of 
ignition and the accuracy of fire. Young attributed one of Kamehameha’s 
minor reverses to a loss of firepower brought about by deficient flints.22
Hawaiian musketeers were vulnerable in battle because of the general 
failure to adopt the bayonet. When fighting at close quarters, warriors 
armed with unloaded muskets without bayonets would find their 
weapons of little use for clubbing, thrusting, or parrying – the British 
standard military-issue Short Land Pattern musket (the Brown Bess) for 
example, was 1 metre long and weighed only 6 kilograms. There are many 
examples throughout the Pacific of musketeers being overcome when 
their opponents anticipated their musket discharges after observing the 
ignition of the powder charges just beforehand, and then rushed in while 
the guns were being reloaded.23 The limited range of flintlock muskets 
meant that warriors could cover the effective shooting range in well under 
the average reloading time of 30 seconds. This may have been the case 
at the battle of Koapapa in the early 1790s where the forces of Keōua 
rushed forward and seized the guns of Kamehameha’s musket men. John 
Young claimed that Davis and he had to be carried on the backs of strong 
warriors to keep up with the flow of Hawaiian battles because of the time 
it took them to reload.24
In a comparison of the battle of Waterloo in 1815 and Alexander the Great’s 
victory at Gaugamela in 331 BC, John Keegan points out that edged-
weapon fighting and battles in the flintlock era had much in common. 
The effective range of firearms meant that the decisive fighting in 18th-
century European warfare still took place at close range and depended on 
the steadiness of the combatants. Keegan notes that, because of the close 
proximity of the antagonists in both modes of fighting, battles were ‘noisy, 
physically fatiguing, nervously exhausting and, in consequence of that 
physical and nervous strain they imposed, narrowly compressed in time’.25 
In both cases each side attempted to extend its line of battle to maximise 
22  Barnard (1829), pp. 230–32, referring to a battle in Hawai‘i Kohala. Kamakau, however, does 
not mention this battle, and claims Kamehameha was in neighbouring Kona at the time.
23  R.A. Cruise, Journal of a Ten Month Residence in New Zealand (2nd edn) (Christchurch: 
Capper Press, 1974 (1824)), p. 68; S. Percy Smith, Maori Wars of the Nineteenth Century (2nd edn) 
(Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, 1910), p. 144; Duperrey, in C.A. Sharp (ed.), Duperrey’s 
Visit to New Zealand in 1824 (Wellington: Alexander Turnbull Library, 1971), p. 61; and Marsden, in 
J.R. Elder, (ed.), The Letters and Journals of Samuel Marsden 1765–1838 (1st edn) (Dunedin: Coulls 
Somerville Wilkie Ltd, and A.H. Reed, 1932), p. 284.
24  Barnard (1829), p. 229.
25  Keegan (1987), p. 115.
231
7 . THE HAWAIIAN ACHIEvEMENT IN CoMPARATIvE PERSPECTIvE
the number of weapons that could be brought to bear against the enemy, 
without the risk of overextending themselves. Each side either sought to 
outflank the other or, failing that, to break some point of the enemy’s line 
by ‘superior savagery’,26 where the issue would be decided at speaking, 
if not spitting distance.
Cannon were more intimidating weapons than muskets. Hawaiians 
received dramatic demonstrations of the destructive power of cannon in 
the British response to the death of Captain James Cook at Kealakekua 
Bay in 1779. While the British were impressed with the Hawaiians’ 
courage under fire, they also noted that they sustained many casualties. 
On 14 February 1779 alone, at least 25 Hawaiians were killed, including 
several prominent ali‘i. Many more were badly wounded. Most fell to 
ships’ cannon as they crowded along the shoreline. Kamehameha was 
among the wounded. He was hit in the face by a splinter when a British 
cannon ball struck a nearby stone.27 When trading contacts began in 
1786, Kamehameha eagerly sought European artillery. He had at least 
four artillery pieces by 1790 and his artillery train had risen to 12 by 
1796. Little is known about the number of cannon his rivals possessed 
(see Table 2A.1 in Appendix 2).
Pogue recorded the reaction of Hawaiians to bombardment by ship’s 
cannon at Waimea on O‘ahu in 1792. As the cannon opened fire:
‘The Natives wondered what is this thing which makes a continuous 
noise?’ Said one of them: ‘it is powder, a death-dealing substance, they 
light it and the people are no more. It is well that we save ourselves from 
death at the hands of these demons. If we stay here, we will all be killed.’28
Mary Pukui and Samuel Elbert’s Hawaiian dictionary lists four terms 
pertaining to cannon: Pu kuni ahi (gun burning fire) and olohao (iron 
noise) refer to the two most noticeable features of their firing action. 
Two others allude to their role in land warfare: Pu ku‘a (rolling gun) refers 
to cannon mounted on wheels to facilitate overland movement; Pu kaua 
refers not only to artillery, but also commanders, champions, and war 
leaders, suggesting cannon were highly valued battlefield assets.29
26  Keegan (1987), p. 116.
27  King, in Beaglehole (1967) 3:1, pp. 562, 565.
28  Pogue (1978), p. 87.




Cannon were capable of inflicting great damage, even against troops in 
open formation. They could fire either solid iron balls or masses of small 
projectiles. The former ploughed its way through all obstacles until it 
lost momentum. Although the ball’s momentum declined markedly at 
distances over a kilometre, it was still capable of shattering limbs at this 
range. Cannon packed with smaller projectiles had an effect similar to 
that of a sawn-off shotgun. The projectiles spewed out over a wide arc 
along the line of trajectory after leaving the cannon barrel. Each projectile 
was capable of killing or disabling a person. Cannon could only fire such 
ammunition up to ranges of 400 metres.30
The robust nature of cannon meant that supplies of ammunition were 
less of a problem than for muskets. If conventional ammunition was 
unavailable, local substitutes could be used. In particular, almost any small 
object could be used for close range scatter shots. But the substitution 
of rounded boulders for round shot did reduce accuracy and range 
considerably. Prolonged use might also damage the barrel, and imported 
gunpowder was still needed as the igniting agent.31
Almost all of the artillery pieces obtained by Hawaiians in this period 
were naval guns. Naval captains required artillery that was much heavier 
than artillery used on land, as its tactical function required hitting power 
rather than mobility. Naval warfare in this period was based on the 
manoeuvring of sail-powered warships to deliver broadsides, or cannon 
barrages from cannon lining either side of the ship, against the sturdy 
timber of opposing vessels. Cannon were classified by the weight of 
the shot they fired. For example, a three-pounder cannon fired a three-
pound shot. While land artillery ranged from three to 12 pounders, naval 
cannon generally consisted of 12, 16, 24 and 32 pounders, which were 
designed for stationary firing. Even the three-pounder field gun of the 
late 18th century still weighed around 350 kilograms.32 Two smaller naval 
cannon were in use by Kamehameha’s time. The carronade was a shorter 
cannon with a stubby, thinner barrel. Its thin barrel limited its range, but 
within that range it was more destructive than long cannon of the same 
bore. The swivel gun was even smaller and lighter, so that it could even 
30  P. Griffith, Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam (Chichester, Great 
Britain: Anthony Bird, 1981), p. 145; Robert Leckie, Warfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 
pp. 115–17; and Keegan & Holmes (1985), p. 107.
31  Smith (1976), pp. 110 ff.
32  Clunie (1977), p. 78.
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be mounted on rowboats.33 The fluid nature of Hawaiian land battles 
reduced the impact of cannon. Without beasts of burden, Hawaiians were 
dependent on human muscle and dry and unimpeded terrain to move 
artillery. They needed to mount naval cannon on mobile carriages if they 
were to be of any use in warfare on land. Henry Restarick claims that John 
Young mounted a small cannon from the Fair American on a  carriage 
for  use on land. This was almost certainly the gun named Lopaka in 
Hawaiian traditions.34
The first use of cannon in battle occurred in 1790 at ‘Īao, when 
Kamehameha attacked neighbouring Maui after securing a cannon, 
firearms and two Europeans to assist in their use.35 Memories of the damage 
inflicted by trained gun crews in the wake of Cook’s death, and tales of the 
recent carnage at Olowalu inflicted by ship’s cannon on canoes possibly 
raised expectations of the effect that cannon would have in local warfare. 
At Olowalu, Hawaiians came out in canoes to trade with the Eleanora, 
unaware that the ship’s captain blamed them for a previous attack and 
was intent on revenge. Hundreds died or sustained horrific injuries as 
they attempted to flee the hail of musket balls and nails packed into the 
ships’ cannon. The corpses were later retrieved from the sea and laid out 
on the beach. Hawaiian accounts mention that many of the victims had 
badly battered skulls whose contents seeped out over the beach. A number 
almost certainly had shattered torsos and limbs.36
The impact of cannon in battle varied. In the two of the three land 
battles known to have involved cannon, the able handling of artillery by 
foreigners, especially John Young and Davis, is cited as an important factor 
in deciding the outcome. At ‘Īao and Nu‘uanu, cannon fire exacted a heavy 
toll on Kamehameha’s enemies. The effect at Pa‘auhau is less certain. These 
relatively immobile weapons required troops to stand firm and protect 
them in battle. Obviously this did not happen at Pa‘auhau. Artillery was 
most effective against stationary, mass targets, such as the Maui forces 
hemmed into the ‘Īao Valley on the last day of fighting, and Kalanikūpule’s 
33  William Reid, ‘Carronades’, War Monthly, vol. 8, 1974, pp. 44–45, 47; and Clunie (1977), p. 
79.
34  Restarick (1913), p. 29.
35  Fornander (1969), pp. 231–34; Kamakau (1961), pp. 146–47; and Vancouver (1801), bk 3, 
pp. 227, 230; and bk 5, p. 59.
36  Kamakau (1961), pp. 145–46; Jarves (1843), p. 70; Kahananui (1984), pp. 177–78; Vancouver 
(1801), bk 3, pp. 227–31; and S.J. Odgers, ‘Early Western Contact with Hawaii’, BA Hons Thesis, 
The Australian National University, 1977, p. 43, citing Frothingham’s Long Island Herald, vol. 1 (n.d.).
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initial battleline in the lower Nu‘uanu valley in 1795. No  mention of 
cannon is made in the fighting around Wailuku that preceded the carnage 
in ‘Īao, nor in the fighting in the upper Nu‘uanu valley in 1795. Once 
Lopaka had stung Keōua’s forces into action at Pa‘auhau, it became more 
of a prize to fight over than a weapon to decide the battle. The use of 
cannon at ‘Īao and Nu‘uanu were not so much decisive turning points 
as the culmination of longer processes of attrition that saw large armies 
kept in the field for lengthy periods of inactivity that were occasionally 
punctuated by battles settled by hand-to-hand combat.
Cannon were more suited to Hawaiian naval warfare where canoes and 
European vessels provided suitable platforms for firing and movement. 
The one naval battle involving cannon, Kepuwaha‘ula‘ula, remembered 
afterwards as the battle of the red-mouthed gun, involved Kamehameha’s 
Fair American and its cannon. Both sides probably also deployed war 
canoes modified to carry smaller cannon, such as swivel guns. Both sides 
used foreign gunners in this battle. Too little is known about the battle, 
however, to allow any firm appraisal of the role of cannon. The battle’s 
title may owe more to the novelty of cannon than to their decisive nature. 
At a time when Hawaiian fleets numbered hundreds, even thousands of 
canoes, there is nothing to suggest that any more than a handful of cannon 
were present.
Cannon used by Hawaiians were out of their element culturally as well 
as physically. Hawaiian traditions continue to emphasise the individual 
acts of valour that occurred in the 1790s. It may not be coincidence that 
no ali‘i of any consequence were among the victims of cannon fire at ‘Īao 
or the naval engagement of Kepuwaha‘ula‘ula. How should we explain 
Ka‘ia‘iaiea and Uhoi’s assault against the cannon Lopaka at Pa‘auhau? 
Were they enhancing their mana by challenging such a fearsome adversary, 
or did their bold charge merely reflect a more sanguine tactical necessity? 
Did Kamehameha’s slaying of his opposite number at Kokomo in single 
combat ultimately enhance his cause more than Lopaka’s firepower in the 
‘Īao Valley a few days later? In these initial decades of European influence, 
the supplanting of the old with the new was by no means a foregone 
conclusion.
The importance placed on personal encounters between skilled warriors 
in Hawaiian battles was threatened by Western weaponry. By substituting 
the chemical energy of exploding gunpowder for physical strength, 
firearms threatened to diminish the importance of traditional fighting 
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skills. Although the flash of the priming pan’s ignition provided warning 
of an impending projectile, no amount of personal skill in dodging 
traditional weapons could protect warriors from projectiles they could 
not see. The more firearms used in battle, the greater the chance of being 
struck. Hawaiian warfare was not only a vehicle for the pursuit of political 
power and economics resources but also a stage for the maintenance and 
advancement of social status. Worthy opponents of equal status were 
difficult to seek out and challenge while trying to avoid musket and 
artillery fire. The indiscriminate hail of lead that characterised battles 
involving firearms was no respecter of rank or prowess, knew no code of 
conduct, and feared no sanctions for breaking social norms.
Firearms brought about some changes to Hawaiian warfare, but generally 
traditional tactics and attitudes continued. This was possible because only 
limited numbers of firearms were introduced into Hawaiian warfare before 
unification. Battlefields continued to be stages for the display of personal 
bravery. Although the inability of wetted mats and feathered cloaks to 
fend off musket balls had been made apparent on 14 February 1779, 
Hawaiians continued to act ‘in a most daring and resolute manner’.37 
On 15 February, James King noted that, ‘a man had the audaciousness to 
come almost within Musket Shot ahead of the Ship & twirl about Captn 
Cooks hat in defiance and heave stones, whilst those on the N. Side were 
exalting him & encouraging his boldness’.38 The importance of individual 
bravery continued into the 1790s. At the battle of Koapapa in 1790, 
warriors of Keōua’s forces, armed with traditional weapons, charged 
Kamehameha’s musketeers and seized their guns.
Ultimately, however, guns did begin to modify tactics, as at the battle of 
Koapapa when Keōua’s men constructed shallow pits in which to crouch 
when they saw the flash from the musket priming pans of Ka‘iana’s forces. 
Chiefs were pinned down by musket fire from Europeans in their enemies’ 
ranks on Kaua‘i in 1793 and at ‘Aiea in 1794, while their opponents closed 
in and routed them with traditional weapons. Mare Amara’s shooting of 
a prominent O‘ahu war chief at Kukui in 1794 perhaps vindicated the 
O‘ahu forces decision to fight from the shelter of trenches and earthworks 
on this occasion. 
37  Thomas Edgar, ‘Extracts from Journal’, 14 Feb. 1779, copy of MS, Hocken Library, Dunedin.
38  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, p. 561.
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Hawaiians appear to have also begun experimenting with European tactics. 
A number of sources state that Kamehameha was influenced by discussion 
over military tactics with Vancouver. The 1838 Mooolelo Hawaii claims 
Vancouver taught Kamehameha how to drill soldiers. Vancouver makes 
no reference to this in his journal, however, portraying himself as a man 
intent on ending the fighting.39 Bishop’s reference to Englishmen being 
attached to ‘divisions’ might mean organisational reforms were instituted, 
although there is no indication that this was the case. The only other 
suggestion of military reform in the 1790s is Restarick’s reference to John 
Young having trained a small body of men in the use of muskets. This 
was possibly Kamehameha’s 30-man bodyguard armed with muskets, 
who Bishop noticed in 1796.40 There is no direct evidence that firearms 
or European tactics dramatically altered Hawaiian tactics in the wars 
of unification. Battle formations used in the 1790s all had indigenous 
precedents.
The old ways still predominated among mō‘ī but, in the atmosphere of 
intense rivalry that prevailed, the temptation to bend conventions and 
improve fighting effectiveness must have been great. Hawaiian leaders 
seem to have considered using indigenous weapons that threatened to 
undermine chiefly prowess in close quarter fighting on the eve of the 
introduction of firearms. Although there is no record of the use of bows 
in battle, Kahekili’s army included expert archers by 1783.41 If firearms 
had not been introduced, it was perhaps only a matter of time before 
Hawaiians used the bow in warfare. Political rivalry between chiefs also 
led to the formation of specialist military units on Maui and Hawai‘i 
by the 1770s. These units could also undermine the significance of 
individual chiefs in battle, particularly when they employed tactics such 
as the massed drills witnessed by Vancouver in the 1790s.42
39  Pogue (1978), p. 90; Kahananui (1984), p. 183; and Freycinet, in Kelly (1978), p. 103 n. 3.
40  Restarick (1913), p. 13; Bishop, in Roe (1967), p. 144.
41  Kamakau (1961), p. 135.
42  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, pp. 252–58.
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The consolidation phase: Coercion 
and consent revisited
The consolidation of the Hawaiian Kingdom under Kamehameha I 
involved changes to the ideological, economic, military and organisational 
aspects of power. In each of these spheres, the presence of Europeans 
provided potential new tools for the exercise of power, or brought about 
modifications to existing practices. The extent of European influence 
should not be overstated. European vessels continued to restrict their 
visits to a handful of ports and Europeans residents also tended to remain 
around the ports. While a few beachcombers overindulged in rum and 
occasionally caused trouble around Honolulu, European residents 
generally assimilated into their host society and adhered to its rules.43 
Although Hawaiian mobility increased after unification, most Hawaiians 
continued to live within a highly localised world that was predominantly 
rural and conservative.
Kamehameha carefully monitored and regulated trade of the unified 
kingdom through his bureaucracy. The king used his administrative and 
military strength to ensure that potential rivals were not able to utilise 
access to European trade to build up independent power. With  the 
fragmentation of landholdings, subordinate ali‘i were also denied 
the chance to develop local power bases. The kingdom based its domestic 
security as much on the denial of resources to rivals as increasing the 
capacity of the kingdom.
This was especially true of the military sphere. The 1804 epidemic 
allowed Kamehameha to consolidate military power by demilitarising 
Hawaiian society. Actual fighting strength declined markedly, but the 
relative coercive advantage of the ruler over his subjects became greater 
than ever before. The 1804 epidemic on O‘ahu decimated Kamehameha’s 
army assembled there to invade Kaua‘i. Many warriors from the armies of 
Kamehameha’s old rivals, Kalanikūpule and Ka‘eokulani, were probably 
also still resident on O‘ahu at the time. It is not until 1815 that there is 
any indication of armed forces numbering over 1,000 being present in 
the islands.
43  Howe (1984), p. 103; Maude (1968), pp. 139–40.
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Royal forces largely monopolised European military hardware after 1804. 
In addition, the main threat to Kamehameha in this period was perceived 
to be attempts by ali‘i on O‘ahu to obtain firearms and raise followers to 
use them against the king. The validity of Kamehameha’s fears is open to 
question. As it was, the challenge never eventuated and the king was able 
to collect his subjects’ firearms and remove them from circulation. This 
emphasis on firearms would at first seem to be at odds with their technical 
capabilities and utilisation in the 1790s. Perceptions may have been more 
important than realities. Without regular training, the issue of muskets 
to royal supporters would do little to enhance their military effectiveness. 
As it was, most of Kamehameha’s muskets seem to have remained in 
storage.44 Archibald Campbell had not been overly impressed with the 
ability of those troops who did drill regularly with firearms at Honolulu. 
The longer that peace was maintained, the greater the government’s 
coercive advantage over possible challengers became. Regular drilling 
with firearms and traditional weapons maintained the organisational 
coherence, discipline and esprit de corps, as well as the martial prowess 
of troops. Without regular practice the skills of others could not have 
been maintained. With no justification for retraining, and the kings’ 
men observant throughout the land, any move to reconstitute military 
retinues by other ali‘i faced the prospect of swift countermeasures before 
an effective fighting force could be organised. Bravery was no substitute 
for training, as Kekuaokalani and his followers found in 1819. Also, by 
1819, the ending of the Napoleonic wars in Europe freed up vast stocks 
of army-issue muskets that were eagerly purchased by traders as items of 
trade.45 Tower muskets, not trade muskets, may have been the weapons 
that Kekuaokalani faced at Kuamo‘o.
The perception of European military technology could only be enhanced 
the longer it remained unchallenged in battle. The public musket drills 
at Honolulu, the impressive batteries of cannon that guarded Hawaii’s 
main ports of call, and the fleet of European vessels may have drawn 
much of their effect from their association with Kamehameha’s victories 
in the 1790s. That most guns faced out to sea was a reminder that the 
44  Similar processes occurred in 16th-century Japan and Tudor England; see Noel Perrin, Giving 
up the Gun: Japan’s Reversion to the Sword, 1543–1879 (Boulder, Colorado: Shambala Productions, 
1979), pp. 45–47, 58–59; and Dyer (1985), p. 58.
45  Clunie (1977), p. 82; Rogers (1960), p. 154; and White (1971), p. 181.
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military served to guard the king’s subjects from outsiders as much as to 
preserve the domestic peace. The threat posed by George Scheffer, late in 
Kamehameha’s reign, seemed to bear out this conviction.
The maintenance of peace and unity in the later part of Kamehameha’s 
reign owes much to the workings of the royal administration. The King’s 
officials served as intermediaries and, to a certain extent, buffers between 
Hawaiian society and the outside world. They ensured that their ruler, 
not his rivals, controlled the trade with visiting vessels. Kamehameha also 
built up a reservoir of artisans who were skilled in European crafts such 
as shipbuilding and metalworking. Europeans were used within the royal 
bureaucracy as artisans and administrators. Such artisans usually taught 
their skills to Hawaiians while practicing their crafts in the service of the 
king.46 Other Europeans were valued for their knowledge of writing and 
financial matters, both of which were important tools in dealing with 
foreign traders and government representatives. European vessels soon 
supplanted Hawaiian canoes as the chief mode of inter-island transport 
and communications for government business. Their large holds and 
ability to handle heavy seas allowed for the rapid movement of men, 
supplies and messages throughout the kingdom, although traditional 
canoes remained in use among the general populace.
Old administrative practices persisted. The lesser ali‘i and kahuna 
who formed the majority of officials at the local level were part of an 
indigenous tradition that stretched back for centuries. Most of the royal 
administration remained concerned with relations between the king and 
his subjects. The existing system was modified rather than changed. The 
features of the royal administrative structure concerned with government 
away from the ports were present in the pre-existing system, and all that 
changed was that the scale was larger and the ruler was able to exercise 
more control over his administrators, now that his nominees had replaced 
the semi-autonomous and powerful vassal ali‘i who governed localities 
under the old system.47 These nominees did not have a local support 
base of their own; rather, their authority rested on their association 
with the king. This move may owe its implementation to the advice of 
Europeans that was based on their experience of European monarchies. 
But it is equally possible that the reason it was introduced was that only 
now were the powerful interests opposed to centralisation able to be 
46  Campbell (1967), pp. 99, 118–19, 144, 154; Daws (1968a), p. 46; and Bargatzy (1980), p. 94.
47  Howe (1984), p. 158.
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overcome. Attempts by Hawaiians to integrate large regions or whole 
islands into unified politics date back to the 1600s at least. It is only when 
Kamehameha’s unification is placed within this longer timescale that the 
dynamic of his state-building efforts in Hawai‘i can be truly understood.
The mere presence of outsiders in ports of call such as Honolulu and 
Kealakekua Bay did not necessarily ensure change, even at these cultural 
interfaces. Europeans visiting Hawai‘i during Kamehameha’s reign were 
in no position to force change on Hawaiians. Increasing exposure to 
European goods and ideas went hand in hand with changes that stemmed 
largely from indigenous factors, particularly the cessation of open warfare. 
Some transformations that occurred in Kamehameha’s lifetime were the 
climax of processes begun centuries before. What particularly distinguished 
Kamehameha from other mō‘ī was his method of consolidating military 
victory. Kamehameha mastered the art of building and maintaining 
coalitions. The early Hawaiian Kingdom was more of a chiefly federation 
that acknowledged Kamehameha’s primacy than a monarchy with power 
concentrated in the hands of the ruler. Kamehameha’s administrative 
reforms after unification combined Hawaiian practice with European ideas. 
Most commentators have noted the significance of these administrative 
changes, but few acknowledge that demilitarisation of the islands was 
central to the unification process. Hawaiian demilitarisation was assisted 
by epidemics, natural disasters and isolation from external threats after 
unification. Kamehameha may not have been able to implement his 
political reforms without this demilitarisation.
Hawaiian beliefs were challenged before 1819 simply by the non-adherence 
of foreigners to Hawaiian norms. At the time of Cook’s arrival, chiefly 
power was becoming more secular, but still rested partly on a belief system 
that closely associated ali‘i with gods. The gods affected the fortunes of 
men. If kapu were adhered to and mō‘ī conducted their duties correctly, 
the gods looked after their community of human worshippers. Although 
worship varied across the archipelago, the underlying assumptions were 
generally accepted. The situation was aided by the archipelago’s relative 
isolation from communities with differing worldviews. While the 
few Europeans who crossed the cultural divide and lived in Hawaiian 
society could be made to adhere to its rules, less control existed on board 
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visiting vessels. Sailors broke kapu by allowing women to eat with them, 
others manhandled ali‘i. The fact that European sailors did not receive 
supernatural or chiefly sanction for disobeying kapu was also noted.48
Kamehameha realised the danger that Europeans posed to the kapu system. 
Any system of beliefs needs to conceal new ideas from the population, 
contain them, or incorporate them to continue to work as a means of 
social conditioning.49 Kamehameha chose to contain the European threat 
to the kapu system. In the 1790s, Vancouver’s men were requested to stay 
away from heiau. As transgressors of kapu, the entry of the crew into these 
sacred places threatened to defile them. When Vancouver left Hawai‘i in 
1793, Kamehameha went into seclusion to purify himself because he had 
been in contact with foreigners who had eaten and drunk with Hawaiian 
women. Kamehameha continued this policy throughout his reign. When 
the Scheffer entered a heiau near Honolulu in 1816 during a kapu period, 
the heiau was declared desecrated and was burned down.50 Kamehameha 
also sought to restrict ship visits largely to Honolulu and to regulate visits 
through government officials.
Ali‘i were divided over the extent to which European influence should 
be controlled. As early as 1793, Ke‘eaumoku’s favourite wife, Namahana, 
had argued that Europeans and their vessels stood outside of the kapu 
system as it applied only to things Hawaiian.51 A number of Hawaiian ali‘i 
were attracted to European ways and openly imitated them. Ka‘ahumanu’s 
brother, Kahekili Ke‘eaumoku, told a European visitor that the white 
man’s god was the only true god.52 Faced with such beliefs, Kamehameha’s 
religious conservatism became a crucial pillar for the old system of beliefs 
in the final years of his rule.
Ali‘i in regular contact with Europeans stood uneasily between two 
systems of belief. Inconsistencies in the behaviour of many ali‘i inevitably 
occurred. Female ali‘i dined with sailors in 1815 on board a ship anchored 
nearby to the corpse of a female maka‘āinana who had been killed for eating 
kapu food. When sailors traded with Hawaiians, ali‘i used kapu to restrict 
maka‘āinana access to European trade goods and then accumulated large 
quantities for themselves. Such kapu had dubious religious justification 
48  Sahlins (1981), pp. 53–55; and Daws (1986a), pp. 57–58.
49  Galbraith (1985), p. 129.
50  Sahlins (1981), p. 54; and (1985), pp. 85–89.
51  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, p. 195.
52  Corney, cited in Sahlins (1989), p. 415 n. 6.
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and therefore ran counter to the reciprocal basis of the Hawaiian social 
contract between ali‘i and maka‘āinana. Straying from traditional forms of 
kapu threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the whole kapu system.
With the exception of labour demanded for harvesting sandalwood, 
most of the compromising behaviour associated with interaction with 
Europeans remained confined to a few ports. Maka‘āinana secular and 
ritual life continued to revolve around localised agricultural production. 
Kamehameha’s departure from Honolulu in 1810 may have been 
prompted by his desire to avoid the compromises that Honolulu’s role 
as a port imposed upon his ritual efficacy. The Hawai‘i he returned to, 
with its celebration of agricultural fertility, sense of local community 
and belief in supernatural potency was probably still the Hawai‘i of the 
majority in 1819. The willingness of maka‘āinana to break kapu imposed 
on trade with Cook’s vessels shows kapu were contested. The fact that 
these transgressions occurred from the moment of contact, and did not 
develop over a period of time after the arrival of Europeans, suggests that 
such contests were already an ongoing part of Hawaiian society and did 
not arise solely as a result of contact with the opportunities that outsiders 
presented.
The major change to state religion in Kamehameha’s time, as the prospect 
of war faded, was the decline in the worship of Kū. Hawaiian sorcery gods 
rose to prominence to fill the void. While sorcery gods were associated 
with war gods as a milder form of the aggressive, violent aspect of kingship, 
Valerio Valeri proposes that their increasing emphasis undermined royal 
power. Whereas the worship of Kū centred on public ritual closely 
associated with the ruling chief, sorcery ‘tended to “internalise” the 
conceptualisation of social processes and consequently to devalue their 
objectified, ritual expression’.53 Sorcery was, therefore, in keeping with the 
‘incipient individualism’ that Valeri detects as ali‘i began to compete with 
each other in accumulating commercial wealth.
The European influences that found the most enduring place in the 
popular consciousness were the memory of Cook and the ravages of 
introduced diseases. Cook’s visit triggered a genuinely spontaneous 
and widespread celebration among the maka‘āinana in both Maui and 
Hawai‘i in late 1778 and early 1779. A large crowd followed his circuit of 
Hawai‘i, culminating in the massive crowd that greeted him at Kealakekua 
53  Valeri (1982), p. 30.
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Bay. Cook was clearly associated with Lono, the most popular god in 
the family shrines of commoners as well as the focus of the makahiki.54 
While there has been debate on whether Cook was viewed as Lono or 
a dangerous rival chief, there is no doubt that the memory of Cook–Lono 
was incorporated into the Hawaiian world view. Some days after Cook’s 
death, priests of Lono asked when ‘Erono’ would return.55 When European 
contacts were renewed in 1786, the belief in the imminent return of Cook 
as Lono makua remained. Evidence from the 1790s and 1800s shows 
that Cook was incorporated into the Hawaiian pantheon and formally 
worshipped as a royal cult. His worship echoed that given to Lono makua 
during the makahiki.56 The English seaman William Mariner learnt from 
Hawaiians in Tonga during his forced residence there that:
His bones (the greater part of which they still have in their possession!) 
they devoutly hold sacred. They are deposited in a house consecrated to 
a god, and are annually carried in a procession to many other consecrated 
houses, before each of which they are laid on the ground, and the priest 
returns thanks to the gods for having sent so great a man.57
This passage implies that Cook was perceived as an agent of Hawaiian 
gods. All great gods were foreign. European goods may also have been 
rationalised within the existing order as Mariner was also told that gods 
sent Cook ‘to civilise them’.58 Cook–Lono also seems to have been 
perceived as acting like a Hawaiian god. Over a decade after Cook’s 
death, Captain James Colnett found that two recent volcanic eruptions 
in the Kailua area of Hawai‘i Kona and a new illness were attributed to 
divine anger for the death of Cook. The association with volcanism relates 
to Lono’s association with lightning. As fire in the sky, lightning was 
a manifestation of Lono’s association with the family of Pele.59
Colnett’s observations are also interesting for his informants’ association 
of  introduced diseases with the gods. Kamehameha’s consolidation of 
power was aided by natural hazards and introduced disease, which resulted 
in an unplanned demilitarisation of the islands. His attempted invasion 
of Kaua‘i in 1796 was thwarted when much of his fleet was capsized 
between O‘ahu and Kaua‘i. By 1804 Kamehameha was ready to attack 
54  Sahlins (1989), p. 413; and Kahananui (1984), p. 173.
55  King, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:1, pp. 560–61.
56  Sahlins (1989), pp. 377–86, 389.
57  Mariner, in Martin (1981), p. 280.
58  Mariner, in Martin (1981), p. 280.
59  Sahlins (1989), p. 379.
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Kaua‘i again, however, his 7,000-strong force60 never saw action due to 
the ravages caused by the 1804 epidemic. Kamehameha’s reconstituted 
power base after the 1804 epidemic fell well short of its previous level.
The magnitude of the decline of the Hawaiian population in Kamehameha’s 
time can never be accurately known. Samuel Kamakau’s assurance that 
‘Many of the old chiefs were still alive in Liholiho’s day’ is supported 
only by a partial list of surviving members of important lineages. Only 
with Ke‘eaumoku’s offspring are we given any indication of the impact of 
disease. Five of his six children are said to have survived into Liholiho’s 
reign, with only Kuakini falling victim to disease.61 Such evidence can 
hardly be considered sufficient for any generalisation. It contrasts 
dramatically with Hawaiians’ claims to William Ellis in 1823 that their 
population was only one quarter of what it had been 45 years earlier.62
Despite David Malo’s statement that all islands were badly depopulated,63 
the possibility remains that the impact of introduced disease varied 
between localities. Islands playing host to visiting vessels may have suffered 
disproportionately more losses due to disease than their neighbours. 
Given the limited mobility between communities, outside of the ali‘i nui, 
it is possible that ahupua‘a communities away from ports like Honolulu 
may have suffered less than those in closer proximity. Certainly Kamakau 
noted that country districts were still thickly populated with chiefs at the 
arrival of missionaries a few years after Kamehameha’s death.64
Stannard suggests that it was normal for 50 to 90 per cent or more of 
Pacific populations to be struck down by exotic disease in the first few 
generations after European contact. Donald Denoon is more circumspect, 
noting that rates of depopulation varied, and concludes that 50 per 
cent in the first generation after of exposure to exotic disease is a more 
reasonable figure. For both, the key demographic factor was the post-
epidemic recovery rate.65 The level of nutrition, frequency of epidemics, 
fertility rates and the ability to maintain economic and social patterns 
influenced recovery. Stannard emphasises that a side effect of many 
exotic diseases was infertility in women. It seems probable that venereal 
60  Lisiansky (1967), pp. 11, 133.
61  Kamakau (1961), p. 221.
62  Stannard (1989), pp. 53–54.
63  Malo, cited in Stannard (1989), p. 57.
64  Kamakau (1961), p. 236.
65  Denoon (1994), pp. 332–34; and Stannard (1990), pp. 325–50.
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disease, for example, was introduced early and caused infertility, which 
contributed to population decline. Hawaiian histories attribute most of 
the population decline to loss of fertility from sexual diseases acquired 
in liaisons with sailors. They rank infertility ahead of epidemics, wars 
and infanticide as the leading cause of their population’s decline in the 
50 years following Cook’s arrival.66 Stannard notes that, even in the period 
1834–41 when no major epidemics occurred, the median birth rate of 
Hawaiians was only 19.3 per  thousand, compared to a median crude 
death rate of 47.3 per  thousand. Stephen Kunitz is less certain, noting 
that the best evidence is from New Zealand, where a decline in Māori 
fertility from 1769 to the 1850s was followed by an increase in fertility 
from 1850 to 1880, during a time when the overall Māori population 
continued to decline.67
Alfred Crosby also emphasises the significance of factors suppressing 
Pacific Islanders’ ability to recover from epidemics. In addition to infertility, 
he lists a raft of less dramatic, but persistent diseases and infections, like 
tuberculosis, that chipped away at the population by overloading immune 
systems so that they were less able to resist more serious pathogens.68
The details concerning the social impact of exotic diseases remain far from 
resolved. Judd’s observation was not untypical, and many contemporary 
European observers attributed this behaviour to despair. Infertility was 
so widespread by the 1850s that Hawaiians began to wonder if their 
race would become extinct.69 Yet, they continued to resist European 
inroads until the 1893 coup and beyond, just as Māori mounted 
sustained military resistance in the 1840s and 1860s as their population 
also plummeted. There is little evidence of a crisis of confidence, even 
in the immediate aftermath of the most devastating epidemics. At the 
time of the 1804 oku‘u epidemic, for example, agricultural production 
in Hawai‘i increased in some areas in response to Western trade,70 and 
Europeans found the population of the island of Hawai‘i numerous 
and industrious.71 Hawaiians launched themselves into the construction 
of a Western fleet after 1800 and successfully repelled a Russian attempt 
to establish themselves on Kaua‘i in 1816. Religious adherence among 
66  Kahananui (1984), pp. 232–33.
67  Stannard (1990), pp. 331–35; and Kunitz (1994), p. 51.
68  Crosby (1992), p. 193.
69  Daws (1968a), pp. 168–69.
70  Cordy (1972), pp. 408–09; and Kirch (1985), pp. 178, 314.
71  Campbell (1967), p. 87.
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
246
chiefs did slacken in the last decade of Kamehameha’s reign, however, 
and the new political elite overturned the old religious system after his 
death in 1819. Most Hawaiians continued to make offerings to their local 
gods for bountiful harvests on the land they had farmed for generations, 
even after Christianity became the official religion in the 1820s. The real 
disruption to their lifestyle came in the 1840s with the legal change to 
land ownership.72
The colonial experience of epidemics in the Pacific supports the proposition 
that dispossession rather than depopulation was the key disruption to 
indigenous life. Samoans suffered the highest mortality of any community 
in the world during the 1918–19 influenza epidemic – 30 per cent of adult 
males, 22 per cent of adult females and 10 per cent of children. European 
settlement and control of land remained limited, however, and Samoans 
made a quick recovery. Within a decade, the Samoan population’s growth 
rate averaged over 3 per cent. Fijians’ birth rate also increased in the years 
immediately following the measles epidemic that struck their islands in 
1875. This was followed by a 20-year decline that coincided with the 
introduction of a new form of economic production as British authorities 
sought to develop a plantation economy.73
Access to European manufactured goods during Kamehameha’s reign 
provided new possibilities for the formulation of economic power. 
Hitherto, the Hawaiian political economy had focused on the control and 
allocation of land and the distribution of its largely perishable production. 
Both processes were used to secure and maintain followers. In terms of 
traditional formulations of power, European goods had two possible 
uses. As exotic, locally unavailable items, they might serve as prestige 
possessions. Some had potentially more functional uses. In particular, 
European firepower might enhance military capabilities, especially 
if accompanied by tactical reform, and iron tools held the promise of 
improvements in farming and indigenous manufacturing.
The ali‘i seemed more determined to accumulate large stores of European 
goods than to encourage their use among their subjects, moving early to 
shut maka‘āinana out of the trade in European goods through regulatory 
kapu and the appropriation of any items that found their way into the 
hands of their lesser subjects. For example, although ali‘i soon satisfied 
72  Daws (1968a), pp. 49–60.
73  Denoon (1994), p. 332.
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their desire for iron tools and moved on to accumulate other items of 
trade, there remained a general shortage of iron tools in the community 
at large into the 19th century.74
European items that did find their way into the wider economy seem to 
have had a limited impact prior to 1819. Crafts involving the working 
of wood were enhanced by the use of metal adzes. By 1809 they had 
almost totally replaced traditional stone adzes.75 Introduced crops and 
livestock did not find favour among Hawaiians and traditional food 
sources continued to dominate the Hawaiian diet. While metal tools may 
have aided the breaking in of raw ground, there was little to be gained 
from their adoption in the Hawaiian agricultural system, dominated as it 
was by the labour-intensive work of mulching and weeding agricultural 
plots.76 The adoption of metal fishhooks and sinkers and European cast 
nets that occurred over the course of the 19th century did little to alter 
fishing techniques or the size of harvests.77
Most items of European trade were used primarily to enhance the status 
of their individual chiefly owners. Whereas traditional status items, such 
as feathered cloaks, acquired their value through their association with 
the mana of their possessor, the value of European goods seems to have 
been more associated with the quantity of the item as an indication of the 
owner’s economic wealth. The sale of feathered cloaks and chiefly headdress 
to European trade may indicate that the flood of introduced goods 
devalued traditional status items, although Jocelyn Linnekin suggests that 
those items sold were usually not associated with important ali‘i.78
To acquire European goods, the ali‘i had to meet the demand of visiting 
vessels. Initially this consisted of agricultural provisions. Later this was 
supplemented by a demand for sandalwood. To accommodate these 
demands, the ali‘i drew upon their traditional right to a proportion of 
their maka‘āinana tenants’ produce and labour. Prior to unification, it 
would appear that the Hawaiian economy was able to meet the demand 
for provisions from visiting vessels without being overextended.79 Ships’ 
complements ranged from five on the Fair American to just over 50 on the 
74  Sahlins (1981), p. 44; Ralston (1984), pp. 25–26.
75  Campbell (1967), p. 143; Malo (1951), p. 52.
76  Cordy (1972), pp. 403–06; Kirch (1984), pp. 189–90.
77  Hommon (1975), p. 116.
78  Linnekin (1988), pp. 275–76.
79  Cordy (1972), pp. 400–03.
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Eleanora.80 Considering that the retinues of individual ali‘i were usually 
much more numerous than this, early European demand may in fact have 
been able to have been met from the agricultural production and free-
ranging herds of pigs of koele lands. After 1800, agricultural production 
seems to have increased to allow the ali‘i greater access to European trade. 
This was particularly true of ahupua‘a around the main ports. Around 
Honolulu, for example, new fields were planted in yams and potatoes, 
and even a limited number of sheep and goats were raised to satisfy the 
European palate.81
The extent to which production was also increased away from the ports is 
uncertain. During the sandalwood period, there is archaeological evidence 
that production may have declined in certain areas such as leeward Kohala 
on Hawai‘i.82 The fact that military garrisons were supplied by inter-
island ship voyages at this time shows that the Hawaiian Kingdom had 
the ability to mobilise resources archipelago-wide. After 1810, demands 
on residents of ahupua‘a away from ports certainly increased as ali‘i sent 
maka‘āinana into the mountains to harvest sandalwood. 
Any loss of maka‘āinana support that ali‘i demands may have caused was 
not compensated for by the formulation of new support bases through the 
distribution of European goods. The kingdom’s healthy currency reserves 
and the stores of material possessions did not translate into domestic 
political influence. Currency was useful in dealings with European 
visitors and for paying European officials in the kingdom’s government 
but, elsewhere, the agriculture-based economy predominated. Most of the 
king’s local officials were paid from a proportion of their administrative 
area’s production through which the king’s subjects acknowledged 
the monarchy’s spiritual and secular protection. Presumably the royal 
army was also supported by agricultural tribute. There are certainly no 
indications that they were paid in currency or goods, as the kingdom’s 
European officials were. Overall, the newly unified Hawaiian Kingdom 
still exhibited more continuity with past practices than Western-influenced 
innovation.
80  Vancouver (1801), bk 3, p. 227.
81  Cordy (1972), pp. 402, 407, 411–12; and Kamakau (1961), p. 190.
82  Kirch (1985), pp. 178, 314.
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Conclusion
Timing mattered. The initial formation of the Hawaiian Kingdom was 
affected as much by specific events and individuals as by structural features. 
Archaeologists and anthropologists correctly emphasise economic modes 
of production, coercive capacity and ideological hegemony as the key 
structures of political power in the pre-unification period. By emphasising 
general structures of power over the enactment of power, however, they 
are unable to explain why unification occurred, when and as it did, 
without recourse to European influences. Western influences did alter 
the configuration of the kingdom, but were not necessarily essential 
for its foundation. Marshall Sahlins moves towards combining general 
structures and specific enactments with his structure of the conjuncture, 
but emphasises ideological schemes and neglects coercion in his 
assessment of Hawaiian chiefly power in Kamehameha’s time. Hawaiian 
chiefs were testing and extending the limits of their secular power from 
the 1770s. A number of futures are possible within any combination of 
longer term structural parameters. Would Kamehameha still have become 
the first unifier of the islands if he emulated Kahekili’s less conciliatory 
policies? Would he have been able to seize the islands if Kahekili had 
died five years earlier or five years later? The historiography of Hawai‘i 
in Kamehameha’s time demonstrates the potential of interdisciplinary 
approaches, particularly the value of constructing detailed narratives to 
supplement analysis of underlying environmental features and cultural 
structures, and to test more general theories. 
The experience of Hawaiian society between 1782 and 1812 is an 
example of the exercise of power in a time of transition. The formation 
of a centralised polity that transcends local kin-based loyalties is invariably 
a watershed in social evolution. The potential for unification was in place 
before Western influences became a permanent feature of the political 
landscape. Kamehameha’s administrative reforms after unification 
combined existing Hawaiian practice with European ideas, personnel 
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and technology. The written word and Western vessels facilitated inter-
island communication, while residents such as John Young and Isaac Davis 
proved to be loyal lieutenants when entrusted with senior administrative 
posts and regulation of commercial interactions with visiting trade 
vessels. Kamehameha also drew upon centuries of political practice 
and accumulated knowledge about the construction and maintenance 
of chiefly coalitions and the administration of moku, which lay at the 
heart of power within a decentralised polity. Coercion also played a role. 
Kamehameha forged the Hawaiian Kingdom in battle in the early 1790s. 
His military gains may have been diminished, however, if they had not 
been followed by the astute political compromises that took place in the 
decade following the battle of Nu‘uanu. 
Kamehameha lived in a society that underwent major transformations 
over the previous few hundred years. Spurred on by increasing population 
pressure and status rivalry between ali‘i, the relationship between humans 
and the environment and rulers and subjects had been altered dramatically. 
Cultivation in favoured locations was intensified, while settlement 
expanded into more marginal agricultural zones. Both processes required 
a degree of coordination beyond family and local community organisation. 
In drought-prone leeward areas, the threat of famine exerted a powerful 
influence on communities to concede greater powers to their rulers. 
Hawai‘i traditions record the rising influence of leeward chiefs relative 
to those of older windward communities with larger populations. The 
defining of fixed landholdings, which was inherent in the demarcation of 
ahupua‘a boundaries, created new functions for rulers as administrators, 
and as defenders of frontier boundaries. Even without these pressures, 
competition between chiefs for status provided a powerful incentive for 
waging war. Leaders developed sizeable retinues and used their sacred 
status to further their administrative and military activities. Feeding 
retinues and making offerings to the gods required a share of agricultural 
production beyond subsistence needs.
These factors gave rise to the structures of power that were witnessed 
by Captain James Cook in the 1770s. By 1778, polities encompassed 
many ahupua‘a, and some consisted of a number of islands. The political 
coherence of these polities rested on the diffusion of power. Maka‘āinana 
obedience to the mō‘ī and his ali‘i was based to a large extent on the latter 
group’s sacred status. Produce and labour were given with the expectation 
that the ruler would protect his subjects from external enemies and 
attract divine favour to ensure prosperity within the realm. The existence 
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of secular sanctions for transgressions of chiefly and divine kapu suggests 
that ideology alone did not ensure maka‘āinana obedience. The relative 
coherence of chiefly retinues provided leaders with a coercive advantage 
over the fragmented maka‘āinana communities that made up the 
overwhelming majority of the population. The system also held together 
because chiefly demands did not intrude too deeply into the worlds of 
local maka‘āinana communities.
Mō‘ī lacked the necessary coercive advantage to dominate their vassal ali‘i. 
Most mō‘ī inherited powerful, well-established ali‘i families as vassals from 
their predecessors. The selection of mō‘ī often owed much to concerns 
for the preservation or balancing of existing power blocs within the ali‘i, 
rather than the relative strength of the candidates. Personal power bases 
had to be built up by mō‘ī through time. The support of powerful vassal 
ali‘i remained a necessity for the maintenance of any moku’s coherence. 
Entrenched power, logistical problems and the importance of individual 
prowess in battle for the enhancement of mana all worked against the 
formation of a full-time, centralised army that was drilled to fight in 
unison and loyal to a central ruler.
The two moku that were most associated with attempts at military reform 
in this period included the leeward districts of Maui and Hawai‘i within 
their domains. The dangers of drought may have allowed mō‘ī to justify 
increased chiefly powers in terms of demands made on their subject’s 
labour and on agricultural production to create a more militarily efficient, 
magazine economy. This process may have been behind the relatively 
late and rapid rise of leeward areas to political prominence, detected by 
Patrick Kirch, and the challenge they posed to older, windward centres 
of power. Relations between moku in Kamehameha’s time, however, 
raise doubts about this theory. The centre of power for the Maui line 
was on the windward coast at Wailuku. Hawai‘i’s windward chiefs were 
as aggressive as their leeward counterparts throughout the late 1700s. 
Ecologically based theories of the evolution of Hawaiian power understate 
the importance of individual ability among mō‘ī and specific historical 
configurations. Was Maui the most powerful moku in the 1780s because 
of its ecological base or the tactical ability and aggressiveness of its ruler 
Kahekili, combined with the temporary weakness of their rivals while 
new, young mō‘ī sought to consolidate power?
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Kamehameha’s success in unifying the Hawaiian chain cannot be 
understood merely in terms of these generalised structural characteristics. 
The economic structures described by Kirch, Earle and others were in 
place long before unification. They provided a foundation for unification, 
but do not explain why unification occurred when and as it did. Within 
these sociopolitical and environmental parameters, the decisions and 
actions of leading figures decisively shaped the course of events. Prior to 
becoming mō‘ī of the leeward coast of his home island, Kamehameha was 
a rather impetuous young man who was more of a warrior than a leader. 
He developed into a mō‘ī whose success was based as much on consent as 
coercion. Kamehameha’s rise owed a great deal to the support of the four 
Kona uncles. His respect for this clique, and their continued coherence, 
ensured the security of Kamehameha’s rule against possible threats from 
within the moku. The induction of Ka‘iana into this ruling group in 1789 
and the occasional dissent of Kame‘eiamoku never seriously challenged 
this unity. Shielded behind Hawai‘i’s rugged interior, the moku’s Kona 
heartland prospered in the absence of external intruders or serious natural 
disaster.
Whether through choice or circumstance, the early years of 
Kamehameha’s  rule involved little territorial expansion. Kamehameha’s 
career as mō‘ī can be seen in contrast with that of his main rival, 
Kahekili. While superior to Kamehameha as a tactician, Kahekili’s 
military expansionism and harsh treatment of rivals weakened his moku’s 
coherence. His bloody conquest of O‘ahu ensured a legacy of animosity 
among many of the island’s inhabitants. His expansion on to O‘ahu also 
diverted resources away from east Maui, which was only loosely integrated 
into Kahekili’s moku after over a decade of Hawai‘ian control. Kahekili’s 
extermination rather than integration of much of the O‘ahu ali‘i meant 
his resources were merely stretched, rather than expanded, over a multi-
island polity.
In the wake of Kalanikūpule’s defeat on Maui in 1790, Kahekili and 
Ka‘eokulani of Kaua‘i allied to protect their realms from the rising star 
of Kamehameha. Kamehameha’s naval victory against this coalition in 
1791 put his many rivals into a defensive frame of mind. Kahekili and 
Ka‘eokulani maintained a standing army on Maui for the next few years 
in anticipation of an invasion by Kamehameha. Kamehameha was left 
free to move against his enemies on Hawai‘i. Once Keōua was removed, 
Kamehameha was able to consolidate his hold on Hawai‘i without fear 
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of attack. Meanwhile, the strain of maintaining a coalition formed to 
counter a possible invasion began to tell on the political coherence and 
economic capabilities of Kahekili and Ka‘eokulani’s domains.
The open rupture of this coalition followed soon after Kahekili’s death in 
1794. Kalanikūpule’s victory over Ka‘eokulani at ‘Aiea later that year was 
not enough to salvage the erosion of the Maui line’s power base over the 
preceding three years. During this time, the dynasty’s old heartland of west 
Maui had been presided over by Ka‘eokulani rather than Kalanikūpule, 
and bled dry by unprecedented logistical demands. Kalanikūpule’s victory 
did not even secure all of O‘ahu for him. Ali‘i from Wai‘anae and Waialua 
fought for Ka‘eokulani at ‘Aiea, in a continuation of their districts’ 
traditional resistance to rule from mō‘ī based in the Kona–Ko‘olaupoko 
area. Kaua‘i remained independent and in no mood to ally with the slayer 
of its deceased mō‘ī, Ka‘eokulani. Kalanikūpule’s loss of his European 
arsenal in early January of 1795 was enough to persuade Kamehameha to 
attack. Kalanikūpule was denied the chance to consolidate his position. 
He probably went into battle against Kamehameha at Nu‘uanu with his 
core of support reduced to the chiefly retinues based on O‘ahu’s Kona and 
Ko‘olaupoko districts.
Contemporary military historiography’s emphasis on the importance 
of logistical and organisational factors calls for a re-evaluation of the 
significance of European weaponry and mercenaries in Kamehameha’s 
wars of unification. Cannon may have secured an advantage for 
Kamehameha at sea, which served to protect the heartland of his 
moku and to threaten that of his enemies. Traditional accounts of land 
warfare in this era, however, suggest victories were gained by the steady 
accumulation of advantage over a number of days or weeks. Individual 
battles were significant as part of a wider process. The two most noted 
instances of the use of cannon on land, at ‘Īao and Nu‘uanu, occurred 
only at the end of such processes. Nowhere in the traditions is there any 
clear indication of the widespread or decisive use of firearms. The available 
muskets were generally of poor quality, and an indiscriminate hail of lead 
threatened the individual martial prowess on which so much Hawaiian 
chiefly status rested.
Each passing year after the ending of hostilities in 1796 may have 
enhanced the reputation of firearms. Past myths rather than contemporary 
performance might well have ensured the future of firearms as tools of 
coercion. The prolonged peace from 1796 to 1819 probably had more 
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impact on Hawaiian society than the mounting European presence. 
European influence remained largely confined to a few ports of call and 
trade in European goods was mainly the preserve of ali‘i. The vast majority 
of the population continued to live a traditional, rural life. Traditional 
obligations arising from Kamehameha’s sacred status still formed the basis 
of his dealings with his maka‘āinana subjects. The continued coherence 
of the ruling clique of Kamehameha and the four Kona uncles enabled 
Kamehameha to hold onto his much-expanded realm in the crucial years 
immediately following 1796.
To preserve their coherence, the ruling group agreed to fragment their 
landed power base and create an independent administrative structure 
to counter their own power. As long as they remained coherent, the 
ruling clique could preserve their near monopoly on coercion by keeping 
the islands demobilised. The administrative bureaucracy could detect 
attempts to rearm and retrain well before potential rebels could mount 
an effective challenge. Demobilisation was aided by military losses in the 
Kaua‘i channel disaster of 1796 and the 1804 epidemic on O‘ahu. General 
military training declined with each year of continued peace, as did the 
ability of those outside the ruling clique to mount an effective military 
challenge. Denied access to administrative and coercive power the lesser 
ali‘i increasingly focused their energies on the competitive accumulation 
of European goods. Even in this sphere, the ruling group’s grip on other 
avenues of power allowed them to control and regulate European trade.
Kamehameha’s kingdom is perhaps best described as a centralised 
monarchy  in the form of an oligarchy. Like mō‘ī prior to 1796, 
Kamehameha’s rule rested on the support of a group of powerful ali‘i 
families within his moku. After 1796, however, the ruling clique 
became smaller, and the balance of power within it was reinforced and 
institutionalised by the creation of designated offices and a bureaucracy. 
This, in turn, allowed the demilitarisation of the islands to be preserved, 
with the retention of only a small standing army. The pursuit of power 
remained distant from the day-to-day life of the vast majority of the 
population. Whether or not the embryonic kingdom’s government could 
keep the outside world equally distant remained to be seen.
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Table 1A.1: Military activity by month and locality, 1778–97
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Table 1A.2: Areas Experiencing Hostile Armies, 1778–96
References
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16; and Dibble (1909), p . 44 . It is likely that the siege lasted from January to December 
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(1961), p . 136)) .
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10 . Kahekili conquers o‘ahu (Fornander (1969), pp . 220–27; Kamakau (1961), p . 136, 
‘some say’ Jan . 1783) .
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17 . Kamehameha versus Keōua in Ka‘ū? (Kamakau (1961, pp. 153–54), and Ellis 
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Keōua. In March, Meares (1968, p. 354) noted tensions between Kamehameha and 
a windward chief who was allied to Kahekili. Menzies (1920, p. 10) refers to fighting 
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1790–91 . Certainly when Menzies returned in July (1968, p . 369–72) there was no sign 
of war . Nor did the Felice (Meares (1968), pp . 272–80) detect signs of war on Hawai‘i 
during its reprovisioning between 17 Sep . and 27 oct .) .
18 . Kamehameha conquers Maui and Moloka‘i (Fornander (1969), pp . 235–40; and 
Kamakau (1961), pp . 147–49 . The campaign must have occurred after the seizure 
of the Fair American in March 1790 (Kamakau (1961), p . 145; and Fornander (1969), 
p. 234) as one of its cannon was used at ‘Īao. After ‘Īao, the army remained mobilised 
on Maui and Moloka‘i for some time (Fornander (1969), pp . 238–40)) .
19 . Keōua defeats and kills Keawe in Hilo, and invades Hāmākua and Kohala (Fornander 
(1969), p . 240; and Kamakau (1961), p . 151) .
20 . Kamehameha versus Keōua in Hāmākua (Fornander (1969), pp. 323–24; and Kamakau 
(1961), pp . 151–52) .
21 . Kamehameha renews attack on Keōua (Kamakau (1961), pp. 153–54. Fornander 
(1969, p. 326) writes that Keōua held his ground during the spring and summer).
22 . Ka‘eokulani and Kahekili attack Kamehameha and are defeated in a naval battle off 
Waipi‘o (Fornander (1969, p . 241) states that Ka‘eokulani and Kahekili mobilised and 
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259
APPENDIx 1
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and Kahekili met on Moloka‘i in preparation for an expected attack by Kamehameha . 
He also noted (p . 363) that they had been absent from Kaua‘i and o‘ahu respectively, 
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(1969, p . 214) both agree that Namahana died as a result of the accidental detonation 
of gunpowder stores . This incident and statements in Menzies (1920, p . 85) imply that 
forces were still mobilised on Maui) .
28 . Inamo asserts his autonomy from Ka‘eokulani on Kaua‘i (vancouver (1801), bk 5, 
pp . 125–26 (Feb .–Mar .)) .
29 . Kahekili dies on o‘ahu (Fornander (1969), p . 260) .
30 . Ka‘eokulani versus Kalanikūpule with the latter emerging victorious (Fornander (1969), 
pp . 262–65 . Kamakau (1961, p . 168–69) dates Ka‘eokulani’s landing at Waialua to 
16 Nov ., and his death in the battle of Aiea to 12 Dec .) .
31 . Death of Ka‘eokulani and Inamo sees Kaumuali‘i become mō‘ī of Kaua‘i (Kamakau 
(1961), p . 169) .
32 . Kalanikūpule’s seizure and loss of the Jackal and Prince Lee Boo (Kamakau (1961), 
pp . 170–71 . The ships were seized in late Dec . and recaptured by the surviving crew 
members on 4 Jan .) .
33 . Kamehameha conquers Maui, Moloka‘i, and o‘ahu . Kamehameha was on Maui in 
February . (Fornander (1969), p . 343; and Kamakau (1961), p . 171 . From the narrative 
that follows in Fornander and Kamakau, he seems to have soon moved onto o‘ahu 
for the decisive showdown . Bishop (in Roe (1967), p . 142), claims that Kamehameha 
set out from Hawai‘i in June and landed on O‘ahu in mid-August – but it seems more 
likely that he would have responded more rapidly to Kalanikūpule’s misfortune of 4 Jan. 
Whatever the case, Kamehameha was in control of o‘ahu when Boit (Judd (1974), p . 8) 
arrived there on 16 oct .) .
34 . Kamehameha remains mobilised on O‘ahu until the failed attempt on Kaua‘i in mid-
1796 (Kamakau (1961, p . 173) states that Kamehameha kept his army mobilised on 
O‘ahu until his fleet was built. The invasion fleet was destroyed by a storm in mid-1796. 
When Broughton (1967, pp . 70–71) arrived at o‘ahu on 25 Jul ., the storm incident had 
already occurred) .
35 . Civil war/rebellion on Kaua‘i (Broughton (1967), p . 44 (13 Feb . 1796); and Bishop, in 
Roe (1967), pp . 145–46 . When Broughton returned to Kaua‘i in Jul ., Keawe ruled and 
Kaumuali‘i was his ‘prisoner’ (Broughton (1967), p . 73)) .
36 . Kamehameha crushes revolt of Namakeha on Hawai‘i (Kamakau (1961, pp . 173–74) 
dates Kamehameha’s campaign to Sep .–Nov . Broughton (1967, pp . 69–70) says the 
rebellion was in progress in Jul .; see also Bishop (in Roe (1967), p . 144) . Kamakau 
(1961, p. 174) states that Namakeha was sacrificed in January 1797).
37 . Keawe, the victor of the 1796 rebellion on Kaua‘i, dies of natural causes . Kaumuali‘i 
becomes mō‘ī of Kaua‘i again (Broughton (1967), p. 73; Bishop in Roe (1967), p. 145 
n . 1) .
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Appendix 2: Firearms in Hawai‘i, 
1786–96
Table 2A.1: From ‘Expenditures for the Columbia’s Outfit and Cargo’, 
September 1790
Remarks
John Derby 1 pair of 4 pounders Ships’ armament rather 
than trade items?1 pair of 3 pounders
4 pairs of swivels
one Iron Cabouse
Carting gunns etc
D . Harthorne freight of gunns from Salem
Jos . Callender Senr 135 lb shot at 3d and 
1 cartridge box
Robt . & Joshua Davis 3 doz . handspikes
John Andrews nails In part, for ships’ use?
Elisha Sigourney 71 lb . grape shot
Jos . Coolidge 31 bullet moulds
1 doz . common spikes
Under ‘cargo’ a lot of barr iron In part for ship’s use?
45 quatre cast powder
6 1/2 barrels powder
20 doz . cuttoe knives
Listed under individual crew (1, 8, 4, 4, 3, 4, 5, 3) = 32 
musketts
from ‘government’ 100 musketts
8 blunderbuses
Source: Howay (1941 pp . 443, 463) .
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Table 2A.2: Post-voyage inventory of Cptn Charles Bishop after a voyage 
to the north-west Pacific coast and Hawai‘i, March 1796 (Canton)
Expenditure




79 1/2 dozen knives
b) To purchase 192 leather war dresses 
(NW Pacific Coast?)
10 pounds of powder
4 musketts
8 silver hilt swords
3 tin powder flasks
? cwt muskett ball
c) Provisions (Hawai‘i and NW Pacific Coast?) 24 1/2 bars of iron




6 bars of steel
d) Breakages 2 pistols (burst)
1 muskett damaged
e) Goods disposed off at Falklands and 







European cargo remaining at Canton, 
March 1796




10 cwt 2 .0 lead ball and shot
40 hatchets
9 dozen Japanese powder flasks
Source: Roe (1967, pp . 162–66) .
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Appendix 3: A Note on Sources
There is a wealth of material from which to develop a more comprehensive 
account of the role played by warfare and coercion during the wars of 
unification. The unification of the Hawaiian archipelago is particularly 
well documented because of its relatively late date, the large number of 
European visitors to the chain who left written accounts about the period 
of unification, and the recording of Hawaiian sources in the 19th century. 
Seven groups of sources are available for the study of Hawaiian society up 
until the death of the first king, Kamehameha I, in 1819: the observations 
of European visitors to the islands from 1778 until 1819, missionary 
accounts from 1820 onwards, oral traditions and oral testimony recorded 
by Hawaiian scholars from the 1830s onwards, ethnographic studies by 
Europeans from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 19th-century 
land records, archaeological remains of Hawaiian culture, and modern 
scientific studies of the physical environment. 
The earliest written accounts of Hawaiian society are the journals and logs 
of various members of Captain James Cook’s third voyage of discovery 
into the Pacific.  Cook made three separate visits to the Hawaiian Islands 
between January 1778 and February 1779. As a number of Cook’s officers 
kept journals, it is possible to crosscheck their accounts for inconsistencies.1 
The expedition only spent three and a half months in the island chain, 
mostly on board ship. Only Waimea Bay on Kaua‘i, and Kealakekua Bay 
on Hawai‘i were visited for any length of time, or described in any detail. 
Language difficulties added to the problems of comprehending Hawaiian 
culture. As one of Cook’s officers noted, ‘There is not much dependence 
to be placed upon these Constructions that we put upon Signs and Words 
which we understand but very little of & at best can only give a probable 
Guess at their Meaning’.2 Nevertheless, the writings of Cook, James King 
1  Valeri (1985a), pp. xviii–xxii; and Beaglehole (1967), pp. clxxi ff.
2  Samwell, in Beaglehole (1967), 3:2, p. 1223, cited in Valeri (1985a), p. xix.
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and David Samwell stand out for their sensitivity to Hawaiian ways. 
King was particularly liked by Hawaiians, and was encouraged to remain 
in the archipelago.
From 1786 until the late 1790s, British and American trade vessels 
that were shipping furs from the north-west coast of America to China 
stopped to provision in Hawai‘i. They rarely stopped for more than a few 
days at any location and concerned themselves mainly with matters of 
commerce.3 In the early 1790s, another British naval expedition arrived 
in the Hawaiian Islands. Commanded by George Vancouver, a veteran of 
Cook’s voyages, this expedition visited the chain a number of times from 
1792 until 1794. This coincided with Kamehameha’s wars of unification, 
which took place between 1790 and 1795. Vancouver was also able to 
comment on the long-term changes that had occurred since Cook’s time. 
The expedition spent about four months in total in the archipelago during 
this time spread over a number of visits.4 A number of Europeans began 
to live in the islands in the 1790s, but none left a significant written 
record of their experiences. This is particularly frustrating in the cases of 
John Young and Isaac Davis, both of whom participated in important 
battles of the decade. Young, in particular, became a close adviser and 
friend to Kamehameha I. The Hawai‘i State Archives holds a manuscript 
listed as The Journal of John Young. It consists of only 46 pages of brief 
administrative details concerning the periods 1801–09, 1821 and 1825. 
European visitor reports of conversations with Young make it apparent 
that he was an intelligent and perceptive observer, although at times prone 
to exaggeration.5
The number of European residents steadily increased after Kamehameha 
secured control over most of the chain with his victory at Nu‘uanu in 
1795. A number of them left accounts of Hawaiian society in the early 
19th century. Visits from European trading vessels and naval expeditions 
continued for the remainder of Kamehameha’s reign. The most valuable 
accounts from this period are those of Archibald Campbell, Otto von 
Kotzebue and Louis Freycinet. Campbell was a sailor who spent more 
3  See Judd (1974) and Valeri (1985).
4  Vancouver (1801). Another excellent account of the Hawaiian Islands, contemporary to 
Vancouver’s, is found in Archibald Menzies (1920).
5  Bradley (1942), pp. 33–34 nn. 129–30; Bruce Cartwright, ‘Some Early Foreign Residents of the 
Hawaiian Islands’, 25th Annual Report of the Hawaiian Historical Society for the Year 1916 (Honolulu: 
1917), pp. 57–64; and Maude (1968), pp. 134–77, esp. 139 ff. 
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than a year on O‘ahu in 1809–10. The Russian naval captain Kotzebue 
touched at the islands in 1816–17, while Freycinet’s French expedition 
arrived in Hawai‘i just after the death of Kamehameha I in 1819.6
The death of Kamehameha I was soon followed by the abolition of 
the kapu system around which much Hawaiian religious practice 
was organised. The arrival of Christian missionaries in 1820 served to 
accentuate the process of cultural transformation. The missionaries left 
a number of accounts of their work and of what they had learned about 
Hawaiian society. The most useful are those of Sheldon Dibble, William 
Ellis and James Jarves. While Dibble revealed a strong European bias and 
concentrates on the Christian mission, his accounts do include Hawaiian 
history. He mentions that he received detailed accounts of the Hawaiians’ 
wars but omitted them because he believed that, ‘to burden history with 
a minute account of battles and conquests would be quite unprofitable’. 
Ellis was more open-minded. He arrived in Hawai‘i already fluent in 
Tahitian, and soon learned Hawaiian. He related well to Hawaiians, and 
was able to collect a great deal of ethnographic and linguistic material 
during a two-month tour of Hawai‘i.7
In the 1830s, Dibble implemented a program to collect and record 
Hawaiian lore and traditions. He selected 10 of his best students at the 
mission seminary at Lahainaluna and formed them into a class of inquiry. 
Each student went out with a list of 10 questions drawn up by Dibble and 
recorded all the information they could gather on each subject from the 
oldest and most knowledgeable informants they could find. The 10 then 
met and discussed each student’s findings to reconcile discrepancies and 
correct errors. Finally, the various compositions were edited by Dibble 
and published in 1838 as Moolelo Hawaii (Hawaiian Antiquities). The 
published work contained information on Hawaiian culture as well as 
historical subjects, such as chiefly genealogies and aspects of European 
contact. Christian elements appear, but are easily detectable and largely 
confined to moral criticisms of the old ways rather than alterations 
of them to conform to Christian doctrine.8
6  Campbell (1967), von Kotzebue (1821) and Kelly (1978).
7  Dibble (1909); Ellis (1969); Jarves (1843) and later enlarged edition(1872).
8  See Ben R. Finney et al., ‘Hawaiian Historians and the First Pacific History Seminar’, 
in N.  Gunson (ed.), The Changing Pacific –  Essays in Honor of H.E. Maude (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), pp. 308–16; and Kahananui (1984), which is based on the 1838 version.
TRANSFoRMING HAWAI‘I
266
Perhaps Dibble’s best student was David Malo, whose Moolelo Hawaii 
was completed in 1839 or 1840. Malo was born in North Kona on 
Hawai‘i in 1795. His father had been attached to the court and army 
of Kamehameha I, and Malo was associated with the high chief Kuakini, 
the brother of Kamehameha’s favourite wife, Ka‘ahumanu. Malo also had 
a close relationship with Auwai, a chief who was well versed in Hawaiian 
traditions through his role as Kamehameha’s genealogist and ritual 
expert. Valerio Valeri’s checking of Malo’s original Hawaiian-language 
manuscript suggests that Nathaniel B. Emerson’s English edition distorts 
and misrepresents the text in places, and that his notes are a misleading 
mixture of valuable data and falsehoods.9
Other Hawaiian historians followed Malo. The most important were 
Samuel Kamakau and John Papa I‘ī. Kamakau was born at Mokuleia in 
the Waialua district of O‘ahu in 1815 and entered Lahainaluna in 1833. 
He based his works on tradition gathered from older people, especially 
his grandfather. Although Samuel Kamakau was careful to distinguish 
between the past and his own time, this distinction is blurred in the 
translations of his ethnographic works. His Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii is, 
however, a chronological narrative. Dorothy Barrere has noted a number 
of inaccuracies and distortions in Samuel Kamakau’s works, but most of 
these relate to early ‘myth history’ where he knits biblical references into 
Hawaiian traditions.10
John Papa I‘ī was born in 1800 at Waipi‘o on O‘ahu. He was brought to 
Honolulu when he was 16 and placed under the supervision of his uncle, 
Papa, who was an attendant at the court of Kamehameha. Papa placed 
I‘ī in the household of Liholiho, Kamehameha’s son and successor. In his 
later years, I‘ī was a prominent member of Kamehameha III’s court before 
retiring to ‘Ewa, O‘ahu, to work in a Christian ministry until his death in 
1870. Fragments of History is a collection of his writings for the Hawaiian 
language newspaper Kuokoa between 1866 and 1870. It contains much 
information on life at the courts of Kamehameha and his successors, 
as well as accounts of life in Honolulu in the early 1800s.11
The other significant Hawaiian sources are Kepelino Keauokalahi, 
S.N. Haleole, and Kēlou Kamakau. Kepelino was a descendant of the 
priestly line of Paao on his father’s side. His mother was a daughter 
9  Malo (1951), pp. 1–2.
10  Kamakau (1961). For his more ethnographic work see Ka Po‘e kahiko: The People of Old (1964). 
11 I‘ī (1959), p. vii.
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of Kamehameha I. He was born in Kailua, in the Kona district of Hawai‘i 
around 1830, and began writing in the 1850s. Unlike most Hawaiian 
historians, he did not attend Lahainaluna as his family was Catholic. 
Kepelino’s family heritage gave him access to Hawaiian priestly and chiefly 
traditions and the most valuable aspects of his works record chants and 
details of traditional Hawaiian religion not previously recorded. Haleole 
wrote a series of articles on Hawaiian religion in the years just prior to 
his death in 1866 that are based mainly on information he gathered in 
the 1850s. Translations of these writings were published in a subsequent 
collection of Hawaiian folklore and traditions. Kēlou Kamakau, a lesser 
chief of Kaawaloa, in the Kona district of Hawai‘i, lived near to the 
important temple of Hikiau and his writings reveal a detailed knowledge 
of traditional ritual. He was around 50 years old in 1823.12
Most of these Hawaiian historians were associated with Kamehameha’s 
victorious party. Malo, Kepelino and Kēlou Kamakau came from a core 
area of Kamehameha’s support base, while I‘ī was closely associated with 
the court of the Kamehameha dynasty. They came from the leeward coast 
of Hawai‘i and O‘ahu. For this reason Samuel Kamakau’s Ruling Chiefs 
of Hawaii and volume two of Abraham Fornander’s An Account of the 
Polynesian Race are invaluable for their accounts of the political history 
of each of the main islands in the archipelago. Fornander, a Swede who 
settled in Hawai‘i in 1842, based his writings on information gathered 
by Hawaiians that he sent to different islands, Europeans familiar with 
Hawaiian culture, and the works of previous Hawaiian scholars. His works 
cover mythological, historical and ritual subjects. According to Barrere, 
most of volume two of An Account of the Polynesian Race relies heavily 
on Samuel Kamakau’s writings. Fornander also referred to the work of 
Malo, Kepelino and S.N. Hakuole (possibly Hale‘ole). The information 
was collected over a three-year period and published in three volumes 
from 1876 to 1885. After Fornander’s death, Thomas G. Thrum edited 
another three volumes of the traditions Fornander collected and published 
them between 1916 and 1920 as The Fornander Collection of Hawaiian 
Antiquities and Folklore.13
12  Valeri (1985a), pp. xxvi–xxvii. Kepelino is discussed in Beckwith (1937, p. 4), and in Valeri 
(1985a, p. xxvi). Haleole’s works are recorded in Thrum (1918–20, pp. 56–59). Some of Kēlou 
Kamakau’s writings were published in Thrum, vol. 6 (1919–20), pp. 2–45.
13  Fornander (1969). See Hommon (1975), pp. 10–12; and Valeri (1985a), p. xxvii.
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Hawaiian ethnography continued throughout the late 19th and 
early 20th  centuries. Scholars such as Mary Kawena Pukui, Martha 
W. Beckwith, E.S.C. Handy and Peter Buck (Te Rangi Hiroa) continued 
the work of translating Hawaiian texts. Pukui and Beckwith translated 
the vast collection of Hawaiian language material housed in the Bishop 
Museum. Handy and Pukui devoted much time to the collection of 
information on Hawaiian life in the Ka‘ū district of the Hawai‘i. Buck 
produced a  description of Hawaiian material culture, while Kenneth 
Emory was associated with archaeological surface surveys throughout the 
Hawaiian Islands and Polynesia.14
The proud tradition of mid-19th- and early 20th-century Hawaiian 
scholars has been carried on and developed by the current generation of 
indigenous Hawai‘ian scholars, as outlined in Chapter 1 in the work of the 
late Kanalu G. Terry Young and Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio 
and Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa.15 Kame‘eleihiwa’s colleague and contemporary 
Haunani K. Trask took issue with anthropological and  other outsider 
representations of Hawaiian history in the early 1990s. Subsequently, 
just prior to his death, Young articulated a powerful vision of Hawaiian 
historical methodology.16
Armies are products of their societies. Information on social and 
economic organisation can be gleaned from two 19th-century inquiries 
into landholdings. In 1840 the Hawaiian monarchy replaced the old 
system of landholding with a new system based on European concepts of 
land ownership. To obtain land under the new system, commoners had to 
prove they lived on or cultivated the land in question. The records of this 
system reveal much about social organisation and land use. Later in the 
century, a government survey plotted and named all the basic ahupua‘a 
land units.17
14  Valeri (1985a), p. xxvi; and Hommon (1975), p. 10. For example, see Alexander (1891); Buck 
(1964); Beckwith (1970); E.S.C. Handy & Mary Kawena Pukui, The Polynesian Family System in 
Ka‘u, Hawaii (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1972); Handy & Handy (1972), and Pukui & 
Elbert (1986).
15 Haunani-Kay Trask, ‘Cultures in Collision: Hawai‘i and England, 1778’, Pacific Studies (Laie), 
vol. 7, 1983, 91–117; Haunani-Kay Trask, ‘Natives and Anthropologists: The Colonial Struggle’, 
The Contemporary Pacific, vol. 3 (1), 1991, 159–67.
16  Young (1998); and Kanalu G. Terry Young, ‘Kuleana: Toward a Historiography of Hawaiian 
National Consciousness, 1780–2001’, Hawaiian Journal of Law & Politics, vol. 2, Summer 2006, 1–33.
17  Linnekin (1983), and Kirch & Sahlins (1992).
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Studies of warfare need details of the environment to assess impediments 
to movement and logistics. Archaeological investigations have focused on 
the structures of day-to-day subsistence. Settlement pattern studies have 
been conducted in a wide variety of environments throughout the islands 
and offer valuable contrasts to early European visitors’ focus on Waimea 
and Kealakekua, both populous leeward areas that are not necessarily 
representative of other ecosystems. Since the mid-1970s, archaeology’s 
subsistence-ecology orientation has been enriched through correlation 
with Hawaiian political traditions. Initially Robert Hommon led the way 
but, in recent years, others have followed his lead, most notably Pat Kirch 
in 2010 and 2012.18
The physical environment of Hawai‘i remains essentially the same as it 
was in the 18th century. Human settlement has altered surface features 
such as vegetation patterns, and volcanic activity has changed Hawai‘i, 
in particular, since the 1700s. Volcanic eruptions are datable, and remnants 
of unmodified vegetation allow for the reconstruction of original patterns 
in most localities. Modern scientific methods provide information on 
physical features such as landforms and soil types, rainfall patterns and 
vegetation. This information provides a valuable supplement with which 
to analyse Hawaiian settlement patterns and agricultural activity. A series 
of detailed maps produced by the United States Department of the 
Interior in the 1920s and 1950s are particularly useful as they predate 
the  explosion of urban development since the 1960s that has engulfed 
many important battlefields and settlement sites.19
18  Hommon (1976), and Kirch (1984).
19  Kirch (1985), pp. 22–33; and Sherwin Carlquist, Hawaii: A Natural History (2nd edn) 
(Honolulu: SB Printers, Inc, 1980). See also US Department of the Interior, Geological Survey 
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